Abstract

In 1951 Lukasiewicz [[sic]] linked Aristotle's Prior Analytics with modern formal logic. This book attempts to analyze Aristotle's syllogistic theory in the light of Lukasiewcz's work and the whole tradition of classic interpretations of Aristotle's logic. The first of the book's five chapters shows that for Aristotle the syllogism is basically a relationship of terms couched in conditional form; a relationship of variables rather than concrete terms; and a relationship that sees S linked with P not by the copula but by less metaphysical expressions. The classical S is P form is not Aristotelian at all but a much later renovation. The second chapter maintains that Aristotle distinguishes "relative necessity" from "absolute necessity." Aristotle himself ignores his own distinction at times and thus creates logical difficulties for himself. The oft-fought sea battle is fought again in this chapter. Chapter three deals with the controversial notions of "perfect" and "imperfect" syllogisms. The author asserts that by "perfect syllogism" Aristotle means self-evident syllogisms that serve as axioms for deducing other proofs. Chapters four and five deal with the figures of the syllogism and the syllogism as a deductive system respectively. Patzig concludes that Aristotle's syllogistic theory is purely formal in its structure and can only be properly understood if it is not tied to a metaphysics and converted into a philosophical logic. He denies that it is a universal logic, but rather sees it as a specialized theory of relations.--J. J. R.