Acta Analytica 37 (1):99-119 (2022)

Fernando Broncano-Berrocal
Universitat de Barcelona
Moisés Barba Magdalena
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
A platitude in epistemology is that an individual’s belief does not qualify as knowledge if it is true by luck. Individuals, however, are not the only bearers of knowledge. Many epistemologists agree that groups can also possess knowledge in a way that is genuinely collective. If groups can know, it is natural to think that, just as true individual beliefs fall short of knowledge due to individual epistemic luck, true collective beliefs may fall short of knowledge because of collective epistemic luck. This paper argues, first, that the dominant view of epistemic luck in the literature, the modal view, does not yield a satisfactory account of lucky collective beliefs. Second, it argues that collective epistemic luck is better explained in terms of groups lacking forms of control over collective belief formation that are specific to the different procedures for forming collective beliefs. One of the main implications of this, we will argue, is that groups whose beliefs are formed via internal deliberation are more vulnerable to knowledge-undermining collective luck than groups that form their beliefs via non-deliberative methods, such as non-deliberative anonymous voting. The bottom line is that the greater exposure to knowledge-undermining luck that deliberation gives rise to provides a reason for thinking that non-deliberative methods of group belief formation have greater epistemic value.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s12136-021-00485-x
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 69,257
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Theory of Knowledge.Roderick Milton Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall.
Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge.Alvin Goldman - 1976 - Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.

View all 40 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Third Type of Epistemic Luck.Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Studies in Dialectics of Nature 7 (37):14-20.
Epistemic Entitlement and Luck.Sandy Goldberg - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):273-302.
Bad Luck for the Anti‐Luck Epistemologist.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (4):463-479.
A Problem for Moral Luck.Steven D. Hales - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2385-2403.
Epistemic Luck and the Generality Problem.Kelly Becker - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366.
When Is A Belief True Because Of Luck?Preston Greene - 2013 - Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):465-475.
Luck: An Introduction.Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman - 2019 - In Ian M. Church & Robert J. Hartman (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy and Psychology of Luck. New York: Routledge. pp. 1-10.
Moral and Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (1):1–25.
Anti-Luck Epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
Epistemic Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.


Added to PP index

Total views
9 ( #947,777 of 2,499,775 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #102,064 of 2,499,775 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes