There is a prominent line of work in natural language semantics, rooted in the work of Hamblin, in which the meaning of a sentence is not taken to be a single proposition, but rather a set of propositions—a set of alternatives. This allows for a more fine-grained view on meaning, which has led to improved analyses of a wide range of linguistic phenomena. However, this approach also faces a number of problems. We focus here on two of these, in our (...) view the most fundamental ones. The first has to do with how meanings are composed, i.e., with the type-theoretic operations of function application and abstraction; the second has to do with how meanings are compared, i.e., the notion of entailment. Our aim is to reconcile what we take to be the essence of Hamblin’s proposal with the more orthodox type-theoretic framework rooted in the work of Montague in such a way that both the explanatory utility of the former and the solid formal foundations of the latter are preserved. Our proposal builds on insights from recent work on inquisitive semantics, and it also contributes to the further development of this framework by specifying how the inquisitive meaning of a sentence may be built up compositionally. (shrink)

A network of aligned ontologies is a distributed system, whose components are interacting and interoperating, the result of this interaction being, either the extension of local assertions, which are valid within each individual ontology, to global assertions holding between remote ontology syntactic entities through a network path, or to local assertions holding between local entities of an ontology, but induced by remote ontologies, through a cycle in the network. The mechanism for achieving this interaction is the composition of relations. In (...) this perspective, we introduce the notions of local composable relations, which relate ontology entities belonging to the same ontology, remotely induced composable relations, which relate ontology entities belonging to remote ontologies through a path of ontologies and alignments in the network, and network induced local composable relations, which relate ontology entities belonging to the same ontology, but through a path of ontologies and alignments forming a cycle starting and ending at the same ontology, to characterize the logical consequences extracted from a network of aligned ontologies, and we propose a category-based methodology for detecting semantic inconsistencies in networks of aligned ontologies, which is based on contravariant representable functors and on the definition of two composition operators suitable for propagating local knowledge through the network. (shrink)

Political integration has been part of the European project from its very beginnings. As far back as the early seventies there was already concern in Brussels that an ingredient was missing in the political integration process. ‘Output legitimacy’ – the permissive consensus citizens grant to a government that is ‘delivering’, even if they do not participate in setting its goals – could not sustain unification indefinitely. Such a lacking ingredient – or ‘soul’ – has been labelled ‘European identity’ (EI) in (...) an abundant and growing academic literature. According to Aristotle, a ‘city’ (polis) is a community composed of ‘citizens’ (politai). No polis can exist unless the politai form it and sustain it. But what will keep them united? They can be very diverse regarding their language, history, religion or economic activity. In absence of a motivation, diversity of itself will make each member of a community go their own way. What kind of bond is required among very diverse European citizens to keep their political community (the EU) together? In this paper I analyse several responses – culture, deliberation, welfare, power, openness. Then I suggest that elements of those responses could be combined in a single notion. Finally I mention issues regarding EI that require further study. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à reconstituer la thèse de Christian Wolff sur l’évidence (Deutlichkeit) des principes métaphysiques, dans un article de 1729 sur les « Notions directrices et le véritable usage de la première science », qui offre une référence centrale (et méconnue aujourd’hui) aux répondants du concours de 1762-1763, dont Kant. Wolff affirme en effet que la métaphysique est susceptible d’une certitude égale voire supérieure à celle des mathématiques et qu’elle diffuse cette certitude à travers toutes les autres disciplines ; (...) c’est cette thèse forte qu’il s’agira précisément de questionner en 1763. Une lecture plus attentive de l’article de Wolff permet d’en dégager certaines prémisses. La thèse de Wolff sur la certitude mathématique de la métaphysique est fondée sur un renversement de l’ordre de priorité entre métaphysique (ontologie) et mathématiques. Selon Wolff qui, dans son débat avec les mathématiques, s’appuie notamment sur la géométrie euclidienne, ce sont des notions métaphysiques qui fondent la validité des règles mathématiques et logiques. Des notions comme « identité », « chose », « possibilité », etc., possèdent en effet un statut « directeur » ou méthodique, dirigeant l’esprit sur le chemin de la connaissance et, sous une forme systématisée, composent une ontologie moderne et « architectonique ». La restitution de ce cadre permet de mieux voir la continuité méthodologique entre Wolff et Kant. En effet, même si Kant conteste la validité de quelques-uns de ces concepts, les modalités de leur systématisation et l’équation entre science architectonique et ontologie, sa Recherche sur l’évidence des principes s’inscrit à l’intérieur du programme, esquissé par Wolff, de la fondation d’une métaphysique architectonique contenant un tableau de concepts directeurs. De ce point de vue, Kant s’avère plus tributaire de la méthode wolffienne qu’il n’est supposé communément, et leur débat gagne en profondeur. (shrink)

Cet article cherche à reconstituer la thèse de Christian Wolff sur l’évidence (Deutlichkeit) des principes métaphysiques, dans un article de 1729 sur les « Notions directrices et le véritable usage de la première science », qui offre une référence centrale (et méconnue aujourd’hui) aux répondants du concours de 1762-1763, dont Kant. Wolff affirme en effet que la métaphysique est susceptible d’une certitude égale voire supérieure à celle des mathématiques et qu’elle diffuse cette certitude à travers toutes les autres disciplines ; (...) c’est cette thèse forte qu’il s’agira précisément de questionner en 1763. Une lecture plus attentive de l’article de Wolff permet d’en dégager certaines prémisses. La thèse de Wolff sur la certitude mathématique de la métaphysique est fondée sur un renversement de l’ordre de priorité entre métaphysique (ontologie) et mathématiques. Selon Wolff qui, dans son débat avec les mathématiques, s’appuie notamment sur la géométrie euclidienne, ce sont des notions métaphysiques qui fondent la validité des règles mathématiques et logiques. Des notions comme « identité », « chose », « possibilité », etc., possèdent en effet un statut « directeur » ou méthodique, dirigeant l’esprit sur le chemin de la connaissance et, sous une forme systématisée, composent une ontologie moderne et « architectonique ». La restitution de ce cadre permet de mieux voir la continuité méthodologique entre Wolff et Kant. En effet, même si Kant conteste la validité de quelques-uns de ces concepts, les modalités de leur systématisation et l’équation entre science architectonique et ontologie, sa Recherche sur l’évidence des principes s’inscrit à l’intérieur du programme, esquissé par Wolff, de la fondation d’une métaphysique architectonique contenant un tableau de concepts directeurs. De ce point de vue, Kant s’avère plus tributaire de la méthode wolffienne qu’il n’est supposé communément, et leur débat gagne en profondeur. (shrink)

This Element introduces the notion of curatorial composing to account for certain musical practices that emerged from the 1960s as the founding concepts of music as an art - instituted in the modern era - were systematically dismantled. It raises the key question of how musical value and authority might be produced without recourse to an external principle, origin, transcendental framework, or other foundation. It argues that these practices do not dismiss the issue of value or simply relativise it (...) but shift the paradigm to a curatorial concern for composing public encounters and staging events. The Element shows that Lydia Goehr's elaboration of the work-concept provides a framework that was transformed by John Cage in his work from 0'00" (1962) onwards. The Element then introduces Heiner Goebbels' practice and focus on his role as Artistic Director of the Ruhrtriennale (2012-14), which it argues was an extension of his curatorial composing. (shrink)

The paper explores the project of an ambitious modal epistemology that attempts to combine the a priori methods of Chalmers’ 2D semantics with Kripke’s modal metaphysics. I argue that such a project is not viable. The ambitious modal epistemology involves an inconsistent triad composed of (1) Modal Monism, (2) Two-Dimensionalism, and what I call (3) “Metaphysical Kripkeanism”. I present the three theses and show how only two of those can be true at a time. There is a fundamental incompatibility (...) between Chalmers’ Modal Rationalism and Kripke’s modal metaphysics. Specifically, Chalmers’ conceivability entails possibilities that a Kripkean rejects as genuinely metaphysical. However, three positive stances in modal epistemology emerge from the combinations that the triad allows. One of those offers a promising way forward for 2D modal epistemologies. But it comes with a cost, as it requires abandoning modal monism and reshaping the scope of what a priori conceivability can give us access to. (shrink)

Dans la série de principes auxquels un Mémoire pour Gabriel Cramer rédigé par Condillac début 1747 ramène le système monadologique de Leibniz, le principe de l’ingrédience de la matière par les êtres simples ou monades échappe à la critique. Condillac accorde le principe [P1] les monades sont les premiers éléments de la matière. Il rejette seulement les deux principes subalternes [P2] les monades ont un principe interne de tous leurs changements et [P3] chaque état passager d’une monade représente sous un (...) certain point de vue l’univers, qui sous-tendent la notion de perceptions inconscientes. Composée dans la même période, la dissertation anonyme Les Monades est tout entière organisée en vue de la démonstration par Condillac en personne de la vérité de la thèse monadologique il y a des composés, donc il y a des êtres simples et de son corrélat, le principe la matière a pour éléments des êtres simples. Une analyse minutieuse des procédés argumentatifs déployés dans Les Monades permet d’interpréter cette défense de la thèse monadologique comme une remise en cause par Condillac en 1747 de l’hétérogénéité qu’il a maintenue en 1746 dans l’ Essai sur l’origine des connaissances humaines entre l’étendue et les qualités dites secondes. En donnant en son nom propre une preuve (opposée à celle par la raison suffisante dans l’ Ontologia de Wolff) de la vérité de la thèse monadologique, Condillac essaie de fonder une parfaite phénoménalisation de l’étendue. La dissertation Les Monades ne doit pas être vue simplement comme un préliminaire à la critique des systèmes abstraits dans le Traité des systèmes de 1749. La tentative d’une monadologie réformée dans la dissertation de 1747 marque le commencement d’une interrogation sur l’idée d’étendue appelée à se poursuivre dans le Traité des sensations de 1754. (shrink)

Le développement considérable des simulations informatiques dans les sciences contemporaines impose une remise à plat des épistémologies des modèles. Franck Varenne propose de revenir sur les limites des notions de métaphore et d'analogie pour penser les modèles, en particulier quand il s'agit des modèles composés, des pluri-modèles et des modèles de simulation (à objets ou à agents), tels qu'ils se développent depuis une dizaine d'années. Il suggère que le paradigme linguistique, à l'oeuvre aussi bien dans la pensée analytique anglo-saxonne que (...) dans la pensée dialectique et pragmatique continentale, trouve ses limites manifestes devant les nouveaux usages épistémiques de telles simulations. Il propose que l'histoire et la philosophie des sciences contemporaines en prennent désormais toute la mesure. Sa conférence est suivie de la retranscription d'un débat fourni, d'abord oral, puis écrit, tel qu'il s'est prolongé, dans les mois qui ont suivi, avec plusieurs personnalités qui réfléchissent sur les modèles, sur les formalisations et sur la science contemporaine. On y verra quelques objections mais aussi beaucoup de points d'accord. Ce débat est l'occasion pour l'auteur d'expliquer davantage son approche et d'ouvrir encore la réflexion, aussi bien avec les scientifiques, les historiens qu'avec les philosophes. (shrink)

1. L'EXPLICATION PAR LES OBJETSNous ne pouvons penser, ou plus généralement agir, sans nous appuyer sur la considération d'objets, ce terme devant être pris ici dans son acception la plus générale, et désignant aussi bien des objets abstraits par exemple , ou même des objets logiques , que des objets soumis plus ou moins immédiatement à notre expérience sensible . Ce sont eux que vise notre besoin d'explication, et en même temps ce sont eux qu'il utilise, qu'il s'agisse de la (...) connaissance la plus vulgaire ou de la iplus évoluée. Chaque objet comme tel possède une individualité significative constituée par l'union de propriétés caractéristiques et douées d'une certaine permanence, par exemple pour les objets matériels la propriété d'être localisés dans telle partie de l'espace. Distinguer un objet, c'est donc à la fois introduire une certaine discontinuité dans le monde extérieur, et affirmer une certaine continuité dans les limites du découpage ainsi effectué; trouver une explication consiste à opérer de nouvelles différenciations à l'intérieur de ce continu, grâce à des comparaisons entre les objets, à le définir comme composant ou composé d'autres objets. (shrink)

I consider how complex logical operations might self-assemble in a signalling-game context via composition of simpler underlying dispositions. On the one hand, agents may take advantage of pre-evolved dispositions; on the other hand, they may co-evolve dispositions as they simultaneously learn to combine them to display more complex behaviour. In either case, the evolution of complex logical operations can be more efficient than evolving such capacities from scratch. Showing how complex phenomena like these might evolve provides an additional path to (...) the possibility of evolving more or less rich notions of compositionality. This helps provide another facet of the evolutionary story of how sufficiently rich, human-level cognitive or linguistic capacities may arise from simpler precursors. 1Signalling and Self-assembly2Simple Unary Logic Games3Composing Unary Functions for Binary Inputs 3.1Utilizing pre-evolved dispositions3.2Co-evolving logical dispositions3.3Learning appropriate outputs3.4Taking account of the full state-space of unary games3.5Role-free composition4Discussion 4.1Efficacy and efficiency of learning complex dispositions4.2Other binary operations4.3To infinity and beyond5Conclusion. (shrink)

We provide a new interpretation of Zeno’s Paradox of Measure that begins by giving a substantive account, drawn from Aristotle’s text, of the fact that points lack magnitude. The main elements of this account are (1) the Axiom of Archimedes which states that there are no infinitesimal magnitudes, and (2) the principle that all assignments of magnitude, or lack thereof, must be grounded in the magnitude of line segments, the primary objects to which the notion of linear magnitude applies. (...) Armed with this account, we are ineluctably driven to introduce a highly constructive notion of (outer) measure based exclusively on the total magnitude of potentially infinite collections of line segments. The Paradox of Measure then consists in the proof that every finite or potentially infinite collection of points lacks magnitude with respect to this notion of measure. We observe that the Paradox of Measure, thus understood, troubled analysts into the 1880’s, despite their knowledge that the linear continuum is uncountable. The Paradox was ultimately resolved by Borel in his thesis of 1893, as a corollary to his celebrated result that every countable open cover of a closed line segment has a finite sub-cover, a result he later called the “First Fundamental Theorem of Measure Theory.” This achievement of Borel has not been sufficiently appreciated. We conclude with a metamathematical analysis of the resolution of the paradox made possible by recent results in reverse mathematics. (shrink)

Dans leurs textes théologiques trinitaires, Bonaventure et Thomas d’Aquin excluent que Dieu – Père, Fils et Saint-Esprit – soit une totalité, au nom de sa simplicité absolue. Alors que le créé est soit composé de parties, soit la partie d’un tout, l’incréé échappe à cette structure tout / parties. Toutefois Bonaventure et Thomas d’Aquin doivent justifier l’application à Dieu, par Augustin ou le Pseudo-Denys, du vocabulaire de la totalité, dont ils mettent alors à jour un sens transcendant. En vertu de (...) la relation de création, la totalité créée préexiste dans la simplicité de l’incréé, dans une « totalité antérieure aux parties » (Thomas, citant les « Platoniciens », c’est-à-dire Proclus). La totalité ne désigne plus alors ce qui réunit l’intégralité des parties, mais ce qui est à la fois sans parties et non partiel, simple et complet. Au moyen d’un sens privatif du « tout », Bonaventure fait de la notion divine de totalité le symétrique de celle de simplicité absolue. Cette totalité transcendante est alors beaucoup plus qu’un concept, elle exprime une thèse : la plénitude passe par la simplicité radicale. (shrink)

Taiji – sport, meditation, martial art , health preservation, way of enlightenment and philosophy of life – is one the best-known signs for recognizing Chinese Daoism. The following article wishes to explain the influence of classical philosophical Taoism notions such as dao , qi and wuwei and their application on Taiji principles practiced today world wide. Arising from tradition of an early Daoism those notions are the core of its fundamental books and forming material of Daoistic philosophy, which has managed, (...) despite its exposure to great historical changes and religious influences during the thousands of years, to preserve its autonomy owing to the application of those axioms. Regularly practicing Taiji with the aim of mens sana in corpore sano and appreciating the rules of principles dao, qi and wuwei directly result in suppleness, strength and composure of body and spirit and carries us to higher levels of consciousness in which we are able to achieve the unity of physical and mental perfection. In this manner Taiji as ”sport” gains its complete, transcendent dimension. (shrink)

In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn claimed that theory choice is a conversion experience and depends upon the personality or psychology of the individual scientist making the choice. Critics charged Kuhn with an irrational and a relativistic position concerning theory choice, arguing he advocated a subjective instead of an objective approach to how scientists choose one theory over another and thereby undercut epistemic accounts for the generation of scientific knowledge. In response to critics Kuhn insisted that his approach, although (...) subjective, was still rational in that the criteria—composed of epistemic values—determining theory choice operate both objectively and subjectively. Recent work in cognitive neuropsychology, particularly in the dual-process theory of cognition, supports Kuhn’s notion of theory choice. In this paper, I initially discuss Kuhn’s approach to theory choice, along with criticism of it and his response to the criticism, followed by an examination of the dual-process theory of cognition. I then explore the application of dual-process theory to Kuhn’s notion of theory choice, especially in terms of a historical case study from the biomedical sciences. I finally discuss briefly the implications of the dual-process theory for contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

Gegenüber den Ansichten vonCharles Richet , sowie auch die gegensätzliche, die von E.Meyerson , bei Seite lassend, hebt der Verfasser hervor, dass gerade auf dem Gebiete der Biologie vollständig identische Gebilde, Merkmale oder Erscheinungen, so zu sagen mit mathematischer Notwendigkeit, auftreten müssen, falls die Verterbung der Merkmale, die sich auf dem Wege der geschlechtlichen Fortpflanzung abspielt und derMendel-Gesetzen unterworfen ist, auf das Verfahren desNewton'schen Binoms zurückzuführen ist. Die entwickelte Reihe dieses letzteren — in deren Gliedern vertreten — stellt dann ein (...) zusammengesetztes Beispiel einer eigenartigen biologischen Multiplizierung dar, die die Entstehung der natürlichen homogenen Gruppen von sogenannten Binomionen verursacht.Jede einzelne derselben setz sich bekanntlich aus vollständig identischen Individuen zusammen, die in durch die binomische Regel festgesetzten, genau bestimmten Häufigkeiten auftreten und lauter aus dem Verfahren der Multiplizierung der teilnehmenden Elementen in allen gegebenen Gliedern jeder beliebigen Reihe herrühren können.Die eventuelle Entstehung etwaiger kleinsten individuellen Differenzen in auf solche Weise entstandenen vollständig identischen Gebilden ist als Folge der allmählichen Vertiefung unseres Erkenntnissverfahrens, bzw. diagnostischer Analyse zu deuten, in welcher mit immer kleiner und kleiner werdenden — materiellen oder energetischen — Einheiten gearbeitet wird.Zum Schluss, sich auf wenige hauptsächlich beiläufig ausgewählte Beispiele aus den Gebieten der Astronomie, der Chemie, der Embryologie, der Anthropologie, der Soziologie, der Logik und der Philosophie stützend, sucht der Verfasser zu beweisen, dass in der modernen Wissenschaft überhaupt eine allgemeine Tendenz herrscht die Schlüsse auf die Wechselwirkung der Factoren, bzw. auf den Prinzip der Komplexität , als einer grundsetzlichen Eigenschaft jeder wissenschaftlichen Methode, zurückzuführen.While refuting the standpoint taken byCharles Richet and simultaneously setting aside the contrary view ofEmil Meyerson , the author argues that in biology the perfectly identical creatures, features or phenomena must occur, so to say by virtue of mathematical necessity, if the inheritance of features through the course of sexual propagation, governed by the laws ofMendel, is proceeding according to the rules ofNewton's binomial. Then the expanded series of the latter brings us the expression of some sort of biological multiplication, which — in their successive terms — leads to the origin of natural groups of so called binomions , each of which being composed of identical individuals, appearing in the exactly definite frequencies, issuing from the very procedure of multiplication of the factors, partaking in those series in any given term.Again, the possibility of ascertaining the eventual, if any, individualising differencies in the identical so originated beings is explained by the author as being actually due to the gradual deepening of our diagnosing analysis, by the use of which the more and more minute units, material or energetic ones, are introduced.Finally, referring to the few, mostly incidentally chosen, examples taken from astronomy, chemistry, embryology, anthropology, sociology, logic and philosophy, the author calls the attention to the fact that the modern science shows a general tendency towards the foundation of its conclusions on the interaction of factors and on the use of the general “principle of complexity” as an obligatory course of very scientific methodology. (shrink)

La notion de mesure traverse les traités du corpus d'Aristote en connexion des problèmes qui sont d'une importance centrale. Le recueil est composé d'une série d'études de: Tomàs Calvo, R.Loredana Cardullo, Laura Castelli, Lambros Couloubaritsis, Paolo Crivelli, Sylvain Delcomminette, Giovanna R.Giardina, David Lefebvre, Antonio P.Mesquita, Pierre-Marie Morel, Marco Panza, Fernando Rey Puente. -- Provided by publisher.

Philosophy of law is philosophy about law. common critical ontology examines the structure of the world which is hierarchical and is composed of four fundamental levels; the anorganic being, the organic being, the psychical being and the spiritual being, where we meet the personal, objective and the objectified spirit. the new critical ontology is science in the strictest sense of the word and consequently goes out from the total experience. critical legal ontology examines the essence of law and states (...) where the law belongs; in the ideal world or the real world, and states its place in these worlds. it appears that the so far unsolvable fundamental question, i.e., the problems of law and power, and law and revolution are easily and "cum ratione" sufficient to be solved on the basis of this new science. (edited). (shrink)

In General Inquiries on the Analysis of Notions and Truths, Leibniz articulates for the first time his favourite solution to the problem of contingency and displays the main features of his logical calculus. Leibniz composed the work in 1686, the same year in which he began to correspond with Arnauld and wrote the Discourse on Metaphysics. General Inquiries supplements these contemporary entries in Leibniz's philosophical oeuvre and demonstrates the intimate connection that links Leibniz's philosophy with the attempt to create (...) a new kind of logic. This edition presents the text and translation of the General Inquiries along with an introduction and commentary. Given the composite structure of the text, where logic and metaphysics strongly intertwine, Mugnai's introduction falls into two sections, respectively dedicated to logic and metaphysics. The first section ('Logic') begins with a preliminary account of Leibniz's project for a universal characteristic and focuses on the relationships between rational grammar and logic, and discusses the general structure and the main ingredients of Leibniz's logical calculus. The second section ('Metaphysics') is centred on the problem of contingency, which occupied Leibniz until the end of his life. Mugnai provides an account of the problem, and details Leibniz's proposed solution, based on the concept of infinite analysis. (shrink)

L‘article étudie la notion de démocratie chez John Dewey en la mettant en rapport avec les idées radicales de gauche passées et contemporaines . L‘article souligne les points de vue épistémologiques, anthropologiques et politiques communs à ces théories. Le rejet ou la sous-estimation de la démocratie politique ainsi que l‘accent mis sur la vie démocratique dans le but de créer une nouvelle société, complètement différente de toutes celles qui existent, relèvent d‘une importance particulière. L‘article est composé de trois parties. (...) La première explore la perception de la démocratie en tant que phénomène apolitique et synonyme d‘une nouvelle forme d‘existence humaine chez le jeune Marx, puis les regards ultérieurs de Marx et de Lénine sur la démocratie comme « hypocrisie ». La deuxième partie analyse le concept de démocratie selon Dewey en tant que « mode de vie connecté » et attire l‘attention sur quelques analogies significatives, tout comme sur les différences par rapport aux idées du jeune Marx. La troisième considère la perception de la société démocratique comme identique à la société globale dans laquelle la communication entre les hommes n‘est pas limitée par les frontières politiques. Sur cette question, on reconnaît des analogies significatives dans les pensées de Marx, Dewey et quelques penseurs contemporains . En conclusion, la démocratie politique et la société démocratique sont compatibles, mais l‘idée d‘une société apolitique démocratique autre que celle de la société globale est considérée comme irréaliste. (shrink)

It is the aim of my paper to explore the chances of a decidedly historical approach to Eugen Fink's involvement in Edmund Husserl's mature philosophy. This question has been subject to much debate recently; but I think that the recently published early notes of Fink have not been sufficiently evaluated by Husserl scholarship. I embed the investigation of Fink's ideas in the contemporaries reactions to them, and argue that Fink's very specific methodological ideas was already formulated in details before he (...) has composed the Sixth Cartesian Meditation and his other much researched assistant writings. Furthermore, I argue that, although it is not possible to draw a clear dividing line between Husserl's own position and the alleged influences by Fink, it is still possible to delineate a specifically Husserlian understanding of the methodology of phenomenological philosophy, especially in the light of Husserl's discussions of the circularity of phenomenological philosophy, which antedate his encounter with Fink. I think that the approach and results outlined here could serve as the basis of a larger investigation of Fink's involvement in the formation of Husserl's notion of philosophy. (shrink)

This study throws new light on the composition of Boyle's Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Receiv'd Notion of Nature ; it also draws more general conclusions about Boyle's methods as an author and his links with his context. Its basis is a careful study of the extant manuscript drafts for the work, and their relationship with the published editions. Section 2 describes Boyle's characteristic method of composition from the late 1650s onwards, involving the dictation of discrete sections of text (...) to amanuenses; it also assesses the effect this had on the structure and presentation of Boyle's writings. Section 3 considers the published text section by section and indicates which parts were written when; it also surveys unpublished draft material relating to the work. Section 4 places the work in context, considering the intellectual threats that Boyle sought to confront in it, both when he initially composed it in the 1660s and when he rewrote it c. 1680. It thus anchors him more precisely than hitherto in the intellectual debates of his day. (shrink)

From the political point of view, European Union (EU) integration implies some kind of unity in the community constituted by EU citizens. Unity is difficult to attain if the diversity of citizens (and their nations) is to be respected. A thick bond that melts members' diversity into a 'European pot' is therefore out of the question. On the other hand, giving up unity altogether makes political integration impossible. Through a meta-theoretical analysis of normative positions, this paper proposes a composed (...) notion of European identity that links without binding. It contains four facets – cultural, political, social, external – with nuances, expressed in three binaries, that cut across all of them – history-project, ethos-achievement, commonness-uncommonness. I will submit that a workable European identity (and the related concepts of unity, polity and citizenship) can be better conceived as analogical – a mid way between blending unity and irreconcilable diversity. (shrink)

The notion of an agent and the notion of a self are connected, for agency is one role played by the self. Millgram argues for a disunity thesis of agency on the basis of extreme incommensurability across some major life events. We propose a similar negative thesis about the self, that it is composed of relatively independent threads reflecting the different roles and different mind-sets of the person's life. Our understanding of those threads is based on theories (...) of the narrative construction of the self. Our disunity thesis is that there need be no overarching narrative that unifies those narrative threads. To explain how the threads hang together to produce coherent action, we make these positive claims: control normally switches smoothly and unconsciously between threads as circumstances require, within one thread there is likely to be acknowledgment of other threads, some situations require a temporary blending of threads, and some plans and policies reach across different threads and contribute to some coordination among them. Our account of a self provides an account of agency that has merits in comparison to Millgram's. Our narrative approach allows explanations of actions beyond rational deliberation. (shrink)

The notion of fitness is usually equated to reproductive success. However, this actualist approach presents some difficulties, mainly the explanatory circularity problem, which have lead philosophers of biology to offer alternative definitions in which fitness and reproductive success are distinguished. In this paper, we argue that none of these alternatives is satisfactory and, inspired by Mumford and Anjum’s dispositional theory of causation, we offer a definition of fitness as a causal dispositional property. We argue that, under this framework, the (...) distinctiveness that biologists usually attribute to fitness—namely, the fact that fitness is something different from both the physical traits of an organism and the number of offspring it leaves—can be explained, and the main problems associated with the concept of fitness can be solved. Firstly, we introduce Mumford and Anjum's dispositional theory of causation and present our definition of fitness as a causal disposition. We explain in detail each of the elements involved in our definition, namely: the relationship between fitness and the functional dispositions that compose it, the emergent character of fitness, and the context-sensitivity of fitness. Finally, we explain how fitness and realized fitness, as well as expected and realized fitness are distinguished in our approach to fitness as a causal disposition. (shrink)

Wittgenstein composed five original musical fragments during his transitional middle period, in which he employs musical notation as a means by which to convey his philosophical thoughts. This is an overlooked aspect of the importance of aesthetics, and musical thinking in particular, in the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. We explain and evaluate the way the music interlinks with Wittgenstein’s philosophical thoughts. We show the direct relation of these musical examples as precursors to some of Wittgenstein’s most celebrated ideas (the (...) push beyond the inner/outer picture, the problem of rule-following, and aspect perception). We also show how important broad aesthetic notions such as style and composition concerning the very possibility of philosophizing were to Wittgenstein. (shrink)

Cet essai a pour but de montrer comment la notion de plasticité articule la façon dont Husserl engage la problématique de la donation. Pour ce faire, il interprète le passage de la phénoménologie statique à la phénoménologie génétique comme le chemin qui mène de l’analyse du cogito éveillé à celle de son éveil ; il montre par la suite comment cette réorientation méthodologique lie la question de la donation à celle des origines du cogito. Ce texte se compose ainsi (...) de quatre parties, qui traitent respectivement (1) du problème de la donation chez Husserl et Marion ; (2) de la relation entre l’apparaître et l’émergence de la conscience chez Husserl ; (3) du cogito éveillé comme expression d’une méthode statique ; (4) de l’éveil du cogito comme complétant l’explication statique avec les dimensions latérale et verticale de la donation. (shrink)

La notion d’ éducation apparaît si vaste qu’il semble difficile d’en proposer une définition univoque. Elle comprend aussi bien les méthodes pédagogiques proches du dressage mécanique le plus behaviouriste que l’influence inconsciente et vague que les adultes exercent sans le vouloir sur les enfants. Elle renvoie au système institutionnel mais aussi à l’univers familial, voire plus simplement encore à l’influence la plus générale que les êtres humains exercent les uns sur les autres à travers les échanges qu’impose l’existence sociale. (...) Elle désigne techniquement l’action réfléchie et systématique que le monde adulte exerce sur l’enfance tout en renvoyant à celle que des adultes exercent entre eux inconsciemment ou de manière stratégique. Sous couvert de communication, l’éducation rejoint alors la manipulation pure et simple par le biais de modèles comportementaux prescrits plus ou moins subtilement. La présente réflexion a pour but de proposer une définition générale de l’éducation. Il s’agit d’en comprendre l’idée à partir des quatre principaux éléments qui la composent. Parler d’éducation, c’est tout d’abord se situer dans le champ de l’ action et non se contenter d’en rester au niveau de la seule connaissance. C’est ensuite renvoyer à un jeu d’influences essentiellement interhumain ; on usine un objet, on dresse des bêtes, mais on éduque des personnes, grandes ou petites. De plus, cette action suppose, quand bien même on suivrait la nature, qu’on ne se satisfait pas de cette même nature ; l’éducation renvoie à une conception de l’homme comme être de culture. Enfin, toute éducation implique la référence à un choix de valeurs éthiques, humaines ou inhumaines, qui permet d’en justifier l’ orientation axiologique. (shrink)

Can the realization of a written musical piece appear as a sufficient phenomenon to impulse a type of experience that suspends our need to decipher to understand and to separate to recognize? The execution of a score is commonly considered as the sound unfolding of the parts that the signs written on it disposes, however, it is precisely the abundance of what actually happens in the territory in which it is realized what that perspective cancels and may well constitute the (...) qualitative dimension of its occurrence. The present article aims to propose a series of reflections around the operations that assist the conformation of an experience in which the sound plane, delineated by the writing of a score, appears as a phenomenal horizon that makes it possible to problematize the complex notion of duration, treated here under the light of Henri Bergson's thought. From this, to compose appears as a conceptual bet that would allow us to think said action as the singular ordering of a musical experience carried out by each subject in the framework of the realization of a work. (shrink)

The notion of the pastoral is at the heart of C. Theobald’s reflection on Vatican II, a council which has been characterized as a “pastoral council”. For Theobald, the pastoral, in the very act of proclamation, implies that the audience ought to be taken into account. This article attempts to trace this reception-critical concern back to its source using two biographies and the discussion on religious freedom which took place in the Central Preparatory Commission. Before Vatican II even opened, (...) A. Roncalli, Y. Congar, a prominent figure in theological circles, along with a considerable number of bishops, promoted the idea that it is essential to take the intended audience into account as one composes any given (theological) statement ; a requirement that would later become a hallmark of Vatican II. (shrink)

A notion of "good work," derived from William Morris and the Arts and Crafts Movement but also part of a wider tradition in philosophy (associated with pragmatism and Everyday Aesthetics) understanding the global significance of, and opportunities for, aesthetic experience, grounds both art making and appreciation in the organization of labor generally. Only good work, which can be characterized as "authentic" or as unalienated conditions of production and reception, allows the arts to thrive. While Arts and Crafts sometimes promotes (...) a limited aesthetic (both theoretically and stylistically) around handicraft, a good-work aesthetic theory encompasses a broader range of working methods and materials without compromising the core Arts and Crafts "authenticity" principles of control over production and creative autonomy. Moreover, it gives weight to the equally important role of spectators by linking their aesthetic education to good work in their working lives and, in turn, to the success of artworks. The theory delivers insights into the nature of works as collaborative projects and the developmental courses, participatory and esoteric, open to the arts generally; and it is a robust counter to anti-aestheticism and intellectualism in the theory and practice of the arts. William Morris and the artist-craftsmen and -women of the Arts and Crafts Movement have a theory of art and the aesthetic that has an importance beyond their own artistic work and its achievements. Morris delivered lectures on the arts in many British towns and cities in the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s; these were published as Hopes and Fears for Art and later as a volume of his collected works.1 The movement codified and publicized its practices through various societies and organizations like the Arts and Crafts Exhibition Society and Charles Ashbee's Guild and School of Handicraft, each producing its own literature, which ranged from practical handbooks to political exhortations. Later, William Lethaby's lectures, often to organizations that were part of the movement, were published as Form in Civilisation.2 To that extent, then, a Morrisian or Arts and Crafts aesthetic theory has to be constructed from sources that were necessarily rhetorical, as well as being practical and theoretic. Morris and Lethaby were explicitly aiming to influence current artistic practice through their lectures to audiences usually composed of artists, architects, civic leaders, and so on (and this no doubt at least partly accounts for their neglect in philosophical aesthetics). Still, I will argue that this reconstructed theory is sufficiently coherent and sophisticated to be worth investigating for its relevance to contemporary debates in analytic aesthetics, particularly against those arguing for art as a nonaesthetic activity (of which the seminal text remains Arthur Danto's "The Artworld"), and for its arguments for art's connections (as an activity of both making and experiencing artworks) with other life experiences.3 In these respects, then, in the history of aesthetics it is a forerunner of, or at least has intellectual associations with, pragmatist aesthetics (yet it is often unacknowledged within that paradigm, so neither Dewey's Art as Experience nor the more recent pragmatist works by Richard Shusterman cite Morris) and shares ground associated with the Everyday Aesthetics movement.4In arguing for the theoretic and historic significance of a Morrisian aesthetic, I take encouragement and a lead from Paul Guyer's recent acknowledgement of the neglect of Morris in accounts of the history of philosophical aesthetics. Guyer names Morris, along with Schiller, Ruskin, and Dewey, as properly understanding the full significance of the distinctive character of aesthetic experience. As Guyer writes, they understood that aesthetic experience is distinctive in its freedom from our most immediate obsessions with purpose and utility, but that the freedom it thereby allows us is not a freedom for the simple contemplation of beauty with no further concerns or implications, but rather a freedom to develop our imaginative and cognitive capacities, to gain knowledge of ourselves and others, and to imagine new ways of life, a freedom that is valued not simply for its own sake but also because of the benefits the developments of these capacities can bring to the rest of our lives. (shrink)

That consciousness is composed of simple or basic elements that combine to form complex experiences is an idea with a long history. This idea is approached through an examination of our “picture” or conception of consciousness . It is argued that CC commits us to a certain abstract notion of simple experiential events, or simples, and that traditional critiques of simple elements of experience do not threaten simples. To the extent that CC is taken to conform to how (...) consciousness really is, therefore, the concept of simples must be treated in kind. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger devotes extensive discussion to medieval philosophers, particularly to their treatment of Truth and Being. On both these topics, Heidegger accuses them of forgetting the question of Being and of being responsible for subjugating truth to the modern crusade for certainty: ‘truth is denied its own mode of being’ and is subordinated ‘to an intellect that judges correctly’. Though there are some studies that discuss Heidegger’s debt to and criticism of medieval thought, particularly that of Thomas Aquinas, there is (...) no constructive reply to his assertions. As a result, Heidegger’s critique had an unprecedented effect on the credibility of medieval philosophy, whereby great portions of the philosophical community dismiss it altogether as an illegitimate Onto‐Theology. It is the aim of this study to offer a constructive reply that will fundamentally grapple with these allegations. By constructive reply we mean not only a reply that avoids the problems Heidegger raises regarding existence, essence and truth, but more importantly, one that uses Heidegger’s criticism in order to present a more insightful account of these notions. The present study is composed of two parts where the second serves as a sort of addendum. The first part, the core of this study, is an attempt to develop an understanding of the distinction between essence and existence that, on the one hand, accords with Heidegger’s criticism while on the other hand advances our understanding of how we think and understand reality. After presenting Heidegger’s depiction of Aquinas’s distinction between essence and existence (esse) as a real distinction, the study will present several views propounded by scholars of Aquinas regarding the status of this distinction. It will be argued that it is not clear whether the distinction is real, formal or conceptual, and that different types of distinction are applied in different places, particularly in regard to the phantasm that Aquinas considers essential to the human act of thinking. The second part diverges from the first part and focuses on Heidegger’s criticism of Aquinas’s conception of truth as adequation, i.e., what it is that grounds the possibility of truth as adequation. This divergence is necessary in order to present a full metaphysical response to Heidegger’s criticism. Since the aim of the present study is to argue that Aquinas’s philosophical system can contend with Heidegger’s criticism, a partial reply would greatly diminish its effectiveness. (shrink)

This book is a comprehensive development and defense of one of the guiding assumptions of evolutionary psychology: that the human mind is composed of a large number of semi-independent modules. The Architecture of the Mind has three main goals. One is to argue for massive mental modularity. Another is to answer a 'How possibly?' challenge to any such approach. The first part of the book lays out the positive case supporting massive modularity. It also outlines how the thesis should (...) best be developed, and articulates the notion of 'module' that is in question. Then the second part of the book takes up the challenge of explaining how the sorts of flexibility and creativity that are distinctive of the human mind could possibly be grounded in the operations of a massive number of modules.Peter Carruthers's third aim is to show how the various components of the mind are likely to be linked and interact with one another - indeed, this is crucial to demonstrating how the human mind, together with its familiar capacities, can be underpinned by a massively modular set of mechanisms. He outlines and defends the basic framework of a perception / belief / desire / planning / motor-control architecture, as well as detailing the likely components and their modes of connectivity. Many specific claims about the place within this architecture of natural language, of a mind-reading system, and others are explained and motivated. A number of novel proposals are made in the course of these discussions, one of which is that creative human thought depends upon a prior kind of creativity of action.Written with unusual clarity and directness, and surveying an extensive range of research in cognitive science, this book will be essential reading for anyone with an interest in the nature and organization of the mind. (shrink)

Bundle theory takes objects to be bundles of properties. Some bundle theorists take objects to be bundles of instantiated universals, and some take objects to be bundles of tropes. Tropes are instances of properties: some take instantiated universals to be tropes, while others deny the existence of universals and take tropes to be ontologically fundamental. Historically, the bundling relation has been taken to be a primitive relation, not analyzable in terms of or ontologically reducible to some other relation, and has (...) been variously characterized as, e.g., “compresence,” “concurrence,” or “consubstantiation.” Bertrand Russell (1940) defends compresence of universals, and Hector-Neri Castañeda (1974) defends consubstantiation of universals. John Bacon (1995) defends concurrent tropes and Keith Campbell (1990) defends compresent tropes. Jonathan Schaffer (2001) bucks this trend, endorsing compresence understood as co-location in spacetime, but this brings with it undesireable consequences such as the impossibility of distinguishing between objects (such as electrons or other microentities) with the same location. Mereological bundle theory improves upon traditional bundle theory by taking the primitive relation of bundling to be the more familiar relation of fusing or composing, such that objects are fusions of properties or fusions of property instances. Hence, mereological bundle theorists endorse a property mereology: a mereology where properties or property instances can be parts of objects. An advantage of the approach derives from the fact that standard mereologies take composition to be primitive or define it using a different primitive mereological notion (such as primitive parthood). Thus, taking the basic primitive of bundle theory to be composition can reduce the need for.. (shrink)

Deux textes composent cet adieu : l'hommage prononcé par Derrida aux obsèques d'Emmanuel Levinas suivi d'une lecture de Levinas à partir de la notion d'accueil et l'élaboration "subjugante" du concept d'accueil.

Finding the Raga is more than a book that tries to make sense of the raga, of Indian classical music, and of how Indian music challenges Western notions of what music might be. It is a work of self-inquiry, as might be expected from Amit Chaudhuri, a musician who is also a novelist; a novelist who is also a critic and essayist; a trained and recorded performer in the Indian classical vocal tradition who was also, once, a guitarist and songwriter (...) in the American folk music style and is now a composer and recorded performer in experimental music. Each one of these undertakings and selves signifies turns at different points in life, and each turn and change of direction brings a fresh perspective on music, writing, and what it means to take on and do these things. No category-Indian, Western-is a given in this book. Partly a record of one of the most important turns in the author's life, toward North Indian music, and of its long aftermath, Finding the Raga is also part autobiography set in 1970s Bombay, part essay, and part detailed analysis of how we might grasp the conceptual underpinnings as well as the experience of music. It explores the different ways in which music relates to the world-whether it's through representation or evocation, as in Western music, or through the raga being sung at different times of day and in different seasons, as in Indian music-and also tries to understand what the act of listening involves for individuals and cultures. (shrink)

The paper examines the notion, widespread in the contemporary color science, that there are certain hues, specifically focal red, yellow, green and blue, that are unique or privileged in human prelinguistic color perception, all other chromatic hues being perceptually composed of these. I successively consider and reject all motivations that have been provided for this opinion; namely the linguistic, “phenomenological”, and some minor or historical motivations. I conclude that, contrary to the standard opinion, there is no solid reason (...) to claim that the RYGB hues are unique among colors in a sense that would allow for direct neurophysiological explanation. The notion also has no relevance for the construction of perceptual color spaces and is not defensible as an explanatory principle with respect to the existing crosslinguistic patterns of color categorization. (shrink)

The vagueness objection seems to block any moderate answer to the Special Composition Question leaving us with the two extreme alternatives that there either is no composite object or that any set of things compose an object. In this technical paper I introduce the notion of causal objects and a definition of a predicate that permits the set of all parts to be divided into equivalence classes. On this view we can use equivalence classes of parts to define the (...) notion of composite objects why vagueness is blocked. The block works in a hypothetical domain where all parts have a cause so the aim is not to suggest empirically detectable parts and composites, nor to claim any kind of existence of the things being defined, but to present a consistent account of a possible moderate answer to the Special Composition Question that avoids the vagueness objection. The underlying idea is that an object, as such, is not caused whereas its parts are. For example, if we have three caused parts A, B and C constituting the composite D, we have three things that are caused whereas the composite D has no cause over and above the three causes of A, B and C. (shrink)

The idea that there could be spatially extended mereological simples has recently been defended by a number of metaphysicians (Markosian 1998, 2004; Simons 2004; Parsons (2000) also takes the idea seriously). Peter Simons (2004) goes further, arguing not only that spatially extended mereological simples (henceforth just extended simples) are possible, but that it is more plausible that our world is composed of such simples, than that it is composed of either point-sized simples, or of atomless gunk. The difficulty (...) for these views lies in explaining why it is that the various sub-volumes of space occupied by such simples, are not occupied by proper parts of those simples. Intuitively at least, many of us find compelling the idea that spatially extended objects have proper parts at every sub-volume of the region they occupy. It seems that the defender of extended simples must reject a seemingly plausible claim, what Simons calls the geometric correspondence principle (GCP): that any (spatially) extended object has parts that correspond to the parts of the region that it occupies (Simons 2004: 371). We disagree. We think that GCP is a plausible principle. We also think it is plausible that our world is composed of extended simples. We reconcile these two notions by two means. On the one hand we pay closer attention to the physics of our world. On the other hand, we consider what happens when our concept of something—in this case space—contains elements not all of which are realized in anything, but instead key components are realized in different features of the world. (shrink)

Based on the notion of time translation, we develop a formalism to deal with the logic of quantum properties at different times. In our formalism it is possible to enlarge the usual notion of context to include composed properties involving properties at different times. We compare our results with the theory of consistent histories.

Free Public Reason examines the idea of public justification, stressing its importance but also questioning the coherence of the concept itself. Although public justification is employed in the work of theorists such as John Rawls, Jeremy Waldron, Thomas Nagel, and others, it has received little attention on its own as a philosophical concept. In this book Fred D'Agostino shows that the concept is composed of various values, interests, and notions of the good, and that no ranking of these is (...) possible. The notion of public justification itself is thus shown to be contestable. In demonstrating this, D'Agostino undermines many current political theories that rely on this concept. Having broken down the foundations of public justification, D'Agostino then offers an alternative model of how a workable consensus on its meaning might be reached through the interactions of a community of interpreters or delegates at a constitutional convention. (shrink)

Hybrid expressivists claim to solve the Frege-Geach problem by offloading the explanation of the logico-semantic properties of moral sentences onto beliefs that are components of hybrid states they express. We argue that this strategy is undermined by one of hybrid expressivism’s own commitments: that the truth of the belief-component is neither necessary nor sufficient for the truth of the hybrid state it composes. We articulate a new approach. Instead of explaining head-on what it is for, say, a pair of moral (...) sentences to be inconsistent, expressivists should “sidestep” and explain what it is _to think that_ a pair of moral sentences is inconsistent. To think so is to think they cannot both be true – a modal notion. Since expressivists have given accounts of such modals, we illustrate how sentences like ‘“lying is wrong” and “lying is not wrong” are inconsistent’ express sensible – and rationally compelling – states of mind. (shrink)

Métachronologie propose une théorie du temps entièrement nouvelle, temps comportant non pas une, mais deux dimensions. Cette théorie se développe à partir de l'analyse d'un instant, lui-même conçu comme double et non simple : instant composé de deux temps coordonnés, passé et futur, chacun mobilisé par sa manière propre de se temporaliser. Au coeur de l'instant, non son présent mais sa faille, un vide de temps. La métachronologie est la métaphysique de ce temps sans présent, auquel se substitue l'instance d'une (...) collision entre deux temporalités corrélatives. La collision est une notion employée par Vladimir Jankélévitch pour désigner la logique (qu'il nomme "métalogique") d'un renvoi réciproque et infini d'un terme à l'autre d'une alternative. Son modèle en est l'instant de la mort, collision de la pensée avec ce qui l'enlève et qu'elle ne rencontre pas. La métachronologie se donne à poursuivre cette intuition métalogique de Jankélévitch, cela jusqu'en des conséquences surprenantes, en rupture même avec quelques racines de sa propre philosophie du temps. La fidélité à sa pensée supposant qu'on en écoute ce qu'elle porte d'inouï. Tout instant donc serait collisionnel. Au lieu du présent, sa défaillance, sorte de trou où passé et futur s'excluent et pourtant se coordonnent, et se convertissent l'un en l'autre. Aussi cette collision est-elle ici notée "vav", opérateur en hébreu de conjonction de termes et de conversion de temps. Quant à l'écartement d'un même instant en deux temps distincts, il qualifie la quandoquité de cet instant, par analogie avec l'ubiquité d'un événement présent au même instant en deux lieux séparés. Ainsi principe de rupture, de coordination et de conversion, "vav" se dispose pour reformuler le mystère temporel en s'arrêtant à cette seule énigme : une sorte de néant écartant en l'instant même deux temps indissociables et incompatibles. (shrink)

Levinas's notion of il y a (there is) existence is shown to be the organizing principle behind his challenge to Being and Time. The two main aspects of that challenge propose an ontology that is not entirely reduced to being-in-the-world and a correlative account of the self that is not entirely reduced to context. In that way Levinas attempts first to restore unconditional value to the self and then to 'produce' a pluralist social ontology based on the independence of (...) persons. The il y a argument is shown to be composed of two versions, one constitutive and one axiological. It is argued that the constitutive argument fails, but that the axiological one remains pertinent. The latter, moreover, recalls a poetics of the transcendence of the work of literature and uncannily resembles the later Heidegger's own critique of Being and Time. The results contribute to a social ontology that affirms commonality without reducing the singularity of events. Key Words: Blanchot • Heidegger • il y a • Levinas • poetics • self • singularity • social ontology • transcendence. (shrink)

Many people find the notion of blending humans and nonhumans together to create animals whose brains are composed entirely of human brain cells disturbing. I argue that these moral qualms lack adequate justification. I consider a number of reasons for objecting to the creation of such chimeras and argue that none of these reasons withstand scrutiny. I argue that the only plausible objections to these chimeras would require that they possess morally significant properties that would be lacked by (...) similar, non-chimeric animals, but that there is no good reason to think this would be the case. (shrink)

In 2008, renowned Australian composer Peter Sculthorpe remarked that almost everything he has written since the early 1960s has been influenced by Indigenous music “because that was a music … shaped by the landscape over 50,000 years.” 3 His preference for accumulating “an effect of relentless prolongation” through the use of long drones has seen his music fail, until recently, to appeal to an Australian ear attuned to Bach and Mozart. 4 His aim, however, has not been to satisfy the (...) European-trained ear, but to “mirror the Australian outback”; to capture a sense of time and space that many Australians have repeatedly failed to access. 5 Sculthorpe‟s efforts to form connections with the landscape are by no means singular; representations of the bush have dominated the arts from early settlement, albeit in a largely negative fashion. The contradiction between an accepted Australian vision of the landscape as empty, unwelcoming bush or desert, and the social reality of a nation living mainly in coastal communities has not gone unnoticed. 6 Nevertheless, contemplating this “accepted vision” alongside the lukewarm reception of Sculthorpe‟s work gives rise to the following question: what conclusions, if any, may be drawn from insistently negative representations of the landscape? In consideration of this question, I propose an analysis of two texts in which the representations of landscape have been overlooked in favour of feminist or classical readings: Barbara Baynton‟s Bush Studies and Joan Lindsay‟s Picnic at Hanging Rock. If “landscape is personal and tribal history made visible,” what is one to make of Bush Studies? 7 The parallels between Baynton‟s narratives of isolation and her own experiences cannot fully account for her portrayals of the bush as “a lonely, hostile place, antagonistic to its inhabitants,” where time recedes into the vast distances of the plains, and the past and future are uncertain. 8 Baynton‟s settlers, cut adrift from cultural and religious traditions, fail to form communities and conform to the notion that “where si gnificant tradition counts for little, places may be virtually without time,” leading to “no awareness of history.” 9 In short, Baynton‟s settlers are plagued with a sense of timelessness that appears to originate from perception, rather than the environment. (shrink)

Cet article mobilise la notion d’« approche transactionnelle », empruntée à John Dewey et Arthur Bentley, pour nous inviter à concevoir les images circulant sur nos réseaux électroniques au-delà des représentations dont elles sont porteuses à la surface des écrans. Comprendre leur dynamique implique de prendre en compte les multiples couches dont elles se composent, depuis la matérialité des flux électriques, à travers les strates de langages-machine, les protocoles de transfert ou le design des interfaces. L’image que nous identifions (...) et isolons dans ses traits figuraux apparaît comme un leurre cachant les implications multiples des transactions dont elle résulte – et qu’il faut apprendre à repérer pour en déjouer certaines illusions. (shrink)

In this paper we give some formal examples of ideas developed by Penco in two papers on the tension inside Frege's notion of sense (see Penco 2003). The paper attempts to compose the tension between semantic and cognitive aspects of sense, through the idea of sense as proof or procedure – not as an alternative to the idea of sense as truth condition, but as complementary to it (as it happens sometimes in the old tradition of procedural semantics).