"How can human beings, who are liable to error, possess knowledge, since the grounds on which we believe do not rule out that we are wrong? Andrea Kern argues that we can disarm this skeptical doubt by conceiving knowledge as an act of a rational capacity. In this book, she develops a metaphysics of the mind as existing through knowledge of itself."--Provided by publisher.

Current debates on collective intentionality focus on the cognitive capacities, attitudes, and mental states that enable individuals to take part in joint actions. It is typically assumed that collective intentionality is a capacity which is added to other, pre-existing, capacities of an individual and is exercised in cooperative activities like carrying a table or painting a house together. We call this the additive account because it portrays collective intentionality as a capacity that an individual possesses in addition to her capacity (...) for individual intentionality. We offer an alternative view according to which the primary entity to which collective intentionality has to be ascribed is not the human individual, but a “form of life.” As a feature of a form of life, collective intentionality is something more than the specific capacity exercised by an individual when she cooperates with others. Collective intentionality transforms all the capacities of the bearers of this specific form of life. We thus call our proposal the transformative account of collective intentionality. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the prospects of a Neo-Aristotelian position—according to which the difference between the human species and non-human animals is a difference in ‘form’—in the context of the question of how the human form of life is related to the idea of education. Two interpretations of this idea have been suggested by contemporary Neo-Aristotelian philosophy that offer contrasting accounts of the role played by education. According to the first, the idea of a formal difference goes with a (...) notion of potentiality, according to which the distinctiveness of the human is mainly a product of education, and hence a matter of second nature. According to the second, the idea of the human is the idea of a formally distinctive kind of first nature that explains the very possibility of education. I maintain that both interpretations do justice to an important aspect of human life yet fail fully to grasp the significance of the notion of ‘form’ that they employ. I argue that to embrace the insight that the difference of the human is a difference in ‘form’, we must think of the human as a form of life whose very concept contains the concept of education. The concept of education, I argue, is a logical concept, contained in the concept of life that it describes. (shrink)

In his treatment of subjective mind, Hegel argues that the development that characterizes the vital process of a human individual is logically unique in that it dissolves the contradiction between two logical determinations that characterize any vital activity: the contradiction between the ‘immediate singularity’ of the subject of this process and its ‘abstract generality’. Hegel employs the term Bildung to characterize any vital activity that has this form. The idea that the distinction between human life and non-human life is a (...) logical distinction is one of the main lessons that Hegel thinks we should learn from Aristotle's treatment of the idea of life. In this article I distinguish between two contemporary varieties of this Aristotelian idea: a sophisticated variety that emphasizes the idea of second nature in order to characterize the distinctiveness of the human, and a naive variety that thinks of the human's uniqueness in terms of characterizations that already belong to its first nature. I argue that Hegel is neither sophisticated nor naive but offers a third variety of Neo-Aristotelianism that solves the difficulties of the other two. This has decisive consequences for his understanding of Bildung. Although the notion of Bildung describes an empirical process, Hegel argues, it is not an empirical concept. Rather, it is the concrete concept of the process of actualization that characterizes a self-conscious form of life that reflects the inner temporality of this form's actuality. (shrink)

Martin Seel wonders how it is possible to liberate oneself from wanting to be right. In the following, we will ask whether the idea of a wanting to be right is so much as intelligible. For if one thinks about thinking and asks what it means to think something, then the idea of wanting to be right seems to have no place. Both the possibility and the necessity of a liberation from wanting to be right seem to dissolve. And yet, (...) we will show, there is wanting-to-be-right. But we do not understand the idea of wanting-to-be-right merely by thinking about thinking. Rather, we understand the idea of wanting-to-be-right only because thinking is something that takes place between two whose thoughts can contradict each other. If my thought meets your thought, and your thought negates my thought, then it is possible that we both want tobe right. This is the existential core of the idea of a liberation from wanting to be right: It is about the liberation from conflict and the hope for reconciliation. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 5, Issue 1, pp 13 - 28 Linking the idea of knowledge with the idea of a certain form of life is uncontestedly one of the lessons the later Wittgenstein wanted to teach us. However, what Wittgenstein exactly meant by this is highly contested in the Wittgenstein literature. In this paper, I distinguish two ways of appealing to the idea of a form of life in order to understand knowledge. According to the first way, the appeal to (...) the idea of a form of life is supposed to “solve” the skeptical problem. On that account the appeal to a form of life is conceived of as an appeal to something that is more fundamental than knowledge and thereby explains how knowledge is possible. According to the second way, the appeal to the idea of a form of life is taken to be a consequence of an insight that makes it impossible for the skeptical problem to even get formulated: it is the insight that the fundamental meaning of the concept of knowledge is to describe a kind of capacity, more precisely, a capacity for knowledge. I take this to be Wittgenstein’s deepest lesson for epistemology which is still to be acknowledged. According to this interpretation, the thought that knowledge is linked with a certain form of life no longer expresses the idea that knowledge rests upon something that is more fundamental than knowledge. It rather expresses the idea that knowledge rests upon a form of life that cannot exist without knowledge. (shrink)

Gemäß der üblichen Auslegung besteht Kants maßgeblicher Beitrag zur Philosophie darin, eine Position entwickelt zu haben, die das Dilemma zwischen zwei gleichermaßen unbefriedigenden Konzeptionen unseres Urteilsvermögens überwindet: der empiristischen Konzeption, der zufolge der letzte Grund des Urteilens in Akten der Empfindung zu finden ist, und der rationalistischen Konzeption, der zufolge der letzte Grund in Erkenntnissen besteht. In meinem Text konzentriere ich mich auf Kants Analyse der Schönheitsurteile und argumentiere, dass Kant in seiner Analytik des Schönen nicht einfach ein anderes Verständnis (...) vom Begriff der Schönheit entwickelt, sondern dass er eine andere Vorstellung davon hat, was es bedeutet, ein solches Verständnis zu haben. Kants sogenannter Mittelweg stellt die Annahme infrage, dass der Philosoph oder die Philosophin den Begriff der Schönheit von außerhalb desjenigen Selbstbewusstseins untersuchen kann, das derjenige hat, der kompetent über Schönheit urteilt. Nach dieser Lesart ist Kants Darstellung der Schönheitsurteile deswegen von besonderem Interesse für die Philosophie, weil Schönheitsurteile eine Form besitzen, die die Form jener philosophischen Urteile widerspiegelt, die diese Form artikulieren. According to the standard interpretation, Kant’s major contribution to philosophy consists in his position that overcomes a dilemma between two equally dissatisfying positions on how we understand our capacity for judgments: the so-called empiricist position, according to which the ultimate ground for judgment is to be found in acts of sensibility, and the so-called rationalist position, according to which its ultimate ground is to be found in cognitions. In my paper I focus on Kant’s analysis of the judgment of beauty and argue that in his analysis of beauty Kant does not simply develop another understanding of the concept of beauty, but that his understanding of beauty manifests a different conception of ›what it means to have such an understanding‹ in the first place. Kant’s so-called middle course calls into question the assumption that the philosopher can investigate the concept of beauty from outside the self-consciousness that constitutes the capacity of his competent judgment of beauty. According to this reading, Kant’s account of judgments of beauty is of special interest to philosophy because they turn out to have a form that, in a certain respect, mirrors the form of philosophical judgments which attempt to articulate this form. (shrink)

The paper investigates the distinction between form and matter in Kant’s theoretical philosophy – his adoption of an Aristotelian hylomorphism. This connection to Aristotle is sometimes recognized in Kant scholarship, though most proponents claim that against the backdrop of a structural analogy, Kant and Aristotle also differ in an important respect: according to them, while Aristotle puts forth a hylomorphic conception of being, Kant merely offers a hylomorphic conception of cognition in which sensibility provides the matter and understanding the form. (...) Against this, the paper claims that this “interiorization” of form cannot be squared with Kant’s actual views. Form is not internal for Kant, but neither is it external. Rather, it is “original form”. This interpretation ascribes a “hylomorphism all the way down” to Kant, meaning that the form and the matter of cognition are jointly actualized in virtue of each other. The understanding cannot be understood apart from its part in a hylomorphic unity with sensibility. Therefore, a proper appreciation of this unity enables us to see that it is impossible to distinguish the form that objects have as objects of cognition from the form they have in themselves. (shrink)

Kant’s conception of the relation between knowledge and doubt stands opposed to much of contemporary epistemology. For Kant denies that it is possible for one to have knowledge of how things are without having a ground for one’s judgment that guarantees its truth. Knowledge, according to him, is judgment that is based on a ground that the judger recognizes to guarantee the truth of her judgment. A judgment that is based on such a ground, trivially, excludes any doubt the judger (...) might have had with respect to it. Therefore knowledge implies certainty. Much of contemporary epistemology has no room for the idea of a truth-guaranteeing ground. By contrast, Kant thinks that the rejection of the idea of a truth-guaranteeing ground has a devastating effect. It does not only render unintelligible the idea of knowledge, but, because of that, the very idea of a subject that is able to be ignorant about things, to have doubts about them or even to err about them. The paper defends the Kantian account of knowledge with the aim to show that ignorance, doubt and error can only characterize, and hence trouble, a subject that knows herself to have a capacity that enables her to overcome any possible doubt and error. (shrink)

Dans ce livre très original, Markus Gabriel avance une théorie du soi humain qui surmonte les blocages inhérents aux positions standards en philosophie de l’esprit contemporaine. Son point de vue, le néo-existentialisme, est intégralement antinaturaliste, en ce sens qu’il rejette toute théorie selon laquelle l’ensemble de nos meilleures connaissances scientifiques naturelles serait pleinement capable de rendre compte de l’esprit humain. L’auteur montre plutôt que l’esprit humain consiste en une prolifération ouverte de vocabulaires mentalistes. Leur rôle dans la forme de vie (...) humaine consiste à rendre compte du fait que l’être humain ne se fond pas simplement dans la nature inanimée et le reste du règne animal. Les humains s’appuient sur un autoportrait qui les situe dans un contexte aussi large que possible au sein de l’univers. Ce qui distingue cet autoportrait de notre connaissance de la réalité naturelle, c’est que nous changeons en vertu de nos croyances, vraies ou fausses, au sujet de nous-mêmes. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz behandelt die Frage, in welcher Weise die Erfahrung einer Illusion und der Vollzug einer Reflexion konstitutive Merkmale der ästhetischen Erfahrung sind. Nach einem weit verbreiteten Verständnis der ästhetischen Erfahrung beschreiben der Begriff der Illusion und der Begriff der Reflexion zwei einander entgegengesetzte Akte: Mit einem Akt der Reflexion machen wir uns eine Illusion bewusst, deren Opfer wir andernfalls waren. Der Beitrag zeigt dagegen, dass im Bereich des Ästhetischen der Begriff der Reflexion keinen Akt beschreibt, der einem Akt der (...) Illusion entgegengesetzt ist. Die Begriffe der Reflexion und Illusion beschreiben hier vielmehr einen einzigen Akt, und zwar so, dass sie hierbei einander wechselseitig erläutern. (shrink)