The unity of emotion: An unlikely Aristotelian solution

Journal of Mind and Behavior 28 (2):101-114 (2007)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Most researchers of emotions agree that although cognitive evaluations such as beliefs, thoughts, etc. are essential for emotion, bodily feelings and their behavioral expressions are also required. Yet, only a few explain how all these diverse aspects of emotion are related to form the unity or oneness of emotion. The most prevalent account of unity is the causal view, which, however, has been shown to be inadequate because it sees the relations between the different parts of emotion as external and contingent. I argue that an adequate account of unity would require internal or conceptual relations between the aspects of emotion, and I suggest that such an account can be found in Aristotle's metaphysics and theory of emotion, and specifically, in his form and matter distinction. After I show that emotions are intentional pleasures and pains or distresses, I argue that the characteristic intentional pleasure and pain of an emotion, along with its other intentional elements , are the form of the emotion, whereas the bodily feelings are its matter. Form and matter constitute a conceptual unity, which cannot be accounted for in conglomeration accounts that see emotions as mixtures of different parts related only through efficient causation.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 97,197

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Emotions as Unities of Form and Matter.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2006 - The Emotion Researcher 22 (1-2):09-10.
Standing up for an affective account of emotion.Demian Whiting - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.
How can emotions be both cognitive and bodily?Michelle Maiese - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (4):513-531.
Emotionally Relevant Feelings.Mary Irene Bockover - 1990 - Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara
Bodily feeling in emotion.Philip J. Koch - 1987 - Dialogue 26 (1):59-75.
Aristotle on Emotions and Contemporary Psychology.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2001 - In D. Sfendoni-Mentzou J. Hattiangdi & D. Johnson (eds.), Aristotle and Contemporary Science. Peter Lang. pp. 226-235.
The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions.Demian Whiting - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303.
Emotion as patheception.Raja Bahlul - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (1):104-122.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-30

Downloads
87 (#202,338)

6 months
9 (#703,139)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Maria Adamos
Georgia Southern University

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references