Neste artigo, o autor começa por discorrer sobre os últimos anos de vida do Doutor Subtil, marcados pelo célebre conflito em torno às relações de poder, ocorrido entre Filipe IV "O Belo", rei da França, e o papa Bonifácio viu, por causa das posições que ele assumiu e de sua relação com a questão da origem da propriedade e da autoridade secular. Para o Menorita escocês tanto a propriedade ou o domínio particular sobre os bens quanto a autoridade secular (...) foram instituídas pelos seres humanos, não por Deus, após a Queda Original, porque condiziam melhor com sua nova condição, influenciada por suas más inclinações. Por isso, foi necessário que houvesse uma autoridade política e leis por ela promulgadas, a fim de regular a convivência social. Os ensinamentos de Escoto sobre esses assuntos significam a via media entre as teses extremistas propostas, de um lado, pelos defensores da hierocracia pontifícia e, de outro, pelos assessores de Filipe IV. /// The author starts the article with a consideration of the last years of Duns Scotus' life, which was particularly marked by the famous conflict, around the relations of power, occurred between Philip IV, "The Fair", king of France, and Pope Boniface VIII, because of the positions which the scotch Friar assumed regarding the question about the origin of property and about the origin of the secular authority. As a matter of fact, for Duns Scotus, both the property and the political authority were established by men, after the Original Fall, not by God, because they are more in consonance with the new condition of humans, marked by their bad passions. Therefore, it was necessary to have a political authority able to promulgate laws in order to regulate the social life. The article shows that the teaching of Duns Scotus about these subjects constitutes a via media between the extremist doctrines professed, on the one hand, by the defenders of the hierocracy and, on the other, by the assessors of Philip IV. (shrink)

Propõe-se nesta tese analisar como as narrativas sobre o martírio de Imam Hussein no deserto de Karbala no ano 680 d.C, pode constituir um tipo de pedagogia, entre os xiitas, e como essa pode influenciar a construção de um tipo de identidade entre eles. Estruturada em cinco capítulos, buscou-se compreender e interpretar a construção da identidade xiita, como religiosa e política, a partir do ensino e aprendizagem da narrativa sobre o martírio de Imam Hussein. Através da pesquisa de campo no (...) Brasil e no Líbano, objetivou-se verificar e compreender como a comunidade xiita ensina e aprende sobre o martírio ocorrido em Karbala. Utilizando-se da metodologia da Teoria Fundamentada nos Dados verificou-se, através da observação participante e de entrevistas semiestruturas, as mobilizações e desdobramentos que o ensino da narrativa sobre o martírio de Imam Hussein gera nessas comunidades. As entrevistas semiestruturadas foram norteadas por três eixos temáticos: 1) a respeito do aprendizado sobre o martírio de Imam Hussein; 2) a respeito do conceito de martírio no Islã; 3) a respeito da importância da narrativa sobre o martírio de Imam Hussein para a comunidade muçulmana xiita e para a sociedade em geral. As entrevistas e as observações do tipo participante foram realizadas na cidade de Foz do Iguaçu, no Brasil, e, no Líbano, na cidade de Beirute e na Aldeia de Mhabib. Família, religião e escola, foram as três instituições de formação de longa duração escolhidas para observação e análise sobre o ensino e aprendizagem dessa narrativa. Interpretou-se que, no momento da lembrança do martírio de Imam Hussein, seja através da celebração anual de seu martírio, seja através do ensino compartilhado, ocorre uma identificação com o sofrimento de Imam Hussein que leva à manutenção e preservação de valores contidos na narrativa. Tais valores são a base para a identificação do grupo, de forma religiosa como xiitas e política como resistentes. Compreendeu-se nessa pesquisa que as três instituições são responsáveis pelo ensino e manutenção dessa narrativa, sendo a instituição família, a primeira instituição a compartilhar e manter esse ensino. Conclui-se que as narrativas sobre o martírio de Imam Hussein e seus companheiros influenciam na construção de um determinado tipo de identidade que se apresenta como religiosa e política. Apesar das distintas formas de ensino e apreensão da narrativa sobre o martírio, pode-se dizer que há uma base comum que permite a utilização dessa como conteúdo pedagógico que alimenta a construção de práticas que dão forma a identidade específica. (shrink)

O artigo trata dos aspectos gerais da articulação entre filosofia e literatura conforme presentes na obra de Franklin Leopoldo e Silva. Valendo-se de certa tensão entre a atividade do filósofo e aquela do professor de filosofia, o texto percorre elementos nos trabalhos de Franklin dedicados a Proust, Bergson e Sartre, os quais permitem delimitar a relação de distância e proximidade entre os gêneros literário e filosófico. Propõe-se, à revelia do filósofo/professor, que seu trabalho evidencia certo estágio do desenvolvimento da filosofia (...) no Brasil, marcado pelo diálogo sistemático com a tradição filosófica, aliando rigor intelectual e síntese criativa, permitindo o que chamamos de coautoria. (shrink)

This book addresses the issue of determinism in Avicenna and Averroes through an analysis of their views on chance, matter and divine providence.

vol. 1. Entre filosofia e poesia, a questão semântica.

El presente artículo explora las percepciones sobre la existencia de los filósofos medievales musulmanes Avicena (m. 1037) y Averroes (m. 1198), cuyas obras se encuentran muy próximas a la filosofía de Aristóteles. Además de la influencia aristotélica, que caló en toda la filosofía islámica medieval, Avicena y Averroes estuvieron inspirados por la teología islámica, conocida en árabe como Kalam. La distinción entre esencia y existencia es uno de los más fundamentales y controvertidos aspectos de la filosofía de Avicena junto a (...) su aseveración de que la existencia es un accidente. Averroes, en cambio, concibe de forma radicalmente diferente la existencia, identificándola con los seres existentes más que considerarla como algo en sí misma. Con la traducción al latín de los trabajos de metafísica de Avicena en el siglo XII, su distinción prosiguió modelando el debate sobre la existencia en la filosofía escolástica medieval y más allá. Este artículo evalúa el significado de la distinción en la crítica tanto de Avicena como de Averroes. Al explicar sus concepciones, radicalmente distintas, de la existencia se establece un contacto con posteriores discusiones concernientes a la misma, como, por ejemplo, la cuestión de si la existencia es un predicado, en la edad moderna. (shrink)

In this work, Frank Griffel provides a historical and philosophical overview of important developments in Islamic philosophy and theology in the eastern parts o.

O que é a ontoteologia (Heidegger)? A filosofia dominada pelo ‘ente’ desde Platão e pela definição, deixando por pensar o movimento e o tempo, a história. One-body psychology e one-body neurology, ambas limitadas ontoteologicamente. Neurologia, antropologia e psicanálise, a aprendizagem onde o que é ‘exterior’, tribal, se torna ‘interior’, estrutura do sujeito, escapam à psicanálise, cuja teoria das pulsões vai, no entanto, para além dos limites ontoteológicos. A descoberta de Freud, segundo Derrida, o ‘atrasadamente’, como o arcaico (inconsciente) é construído (...) ‘après coup’. A sexualidade ligada à lei, a pulsão com ‘objecto’ exterior são dois pontos cruciais em que a psicanálise transgride os limites ontoteológicos. O que ela analisa é como o bebé passa de ‘ser no seio da mãe’ a ‘ser no mundo’; a aprendizagem é o mecanismo decisivo que a ontoteologia sempre ignorou, ainda ignora, como mostram os melhores neurologistas. (shrink)

Games may seem like a waste of time, where we struggle under artificial rules for arbitrary goals. The author suggests that the rules and goals of games are not arbitrary at all. They are a way of specifying particular modes of agency. This is what make games a distinctive art form. Game designers designate goals and abilities for the player; they shape the agential skeleton which the player will inhabit during the game. Game designers work in the medium of agency. (...) Game-playing, then, illuminates a distinctive human capacity. We can take on ends temporarily for the sake of the experience of pursuing them. Game play shows that our agency is significantly more modular and more fluid than we might have thought. It also demonstrates our capacity to take on an inverted motivational structure. Sometimes we can take on an end for the sake of the activity of pursuing that end. (shrink)

There seems to be a deep tension between two aspects of aesthetic appreciation. On the one hand, we care about getting things right. On the other hand, we demand autonomy. We want appreciators to arrive at their aesthetic judgments through their own cognitive efforts, rather than deferring to experts. These two demands seem to be in tension; after all, if we want to get the right judgments, we should defer to the judgments of experts. The best explanation, I suggest, is (...) that aesthetic appreciation is something like a game. When we play a game, we try to win. But often, winning isn’t the point; playing is. Aesthetic appreciation involves the same flipped motivational structure: we aim at the goal of correctness, but having correct judgments isn’t the point. The point is the engaged process of interpreting, investigating, and exploring the aesthetic object. Deferring to aesthetic testimony, then, makes the same mistake as looking up the answer to a puzzle, rather than solving it for oneself. The shortcut defeats the whole point. This suggests a new account of aesthetic value: the engagement account. The primary value of the activity of aesthetic appreciation lies in the process of trying to generate correct judgments, and not in having correct judgments. -/- *There is an audio version available: look for the Soundcloud link, below.*. (shrink)

Esse artigo pretende explorar os temas do estatuto e da função do intelectual em dois autores significativos para a questão a partir do século XX: Julien Benda e Jean-Paul Sartre. Trata-se de revisitar as noções de autonomia e engajamento, fundamentais para uma compreensão comparativa entre os dois autores. O texto procura caracterizar de forma ampla o tipo de intelectual defendido por Benda no mesmo passo em que procura evidenciar a gênese e as condições de aparecimento do intelectual para Sartre. O (...) Caso Dreyfus, momento histórico de surgimento do intelectual como o conhecemos, é revisitado a fim de estabelecermos um referencial concreto para as posições dos autores em discussão. A partir dos elementos levantados, procura-se argumentar no sentido das divergências entre Benda e Sartre sobre a natureza e o papel do intelectual, mas também propõe-se evidenciar o solo comum em que os dois autores parecem trafegar. O texto, ainda, aponta questões para se pensar o intelectual a partir das novas condições políticas e sociais na contemporaneidade. (shrink)

A herança de Heidegger em Derrida (e Lévinas) permite abordar a conferência de 1962 como 'acabamento' do motivo da doação-e-retiro no Ereignis, e depois entender a "tarefa de pensamento" que nela Heidegger legou às ciências: com o exemplo da biologia, o autor mostra como o retorno de Heidegger ultrapassa Aristóteles e a oposição metafísica entre ser e tempo; o que se confirma depois com o exemplo da linguística saussuriana. A herança: o futuro ficou espantosamente aberto. /// The consideration of Heidegger's (...) heritage in Derrida (and Levinas) allows the author to read the conference of 1962 as a fulfillment of the motif of giveness-andretreat in the Ereignis, leading to an understanding of the "task of thinking" which Heidegger left to the sciences. Taking as an example the science of biology, the author shows how Heidegger's return overcomes Aristotle and the metaphysical opposition between being and time; the same is then confirmed with the example of Saussure's linguistics. For the author, Heidegger's heritage consists in a future that remains exceedingly open. (shrink)

I propose to study one problem for epistemic dependence on experts: how to locate experts on what I will call cognitive islands. Cognitive islands are those domains for knowledge in which expertise is required to evaluate other experts. They exist under two conditions: first, that there is no test for expertise available to the inexpert; and second, that the domain is not linked to another domain with such a test. Cognitive islands are the places where we have the fewest resources (...) for evaluating experts, which makes our expert dependences particularly risky. -/- Some have argued that cognitive islands lead to the complete unusability of expert testimony: that anybody who needs expert advice on a cognitive island will be entirely unable to find it. I argue against this radical form of pessimism, but propose a more moderate alternative. I demonstrate that we have some resources for finding experts on cognitive islands, but that cognitive islands leave us vulnerable to an epistemic trap which I will call runaway echo chambers. In a runaway echo chamber, our inexpertise may lead us to pick out bad experts, which will simply reinforce our mistaken beliefs and sensibilities. (shrink)

This study is concerned with 'nature' specifically as the subject-matter of physics, or natural science, as described by Aristotle in his "Physics". It also discusses the definitions of nature, and more specifically physical nature, provided by Avicenna and Averroes in their commentaries on Aristotle's "Physics". Avicenna and Averroes share Aristotle's conception of nature as a principle of motion and rest. While according to Aristotle the subject matter of physics appears to be nature, or what exists by nature, Avicenna believes that (...) it is the natural body, and Averroes holds that the subject matter of physics or natural science consists in the natural things, in what constitutes a slight shift in focus. O presente artigo trata da 'natureza' enquanto objeto da física, ou da ciência natural, tal como descrita por Aristóteles na "Física". Também trata das definições da natureza, especificamente a natureza física, fornecidas por Avicena e Averróis nos seus comentários à "Física" de Aristóteles. Avicena e Averróis partilham da conceção da natureza de Aristóteles enquanto princípio de movimento e repouso. Enquanto para Aristóteles o objeto da física parece ser a natureza, ou aquilo que existe por natureza, Avicena defende que é o corpo natural, e Averróis afirma que o objeto da física, ou ciência natural, consiste nas coisas naturais, apresentando uma ênfase algo diferente. (shrink)

Comparing Averroes' and Hegel's positions on the relation between philosophy and religion, this book explores the relation between faith and reason in a medieval Islamic and a modern Christian context. Through an in-depth analysis of Averroes' and Hegel's views on philosophical and religious language and method, Belo presents new insights into their perspectives on the relation between philosophical knowledge and religious knowledge. In addition to discussing the parallels and differences of their positions, Belo explores particular works which have (...) not yet been analysed by modern scholarship. (shrink)

(2001). A responsible investment?—an overview of the socially responsible investment community. World Futures: Vol. 56, Values, Ethics and Econmics, Part II, pp. 409-416.

Carolina Maria de Jesus, a partir de seu "Quarto de Despejo", inspira o diálogo transdisciplinar entre a psicanálise, o direito e a literatura, nos artigos reunidos neste livro. Como a obra de Carolina e o diálogo acadêmico inspirado por ela pode nos auxiliar a pensar sobre e a lutar contra o racismo? Fazendo circular e acreditando na força que a palavra tem de desconstruir as ficções psíquicas e políticas que organizam nosso pacto social. Essa é a aposta que anima a (...) pesquisa cujos primeiros resultados estão neste livro. Partimos da hipótese de que o racismo é uma construção histórico-libidinal e que pode ser desfeita. Dentre os códigos fascistas que organizam o desejo, o racismo se destaca (dentre o machismo, a homofobia, por exemplo) por tentar situar a alteridade num determinado grupo de pessoas de forma a controlá-la, subjugá-la. Esse desejo de distinção provém, em grande medida, da angústia produzida pela presença da alteridade dentro do próprio sujeito. Há algo em um livro como o de Carolina que é preciso ser destacado: trata-se de uma resposta singular a um pacto social perverso, organizado pelo racismo. É preciso pensar nos efeitos afetivos que tal resposta, endereçada como um "diário de uma favelada", produz em cada um(a) de seus (suas) leitores(as). (shrink)

Pela dimensão da crítica literária de Benedito Nunes, a sua história intelectual e os desdobramentos do seu pensamento são indispensáveis aos estudiosos que procuram compreendê-lo como filósofo da literatura, teórico e intérprete da Amazônia. Cabe a este artigo apresentar um conjunto de pesquisas sobre sua crítica de literatura e uma síntese do seu itinerário intelectual em Belém do Pará. Morador da Rua da Estrela no bairro do Marco, na capital paraense, Benedito Nunes não se considerava uma “planta nativa”, por isso (...) criticava o localismo e as visões endógenas da arte, mas, a partir de estudos avançados, em aulas, entrevistas, ensaios, orientações, seminários se tornou um “fazedor de intelectuais”, guiando uma rede de sociabilidade em diversas instituições do Pará. Assim, com ênfase na relação entre filosofia e literatura, construiu uma trajetória e uma crítica com alcance ético e universalizante. Seus ensaios circularam em jornais e revistas com grande impacto cultural. Seus estudos no campo literário contribuíram enormemente para a validação estética e histórica de autores da Literatura da Amazônia paraense como Mário Faustino, Max Martins, Paulo Plínio Abreu, Ruy Barata e muitas outras vozes invisibilizadas pelo cânone brasileiro. (shrink)

Este artículo se basa en el capítulo de Ibo Ruid sobre los atributos qa'd wa-qadar de Alláb, que se ocupa del concepto de "predestinación", como ejemplo de una aproximación racionalista que introduce conceptos filosóficos en un viejo debate religioso. Es mi propósito presentar el argumento de Ibo RuId que contiene inequívocas alusiones aristotélicas; por tanto, la armonización de la religión y la filosofia implícita en sus argumentos es uno de los puntos que trataré de explorar en este trabajo. Igualmenle, estoy (...) interesada en la cuestión de si las soluciones propuestas por Ibo Ruid suponen un térmimo medio entre dos posiciones enfrentadas y resuelven el eterno problema del determinismo. Este trabajo discute también si lbn Ruid defiende la predestinación, es decir, la cuestión de si los sucesos están predeterminados por Dios antes de que tengan lugar. (shrink)

This article analyses the debate concerning divine attributes in medieval Islamic theology (kalam), more specifically in Mu‘tazilite and in Ash‘arite theology. It further compares their approach with that of medieval Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides (d. 1204). In particular it studies the identification of the divine attributes with God’s essence in Mu‘tazilite theology, which flourished in the first half of the 9th century. It discusses the Ash‘arite response that followed, and which consisted in considering God’s attributes as real entities separate from (...) God’s essence. Maimonides, conversant with the tradition of kalam, proposes a solution that does not involve the predication of any attributes that would undermine his oneness. KEY WORDS – Mu‘tazilites. Ash‘arites. Kalam. Maimonides. Divine attributes. Predication. Medieval philosophy. Islamic theology. (shrink)

Este artigo analisa o debate acerca dos atributos divinos na teologia islâmica medieval, mais especificamente na teologia mu‘tazilita e ash‘arita. Nele se compara a abordagem da teologia islâmica medieval com a de Moisés Maimónides, filósofo judeu do período medieval. Em particular este artigo debruça-se sobre a identficação dos atributos divinos com a essência de Deus na teologia mu‘tazilita, que se desenvolveu na primeira metade do século IX, e analisa a reação dos ash‘aritas que se seguiu e que insistiu em considerar (...) os atributos divinos enquanto entidades reais, separadas da essência de Deus. Maimónides, conhecedor da tradição do kalam, apresenta uma solução que não envolve a predicação de atributos divinos que comprometeria a unidade divina. PALAVRAS-CHAVE – Mu‘tazilitas. Ash‘aritas. Kalam. Maimónides. Atributos divinos. Predicação. Filosofia medieval. Teologia islâmica. (shrink)

O presente estudo tem o objetivo de mapear dissertações e teses brasileiras na área da Educação que, no método de investigação, utilizaram-se da Fenomenologia como referência. O levantamento foi realizado no Banco de Teses e Dissertações da Capes, encontrando-se 1.142 registros, dos quais 89 foram analisados, referentes aqueles orientados pelos pesquisadores com maior número de orientações nesta perspectiva. Constatou-se um aumento da presença da Fenomenologia nos estudos da área da Educação, além da grande diversidade de procedimentos adotados. Identificou-se, ainda, a (...) presença marcante da Hermenêutica, em detrimento de pesquisas fundadas exclusivamente na Fenomenologia Estrutural. (shrink)

Em A transcendência do Ego, primeiro ensaio filosófico de Sartre, recusa-se a presença do Ego na consciência. Apropriando-se da fenomenologia de Husserl, Sartre critica as posições filosóficas e psicológicas que transformaram o Ego num habitante da consciência. O presente artigo se propõe a examinar a tese de Sartre e delinear o alcance de suas considerações para a psicologia e para a filosofia. Trata-se de momento importante da trajetória de Sartre porque nele podemos identificar as primeiras preocupações do filósofo, assim como (...) compreender o alcance da fenomenologia em obras posteriores. (shrink)

An adequate theory of rights ought to forbid the harming of animals to promote trivial interests of humans, as is often done in the animal-user industries. But what should the rights view say about situations in which harming some animals is necessary to prevent intolerable injustices to other animals? I develop an account of respectful treatment on which, under certain conditions, it’s justified to intentionally harm some individuals to prevent serious harm to others. This can be compatible with recognizing the (...) inherent value of the ones who are harmed. My theory has important implications for contemporary moral issues in nonhuman animal ethics, such as the development of cultured meat and animal research. (shrink)

Value capture occurs when an agent’s values are rich and subtle; they enter a social environment that presents simplified — typically quantified — versions of those values; and those simplified articulations come to dominate their practical reasoning. Examples include becoming motivated by FitBit’s step counts, Twitter Likes and Re-tweets, citation rates, ranked lists of best schools, and Grade Point Averages. We are vulnerable to value capture because of the competitive advantage that such crisp and clear expressions of value have in (...) our private reasoning and our public justification. There is, however, a price. In value capture, we take a central component of our autonomy — our ongoing deliberation over the exact articulation of our values — and we outsource it. And the metrics to which we outsource usually engineered for the interests of some external force, like a large-scale institution’s interest in cross-contextual comprehensibility and quick aggregability. That outsourcing cuts off one of the key benefits to personal deliberation. In value capture, we no longer adjust our values and their articulations in light of own rich experience of the world. Our values should often be carefully tailored to our particular selves or our small-scale communities, but in value capture, we buy our values off the rack. In some cases – like decreasing CO2 emissions – the costs of non-tailored values are outweighed by the benefit of precise collective coordination. In other cases, like in our aesthetic lives, they are not. This suggests that we should want different values suited to different scales. We should want value federalism. Some values are perhaps best pursued at the largest-scale level, others at smaller scales. The problem occurs when we exhibit an excess preference for the largest-scale values – when we consistently let the universal metrics swamp our quieter interests. (shrink)

We offer an account of the generic use of the term “porn”, as seen in recent usages such as “food porn” and “real estate porn”. We offer a definition adapted from earlier accounts of sexual pornography. On our account, a representation is used as generic porn when it is engaged with primarily for the sake of a gratifying reaction, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with the represented content. We demonstrate the usefulness of the concept of generic (...) porn by using it to isolate a new type of such porn: moral outrage porn. Moral outrage porn is representations of moral outrage, engaged with primarily for the sake of the resulting gratification, freed from the usual costs and consequences of engaging with morally outrageous content. Moral outrage porn is dangerous because it encourages the instrumentalization of one’s empirical and moral beliefs, manipulating their content for the sake of gratification. Finally, we suggest that when using porn is wrong, it is often wrong because it instrumentalizes what ought not to be instrumentalized. (shrink)

Recent conversation has blurred two very different social epistemic phenomena: echo chambers and epistemic bubbles. Members of epistemic bubbles merely lack exposure to relevant information and arguments. Members of echo chambers, on the other hand, have been brought to systematically distrust all outside sources. In epistemic bubbles, other voices are not heard; in echo chambers, other voices are actively undermined. It is crucial to keep these phenomena distinct. First, echo chambers can explain the post-truth phenomena in a way that epistemic (...) bubbles cannot. Second, each type of structure requires a distinct intervention. Mere exposure to evidence can shatter an epistemic bubble, but may actually reinforce an echo chamber. Finally, echo chambers are much harder to escape. Once in their grip, an agent may act with epistemic virtue, but social context will pervert those actions. Escape from an echo chamber may require a radical rebooting of one's belief system. (shrink)

In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan argues that although all subjects-of-a-life have equal inherent value, there are often differences in the value of lives. According to Regan, lives that have the highest value are lives which have more possible sources of satisfaction. Regan claims that the highest source of satisfaction, which is available to only rational beings, is the satisfaction associated with thinking impartially about moral choices. Since rational beings can bring impartial reasons to bear on decision making, (...) Regan maintains that they have an additional possible source of satisfaction that nonrational beings do not have and, consequently, the lives of rational beings turn out to have greater value.. (shrink)

What is a game? What are we doing when we play a game? What is the value of playing games? Several different philosophical subdisciplines have attempted to answer these questions using very distinctive frameworks. Some have approached games as something like a text, deploying theoretical frameworks from the study of narrative, fiction, and rhetoric to interrogate games for their representational content. Others have approached games as artworks and asked questions about the authorship of games, about the ontology of the work (...) and its performance. Yet others, from the philosophy of sport, have focused on normative issues of fairness, rule application, and competition. The primary purpose of this article is to provide an overview of several different philosophical approaches to games and, hopefully, demonstrate the relevance and value of the different approaches to each other. Early academic attempts to cope with games tried to treat games as a subtype of narrative and to interpret games exactly as one might interpret a static, linear narrative. A faction of game studies, self-described as “ludologists,” argued that games were a substantially novel form and could not be treated with traditional tools for narrative analysis. In traditional narrative, an audience is told and interprets the story, where in a game, the player enacts and creates the story. Since that early debate, theorists have attempted to offer more nuanced accounts of how games might achieve similar ends to more traditional texts. For example, games might be seen as a novel type of fiction, which uses interactive techniques to achieve immersion in a fictional world. Alternately, games might be seen as a new way to represent causal systems, and so a new way to criticize social and political entities. Work from contemporary analytic philosophy of art has, on the other hand, asked questions whether games could be artworks and, if so, what kind. Much of this debate has concerned the precise nature of the artwork, and the relationship between the artist and the audience. Some have claimed that the audience is a cocreator of the artwork, and so games are a uniquely unfinished and cooperative art form. Others have claimed that, instead, the audience does not help create the artwork; rather, interacting with the artwork is how an audience member appreciates the artist's finished production. Other streams of work have focused less on the game as a text or work, and more on game play as a kind of activity. One common view is that game play occurs in a “magic circle.” Inside the magic circle, players take on new roles, follow different rules, and actions have different meanings. Actions inside the magic circle do not have their usual consequences for the rest of life. Enemies of the magic circle view have claimed that the view ignores the deep integration of game life from ordinary life and point to gambling, gold farming, and the status effects of sports. Philosophers of sport, on the other hand, have approached games with an entirely different framework. This has lead into investigations about the normative nature of games—what guides the applications of rules and how those rules might be applied, interpreted, or even changed. Furthermore, they have investigated games as social practices and as forms of life. (shrink)

Анотація. У статті проаналізовані досягнення Соціального Вчительства Католицької Церкви, репрезентовані працями Лева ХІІІ, Пія ХІ, Пія ХІІ, Івана Павла ІІ, що розкривають змістовні характеристики поняття «принцип субсидіарності», його роль і значення в системі християнських цінностей. Принцип субсидіарності робить можливими такі взаємовідносини в соціальному житті, коли спільнота вищого порядку не втручається у внутрішнє життя спільноти нижчого порядку, перебираючи на себе належні тій функції; заради спільного добра, спільного блага вона надає їй у разі потреби підтримку й допомогу, узгоджуючи у такий спосіб її (...) взаємодію з іншими соціальними структурами. Принцип субсидіарності скеровує соціальну практику на утвердження спільного блага в людському співтоваристві. Поширення і застосування принципу субсидіарності протистоїть небезпеці «одержавлення» суспільства та найзагрозливіших проявів колективізму, обмежує абсолютизацію влади, бюрократизацію державних і соціокультурних структур, стає одним із гарантів дотримання прав і свобод громадян своєї країни. (shrink)

In her BBC Reith Lectures on Trust, Onora O’Neill offers a short, but biting, criticism of transparency. People think that trust and transparency go together but in reality, says O'Neill, they are deeply opposed. Transparency forces people to conceal their actual reasons for action and invent different ones for public consumption. Transparency forces deception. I work out the details of her argument and worsen her conclusion. I focus on public transparency – that is, transparency to the public over expert domains. (...) I offer two versions of the criticism. First, the epistemic intrusion argument: The drive to transparency forces experts to explain their reasoning to non-experts. But expert reasons are, by their nature, often inaccessible to non-experts. So the demand for transparency can pressure experts to act only in those ways for which they can offer public justification. Second, the intimate reasons argument: In many cases of practical deliberation, the relevant reasons are intimate to a community and not easily explicable to those who lack a particular shared background. The demand for transparency, then, pressures community members to abandon the special understanding and sensitivity that arises from their particular experiences. Transparency, it turns out, is a form of surveillance. By forcing reasoning into the explicit and public sphere, transparency roots out corruption — but it also inhibits the full application of expert skill, sensitivity, and subtle shared understandings. The difficulty here arises from the basic fact that human knowledge vastly outstrips any individual’s capacities. We all depend on experts, which makes us vulnerable to their biases and corruption. But if we try to wholly secure our trust — if we leash groups of experts to pursuing only the goals and taking only the actions that can be justified to the non-expert public — then we will undermine their expertise. We need both trust and transparency, but they are in essential tension. This is a deep practical dilemma; it admits of no neat resolution, but only painful compromise. (shrink)

According to most accounts of trust, you can only trust other people (or groups of people). To trust is to think that another has goodwill, or something to that effect. I sketch a different form of trust: the unquestioning attitude. What it is to trust, in this sense, is to settle one’s mind about something, to stop questioning it. To trust is to rely on a resource while suspending deliberation over its reliability. Trust lowers the barrier of monitoring, challenging, checking, (...) and questioning. Trust sets up open pipelines between yourself and parts of the external world. Trust permits external resources to have a similar relationship to one as one’s internal cognitive faculties. This creates efficiency, but at the price of exquisite vulnerability. We must trust in this way because we are cognitively limited beings in a cognitively overwhelming world. Crucially, we can hold the unquestioning attitude towards objects and technologies. When I trust my climbing rope, I stop worrying about its reliability. When I trust my online calendaring system, I simply go to the events indicated, without question. But, one might worry, how could one ever hold such a normatively loaded attitude as trust towards mere objects? How could it ever make sense to feel betrayed by an object? Trust is our engine for expanding and outsourcing our agency — for binding external processes into our practical selves. Thus, we can be betrayed by our smartphones in the same way that we can be betrayed by our memory. When we trust, we try to make something a part of our agency, and we are betrayed when our part lets us down. To unquestioningly trust something is to let it in—to attempt to bring it inside one’s practical functioning. This suggests a new form of gullibility: agential gullibility, which occurs when agents too hastily and carelessly integrate external resources into their own agency. (shrink)

Recent discussions in the just war literature suggest that soldiers have a duty to assume certain risks in order to protect the lives of all innocent civilians. I challenge this principle of risk by arguing that it is justified neither as a principle that guides the conduct of combat soldiers, nor as a principle that guides commanders in the US military. I demonstrate that the principle of risk fails on the first account because it requires soldiers both to violate their (...) strict duty of obedience and loyalty and to exceed their special obligations to protect their fellow comrades, the state, the state's constituents and other protected civilians. I then illustrate that the principle of risk fails on the second account since it conflicts with the commander's primary obligation to protect and promote the welfare and lives of his or her soldiers. I conclude by arguing that we cannot reasonably expect soldiers and commanders to adhere to the principle of risk until there is a radical, institutional-level transformation of militaristic goals, values, strategies, policies, warrior codes and expectations of service members in the US Armed Forces. (shrink)

Монографія "Функціональність релігії: український контекст".

Recent studies on the philosophy of Avicenna have traditionally focused on his metaphysics, his psychology, and his influence on subsequent philosophers within.

Twitter makes conversation into something like a game. It scores our communication, giving us vivid and quantified feedback, via Likes, Retweets, and Follower counts. But this gamification doesn’t just increase our motivation to communicate; it changes the very nature of the activity. Games are more satisfying than ordinary life precisely because game-goals are simpler, cleaner, and easier to apply. Twitter is thrilling precisely because its goals have been artificially clarified and narrowed. When we buy into Twitter’s gamification, then our values (...) shift from the complex and pluralistic values of communication, to the narrower quest for popularity and virality. Twitter’s gamification bears some resemblance with the phenomena of echo chambers and moral outrage porn. In all these phenomena, we are instrumentalizing our ends for hedonistic reasons. We have shifted our aims in an activity, not because the new aims are more valuable, but in exchange for extra pleasure. (shrink)

The Statesman is Plato's neglected political work, but it is crucial for an understanding of the development of his political thinking. In some respects it continues themes from the Republic, particularly the importance of knowledge as entitlement to rule. But there are also changes: Plato has dropped the ambitious metaphysical synthesis of the Republic, changed his view of the moral psychology of the citizen, and revised his position on the role of law and institutions. In its presentation of the statesman's (...) expertise, the Statesman modifies, as well as defending in original ways, this central theme of the Republic. (shrink)