Philosophical Issues 26 (1):314-331 (2016)

Authors
Conor McHugh
University of Southampton
Jonathan Way
University of Southampton
Abstract
According to Paul Boghossian and others, inference is subject to the taking condition: it necessarily involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion, and drawing the conclusion because of that fact. Boghossian argues that this condition vindicates the idea that inference is an expression of agency, and that it has several other important implications too. However, we argue in this paper that the taking condition should be rejected. The condition gives rise to several serious prima facie problems and the reasons which have been offered in favour of it fail to convince.
Keywords reasoning  inference  taking condition  epistemic agency
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DOI 10.1111/phis.12074
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References found in this work BETA

The Possibility of Altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford Clarendon Press.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
In Praise of Desire.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2013 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.
Inferring by Attaching Force.Ulf Hlobil - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):701-714.
On the Transcendental Freedom of the Intellect.Colin McLear - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7:35-104.
Inferring as a Way of Knowing.Nicholas Koziolek - 2017 - Synthese (Suppl 7):1563-1582.
Reasoning Without Regress.Luis Rosa - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2263-2278.

View all 31 citations / Add more citations

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