The Theme A substance is a composite particular. If it is composed of further particulars, will the substance itself be one or many? ...

Written by some of the leading experts in the field, the essays in this volume will be a fascinating resource for students and scholars of ancient philosophy, ...

In this paper i offer a detailed analysis of the dilemma of participation (parmenides, 130e-131e), in which plato considers the consequences of participation in the whole, and in a part of, a form. This analysis explains, in contrast to existing interpretations of the argument, plato's claim that participation in parts of a form is incompatible with the uniqueness of the form, and his modal claim that becoming equal by possessing part of the equal is absurd. In the second part of (...) the paper, i give the premisses and logical steps of the third man argument in the parmenides, and show the premisses to be committed to absurdity, even without the assumption that there is a unique form per character f. (shrink)

This volume presents fourteen essays by leading figures in the fields of ancient philosophy and contemporary metaphysics, discussing Aristotle's theory of the unity and identity of substances, a topic that remains at the center of metaphysical enquiry. The contributors examine the nature of essences, how they differ from other components of substance, and how they are related to these other components. The central questions discussed are: What does Aristotle mean by "potentiality" and "actuality?" How do these concepts explicate matter and (...) form, and how are they related to the actuality of a substance? What is the role of actuality in accounting for the unity and identity of substance? These questions are crucial to an understanding of the unity of composite substances and their identity over time. The aim of the volume is both exegetical and philosophical: to give answers to central problems in Aristotle's metaphysics, and also to stimulate further investigation of the problems defined and the controversies embodied. (shrink)

Plato was the first philosopher to discover the metaphysical phenomenon of plural-subjects and plural-predication; e.g. you and I are two, but neither you, nor I are two. I argue that Plato devised an ontology for plural-predication through his Theory of Forms, namely, plural-partaking in a Form. Furthermore, I argue that Plato used plural-partaking to offer an ontology of related individuals without reifying relations. My contention is that Plato’s theory of plural-relatives has evaded detection in the exegetical literature because his account (...) of plural-subjects through the Theory of Forms had not been recognised for what it is. I further submit that Plato’s handling of related individuals through plural-predication is not only a “first” in philosophy, but also an “only”, having remained a unique account in the metaphysics of relations. I hope that Plato’s account will introduce a fresh approach to contemporary debates on the subject. (shrink)

Forthcoming in the Blackwell Companion to Aristotle, 2008.

I argue that in "en", Aristotle allows not only for weak akrasia but also for "strong akrasia". In weak akrasia, The agent makes only a "nominal" choice according to the right principle, While in strong akrasia he/she makes a "real" choice, But still acts against it. I show that, Although aristotle does not give a detailed account of strong akrasia, Such an account can be reconstructed on the basis of the analyses and examples of choice and akratic behaviour provided by (...) him in "en" and "de motu". (shrink)

In Republic V, Plato distinguishes two different cognitive powers, knowledge and belief, which operate differently on different types of object. I argue that in Republic VI Plato modifies this account, and claims that there is a single cognitive power, which under different circumstances behaves either as knowledge or as belief. I show that the circumstances which turn true belief into knowledge are the provision of an individuation account of the object of belief, which reveals the ontological status and the nature (...) of the object. Plato explores many alternative candidates of individuation accounts of objects of true belief, which he discards. I conclude with a Platonic sketch of a teleological account of individuation which would satisfy his requirements of turning true belief into knowledge. (shrink)

In Republic V, Plato makes the astonishing claim that knowledge is a different and independent power from belief, in the way, for example, that sight differs from hearing. I will argue that this is a fundamentally different conception of knowledge than the, also Platonic, conception of knowledge as 'true belief with an account'. I examine the reasons why Plato holds this position, and the ontology and epistemology which sustain its claims.

In Republic V, Plato distinguishes two different cognitive powers, knowledge and belief, which operate differently on different types of object. I argue that in Republic VI Plato modifies this account, and claims that there is a single cognitive power, which under different circumstances behaves either as knowledge or as belief. I show that the circumstances which turn true belief into knowledge are the provision of an individuation account of the object of belief, which reveals the ontological status and the nature (...) of the object. Plato explores many alternative candidates of individuation accounts of objects of true belief, which he discards. I conclude with a Platonic sketch of a teleological account of individuation which would satisfy his requirements of turning true belief into knowledge. (shrink)

The Socratic discussion in the Hippias Major, 300-303, is not a passing comment on plural reference; it is a theory of plural subjecthood. It has escaped attention because it is a small part of a larger complex argument on the topic of which pleasures are fine. Socrates’s theory is further concealed by the fact that it is presented as an antithesis between Hippias and himself, whereas in fact, Hippias’s position becomes part of Socrates’s theory. I begin by examining Hippias’s position, (...) and subsequently Socrates’ criticism of it. I then turn to Socrates’s further proposal, and the development of a theory of plural subjects that incorporates elements of Hippias’s position, and Socrates’s own. At the end, I address the question of the ontology of plural subjects. I argue that the key to sharing a property between subjects is not in the way that the plural terms refer to these subjects, or in any decomposition of the commonly owned property instance into parts distributed to these subjects. Rather, I follow Socrates in finding the common ownership of a property instance central to plural subjecthood, and develop an account of how this metaphysical function can be performed by the plural subjects without threatening their distinctness and plurality. (shrink)

Creativity is an emerging field of research for philosophy. A diachronic cultural value and fundamental human ability, creativity poses a host of questions that challenge us both on a theoretical and practical level. In this paper we explore creativity through the use of problem-solving lateral thinking techniques, as part of the C2Learn European Community research program. Lateral thinking is defined and then classified into three distinct kinds: conceptual, diagrammatic and emotive. Each kind is then explicated and its basic principles examined, (...) in an effort to shed light on the different ways the space of possible solutions is affected by each kind of lateral thought. It is this active engagement with the space of possibilities itself, that separates a mere problem-solver from an actual creator. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Parallel processing systems can carry out computational tasks which would be impossible to be carried out by sequential systems. Cognitive psychologists are discovering that brains do not operate on a sequential ordering of tasks, but along parallel processing models. Sequential ordering is abandoned in the new generation computers, which are being designed on evolving parallel processing models. My proposal consists in applying the parallel processing principles to the state, creating a ‘parallel governing’model for the decision‐making procedures at the political (...) level, in place of the present sequentially ordered procedures. I describe the main principles of current parallel processing models, and use them towards the creation of a parallel governing system. The most fundamental principle is the ‘De‐Centralisation Principle’, which requires that there be no centralised unit with special rights to information, or to policy‐, and decision‐making authority. In parallel governing, political and moral principles are built into the structure of the system, which consists of units of specialised interests and powers, with specialised channels of communication between them. I close by delineating the main differences between parallel governing and Nozick's utopia and Hayek's neo‐libertarianism. (shrink)

Theodore Scaltsas; XIII*—Fairness in Socratic Justice—Republic I†, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 93, Issue 1, 1 June 1993, Pages 247–262, http.

The aim of this report is to explore, collect and classify the surface characteristics of texts which contain arguments, and in particular arguments pertaining to policy. Our interest is in the automated identification of publically presented arguments, rather than in their success or failure as arguments. We are therefore not dwelling on their validity or their soundness, but on the way they are typically expressed. Of special interest to us are the policy arguments which give reasons for and against legislation (...) proposals. The automated identification of arguments which are to be found in the public domain is an approximate science. Nevertheless, the redeeming factor is that in building an assistant to the policy maker, the interest is in the main lines of argument that pertain to an issue, which, if significant, will not be expressed only once, in atypical logical language. The computational tool we are constructing will assist the policy maker with texts that display even minute hints that there may be some reason giving enfolded within their content. (shrink)

In the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle begins his investigation by exploring the nature of the end of all action. In the very first sentence of the work he says: "Every art and every enquiry and similarly every action and pursuit is thought to aim at some good and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim". It is easy, says Aristotle, to find verbal agreement between people regarding that good because they all (...) consider it to be happiness. Aristotle says: " Let us resume our inquiry and state in view of the fact that all knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we say that Political Science aims at and what is the highest of all good achievable by action. Verbally, there is very general ageement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, arrd identify living well and doing well with being happy". But there is no agreement between people with regard to what the good is. Some think it is pleasure, others wealth, others honour and so on, for each what happens to be most desirable to them. As is well known Aristotle's general method of approach to a new subject relies on the endoxrg namely the respected opinions of society. But in this case, as he informs us, there is much and radical disagreement on the accepted even the respected positions within society on the subject of what eudaimonia is. For this reason, far from finding the truth in the respected opinions of society, Aristotle cannot use them even as his starting point. Thus we'find him turning to argument, a metaphysical one at that, in order to be assisted in his endeavour to determine the nature of the good at which human action aims. This is the well known function argument. My concern in the present article is to study the steps of this. (shrink)