Hobbes's relation to the later Aristotelian tradition, in both its scholastic and its humanists variants, has been increasingly explored by scholars. However, on two fundamental points (the naturalness of the city and the use of the matter/form distinction in the political works), there is more to be said in this connection. A close examination of a range of late Renaissance commentaries on Aristotle's Politics shows that they elucidate a picture of pre-civic human nature that had (contrary to Hobbes's (...) implication) much in common with that of Hobbes. Moreover, they deployed the matter-form distinction in their analysis of the city or civitas in ways that are in important respects similar to Hobbes's procedure in De cive and Leviathan . The paper concludes that Hobbes drew on this tradition in multiple ways while at the same time undermining some of its principal conclusions; Hobbes was in no sense an 'Aristotelian' even if his philosophy has substantial debts to Aristotelianism. (shrink)

Forthcoming in the Blackwell Companion to Aristotle, 2008.

There are several innocuous or trivial ways in which to explicate Aristotle’s hylomorphism. For example: objects are characterisable in terms of matter and form; or analysable into matter and form; or understood on the basis of matter and form. Serious problems arise when we seek to specify the sorts of relation holding among the different contributors to the hylomorphic picture. Here are some central general questions: a. What types of relation are most suitable for each n-tuple of (...) contributors? b. What direction and modal profile should each relation have? In addressing such questions we find that the types, directions, or modal character of the relations that we or Aristotle may favour are often in tension with each other, or clearly lead to inconsistencies. The paper focuses on the Modal Question, also known as ‘Ackrill’s problem’: is form essentially or contingently related to matter? I outline a hylomorphic model, what I label the ‘causal-explanatory’ model, and show how it can tackle M. (shrink)

Book synopsis: Aristotle's probing inquiry into some of the fundamental problems of philosophy, The Metaphysics is one of the classical Greek foundation-stones of western thought, translated from the with an introduction by Hugh Lawson-Tancred in Penguin Classics. The Metaphysics presents Aristotle's mature rejection of both the Platonic theory that what we perceive is just a pale reflection of reality and the hard-headed view that all processes are ultimately material. He argued instead that the reality or substance of (...) things lies in their concrete forms, and in so doing he probed some of the deepest questions of philosophy: What is existence? How is change possible? And are there certain things that must exist for anything else to exist at all? The seminal notions discussed in The Metaphysics - of 'substance' and associated concepts of matter and form, essence and accident, potentiality and actuality - have had a profound and enduring influence, and laid the foundations for one of the central branches of Western philosophy. Hugh Lawson-Tancred's lucid translation is accompanied by a stimulating introduction in which he highlights the central themes of one of philosophy's supreme masterpieces. Aristotle (384-22 BC) studied at the Academy of Plato for 20 years and then established his own school and research institute, 'The Lyceum'. His writings, which were of extraordinary range, profoundly affected the whole course of ancient and medieval philosophy and are still eagerly studied and debated by philosophers today. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 39.3 (2001) 437-438 [Access article in PDF] Michael V. Wedin. Aristotle's Theory of Substance: The Categories and Metaphysics Zeta. Oxford Aristotle Studies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii + 482. Cloth, $55.00. Michael Wedin has written the equivalent for Aristotle of what biblical scholars would call a "harmony of the gospels." It is a wonderfully rich and argumentatively dense (...) reconstruction of Aristotle's two most important treatises on substance, the Categories and Metaphysics Zeta, works that many of our most able Aristotle scholars have declared irreconcilable.The first chapter, on "the plan" of the Categories, includes a sensible account of the role in that work of the "onymies," as Wedin calls homonymy, synonymy, and paronymy. The second chapter, which focuses on "nonsubstantial individuals" in the Categories, gives the most philosophically sophisticated reconstruction known to me of how Aristotle might have conceived this white in Socrates to be a nonrecurrent particular. Having myself contributed to the glut of recent scholarship on nonsubstantial individuals in the Categories, I have personal, as well as professional, reasons to praise the rigor and insight of this chapter.In Chapter 3 Wedin tries to pin down the ontological commitment of Aristotle's Categories. Since, if there were no primary substances there would not be anything else, the fundamental ontological commitment of the Categories is a commitment to primary substances. Individual nonsubstances exist just in case there are primary substances in which they inhere. As for species and genera of substances and species and genera of the nonsubstantial individuals that inhere in them, Wedin finds Aristotle curiously indifferent to their existence.Chapter 4, a transitional chapter, takes up a range of possible views on the relation between the Categories and Metaphysics Zeta. Incompatibilism is argued against, yet the arguments for compatibilism in recent commentaries are found to be insufficient. In the next chapter Wedin moves on to his own statement of, and justification for, compatibilism.The key to Wedin's compatibilist interpretation is the distinction he draws between being a substance and being the "substance-of" something. Zeta can then be seen to be supplementing, rather than revising, let alone contradicting, the Categories, if Zeta can be understood to be about the substance-of the primary substances of the Categories (157-8).Aristotle proposes in Z3 three candidates for what the substance of, say, Socrates, is, namely, his matter, his form, and the compound of the two. Aristotle settles on form and discusses form as essence in Z4 and Z5, which discussion Wedin takes up in his own [End Page 437] Chapter 6. Then in Chapter 7 Wedin takes on the enigmatic claim of Z6, "In the case of things that are primary and spoken of per se, it is clear that the thing and the essence of the thing are the same" (1032a4-6).Wedin makes Chapter 8, which is primarily a treatment of Z10 and Z11, a discussion of Aristotle on "compositional plasticity," that is, on whether, say, the form of human being might be realized in something other than flesh and bones. "[O]ne could grant," Wedin writes, that to be a human being is just to be a member of a determinate biological species and so to have a very specific material nature, and yet insist that the form of such creatures be realizable in quite different sorts of matter. Creatures so constituted would not be human beings but they would be entities with similar functional capacities and states... From the point of view of philosophy of mind, for example, what matters are the psychological capacities, functions, and states characteristic of persons. Just what these are is determined by a form—the form that happens to be realized in human matter. (340-41) In Chapter 9 Wedin turns to Z13, which, as he acknowledges, has often been thought to be the most confounding chapter in Zeta. Wedin draws on Z16 to help resolve the aporia with which Z13 ends (roughly this... (shrink)

Metaphysics Θ treats potentiality (δύναμις) and actuality (ἐνέργεια), and many scholars think that Aristotle broaches these topics once he has answered his main questions in Ζ and Η. In Ζ he asked, what is primary being? After arguing in Ζ.1 that substance (οὐσία) is primary being—a being existentially, logically, and epistemologically prior to quantities and qualities and other categorial beings—he devotes the rest of the book to οὐσία itself, investigating what it is, to decide what entities count as primary substances. (...) I differ from the leading interpretative consensus that ΖΗ adequately answer the questions about primary substance, and contend instead that Metaphysics Θ continues the same investigation as ΖΗ and, using δύναμις and ἐνέργεια as tools, arrives at a striking new conception of hylomorphism, different from that in ΖΗ, which enables Aristotle to defend the substantial primacy of living organisms consisting of matter and form. (shrink)

In the De Generatione et Corruptione II 9, Aristotle aims to achieve the confirmation of his theory of the necessity of the efficient cause. In this chapter he sets out his criticism on the one hand of those who wrongly attributed the efficient cause to other kinds of causality and on the other, of those who ignored the efficient cause. More specifically Aristotle divides all preceding theories which attempted to explain generation and corruption into two groups: i) those which (...) offered an explanation by using the formal cause ii) those which provided an explanation by using the material or the instrumental causes. According to Philopo­nus, when Aristotle reproaches the other philosophers for adducing no proper notion of the efficient cause he alludes to both Anaxagoras and Plato. Regarding Anaxagoras, in our view this cannot be confirmed by internal textual evidence. In terms of Plato, in this chapter we trace an explicit and an implicit criticism of the Platonic Forms as causes. Aris­totle’s implicit criticism is that the Forms are not at all active causes. We can understand better the grounds for this criticism if we also consider his relevant arguments in Book Lambda of his Metaphysics. His explicit criticism, articulated in two arguments, is formulated in GC 335b18–24. We examine the different lines of its interpretation in the second­ary literature, but primarily we focus on Philoponus’ exegesis, which contributes significantly, not only to the clarification of Aristotle’s thinking, but also to the manifestation of the arguments articulated in defence of the Platonic theory of the Forms. In this paper, through the analysis of Philoponus’ exegesis we set out to prove that Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonic causes can be construed from the perspective of either Aristo­telian theory or the Platonic and Neoplatonic influence. Finally, based on Philoponus’ exegesis, we examine Aristotle’s criticism of those who posited matter or instrumental causes as efficient causes. (shrink)

In this work I reconstruct the physical and mental descriptions of perception in Aristotle. I propose to consider the thesis that αἴσθησις is a μεσότης as a description of the physiological aspect of perception, meaning that perceiving is a physical act by which the sensory apparatus homeostatically counterbalances, and thence measures, the incoming affection produced by external perceptible objects. The proposal is based on a revision of the semantics of the word mesotês in Plato, Aristotle and later Greek mathematicians. I (...) show how this interpretation fits the text, and how it solves problems that afflict the rival interpretations. I further develop a ‘non-dephysiologizing’ spiritualist reading of the additional description of perception as reception of forms without the matter. I show that Aristotle uses the expression ‘forms without matter’ to describe actually abstracted items in one’s mind rather than the way in which the form are received. In opposition to forms-in-matter, such items are causally powerless and metaphysically sterile: an F-without-matter somewhat determines the subject it is in without qualifying or identifying it as an F-subject. Thus, we have a second ‘mental’ description of perception. Further parts of the thesis are devoted to settle interpretive questions raised by controversial statements about perception found in De Anima II 5 and III 2, and to discuss the question of how the mental and physiological descriptions of perception Aristotle offers are related. My conclusion is that Aristotle’s views combines a form of quasi-dualist vitalism about powers which is nonetheless compatible with hylomorphism, and a form of epiphenomenalism with regard to perceptual events. (shrink)

The present paper argues that Burnyeat's view is fundamentally correct, but approaches the issues from a somewhat different angle. The claim that forAristotle the form and the matter are non-contingently related is an allusion to Aristotle's difficult doctrine of the unity of substances. The functionalist interpretation underestimates Aristotle's doctrine of the unity of substance. Irwin thinks that Aristotle's view is a version of functionalism but acknowledges that his claims go beyond what is normally associated with functionalism. But (...) Irwin too fails to take sufficient account of his own acknowledgement of the importance of the unity of substance doctrine. The proper appraisal of the functionalist interpretation cannot, therefore, avoid the "abyss" of the Metaphysics. (shrink)

In the first book of Physics, Aristotle is concerned with the question “What is Being?” Ti to on? The determinations of Being are obtained from our experience of things in movement: on kinoumenon. His discussion on Being and One, on matter and form, on subject and privation, etc. does not differ from metaphysics. Contents of the translated chapters: 1. Method, 2-3. Theories of the Presocratic physicists on the principles of nature; the essent exists not as one the way Parmenides and (...) Melissus supposed; the multiplicity of Being, 7. Analysis of becoming: the pair of contraries presupposes something third – a substratum, 9. Not-Being as the condition of becoming: Aristotle’s notion of matter. (shrink)

Devin Henry offers a comprehensive study of Aristotle’s hylomorphic account of substantial generation. In particular, he argues that, in Generation of Animals, Aristotle defends a view that Henry calls “reproductive hylomorphism” : an application of the hylomorphic model of substantial generation to the central case of the generation of animals. In this review, I explain Henry's view and offer some criticisms of his two-stage model of reproductive hylomorphism that distinguishes embryogenesis from morphogenesis.

One of the most fundamental notions in the thought of Aristotle is the distinction between actuality and potentiality, which Aristotle links with the equally fundamental distinction between form and matter respectively. According to Aristotle, form, which brings with it actuality, and matter, which brings with it potentiality, are eternal and as such necessary. Consequently, on Aristotle?s view, neither form nor matter needs an efficient cause for its existence. Later thinkers?both in the Greek Neoplatonic tradition and Arabic falsafa tradition?believed that in (...) fact form and matter, while being eternal, nonetheless did have an efficient cause, namely, God. In order to maintain this belief, however, these later thinkers needed to respond to certain arguments that Aristotle had presented, which identified existing for all time with being necessary, while anything that has an efficient cause is merely possible and so does not exist for all time. After briefly outlining developments in the late Greek-speaking world surrounding this issue concerning God?s causal relation to eternal forms and matter, I shall consider two theories presented in the Arabic-speaking world: first that of Abu Bishr Matta and second that of Avicenna and his criticism of Abu Bishr. What primarily sets Avicenna apart from other thinkers is that he closely links possibility with matter. While this shift might seem small it opens up for Avicenna a whole new array of options that were not available to earlier philosophers. (shrink)

This book examines an important area of Aristotle's philosophy: the generation of substances. While other changes presuppose the existence of a substance (Socrates grows taller), substantial generation results in something genuinely new that did not exist before (Socrates himself). The central argument of this book is that Aristotle defends a 'hylomorphic' model of substantial generation. In its most complete formulation, this model says that substantial generation involves three principles: (1) matter, which is the subject from which the change proceeds; (...) (2) form, which is the end towards which the process advances; and (3) an efficient cause, which directs the process towards that form. By examining the development of this model across Aristotle's works, Devin Henry seeks to deepen our grasp on how the doctrine of hylomorphism - understood as a blueprint for thinking about the world - informs our understanding of the process by which new substances come into being. (shrink)

The paper investigates the distinction between form and matter in Kant’s theoretical philosophy – his adoption of an Aristotelian hylomorphism. This connection to Aristotle is sometimes recognized in Kant scholarship, though most proponents claim that against the backdrop of a structural analogy, Kant and Aristotle also differ in an important respect: according to them, while Aristotle puts forth a hylomorphic conception of being, Kant merely offers a hylomorphic conception of cognition in which sensibility provides the matter and understanding the (...) form. Against this, the paper claims that this “interiorization” of form cannot be squared with Kant’s actual views. Form is not internal for Kant, but neither is it external. Rather, it is “original form”. This interpretation ascribes a “hylomorphism all the way down” to Kant, meaning that the form and the matter of cognition are jointly actualized in virtue of each other. The understanding cannot be understood apart from its part in a hylomorphic unity with sensibility. Therefore, a proper appreciation of this unity enables us to see that it is impossible to distinguish the form that objects have as objects of cognition from the form they have in themselves. (shrink)

Plato had a great deal to say about the nature and function of the soul, much of it inspired by Socrates’ death by hemlock. According to Plato, the body and soul are two separate entities. The soul, Aristotle hypothesized, is a sort of non‐corporeal nervous system that directs sensory perception, movement, and thought, a great blob of form that animates a matter, entirely useless without a vessel to fill. In direct opposition to Plato and Socrates, Aristotle believed the physical and (...) metaphysical comprised an integrated system, and, therefore, the soul could not exist separate from a body. Medieval theologian, and later saint, Thomas Aquinas, really, really tried to tint the stained‐glass windows rose by combining the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophies on the nature of our spiritual guts. Thomas leaned much more heavily on Aristotle than he did on Plato when formulating his own theory of post‐demise, body–soul logistics. (shrink)

The present study aims at giving factual support to the thesis that the Parmenides is serious in intention, rigorous in logical demonstration, and stylistically meticulous in its original composition. While this consideration may be tedious, still it is useful. Against a past history which has claimed to find the tone hilarious, the logic fallacious, the work inauthentic, the text in need of bracketing by divination, the whole incoherent— against these eccentricities a certain firm sobriety seems called for. I hope that (...) my conclusions find support and persist through fluctuations of philosophic and philological styles.The main difficulty with my thesis is that the text as we now have it (in Burnet's and Dies' editions) shows exceptions to every rule that might apply to style and even to logical structure. Thus it is almost but not quite uniformly true that each theorem opens with a theorem statement; that each is marked by a "questioning" response; that each deduction is valid when formalized in propositional calculus; and so on. Are the exceptions the result of careless composition; are they deliberate warnings not to take the proofs too seriously; or are they the result of errors in transmission? One way to test this is to reconstruct early versions of the text: if these show more logical rigor than the later versions the notion of a wholly valid original is supported; if they do not, the result may point toward the need for a less serious interpretation. A second thing to look for is the possibility that, here and there, parts of a coherent original text are uniquely conserved in sources other than the principal mss, B,T, and W. This assumes, of course, that the "original" text in question is the one with the best logical form, and that assumption seems justified. As a matter of fact, later copyings almost universally show deterioration, not improvement in style and logic.My textual findings are more compatible with some lines of interpretation than with others. Thus I offer some reasons for not accepting treatments of the work as a joke, mystical revelation, or abrupt metaphysical revision. The structure of the dialogue is best explained, I think, by reading it as an indirect proof that some non-Platonic interpretations of the theory of forms are unsatisfactory. In particular, these are the Megarian version (represented in the first part of the dialogue by Zeno, in the second by the First Hypothesis), and the Anaxagorean version put forward by Eudoxus (represented in the first part by Cephalus and his friends from Clazomenae, in the second by the Second Hypothesis). At the same time, the dialogue shows the need for a philosophic method other than the "hypothetical— deductive" way of dianoia; presumably this other method is the "dialectic" discussed in Republic VII. It also follows that any interpretation of the Phaedo which falls into either the Eudoxian or Megarian difficulties was not— at least at the date of the Parmenides—Plato's intended reading.Findings concerning the relations and reliability of the manuscripts of this dialogue also apply to the texts of the other Platonic dialogues which these mss contain.Further, the Parmenides is such an important work both historically and intrinsically that any insight which textual study can bring to its interpretation is a contribution to Western philosophy. (shrink)

Essays on Aristotle's "hylomorphism" - i.e., his conception of an organism's body as standing to its soul as matter (hulê) to form (morphê). Common readings - that there is only one form per species and that matter is what distinguishes individuals within a species from one another - are rejected in favor of the view that each member of a biological species has its own numerically distinct form. Original grounds are given for Aristotle's conception of soul as (...) "the form and essence" of an organic body: he thinks it needed to account for the distinction between generation and destruction simpliciter and the mere alteration of existing stuff. The compatibility of this with Aristotle's conception of matter as the substratum of coming-to-be and passing-away is defended by appeal to a distinction between functionally defined organic parts (such as eyes) and the elements that constitute them. An original reading of the perceiving part of soul as one with the desiring part is given and asymmetries afforded by Aristotle's teleology explored. "Normative" cases (where formal explanations dominate) are contrasted with "defective" ones (where matter is incompletely "mastered" by form), with special attention to akratic subjects: their desires are not fully mastered by practical reason, which stands in normative cases as form to matter. The role played by Aristotle's conception of soul in his account of rational agency is employed against the dogma that he lacked the allegedly "modern" conception of "self" found in Locke and an original reading of Locke's account of personal identity is developed. (shrink)

In 1951 Lukasiewicz [[sic]] linked Aristotle's Prior Analytics with modern formal logic. This book attempts to analyze Aristotle's syllogistic theory in the light of Lukasiewcz's work and the whole tradition of classic interpretations of Aristotle's logic. The first of the book's five chapters shows that for Aristotle the syllogism is basically a relationship of terms couched in conditional form; a relationship of variables rather than concrete terms; and a relationship that sees S linked with P not (...) by the copula but by less metaphysical expressions. The classical S is P form is not Aristotelian at all but a much later renovation. The second chapter maintains that Aristotle distinguishes "relative necessity" from "absolute necessity." Aristotle himself ignores his own distinction at times and thus creates logical difficulties for himself. The oft-fought sea battle is fought again in this chapter. Chapter three deals with the controversial notions of "perfect" and "imperfect" syllogisms. The author asserts that by "perfect syllogism" Aristotle means self-evident syllogisms that serve as axioms for deducing other proofs. Chapters four and five deal with the figures of the syllogism and the syllogism as a deductive system respectively. Patzig concludes that Aristotle's syllogistic theory is purely formal in its structure and can only be properly understood if it is not tied to a metaphysics and converted into a philosophical logic. He denies that it is a universal logic, but rather sees it as a specialized theory of relations.--J. J. R. (shrink)

Despite an infelicitous tradition downgrading their status, technical artefacts are increasingly acquiring their place in contemporary ontology. However, although most metaphysicians currently allow for an ontological consideration of artefacts, they define the class of artefacts differently and disagree on the essence of artificial objects. In this paper, I present a handful of recent accounts of artefacts, with particular regards to the hylomorphic framework. I make an attempt at reconstructing the debate on the spectrum of artefacts and the ways in which (...) artefacts’ essences are singled out. Moreover, I indicate special cases, such as ready-mades and malfunctioning objects, which seem to constitute a threat for the presented accounts. Thereafter, I propose that Aristotle’s account of artefacts embraces the challenges of the contemporary debate. I also attempt to demonstrate that his theory of artefacts escapes the abovementioned threats. While unfolding Aristotle’s conceptual tools against such threats, I present his account of artefacts as hylomorphic and, hence, essentialist. (shrink)

It is argued that according to Aristotle the universe is a single substance with its own form and matter.

The accuracy of Aristotle’s definition of place is defended in terms of his form-matter theory. This theory is in turn defended against the objectionable notion that it entails matter is ultimately characterless.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:19. HUME AND BARKER ON THE LOGIC OF DESIGN I find myself in complete agreement with what I take to be the main thesis of Stephen Barker's paper. It is certainly a mistake to concentrate our attention on the negative critique which Hume directed at the modes of argument of his rationalist predecessors and contemporaries and directed even more at the mode of certain conviction with which they presented (...) conclusions arrived at by arguments that did not have a logically compelling force. Hume was very much concerned with the problem of just what kind of force an argument that was not logically compelling could have; and he was even more concerned (perhaps) with the problem of how the logical structure of non-compelling argument could best be exhibited so that the logic of the argument would not be confused with its force. He made significant contributions to both of these problems; and I think he knew what he was doing well enough not to deserve the charge of inconsistency which Barker seems inclined to bring against him. There are some questions which he did not address, for the very good reason that they could only arise, or at least they could only be formulated clearly, as a result of the clarification of our ideas and our situation that Hume himself achieved. His distinction between "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact" may be overly simplistic. But in all its simplicity this distinction is powerful enough to enable Hume to deal quite shortly with any claim that it is inconsistent to want to achieve this goal of knowing and saying what is true, just because we have shown that we have no logical guarantee that we shall achieve it. Christian orthodoxy has always maintained that we are all of us equally "sinners"; but no orthodox Christian moralist has ever maintained the Stoic paradox that all sins are equal. It is precisely because we know that we cannot achieve Stoic wisdom that we cannot possibly be tempted to 20. accept that paradox. Hume's achievement was to show that (in spite of the serpent's false promise) our situation with respect to knowledge has always been just as parlous as our situation with respect to action. But even in these unhappy circumstances it is not inconsistent to strive for whatever measure of truth we can achieve; and to strive at the same time for absolute logical clarity about the limits of our insight and about the comparative merits of all proposed approaches to the goal. But I must not devote my time to an issue that Barker wisely asks us to keep an open mind about. I want to discuss the form and substance of the arguments with which Barker supports the thesis that I do agree with, rather than take up an aside of his that I happen not to agree with. So then, first, let us consider the fault that he finds in the "fifth way" of Thomas. He says that it "begs the question". It "obscures the nexus of controversy" because the first premiss of the syllogism makes a crucial assumption that needs to be proved. Now I deny that the "fifth way" obscures the nexus of controversy in that way. Thomas (and all of his competent hearers) knew perfectly well that his first premiss had not been universally accepted. He was stating the view of Aristotle about the generally purposive character of nature, and he knew that it had been doubted. But he did not think that a rational believer could hesitate about the choice between Aristotle's position and that of the atheist defenders of chance. Anyone who did hesitate was a fool, and arguments could not touch him. That some men were fools, and could "say in their heart, 'There is no God'", was part of the "problem of evil" which we must consign trustfully to the inscrutable wisdom of God (save in so far as Scripture reveals to us the origin of and reason for our fallen condition). In Hume's world, Aristotle's conception of the orderliness of Nature had been supplanted by Newton's. Newton accepted the atomist view that "natural bodies... (shrink)

During the thirteenth century, Aristotelian hylomorphism became the cornerstone of scholastic natural philosophy. However, this theory was fragmented into a plurality of interpretations and reformulations, sparking a rich philosophical debate. This article focuses on Robert Grosseteste (d. 1253), one of the earliest Latin philosophers to directly engage with Aristotle’s natural philosophy. Specifically, it delves into Grosseteste’s perspective on hylomorphism, emphasizing two controversial doctrines that characterized British scholasticism in the late thirteenth century: universal hylomorphism and formal pluralism. (...) The former claims that all substances, whether bodily or spiritual, are hylomorphic compounds, that is, they are made of matter and form. Formal pluralism, in turn, maintains that hylomorphic substances possess more than one substantial form simultaneously. After a brief introduction, the paper proceeds, first, to examine the type of hylomorphism endorsed by Grosseteste, shedding light on an obscure passage that seems to suggest universal hylomorphism. Second, the examination expands on Grosseteste’s theory of bodily form and emphasizes the apparent contradiction of this theory with universal hylomorphism. The discussion then turns to Grosseteste’s endorsement of formal pluralism and the functionality he envisioned being expressed by the bodily form. Finally, the paper draws conclusions about Grosseteste’s revised hylomorphic account. (shrink)

This book aims to provide an introduction to Aristotle's Politics, highlighting the major themes and arguments offered in the scholar's work. It begins with a discussion on what Aristotle perceives as human good, which he had described as the ethical purpose of political science, and how he views the political community, or the polis, as a community of persons formed with a view to some good purpose and a supreme entity in the sense that it is not just one (...) aspect of city-state society but is the whole of that society. The book also discusses Aristotle's arguments against the abolition of the household for the ruling class and the communism of families and property, which Plato advocates, and highlights certain inconsistencies and vulnerabilities in his arguments supporting natural slavery and on how the husband should rule over his wife and children. The book presents Aristotle's account of the relative merits of six different types of constitution and his views on the best possible constitution that will help in the realization of the polis' true purpose of achieving the good life. It ends with a discussion on Aristotle's view of political science in relation to the protection of particular constitutions against constitutional change and political disorder. (shrink)

Aristotle's notion of matter has been seen either as unintelligible, it being some mysterious potential entity that is nothing in its own right, or as simply the notion of an everyday object. The latter is the common assumption in contemporary approaches to hylomorphism, but as has been pointed out, especially by scholars with a background in ancient philosophy, if we conceive of matter as an object itself we cannot account for the unity of hylomorphic substances. Thus, they assume (...) that a hylomorphic substance is an essential unity and matter not a constituent at all. This solution to the problem of unity, however, brings us back to the mysterious notion of matter. For these reasons, I will revisit Aristotle's conception of matter in this paper. I will argue that an understanding of form as a cause of being requires that matter be an independent constituent of the individual substance. However, I agree that the conception of matter as an individual object with an essence makes it impossible to solve the problem of unity. We therefore need to take seriously Aristotle's assertion that matter is nothing in its own right and not an individual. By denying that matter is an individual, Aristotle does not introduce a mysterious entity, nor does he deny that it can be identified independently of the whole; instead, matter for Aristotle is an irreducible plurality, and this explains why it is not an individual and has no essence. I will conclude with some observations on how this gives rise to two competing versions of hylomorphic constitution. (shrink)

The introduction to this book begins with the claim that it will provide new perspectives on the relationships between form and matter in Aristotle's thought, identifying as a point of departure the "basic level" where they interact, namely, in the coming-to-be of composite material substances, notably living things, and in their stable persistence, both at the level of the individual and of the species. Central to this interaction, it is claimed, is vital heat, the significance of which has not (...) been fully appreciated. Aristotle nowhere offers a systematic theory of vital heat, but the author attempts to recover such a thing from scattered discussions; in so doing, he argues for its unitary explanatory role in relation to all the soul's functions, makes some suggestions concerning its origin in Presocratic thought, and suggests its likely provenance in Aristotle's early theological cosmology. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Knowledge and Analysis The Relation Between Prior and Posterior Analytics Syllogistic Interpretations of Aristotle's Syllogistic Logic Knowledge of Facts Aristotelian Causes Demonstration Principles Definitions and Demonstrations Necessity Science and Dialectic Fallibility Applicability Readings of Aristotle's Theory of Science Epistemological Status of the Analytics Bibliography.

Book synopsis: For the Pre-Socratic philosophers the soul was the source of movement and sensation, while for Plato it was the seat of being, metaphysically distinct from the body that it was forced temporarily to inhabit. Plato's student Aristotle was determined to test the truth of both these beliefs against the emerging sciences of logic and biology. His examination of the huge variety of living organisms - the enormous range of their behaviour, their powers and their perceptual sophistication - convinced (...) him of the inadequacy both of a materialist reduction and of a Platonic sublimation of the soul. In De Anima, he sought to set out his theory of the soul as the ultimate reality of embodied form and produced both a masterpiece of philosophical insight and a psychology of perennially fascinating subtlety. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Buddhist-Christian Studies 22 (2002) 133-135 [Access article in PDF] Response to Harry L. Wells Frances S. Adeney Louisville Presbyterian Theological Seminary Current understandings of how religions may reflect divine truth often use a model developed in England by Alan Race that designates attitudes toward other religions as exclusive, inclusive, or pluralist. John Hick's use of this seemingly simple paradigm, in conversation with scholars in the United States, presupposes the (...) reality of the divine, along with the unknowability of that reality through any human effort or religious tradition. Hick mediates that tension by calling on practitioners of all religions to recognize the relativity of their beliefs and, on that basis, tolerate the religions of others. Both use of and critiques of that model have generated lively discussion among scholars and practitioners of religions.Consider, for example, two possible ways to move beyond this model. The first is theological. Attempts to describe the divine by speaking of transcendence, immanence, or emptiness stretch human ability to conceptualize and communicate. Enlarging the understanding of God from within a tradition itself to a view that understands God's presence to be active in all traditions, moves us beyond the pluralist category. A second way of going beyond the current model does not attempt to elucidate pan-religious conceptions of the divine but strives to analyze particular traditions themselves. The history of particular traditions and their encounters with one another influence the theologies of the religions themselves and shape theories of religious otherness purported by those traditions. Finding a particular historical set of conditions and beliefs conducive to a positive pluralism that maintains the integrity of each tradition without relativizing all positions would move us beyond Hick's current relativizing pluralist position. These two approaches each struggle with a different side of the tension resulting from presuppositions in the theory of religions put forward in the exclusivist, inclusivist, pluralist model. The first grapples with the ontological issues and the second addresses the epistemological issues of that tension.Harry Wells chooses to work with the first—the ontological assumption of divine reality. He outlines a Christian Trinitarian relational view of God that not only encompasses but goes beyond the pluralist category as outlined by John Hick. At the same time, he finds the source for that view in a particular historical tradition of Christianity—the early church fathers. [End Page 133]Wells begins by wondering how he can move beyond Raimon Panikkar's pluralism, which, he claims, already moves beyond Hick's understanding of the pluralist category. Wells then outlines his own pluralist understanding by describing a dynamic and relational understanding of the divine. In so doing, he entertains the notion of knowing something of noumenal reality, no matter how indirectly, through the eyes of a particular tradition. By drawing the circle of divine presence very widely, Wells attempts to express from within the Christian tradition a view of God that allows for a distinctive divine work through other traditions. The practitioner, through experience, encounters a reality that changes perceptions both of the divine and of the religious other.Here Wells moves beyond the necessity of deconstructing all absolute claims to truth by different religions in order to maintain a pluralist position. Rather than relativize all particular religious traditions, as Hick suggests, Wells utilizes a perspectival approach and projects from it a view of the divine that allows for truth in other traditions. In this way he removes the debilitating necessity of embracing agnosticism by all religious traditions and shows, rather, how pluralist claims may be formed from within a single deeply held tradition.This broader understanding of the divine, rooted in early Christian mysticism according to Wells, does not rule out tolerance of other religions but embraces tolerance for reasons of faith, rather than through agnosticism. In effect, Wells argues that a theological orientation growing from an encounter with divine mystery influences the articulation of a specific tradition and its stance toward other religions.While avoiding the dualism inherent in studying religions only phenomenonologically and, at the same time, postulating a noumenal reality, this approach is not without its dangers. One... (shrink)

Some years ago Edward Regis, Jr. pointed to a serious gap in Aristotelian studies: "The centrality of the . . . 'problem of universals' to epistemology and metaphysics is hardly an issue for argument. Questions regarding the metaphysical status of universals and their relation to individuals, the process of 'concept formation,' and the epistemological function of universals in predication are classic ones in philosophy . . . In view of the contemporary interest in these problems as well as the (...) numerous studies of other topics treated of by Aristotle, it is a matter for at least initial surprise that there exists no systematic account of his views on universals." This essay attempts to fill this gap in Aristotelian studies partially. ;Aristotle's view of the universal went through three phases, and the essay attempts to give a systematic account of his early concept of it, as well as briefer accounts of his middle and late views. His early concept may be defined as 'an existent by nature asserted of several existents'. The essay attempts to explain this concept by explicating the two major terms of its definition, 'an existent' and 'is asserted of'. 'An existent' is explained on the basis of his doctrine of the categories and 'is asserted of' on the basis of some fundamentals of his early theory of the simple statement. His middle view of the universal may be defined as 'an existent which by nature belongs to several existents'. According to his late view, however, the universal is a mere potency, no longer an actually existing thing. ;After its account of Aristotle's three views, the essay reconsiders the commonly-held view that he is a moderate realist, arguing that, although moderate realism can be truly ascribed to him, it gives us neither an accurate nor an adequate statement of the nature of his universal. It concludes by briefly tracing the movement of thought on universals in Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Aristotle’s Phantasia in the Rhetoric:Lexis, Appearance, and the Epideictic Function of DiscourseNed O’GormanIntroductionThe well-known opening line of Aristotle's Rhetoric, where he defines rhetoric as a "counterpart" (antistrophos) to dialectic, has spurred many conversations on Aristotelian rhetoric and motivated the widespread interpretation of Aristotle's theory of civic discourse as heavily rationalistic. This study starts from a statement in the Rhetoric less discussed, yet still important, that suggests (...) that a visual aspect inheres in Aristotle's theory of rhetoric. Near the beginning of book 3, which deals with lexis (style, sometimes subsuming delivery1 ), Aristotle conjoins lexis and phantasia with the copula "is" (eimi): "The subject of expression [lexeôs], however, has some small necessary place in all teaching; for to speak in one way rather than another does make some difference in regard to clarity, though not a great difference; but all these things are forms of outward show [phantasia] and intended to affect the audience" (1404a).2 Whereas scholars exploring the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic have compared and contrasted the Rhetoric and the Topics, I explore rhetoric's relationship with phantasia by reading the Rhetoric alongside De Anima. De Anima is Aristotle's seminal account of the senses and their relationship to psychê (often translated "soul"). It addresses topics intimately connected to rhetoric: perception, cognition, deliberation, visualization, imagination, and the image. Phantasia is integral to each of these psychic processes and to Aristotle's understanding of the function of appearance in human experience. Hence, itis a lens suitable for exploring the relationship between Aristotle's conception of civic discourse and his notions of sight and appearances as they relate to perception, interpretation, deliberation, and judgment. I find in Aristotle's phantasia a tie between his art of rhetoric and his psychology and phenomenology (anachronistic though these terms are). Aristotle's psychological works, as Richard McKeon points out, are foundational to Aristotle's philosophy, and thus to his Rhetoric. [End Page 16] "Psychological inquiries occupy an extremely important position in the philosophy of Aristotle, for the conception of the psychê lays the foundation for the continuity of functions in nature" (1947, 142). De Anima, especially, articulates the psychological and phenomenological conceptions often tacitly at work in the Rhetoric.The importance of phantasia for the trajectory of ancient rhetorical and aesthetic theory is seen in the parallels between the visual arts, rhetoric, and poetics in Greek and Roman thought.3 As David Freedberg states (perhaps, slightly overstates), parallels between painting and poetry are "to be found everywhere in classical literature" (1989, 50). With respect to such visual-verbal parallels in Aristotle, D. Thomas Benediktson's reading of Aristotle's psychological, poetic, and rhetorical works concludes that phantasia ties together the visual and the literary. "[Aristotle's passages on phantasia] do help to see why Aristotle took for granted the similarity, almost the identity, of literature and the visual arts. Both types of art are imagistic; they present to the viewer either an image, as in visual art, or as in literature, a set of moving images that the soul then uses as raw data (phantasia) to enable thought to occur" (2000, 170). Phantasia developed a legacy in Hellenistic aesthetics, where it came to designate suprarealism in painting, moving art "beyond imitation" (Fowler 1989, 180–81). In later Greco-Roman works, phantasia was used to designate vivid imagery in written and oral discourse, imagery that could create sights and scenes in the minds of audience members. As Quintilian noted in his discussion of forensic rhetoric, in Latin phantasiai were termed visiones. Here, phantasiabecame a mode of displacing narrative in rhetorical discourse:There are certain experiences which the Greeks call phantasiai, and the Romans visions [visiones], whereby things absent are presented to our imagination with such extreme vividness that they seem actually to be before our very eyes.... From such impressions arises that enargeia which Cicero calls illumination [illustration] and actuality [evidential], which makes us seem not so much to narrate [dicere] as to exhibit [ostendere] the actual scene.(Institutio Oratoria 4.2.29, 32)Quintilian's invocations of phantasia and enargeia can be traced to Aristotle's discussion of rhetorical style in book... (shrink)

Aristotle uses 'body' to describe the matter of animals, the elements and what they compose, as well as magnitudes extended in three-dimensions. These last bodies belong to the category of quantity, alongside surfaces and lines. It is this notion of body that interests Christian Pfeiffer, who presents Aristotle's various discussions of it as one exhaustive theory of body. According to this theory, magnitudes are form-matter composites, where boundaries are forms and extensions are matter. The boundary of a (...) body is its particular shape and its extension is its volume. It follows that Socrates destroys his body and gains another by standing up (since the shape of the sitting and standing bodies, and thus the bodies... (shrink)

This thesis argues that Metaphysics ZH$\Theta$--the crux of Aristotle's metaphysics--are not, as the tradition takes it for granted, a unity which hosts a consistent doctrine of substance; rather they contain two distinct approaches to substance. I call them respectively the formal approach and the synthetical approach. They present two kinds of hylomorphism, with Z17 as a demarcation. ;The formal approach takes form or essence as a separate substance from matter and the composite and demonstrates that form is the (...) primary substance over them. In this approach Aristotle views form or essence to be an essential property of an individual material substance. The locus of this approach is mainly in Z3-16 which host two conflict schemes for avoiding Plato's Third Man Argument. One is in Z7-9 which claims that form as primary should be toionde and not separate, and the other is in the program outlined in Z3 which rejects the notion of the Categories that primary substance is primary subject and proposes that it should be tode ti and separate. Each of these two schemes has internal difficulty. The former's claim that substance is universal is criticised in Z13, and the latter's claim that substance is particular is in conflict with the universality of knowledge. Thus the formal approach is an aporematic investigation into the ontological status of form on the basis of the dichotomy of tode ti-toionde. ;The synthetical approach associates the matter/form relation with the potentiality/actuality relation. Form and matter become relative conceptions, and are not separated from each other in definition. In this approach, Aristotle views form or essence to be the formal cause or the unifying principle which makes the material substance a unity rather than a heap. The locus of this approach is Z17 and H$\Theta$. ;The formal approach leads to the science of being qua being , and the synthetical approach leads to theology . Since two approaches are distinct, Aristotle's two notions of first philosophy cannot be reconciled. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Conflict and Reconciliation in Hegel’s Theory of the TragicJ. G. FinlaysonἊϱης Ἂϱει ξυμβαλεῖ, Δίϰᾳ Διϰα. (Κοεφοϱοι 461)this article has two related aims: to expound and defend Hegel’s theory of the tragic; and to clarify Hegel’s concept of reconciliation. These two aims are related in that a widespread, but misleading, conception of the tragic and a common, but mistaken, understanding of Hegel’s concept of reconciliation can seem to (...) offer mutual support. According to the misleading conception, the tragic consists in the defeat of human lives and projects that arises from irresolvable conflict. Goethe is the most notable exponent of this view. In 1824 Goethe writes that “everything tragic rests on irresolvable opposition. As soon as resolution enters or becomes possible the tragic vanishes.”1 The mistaken understanding of Hegel’s concept of reconciliation is that it consists in a triumphal and wholly affirmative resolution of contradiction through the attainment of harmony. It is easy to see how the two views support one another. For Hegel presents the tragic as a dialectic of conflict and reconciliation in human action, a dialectic in which the moment of reconciliation is ineliminable. So, if one conceives reconciliation as an harmonious resolution of conflict and one also subscribes to Goethe’s view that the tragic rests on irreconcilable opposition, one is not likely to take Hegel’s theory of the tragic very seriously. If, however, we keep in mind what Hegel means by ‘reconciliation, ’ then we can begin both to understand and to defend his theory of the tragic. [End Page 493]1. TRAGEDY AND THE TRAGICLet us begin with a preliminary delineation and defense of the concept of the tragic. Hegel does not have a theory of tragedy, he has a theory of the tragic. A theory of tragedy would be genre-specific, a theory about tragedies, the works of theater and not the pitiable and terrifying events they represent.2 Aristotle’s Poetics is a theory of tragedy. It is a theory about the composition of tragic poems, about their parts and their function. One can call a theory of tragedy loosely an ‘aesthetic’ theory, to the extent that it is a theory of the experience of a work of tragedy, indeed for the ancient Greeks, an experience not just of beholding but of participating in the performance of a tragedy. By contrast, a theory of the tragic is not a theory about tragedies. It is not genre specific, for not only tragedies are tragic. And neither is it an ‘aesthetic’ theory about the experience of a work of tragedy. Rather, it is a theory about what makes a work of theater into a tragedy, about what it is to be a tragedy. True, the essence of tragedy has to do with experience, but it has to do primarily with the experience of the tragic hero, not the experience of the actor or the spectator.Furthermore, whereas a theory of tragedy tells us something about tragedies, a theory of the tragic tells us something about human experience, human actions and the ethical-life of a community in which the actions are played out.3 The tragic arises from the way in which institutions, customs, and practices within which we become what we are, shape our actions on the one hand, and take shape through our actions on the other. Hence the question of the tragic enjoys a certain priority over the question of tragedy. The works of theater we call tragedies exist because of the tragic, not vice versa.There is another reason why we should grant that the question of the tragic as such is interesting and relevant. Tragedy is not a vague term; historically at least the matter of classification has been settled. It is not as if, in significant instances, it is impossible to decide whether a work of ancient drama is or is not a tragedy. Lebeck may argue, rather unconvincingly that the trial scene in the Eumenides is a parody of Athenian litigation; but she does not dispute that it is a tragedy.4 Steiner may claim that “tragedies end badly,” in flagrant disregard of the evidence, (the Eumenides of Aeschylus, and Sophocles’ Philoctetes and Oedipus at... (shrink)

The case for believing that aristotle thought perceptible qualities to be 'secondary' qualities or sense data has no firm grounds. Three types of argument for it are examined and claimed to be mistaken: the argument from the identity of act and object of perception, The argument from the "de anima" definitions, The argument from the formula 'receiving the form without the matter'. It is more likely that aristotle believed thinking to be involved in perception, So that his doubts about faculty (...) psychology are to be taken seriously. (shrink)

William Whewell’s 19th century philosophy of science is sometimes glossed over as a footnote to Kant. There is however a key feature of Whewell’s account worth noting. This is his appeal to Aristotle’s form/matter hylomorphism as a metaphor to explain how mind and world merge in successful scientific inquiry. Whewell’s hylomorphism suggests a middle way between rationalism and empiricism reminiscent of experience pragmatists like Steven Levine’s view that mind and world are entwined in experience. I argue however that (...) Levine does not adequately explain exactly how mind and world entwine. He could nonetheless do so if he appealed to Whewell’s hylomorphic metaphor. We may prefer a reductive metaphysical explanation, but I suggest that pragmatists only have recourse to metaphor in this case. Both reductive and metaphorical explanations can enjoy great explanatory power if they exhibit a suitable measure of what I will call sematic distance. Semantic distance measures how close or how far apart explanandum and explanans are from each other in meaning. Metaphorical explanation - as evident in Whewell’s hylomorphism and as detailed via the notion of semantic distance - presents a valuable new explanatory tool to those who hold that mind and world are entwined sans recourse to metaphysics. (shrink)

This paper investigates Péter Pázmány’s theory of mixtures from his exegesis of Meteorologica IV, in the context of sixteenth-century scholarship on Aristotle’s Meteorologica. It aims to contribute to a discussion of Anneliese Maier’s thesis concerning the incompatibility between hylomorphism and the theory of elements in the Aristotelian tradition. It presents two problems: the placement of Meteorologica IV in the Jesuit cursus on physics and the conceptualization of putrefaction as a type of substantial mutation. Through an analysis of (...) these issues, it shows how sixteenth-century exegesis imposes the hylomorphic thesis onto the subject matter of meteorology and how the hylomorphic theory of substantial change can be adapted in order to accommodate the theory of elements. The case being made is that Meteorologica is a privileged place where hylomorphism and the theory of elements meet and that the late Aristotelian theory of mixtures sought to accommodate both theories of material substance. (shrink)

This inaugural lecture, delivered on 17 November 2021 at the University of Neuchâtel, addresses the question: Are material objects analyzable into more basic constituents and, if so, what are they? It might appear that this question is more appropriately settled by empirical means as utilized in the natural sciences. For example, we learn from physics and chemistry that water is composed of H2O-molecules and that hydrogen and oxygen atoms themselves are composed of smaller parts, such as protons, which are in (...) turn composed of yet smaller parts, such as quarks, and so on. While the question at the center of this lecture might thus appear to fall more appropriately into the empirical domain of natural science, I argue that metaphysics in fact has an important role to play in determining how best to answer the question before us. More concretely, I propose that the Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism, when appropriately interpreted, provides the best metaphysical answer to the question of whether and how material objects are analyzable into more basic constituents. Hylomorphism holds that those entities to which this doctrine applies are, in some sense, compounds of matter (“hylē”) and form (“morphē” or “eidos”). Thus, the title of this lecture, “Form, Matter, Substance”, refers to the claim that lies at the center of the doctrine of hylomorphism, as applied to the domain of material objects, namely that sensible substances are the result of combining matter and form in the right sort of way; or, for short, “form + matter = substance”. I begin in Section II by providing some historical background which brings out Aristotle’s motivations for proposing the doctrine of hylomorphism in the context of his analysis of change. Section III turns to some of the main features of the contemporary hylomorphic theory I have defended especially in Koslicki (2008) and Koslicki (2018). Section IV discusses some challenging questions concerning artifacts which arise for both hylomorphic and other approaches to the metaphysics of concrete particular objects. Section V concludes by summarizing why, as contemporary metaphysicians, we should prefer a hylomorphic theory over its competitors as an analysis of concrete particular objects that is compatible with our current scientific understanding of the world. (shrink)

This volume contains a close translation, suitable for students without a knowledge of Greek, of the seventh and eighth books of Aristotle's Metaphysics, together with a thorough and careful philosophical commentary. In these difficult books, which are central to his metaphysical system, Aristotle discusses the nature of perceptible reality. In particular, he discusses which of matter and form might be the basic reality of things, and he frequently contrasts his own view of form with the Platonic view. Several other (...) topics are treated which are of central importance to his metaphysics, such as the notions of essence and definition, the status of universals, and the concept of a unity. (shrink)

In Books VIII and IX of his masterpiece of moral philosophy, the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle gives perhaps the most famous of all philosophical discussions of friendship. Michael Pakaluk presents the first systematic study in English of these books, showing how important Aristotle's treatment of friendship is to his ethics as a whole. Pakaluk's fresh and scrupulously accurate translation is accompanied by a detailed philosophical commentary which reveals the remarkably coherent structure of the books and unfolds with lucidity the various (...) arguments contained within Aristotle's terse and compressed text. Pakaluk looks at the logical form of Aristotle's analysis of friendship, at his subtle view of the relationship between friendship and justice, at the role of reciprocity in friendship, at civic friendship and its relation to the family, and at the development of friendship out of self-love and reflexive consciousness. This volume will be a valuable tool for anyone studying Aristotle's ethics, especially readers with no Greek. (shrink)

In the Physics, Aristotle defines motion as 'the actuality of what is potentially, qua potential' (Phys. 201b5). This definition has been interpreted countless times and has been the subject of heated controvery. At issue today is whether ὲντελέχεια refers to motions as a process or a state. Accordingly, if the idea of ὲντελέχεια is believed to refer to a process, it is translated to mean actualization. If on the other hand it is taken to refer to a state, it is (...) translated as meaning actuality. In the first instance, known as the 'state-view', a change is defined as being the state of a changing object when it is actually potentially F, for some F. In the second, or 'process-view', a change is defined as the actualization of a potentially. It seems to me that both views mistakenly assume that Aristotle succeeded in defining motion as motion. As a consequence, the discussion has focused on a presumed content that the definition does not offer. Indeed, were it the case that Aristotle's definition was adequate, there would hardly be any point in even considering the question of whether he had intended to regard motion as being a state or a process. In this paper I examine both of these views and offer an alternative interpretation of my own that differs markedly from either. Additionally, I shall show that just as Aristotle's definition represents a projection of his particular attitude toward nature - so also recent interpretations of his definition represent a projection of the attitudes of modern thinker's toward Aristotle's philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Martin Heidegger and OntologyEmmanuel Levinas (bio)The prestige of Martin Heidegger 1 and the influence of his thought on German philosophy marks both a new phase and one of the high points of the phenomenological movement. Caught unawares, the traditional establishment is obliged to clarify its position on this new teaching which casts a spell over youth and which, overstepping the bounds of permissibility, is already in vogue. For once, (...) Fame has picked one who deserves it and, for that matter, one who is still living. Anyone who has studied philosophy cannot, when confronted by Heidegger’s work, fail to recognize how the originality and force of his achievements, stemming from genius, are combined with an attentive, painstaking, and close working-out of the argument—with that craftsmanship of the patient artisan in which phenomenologists take such pride. In this study, it is important for us to understand, above all, the true intentions of our author, to illuminate what he thinks really needs to be said, and to surmise what is most critical for him.To get to the heart of Heidegger’s system, it seems fitting to begin with a problem that is generally familiar. We choose the problem of knowledge, a deeper understanding of which takes us to the very threshold of Heidegger’s thought. For this problem, central to modern philosophy, is one of the main obstacles of modern philosophy that Heidegger wishes to surmount. Neo-Kantianism, which takes knowledge as the philosophical problem of the first rank, is the movement against which Heidegger rebels with all his strength. We have, thus, every chance of gaining access to his thought by the main door, so to speak. Once inside the system we will try to trace its outlines, 2 reserving, for a second part of our work, the determination of Heidegger’s place in the history of ideas, especially in the phenomenological movement, as well as of his relations with the philosopher to whom he owes so much—Edmund Husserl. 31In its most general form, the problem of the theory of knowledge has a critical significance. It consists in delineating a domain where knowledge can be certain and in determining the criteria for the legitimate scope of knowledge. But this problem, as normal and as simple as it may appear, has deeper roots. That knowledge should need a criterion at all presupposes that truth is not identical to all that is known and that the course [End Page 11] of things can fail to correspond with the course of thought. “How does knowledge correspond to being?” is a more profound formulation of the problem of knowledge.But we are not going to touch anymore on the primordial phenomenon that generates the problem. The problem of correspondence between thing and thought presupposes a free activity of thought and its isolation in relation to the object. It is precisely this presupposition which renders their harmony and even their contact problematic. “How does the subject take leave of itself to attain the object?” is what the problem of knowledge, in the last analysis, boils down to. Its true source is thus the concept of “subject” as elaborated by modern philosophy. The cogito presided over the subject’s birth. The cogito was the affirmation of the privileged nature of the subject’s immanent sphere, of its unique place in existence; hence, the cogito was the specificity of the subject’s connection to the rest of reality, the sui generis nature which opens up the passage from immanence to transcendence, the passage from ideas contained in the thinking substance to 4 their “formal existence.”The concept of the subject, understood as a substance having a specific position in the entire domain of being, presents us with difficulties of two kinds. First, how do we understand this leave-taking from the self which the thinking substance brings about and which displays an entirely original aspect? Indeed, we could say that thought, in reaching out toward objects, does not actually take leave of itself, since its objects—considered as ideas and contents of thought—are, in a certain sense, already within it. In order to make sense of this paradox, Descartes... (shrink)

Aristotle’s biology is based on his method of division of animal kinds by multiple differentiae. This results in complex clusters of non-subordinate terms, between which Aristotle seeks to establish universal correlations. The form of these, however, does not correspond to that prescribed by his theory of syllogism. Mereological relations between terms are not linear and quantification is far more complex than the distinction between universal and particular propositions. Thus the axiomatisation of Aristotle’s biology requires a tool designed for analysing (...) such complex universal correlations into valid syllogistic premises. Prosleptic-like premises turn out to be the solution outlined by Aristotle. They make it possible to handle both the logic of consequence which translates from and into mereological relations between term clusters, and the complex quantification required by division based on multiple differentiæ, through the instantiation of a variable ideally consisting of indivisible groups of animals. (shrink)

Two essays relating Thomas and Whitehead have recently appeared. Coming To Be by James W. Felt, S.J., modifies Thomas by replacing his substantial form with Whitehead’s notion of subjective aim, the essencein-the-making introduced by God to guide the occasion’s act of coming into being. Felt also substitutes subjective aim for matter as the means of individuation. This is one of Whitehead’s individuating principles, although a case can be made that matter (the multiplicity of past actualities as proximate matter) is another. (...) “God and Creativity” by Stephen T. Franklin develops a reconciliation of these two ultimates by conceiving of God as the source of creativity, and seeing creativity in terms of the Thomistic esse. In my reflections on this project I explore four alternativeswith respect to the source of creativity: (a) creativity as derived from the past; (b) creativity as inherent in the present; (c) God as the source of transitional creativity (Franklin); (d) God as the source of concrescent creativity (Ford). The last two differ with respect to being’s relation to becoming. Does being undergird becoming, or does becoming bring about being, such that apart from it there would be no being? Our theory of creation depends upon this question. (shrink)

The current debate over Aristotle's commitment to prime matter is centered on diachronic considerations found in his theory of substantial change. I argue that an appeal to this theory is not required in order to establish his commitment to the existence of prime matter. By drawing on Physics II.1's conception of what it is for an element to have a nature - that is, to have an inner source of movement and rest - I introduce a synchronic (...) justification for the existence of prime matter. By trading on the relationship between the thing that has a source of change and the source it has , I show that something that has a source in itself cannot be identical with its source, and that a type of matter that has no nature of its own (a kind of prime matter) is required to block this identification at the level of the elements. (shrink)

This paper addresses alleged contradictions between the use and theory of metaphora in Aristotle. Some authors claim that these inconsistencies are resolved by showing that the use of metaphorai is allowed in the technai and forbidden in the epistemai. This paper instead unpacks Aristotle’s view on language, as it is contained in the semantics of metaphora, to make sense of Aristotle’s statements on metaphora. My proposal is that Aristotle refers to metaphora under different nomenclatures (metaphora, metapherein, and metaphorikon einai) (...) as they relate to the level of linguistic expression, to the perception of similarities, or to the ability to produce metaphors. This threefold distinction helps us understand that the use of metaphora by Aristotle is guided by his idea of the lexis as a means to show the dianoia, and express reality in energeia. This use does not contradict his methodological principles. Lastly, this interpretation also enlightens Aristotle’s understanding of the relations between language, thought, and reality. (shrink)

In these comments on Bernard Williams's probing and provocative paper, I shall first try to develop a line of response to the pair of problems Williams poses concerning Aristotle's account of soul. I shall then offer some reactions, of a more general sort, to his discussion of hylomorphism (henceforth "HMism"). In particular, I want to suggest that, though HMism is in part a form of inoffensive materialism, it is more than just that. And I want to urge also (...) that HMism need not be tempted towards the quasi-dualist position that Williams describes. (shrink)

Devin Henry’s excellent book takes on Aristotle’s theory of substantial generation. Substantial generation is the sort of “unqualified” change in which a substance comes to be: it is what happens when Socrates comes to be, rather than when he grows a centimetre taller (1). Henry’s overarching argument is that “Aristotle employs a single model of generation throughout the corpus”: the hylomorphic model. -/- This argument comes in two stages. Chapters 2-4 introduce the three principles of the hylomorphic model: matter, (...) form, and efficient cause. Chapters 5-8 consider these principles in Aristotle’s account of animal generation. This discussion is framed by an introduction and two chapters that consider the wider context: Aristotle’s reaction to his intellectual inheritance and his cosmological perspective on generation. -/- The result is a thoughtful, systematic account of Aristotle’s theory and the biological details that fill it out in practice. Its central moves are philosophically rich, well-argued, and responsive to a variety of texts. Indeed, a significant strength is its sustained attention to not only to the implications of the Physics and GC’s more abstract framework for our understanding of the biological details, but also the puzzles those details raise for the theoretical account. Moreover, its careful analysis and formulations of existing debates point up important questions. (shrink)

In the first two books of the Physics Aristotle discusses philosophical issues involved in the investigation of the physical universe. He introduces his distinction between form and matter and his fourfold classification of causes or explanatory factors, and defends teleological explanation. These books therefore form a natural entry into Aristotle's system as a whole, and also occupy an important place in the history of scientific thought. The present volume provides a close literal translation, which can be used by serious (...) students without Greek. The introduction and commentary deal with the interpretation and assessment, from a philosophical standpoint, of what Aristotle says. This translation was first published in 1970. (shrink)

Most researchers of emotions agree that although cognitive evaluations such as beliefs, thoughts, etc. are essential for emotion, bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions are also required. Yet, only a few explain how all these diverse aspects of emotion are related to form the unity or oneness of emotion. The most prevalent account of unity is the causal view, which, however, has been shown to be inadequate because it sees the relations between the different parts of emotion as external and (...) contingent. I argue that an adequate account of unity would require internal or conceptual relations between the aspects of emotion, and I suggest that such an account can be found in Aristotle's metaphysics and theory of emotion, and specifically, in his form and matter distinction. After I show that emotions are intentional pleasures and pains or distresses, I argue that the characteristic intentional pleasure and pain of an emotion, along with its other intentional elements , are the form of the emotion, whereas the bodily feelings are its matter. Form and matter constitute a conceptual unity, which cannot be accounted for in conglomeration accounts that see emotions as mixtures of different parts related only through efficient causation. (shrink)