Authors
Conor McHugh
University of Southampton
Jonathan Way
University of Southampton
Abstract
What makes the difference between good and bad reasoning? In this paper we defend a novel account of good reasoning—both theoretical and practical—according to which it preserves fittingness or correctness: good reasoning is reasoning which is such as to take you from fitting attitudes to further fitting attitudes, other things equal. This account, we argue, is preferable to two others that feature in the recent literature. The first, which has been made prominent by John Broome, holds that the standards of good reasoning derive from rational requirements. The second holds that these standards derive from reasons. We argue that these accounts face serious difficulties in correctly distinguishing good from bad reasoning, and in explaining what's worthwhile about good reasoning. We then propose our alternative account and argue that it performs better on these counts. In the final section, we develop certain elements of the account in response to some possible objections.
Keywords reasoning  reasons  rationality  normativity
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2016, 2018
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12299
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - Oxford University Press.

View all 54 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
Against the Taking Condition.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331.
Two Arguments for Evidentialism.Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):805-818.
How Reasoning Aims at Truth.David Horst - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):221-241.

View all 30 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Fittingness First.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2016 - Ethics 126 (3):575-606.
What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).
Ethics and Practical Reasoning.Matthew Silverstein - 2017 - Ethics 127 (2):353 - 382.
Broome on Reasoning.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2015 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 34 (2).
Reasoning to Obligation.Barbara Herman - 2006 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):44 – 61.
Truth, Lies, and Good Reasons.Brian Douglas Huss - 2002 - Dissertation, University of Minnesota
Critical Thinking, Reasoning, and Logic.Harun Ur Rashid - 1993 - Dissertation, Wayne State University
Practical Reasoning.Antti Kauppinen - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
Practical Reasoning and the First Person.David Hunter - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (2):677-700.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-02-04

Total views
661 ( #11,907 of 2,507,392 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
27 ( #33,250 of 2,507,392 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes