Abstract

This paper addresses alleged contradictions between the use and theory of metaphora in Aristotle. Some authors claim that these inconsistencies are resolved by showing that the use of metaphorai is allowed in the technai and forbidden in the epistemai. This paper instead unpacks Aristotle’s view on language, as it is contained in the semantics of metaphora, to make sense of Aristotle’s statements on metaphora. My proposal is that Aristotle refers to metaphora under different nomenclatures (metaphora, metapherein, and metaphorikon einai) as they relate to the level of linguistic expression, to the perception of similarities, or to the ability to produce metaphors. This threefold distinction helps us understand that the use of metaphora by Aristotle is guided by his idea of the lexis as a means to show the dianoia, and express reality in energeia. This use does not contradict his methodological principles. Lastly, this interpretation also enlightens Aristotle’s understanding of the relations between language, thought, and reality.