Skeletal myoblasts have their origin early in embryogenesis within specific somites. Determined myoblasts are committed to a myogenic fate; however, they only differentiate and express a muscle‐specific phenotype after they have received the appropriate environmental signals. Once proliferating myoblasts enter the differentiation programme they withdraw from the cell cycle and form post‐mitotic multinucleated myofibres (myogenesis); this transformation is accompanied by muscle‐specific gene expression. Muscle development is associated with complex and diverse protein isoform transitions, generated by differential gene expression and mRNA (...) splicing. The myofibres are in a state of dynamic adaptation in response to hormones, mechanical activity and motor innervation, which modulate differential gene expression and splicing during this functional acclimatisation. This review will focus on the profound effects of thyroid hormone on skeletal muscle, which produce alterations in gene and isoform expression, biochemical properties and morphological features that precipitate in modified contractile/mechanical characteristics. Insight into the molecular events that control these events was provided by the recent characterisation of the MyoD gene family, which encodes helix‐loop‐helix proteins; these activate muscle‐specific transcription and serve as targets for a variety of physiological stimuli. The current hypothesis on hormonal regulation of myogenesis is that thyroid hormones (1) directly regulate the myoD and contractile protein gene families, and (2) induce thyroid hormone receptor‐transcription factor interactions critical to gene expression. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

Since at least the advent of Jack Kevorkian’s “suicide machine” the major argument against adopting physician-assisted suicide laws has been that they will lead us down a slippery slope to state-sa...

Self-taught mathematician and father of Boolean algebra, George Boole (1815-1864) published An Investigation of the Laws of Thought in 1854. In this highly original investigation of the fundamental laws of human reasoning, a sequel to ideas he had explored in earlier writings, Boole uses the symbolic language of mathematics to establish a method to examine the nature of the human mind using logic and the theory of probabilities. Boole considers language not just as a mode of expression, but as (...) a system one can use to understand the human mind. In the first 12 chapters, he sets down the rules necessary to represent logic in this unique way. Then he analyses a variety of arguments and propositions of various writers from Aristotle to Spinoza. One of history's most insightful mathematicians, Boole is compelling reading for today's student of intellectual history and the science of the mind. (shrink)

George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne, was one of the great philosophers of the early modern period. He was a brilliant critic of his predecessors, particularly Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke. He was a talented metaphysician famous for defending idealism, that is, the view that reality consists exclusively of minds and their ideas. Berkeley's system, while it strikes many as counter intuitive, is strong and flexible enough to counter most objections. His most studied works, the Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human (...) Knowledge Principles, for short) and Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous Dialogues), are beautifully written and dense with the sort of arguments that delight contemporary philosophers. He was also a wide ranging thinker with interests in religion (which were fundamental to his philosophical motivations), the psychology of vision, mathematics, physics, morals, economics, and medicine. Although many of Berkeley's first readers greeted him with incomprehension, he influenced both Hume and Kant, and is much read (if little followed) in our own day. (shrink)

Although George Berkeley himself made no major scientific discoveries, nor formulated any novel theories, he was nonetheless actively concerned with the rapidly evolving science of the early eighteenth century. Berkeley's works display his keen interest in natural philosophy and mathematics from his earliest writings (Arithmetica, 1707) to his latest (Siris, 1744). Moreover, much of his philosophy is fundamentally shaped by his engagement with the science of his time. In Berkeley's best-known philosophical works, the Principles and Dialogues, he sets up (...) his idealistic system in opposition to the materialist mechanism he finds in Descartes and Locke. In De Motu, Berkeley refines and extends his philosophy of science in the context of a critique of the dynamic accounts of motion offered by Newton and Leibniz. And in Siris, Berkeley's flirtation with neo-Platonism draws inspiration from the fire theory of Boerhaave as well as Newton's aetherial speculations in the Queries of the Optics. In examining Berkeley's critical engagement with the natural philosophy of his time, we will thus improve our understanding of not just his philosophy of science, but of his philosophical corpus as a whole. (shrink)

The Oxford Philosophical Texts series consists of authoritative teaching editions of canonical texts in the history of philosophy from the ancient world down to modern times. Each volume provides a clear, well laid out text together with a comprehensive introduction by a leading specialist,giving the student detailed critical guidance on the intellectual context of the work and the structure and philosophical importance of the main arguments. Endnotes are supplied which provide further commentary on the arguments and explain unfamiliar references and (...) terminology, and a fullbibliography and index are also included.The series aims to build up a definitive corpus of key texts in the Western philosophical tradition, which will form a reliable and enduring resource for students and teachers alike.In his Principles of Human Knowledge Berkeley makes the striking claim that physical things consist of nothing but ideas, and so do not exist outside the mind. This establishes Berkeley as the founder of the idealist tradition in philosophy. Berkeley argues vigorously that once we correct ourunderstanding of the physical, we can find a new proof of the existence of God, refute sceptical attacks on human knowledge, and resolve many difficulties and paradoxes raised by the advance of science.The text printed in this volume is the 1734 edition of the Principles which is generally agreed to represent Berkeley's mature thought. Also included are the four important letters between George Berkeley and Samuel Johnson, written in 1729-30. The text is supplemented by a comprehensiveintroduction which looks at the structure and main arguments of the text, as well as discussing Berkeley's life, influences, and general philosophy. In addition the volume includes an analysis of the text, a glossary, detailed notes, and a full bibliography with guidance on further reading.This new edition of Berkeley's most famous work, published alongside his other masterpiece, the Three Dialogues (also edited by Jonathan Dancy) provides the student with a thorough introduction to the central ideas of one of the world's greatest philosophers. (shrink)

Physics underlies all complexity, including our own existence: how is this possible? How can our own lives emerge from interactions of electrons, protons, and neutrons? This book considers the interaction of physical and non-physical causation in complex systems such as living beings, and in particular in the human brain, relating this to the emergence of higher levels of complexity with real causal powers. In particular it explores the idea of top-down causation, which is the key effect allowing the emergence of (...) true complexity and also enables the causal efficacy of non-physical entities, including the value of money, social conventions, and ethical choices. (shrink)

Commonplace syntactic constructions in natural language seem to generate ontological commitments to a dazzling array of metaphysical categories - aggregations, sets, ordered n-tuples, possible worlds, intensional entities, ideal objects, species, intensive and extensive quantities, stuffs, situations, states, courses of events, nonexistent objects, intentional and discourse objects, general objects, plural objects, variable objects, arbitrary objects, vague kinds and concepts, fuzzy sets, and so forth. But just because a syntactic construction in some natural language appears to invoke a new category of entity, (...) are we theoreticians epistemically justified in holding that there are such entities? This would hardly seem sufficient. To be epistemically justified, the ontology to which we theoreticians are committed must pass strict standards: the entities must be of the sort required by our best comprehensive theory of the world. The thesis of this paper is that fine-grained type-free intensional entities are like this. If the thesis is right, these entities have a special objective status perhaps not possessed by some of the other ontological categories associated with special syntactic constructions in natural language. In fact, it is plausible to hold that fine-grained type-free intensional entities provide the proper minimal framework for constructing logical and linguistic theories. In this paper my strategy will be to survey the competing conceptions of fine-grained type-free intensionality and to present arguments in support of one of them. Following this narrowing down process, I will go on to the indicated epistemological considerations. (shrink)

_The Disordered Mind: An Introduction to Philosophy of Mind and Mental Illness, second edition_ examines and explains, from a philosophical standpoint, what mental disorder is: its reality, causes, consequences, and more. It is also an outstanding introduction to philosophy of mind from the perspective of mental disorder. Revised and updated throughout, this _second edition_ includes new discussions of grief and psychopathy, the problems of the psychophysical basis of disorder, the nature of selfhood, and clarification of the relation between rationality and (...) mental disorder. Each chapter explores a central question or problem about mental disorder, including: what is mental disorder and can it be distinguished from neurological disorder? what roles should reference to psychological, cultural, and social factors play in the medical/scientific understanding of mental disorder? what makes mental disorders undesirable? Are they diseases? mental disorder and the mind–body problem is mental disorder a breakdown of rationality? What is a rational mind? addiction, responsibility and compulsion ethical dilemmas posed by mental disorder, including questions of dignity and self-respect. Each topic is clearly explained and placed in a clinical and philosophical context. Mental disorders discussed include clinical depression, dissociative identity disorder, anxiety, religious delusions, and paranoia. Several non-mental neurological disorders that possess psychological symptoms are also examined, including Alzheimer’s disease, Down’s syndrome, and Tourette’s syndrome. Containing chapter summaries and suggestions for further reading at the end of each chapter, _The Disordered Mind, second edition_ is a superb introduction to the philosophy of mental disorder for students of philosophy, psychology, psychiatry, and related mental health professions. (shrink)

Differential diagnosis of motor symptoms, for example, akinesia, may be difficult in clinical neuropsychiatry. Symptoms may be either of neurologic origin, for example, Parkinson's disease, or of psychiatric origin, for example, catatonia, leading to a so-called “conflict of paradigms.” Despite their different origins, symptoms may appear more or less clinically similar. Possibility of dissociation between origin and clinical appearance may reflect functional brain organisation in general, and cortical-cortical/subcortical relations in particular. It is therefore hypothesized that similarities and differences between Parkinson's (...) disease and catatonia may be accounted for by distinct kinds of modulation between cortico-cortical and cortico-subcortical relations. Catatonia can be characterized by concurrent motor, emotional, and behavioural symptoms. The different symptoms may be accounted for by dysfunction in orbitofrontal-prefrontal/parietal cortical connectivity reflecting “horizontal modulation” of cortico-cortical relation. Furthermore, alteration in “top-down modulation” reflecting “vertical modulation” of caudate and other basal ganglia by GABA-ergic mediated orbitofrontal cortical deficits may account for motor symptoms in catatonia. Parkinson's disease, in contrast, can be characterized by predominant motor symptoms. Motor symptoms may be accounted for by altered “bottom-up modulation” between dopaminergic mediated deficits in striatum and premotor/motor cortex. Clinical similarities between Parkinson's disease and catatonia with respect to akinesia may be related with involvement of the basal ganglia in both disorders. Clinical differences with respect to emotional and behavioural symptoms may be related with involvement of different cortical areas, that is, orbitofrontal/parietal and premotor/motor cortex implying distinct kinds of modulation – “vertical” and “horizontal” modulation, respectively. Key Words: Bottom-up modulation; catatonia; horizontal modulation; Parkinson's disease; top-down modulation; vertical modulation. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore the architecture of downward causation on the basis of three central cases. We set out by answering the question of how top-down causation is possible in the universe. The universe is not causally closed, because of irreducible randomness at the quantum level. What is more, contextual effects can already be observed at the level of quantum physics, where higher levels can modify the nature of lower-level elements by changing their context, or even creating them. As (...) one moves up through higher levels, contextual effects on lower levels occur on various scales within nature, which is crucial in biology in general and the brain in particular. We then argue that there are important logical downward causes.objects have causal effects on material-energetic systems. It can be shown that abstract objects have measurable effects on lower levels, which needs to be accounted for by successful explanations of real phenomena such as intentional action. Intentional action has the form of deductive causation from logical structures to human agency. Without this assumption, we would not be warranted in believing that our physical theories latch onto a universe that is essentially the way we discover it to be. Denying top-down causation on account of the idea that the universe permits only bottom-up constitution of wholes from lower-level elements leads to undermining the very possibility of knowledge and science. Thus, it can be rejected as a global form of explanation. We sketch a model for mind-body interaction according to which the various levels of a human organism together enable the emergence of mental top-down effects. They are necessary conditions for the emergence of human mindedness. Once it is clear that downward causation is a widespread natural phenomenon, the apparent mystery of mental causation is, in principle, solved. (shrink)

The outbreak of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) since November 2019 has increased the challenges of human existence. Before the pandemic there were the issues of insecurity, religious and racial bigotry, climate change, poverty and so forth, which to a large extent have affected humanity negatively. The lockdown, which was introduced as a measure to curb the spread of the virus, exacerbated the anguish of the already tense world. Suddenly, the government proscribed gatherings of people in large numbers, thereby suspending (...) economic, cultural and social activities. The continued increase of the COVID-19 cases necessitated the shutdown of worship centres. It was the first time churches would be shut down in Nigeria. The incident provoked concerns and interests in public discourse and intellectual circles. Therefore, this study examines the effects of COVID-19 on churches, using a historical approach and basically depending on secondary sources from available literature and Internet sources of information. The findings show that it was the lockdown that affected the churches most, rather than the virus. The suspension of corporate worship, sacramental rites, evangelistic outreaches and pastoral visits posed a significant challenge to the churches, affecting members’ psychology and leading to a decline in church revenue and an increase in charity services. The study therefore recommends that churches be digitalised and house fellowships be revitalised. Contribution: Regardless of the impact the lockdown had on the churches, it conscientised them about the proper use of their personnel and material resources. Nowadays, churches do ministry differently, adapting to changing circumstances and harnessing divergent Christian concepts of faith and divine healing by combining science and faith in health-related theologies. (shrink)

This book assembles the evidence for what the Greek Fathers, the men whose contructive thought underlies the creeds, really thought and taught about the nature of God. It shows that they were original thinkers, with a profound reverence for the text of the Scriptures, and minds keenly tranined to discuss what ultimate truths were expressed in the scriptural text and what reality should be ascribed to Christian religious experience. The results indicate that a good deal which is assumed in current (...) theological text-books needs to be revised. The Fathers had to reconcile monotheism with faith in a Trinity of divine Persons. In the process, they pursued many lines of inquiry, often only to discard them after trial, but after following various clues and making various intellectual adventures they reached a solution of the problem, which was both true to their data and philosophically reasonable. Though the bulk of the book is concerned with the third and fourth centuries, during which the creeds were in the process of formulation, the story is carried down to the eighth century where the progress of original thought came to a standstill. It is shown that a great change came over the philosophical tradition during the sixth century, and owing to the consequent growth of formalism, a genuine outbreak of tritheism occurred. The book ends with the account of how this outbreak was met and overcome, largely through the efforts of a thinker whose very name is unknown, and whose book has only survived under the name of another man. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Coda: Getting Something Back Notes.

How did I come to non-reductive neurophilosophy? Let me sketch my biography a little. When I was young, I always wanted to study philosophy, the basic questions of the world, humans and the mind fascinated me – going down to the bottom of things. However, I did not want to study philosophy in isolation from the science. My fascination was and still is on the mind and specifically subjectivity as core feature of the mind. Subjectivity and mind are obviously key (...) topics in philosophy. However, having grown up from the mid/end of the 20 th century allowed me to also study the mind empirically and thus to complement philosophy by science. At my time there were no neuroscience programs yet. Hence, the only way to study the brain and its connection to the mind was to go into medicine which I did parallel to my philosophy studies. ER -. (shrink)

An English translation of Hegel's introduction to his lectures on the philosophy of history, based directly on the standard German edition by Johannes Hoffmeister, first published in 1955. The previous English translation, by J. Sibree, first appeared in 1857 and was based on the defective German edition of Karl Hegel, to which Hoffmeister's edition added a large amount of new material previously unknown to English readers, derived from earlier editors. In the introduction to his lectures, Hegel lays down the principles (...) and aims which underlie his philosophy of history, and provides an outline of the philosophy of history itself. The comprehensive and voluminous survey of world history which followed the introduction in the original lectures is of less interest to students of Hegel's thought than the introduction, and is therefore not included in this volume. (shrink)

The idea that we should simply live in the moment, and should not concern ourselves about the future or the past, has long been a staple of popular philosophy. In this paper, I first attempt to clarify the doctrine and then examine the case for accepting it. My conclusions are, first, that a number of its implications seem quite unpalatable; second, that the main advantages that living in the moment are said to yield are greatly overstated; and, third, that to (...) live by any version of the doctrine that was not highly watered down would be to sacrifice much of what gives meaning to our lives. (shrink)

This paper explores how whiteness as the transcendental norm shapes the meaning structure of Black-being-in-the-world. If home is a place, a site, a dwelling of acceptance, where one is allowed to feel safe, to relax, to let one’s guard down, then being Black in white supremacist America is anathema to being at home for Black people. Indeed, to be Black is to be a stranger, something “strange,” “scary,” “dangerous,” an “outsider.” To be Black within white America belies what it means (...) to dwell, to reside, to rest. In other words, one’s sense of racialized Black embodiment remains on guard, unsettled, hyperalert. Phenomenologically, there is a profound sense of alienation, where one’s racialized body is ostracized and shunned. On this score, I examine, within the mundane context of an elevator, how the dynamics of intersubjectivity and sociality are strained through the dynamics of the white gaze. The white gaze, among other things, functions to police the meaning of the Black body and attempts to de-subjectify Black embodiment. In this way, the only real perspective is white. Black bodies are deemed devoid of a perspective on the world as there is no subjectivity, no sense of agential meaning making. One might say that Black people, on this view, constitute an essence, a typified mode of being. Unlike the existentialist thesis where existence precedes essence, Black people are locked into an objecthood, a fungible and fixed essence. This racial and racist myth is what, for Schutz, would collapse the importance that he places on intersubjectivity and sociality. Indeed, within this paper, I delineate the threatening, necro-political dimensions of whiteness that I experienced after writing the well-known article “Dear White America.” That experience cemented, for me, and for many other readers, what it means to occupy the residence of whiteness, an abode that can take one’s life in the blink of an eye. The experience of the racialized stranger means walking a tightrope, a precarious situation where one flirts with death, where one’s body is deemed hypersexual, inferior, frightening, and monstrous. Based upon this construction, the white body is deemed the site of virtue, safety, deliverer, protector of all things white and pure. Think here of “the white man’s burden” or the idea of “white manifest destiny.” Stain, blemish, taint, and defilement are indelible markers of the stranger. And based upon the logics of racial purity, one must extinguish the “vermin,” the “criminals,” the “rapists.” While I don’t explore this within the paper, Schutz scholars will immediately recognize the genocidal implications of what would have been at stake for Schutz had he not escaped Adolf Hitler’s anti-Semitic gaze and his Anschluss of Austria. My sense is that Schutz would have understood not just the horrors of white racism but would appreciate the necessity of theorizing the need to rethink home as existentially capacious and intersubjectively vibrant. I conclude this paper by thinking through the concept of “breakdown”, delineating its spatial, phenomenological, and subjectively embodied implications. Breakdown, as I use the term, upends forms of white racialized habituation, creating possible embodied psychic space for what I term un-suturing, which involves undoing the machinations of white safety in the face of alterity, where the stranger invokes wonder and self-critique. (shrink)

The paper argues that the question of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms has been largely misconceived. Referencing comparable devices such as anonymity, noms de plume, and heteronyms, and drawing on Heidegger’s discussion of Kierkegaardian pseudonymity in the lectures on Parmenides, the paper further distinguishes between fictional characters (e. g. the Seducer and Assessor Vilhelm), noms de plume (H.H.), fictional editors, and pseudonyms proper. It is argued that in the first authorship only Constantin Constantius and Johannes Climacus approximate to the criteria Kierkegaard himself lays (...) down for pseudonymity. Furthermore, Kierkegaard’s anxieties regarding the form of publication of his works in the late 1840s reveals the whole project of pseudonymity collapsing into incoherence. By means of a comparison with Nietzsche, it is argued that Kierkegaard’s work is less a manifold of different literary personalities and more a play of revealing/concealing voices. In these voices there is nevertheless a literary watermark that makes Kierkegaard’s work as a whole distinctively Kierkegaardian. (shrink)

For far too many people for far too many years, schooling has been a debilitating, demoralizing, and ultimately dehumanizing experience. Make-shift, half-hearted, and watered-down reform measures have proved ineffective. Reform throws out the bath water, but keeps the baby. Radicalism recognizes not a baby but a beast lurks in the bath water and throws both out. This dramatic redefinition of schooling examines four models of dynamism as provided by Nietzsche, Whitehead, Dewey, and Freire. Nietzsche's af-firmation of dynamism is marred by (...) his elitism. Whitehead understands that inert cripple schooling. Without dialogue, ideas remain inert. Dewey misunderstands thinking and does not grasp its inherent double movement: toward order and disorder. Freire's pedagogy is transcended, with emphasis on negotiation between prime values. The final chapter expounds a radical pedagogy of dynamism. Miller argues that teaching and learning are not separate acts, but form a continuum. Within the teaching-learning continuum, all participants are spontaneous and receptive and seek to overcome fear of process, ambiguity, and doubt. The key to radical schooling is a pro-active stance toward creativity that allows for a dynamic integration of difference in dialogue. _Negotiating Toward Truth_ is a call to arms for all educators. The book asks us to look closely what is in the bath water and to have the courage to throw the beast out with the bath water. (shrink)

Physics and chemistry underlie the nature of all the world around us, including human brains. Consequently some suggest that in causal terms, physics is all there is. However, we live in an environment dominated by objects embodying the outcomes of intentional design (buildings, computers, teaspoons). The present day subject of physics has nothing to say about the intentionality resulting in existence of such objects, even though this intentionality is clearly causally effective. This paper examines the claim that the underlying physics (...) uniquely causally determines what happens, even though we cannot predict the outcome. It suggests that what occurs is the contextual emergence of complexity: the higher levels in the hierarchy of complexity have autonomous causal powers, functionally independent of lower level processes. This is possible because top-down causation takes place as well as bottom-up action, with higher level contexts determining the outcome of lower level functioning and even modifying the nature of lower level constituents. Stored information plays a key role, resulting in non-linear dynamics that is non-local in space and time. Brain functioning is causally affected by abstractions such as the value of money and the theory of the laser. These are realised as brain states in individuals, but are not equivalent to them. Consequently physics per se cannot causally determine the outcome of human creativity, rather it creates the possibility space allowing human intelligence to function autonomously. The challenge to physics is to develop a realistic description of causality in truly complex hierarchical structures, with top-down causation and memory effects allowing autonomous higher levels of order to emerge with genuine causal powers. (shrink)

This chapter responds to claims that causal closure of the underlying microphysics determines brain outcomes as a matter of principle, even if we cannot hope to ever carry out the needed calculations in practice. The reductionist position is that microphysics alone determines all, specifically the functioning of the brain. Here I respond to that claim in depth, claiming that if one firstly takes into account the difference between synchronic and diachronic emergence, and secondly takes seriously the well established nature of (...) biology in general and neuroscience in particular, downward causation enables genuine causal powers to occur at higher emergent levels in biology and that causal closure is in reality an interlevel affair involving even social levels. (shrink)

It may be laid down as a general working hypothesis that nothing is a problem that happens according to rule. It is usually assumed by scientists that only deviations from the rule are problematic. And in philosophy, if one is confronted by a diversity of events or data, the problems seem to arise on the occasion of trying to unify them in some way. The ways of philosophic unification are multiple. Philosophers have found unity in material substrata, in formal patterns, (...) in the achievement of purpose, in a single genetic source of things. If it is true that the pre-Socratics were above all interested in a material arché whose transformations were the objects of perceptual experience, the unity which they found would be that arché. Once found, some reason had to be given why the arché should appear to be so diversified. To take another, but somewhat dubious case, if the Pythagoreans were seeking for some geometrical formula which would underlie all diversities, then their program would be an example of the search for formal unity. Teleological patterns, the doctrine of divine creation, combinations of several such dogmas, would exemplify other types of unification. My point is that once some kind of unity is discovered, or assumed, the mind has a resting place and no further search is carried on. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Critics of Converse’s agenda‐setting 1964 essay underexplored the seemingly technical issue of measurement error. Down this road not taken lie serious questions about the evidence for both of Converse’s main theses. First, a thorough reexamination of the exact questions posed to a mass sample of the electorate and to an elite sample of congressional candidates suggests that the mass/elite difference in ideological constraint reported by Converse could be, in significant part, a measurement‐error artifact caused by differences in question form. (...) Furthermore, the vagueness and ambiguity of the questions not only calls into question the plausibility of Converse’s main thesis—lack of ideological constraint among the public—but of his subsidiary thesis: that, measured over time, members of the public had such unstable political opinions that they might best be considered “nonattitudes.”. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Critics of Converse’s agenda‐setting 1964 essay underexplored the seemingly technical issue of measurement error. Down this road not taken lie serious questions about the evidence for both of Converse’s main theses. First, a thorough reexamination of the exact questions posed to a mass sample of the electorate and to an elite sample of congressional candidates suggests that the mass/elite difference in ideological constraint reported by Converse could be, in significant part, a measurement‐error artifact caused by differences in question form. (...) Furthermore, the vagueness and ambiguity of the questions not only calls into question the plausibility of Converse’s main thesis—lack of ideological constraint among the public—but of his subsidiary thesis: that, measured over time, members of the public had such unstable political opinions that they might best be considered “nonattitudes.”. (shrink)

In this response, George Ellis comments on the publications of Part IV. He responds first to James Woodward, Richard Healey, Jan Voosholz, Simon Friederich and Sach Mukherjee, before outlining his thoughts on Max Kistler’s piece.

In this significant new addition to moral theory, George Harris challenges a view of the dignity and worth of persons that goes back through Kant and Christianity to the Stoics. He argues that we do not, in fact, believe this view, which traces any breakdowns of character to failures of strength. When it comes to what we actually value in ourselves and others, he says, we are far more Greek than Christian. At the most profound level, we value ourselves (...) as natural organisms, as animals, rather than as godlike beings who transcend nature. The Kantian-Christian-Stoic tradition holds that if we were fully able to realize our dignity as Kantians, Christians, or Stoics, we would be better, stronger people, and therefore less vulnerable to character breakdown. _Dignity and Vulnerability_ offers an opposing view, that sometimes character breaks down not because of some shortcoming in it but because of what is good about it, because of the very virtues and features of character that give us our dignity. If dignity can make us fragile and vulnerable to breakdown, then breakdown can be benign as well as harmful, and thus the conceptions of human dignity embedded in the tradition leading up to Kant are deeply mistaken. Harris proposes a foundation for our belief in human dignity in what we can actually know about ourselves, rather than in metaphysical or theological fantasy. Having gained this knowledge, we can understand the source of real strength. (shrink)

In this response, George Ellis comments on the publications of Part I. He responds first to Sara Green and Robert Batterman, before outlining his thoughts on Otávio Bueno’s piece.

The discussion begins with a familiar and defensible characterization of the eureka moment, according to which it is the unexpected product of separate and often seemingly incompatible perspectives. The principal aim of the discussion is to explain how, so characterized, vision-related eureka moments can occur. To fulfill this aim, the discussion employs a notion of crosstalk, in which cognitive interference slightly increases as a result of the creative thinker's considerable, albeit only partly successful, pre-eureka cognitive effort. Such crosstalk, it is (...) suggested, is likely to occur when top-down visual imaging repeatedly stimulates pyramidal cells closely apposed to others that, although simultaneously active, are part of bottom-up visual perception that is initially cognitively unrelated to such imaging. It is further suggested that local circuitry, in the form of inhibitory interneurons, can synchronize cells associated with these initially separate processes, thus causing subsequent perceptual patterns to be subtly modified by pre-eureka problem-solving imagery. This modification, it is claimed, may help explain the unexpected shift in visual perception that accompanies the creative thinker's eureka moment, a shift that can improve the thinker's subsequent understanding of the relevance of information to a problem's solution. (shrink)

I propose to demonstrate the clinical plausibility of the ‘psychotherapy scene’ of the Bacchae, which is subjected here to a purely psychiatric analysis: all my interpretations and conjectures are based on clinical data and psychiatric theory only. Euripides' objective and rational treatment of the irrational, the accuracy of his descriptions of abnormal behaviour, which are compatible, down to the last detail, with descriptions found in modern psychiatric texts, and his capacity to present not simply a partial list of symptoms, but (...) a coherent clinical picture are taken for granted and will not be discussed further in the present context. The focus of my enquiry is exclusively the psychiatric plausibility of Euripides' description of the psychotherapeutic process.It goes without saying that, since ‘instant cures’ are impossible, Euripides condensed a normally fairly long procedure into a single scene, selectively high-lighting only what would be the crucial moments of a real psychotherapy. His summary of the psychotherapy is as satisfactory as that of a modern psychiatrist. In fact, Euripides' masterly selectivity actually facilitates the understanding of the psychodynamics of Agave's recovery. This enables me to comment on the Euripidean text in exactly the same way as I commented on the verbatim transcript of the psychotherapy of one of my Plains Indian patients. (shrink)

Epicurus, born at Samos, Greece, in 341 BC, and died at Athens in 270 BC, founded a school of philosophy in the ancient world which has little to do with the meanings that surround the word "Epicureanism" today and more to do with living a mindful, simple life, maximizing simple pleasures and minimizing pain, such as the irrational fear of death--"Death is nothing to us, since when we are, death has not come, and when death has come, we are not." (...) Epicurus did not believe that humans would be punished for their sins after death, and stressed the search for lasting pleasures during the life we have, such as tranquility, friendship, and philosophical inquiry. What is good is what is pleasurable and what is bad is what is painful. Epicurus was a prolific author, but very few of his writings have come down to us. Included in this collection, edited and translated by George K. Strodach, are a collection of observations that were preserved by the biographer of ancient philosophers, Diogenes Laertius, and three important letters. (shrink)

My purpose in this essay is to provide a critical survey of arguments within recent analytic philosophy regarding the so-called “mind-body problem” with a particular view toward the relationship between these arguments and the philosophy of A.N. Whitehead (and Charles Hartshorne’s closely related views).1In course, I shall argue that Whitehead’s panexperientialist physicalism avoids paradoxes and difficulties of both materialist-physicalism and Cartesian dualismas advocated by a variety of analytic philosophers. However, and I believe that this point is not often sufficiently recognized, (...) analytic philosophy of mind is no monolith, and there are those who have found some form of panexperientialism to be attractive enough to merit serious consideration or even full-fledgedacceptance (David Chalmers, Thomas Nagel, Ralph Pred, William Seager, and Galen Strawson among them). A critical discussion of such thinkers should beincluded in any adequate survey of the relation between process panexperientialism and the analytic tradition. Moreover, the revisionary strain of the analyticaltradition which looks to natural science for its construction of worldviews (Broad, Russell, Bunge, Carnap, Quine, etc.) would move us in the direction of examining arguments concerning Whitehead’s view and contemporary empirical scientific considerations. (For a discussion of the basic nature of analytic philosophy and the descriptive and revisionary approaches contained within it, see my Process and Analysis, 5-9, 12-13, 57; and McHenry.) Here I shall argue that Whiteheadian panexperientialism very naturally accommodates important aspects of quantum theory, including the top-down causation involved in neuroplastic phenomena under a quantum mechanical interpretation of brain processes and in so-called Quantum Zeno Effect. The overall picture which emerges is that Whitehead’s position is (at the very least) a strongly plausible alternative in philosophy of mind.While I must confess that this essay can only represent the merest sketch—indeed an adequate treatment of the richly complex interpretive, comparative, and substantive philosophical issues here requires at the very least a monograph—I nonetheless hope to present a coherent and useful précis of major arguments and comparative conceptual relationships, especially for the reader who may not be readily familiar with this terrain. I thus hope that this essay will serve as a short expository and critical introduction to the interface between process and analytic philosophy of mind, and a presentation of the several theoretical advantages gained by listening to Whitehead’s theory as it connects with concerns of analytic philosophers.I shall proceed by first working though the main outlines of John Searle’s important and widely reaching “The Recent History of Materialism,” an essay which exposes critical flaws in a variety of materialist theories in ways which Whiteheadians should find especially fitting and congenial. I shall then examine defenses of dualism and the relation of Whitehead to such defenses, followed by a separate section on Chalmers, Nagel, and Pred. I will then consider a number ofimportant objections to process panexperientialism, including objections arising from the work of Jaegwon Kim and John Searle. I close with a discussion of thementioned empirical scientific arguments. (shrink)

In societies with a history of racial oppression, present-day relations between members of different racialised groups are often difficult, tense, prone to escalate into open hostility. This can partly be put down to the persistence of racist beliefs and sentiments. But it is plausible to think there are also non-racist ways in which societal relations between members of different racialised groups go seriously wrong. This is not to downplay the extent to which racism persists: rather, the point is that there (...) exist forms of race-based interaction which, though not racist, are objectionable in their own right. Social equality theory—which understands the ideal of equality not distributively but relationally—can help us to identify and delineate some of these. Taking a social egalitarian approach, I argue that one can identify at least three types of distinctively race-based social inequality, besides racism, which need to be overcome before a society of equals can be realised: ‘racial stigma’, ‘rac... (shrink)

In a review in JHS lxxxix 127 Dr M. L. West gives as an example of ‘a certain innocence on matters of literary history’ the belief that seven-stringed lyres ‘came in’ in the seventh century B.C. Since the emphasis in the context is upon rigorous down-dating, what Dr West seems to be saying is that seven-stringed lyres were not in use amongst the Greeks before about 600 B.C. I hope that I do not misunderstand Dr West's contention: the purpose of (...) this short note is to suggest, with the greatest respect and deference, that another view of the matter may perhaps be permissible.Let us ignore the seven-stringed musical instrument shown on the Ayia Triadha sarcophagus, because evidence from the Late Bronze Age may be thought too remote to be relevant to early Hellenic musical practice. Let us also leave aside ancient opinions associating Terpander with the seven-stringed lyre and assigning him to the first half of the seventh century B.C.. Dr West may well regard the putting of trust in such testimonies as evidence of incorrigible amateurism. There remains, nevertheless, a contemporary witness to the existence of seven-stringed lyres amongst the Greeks of the seventh century B.C.In JHS lxxi 248, fig. 8, there is illustrated a fragment of a Subgeometric dinos of the first half of the seventh century B.C. from the excavations at Old Smyrna. On the piece is painted a seven-stringed lyre. The lines representing strings are carefully distinguished and spaced. It would be extravagant to assert that the artist could not count, or that he was suffering from hallucinations, or that he was imagining a type of instrument never seen by himself or his customers. In short, a tentative suggestion may be made—with due deference and hesitation: scholars, including those whom in this particular matter Dr West would, it seems, classify as innocents, ‘can seriously argue’ that seven-stringed lyres were reintroduced to Greece or ‘came in’ well within the first half of the seventh century B.C. (shrink)

Amidst the constantly augmenting gastronomic capital of celebrity chefs, this study scrutinizes from a critical discourse analytic angle how Jamie Oliver has managed to carve a global brand identity through a process that is termed (dis)placed branding. A roadmap is furnished as to how Italy as place brand and Italianness are discursively articulated, (dis)placed and appropriated in Jamie Oliver’s travelogues which are reflected in his global brand identity. By enriching the CDA methodological toolbox with a deconstructive reading strategy, it is (...) shown that Oliver’s celebrity equity ultimately boils down to supplementing the localized meaning of place of origin with a simulacral, hyperreal place of origin. In this manner, the celebrity’s recipes become more original than the original or doubly original. The (dis)placed branding process that is outlined in the face of Oliver’s global branding strategy is critically discussed with reference to the employed discursive strategies, lexicogrammatical and multimodal choices. (shrink)

This article offers a logical analysis of Slippery Slope Arguments. Such arguments claim that adopting a certain act or policy would take us down a slippery slope to an undesirable bottom and infer from this that we should refrain from this act or policy. Even though a logical assessment of such arguments has not received much careful attention, it is of vital importance to their overall assessment because if the premises fail to support the conclusion an argument is worthless. I (...) partition slippery slope reasoning by means of two dichotomies (reasoning under certainty vs. uncertainty and one-step vs. multiple-step reasoning) into four general categories and evaluate these in turn. The analysis reveals that slippery slope arguments are logically fallacious. (shrink)

Did the first men dream their voyages before making them? Or did they have to first take to the sea so as to be able to later embark on the ship of their imagination and thus embroider on accounts of their journeys? Is it the prestige of the dream that spurred them on to run the risk of translating it into a real experience? Or is it the account of authentic voyages that supported that of imaginary voyages? These are questions (...) that make one dream and that we continue to ask ourselves, even though we suspect that they are idle, since it is impossible to answer them with certitude. All that we know, or think we know, is that among the first written testimonies that have come down to us, real and imaginary voyages are mixed and confused in an alloy of a homogeneity that resists analysis and is perhaps an image of the reception they had from their original public. Who knows if the Greeks who listened in the middle of the first millennium B.C. to the poets singing the return of Ulysses to Ithaca, could, or wanted to, untangle the part of truth from that of poetry? Who knows if the Arabs who, at the end of the following millennium heard the enchanting tale of the voyages of Sinbad, distinguished, as the Western orientalists of the 19th century must have done, the real ports of call and the shipwrecks experienced in the dreamed places and fantastic adventures? (shrink)

This essay is based on a close reading of two poems written by ChatGPT. One is about preimplantation genetic testing; the other is about Down syndrome. Examining these AI-generated poems along with several human-composed texts, the author—the father of a young woman with Down syndrome—explores a number of related topics, including the difference between human- and machine-written poetry; ableist bias in large language models; the future of people with intellectual disabilities, in a world of machine intelligence; and the value of (...) writing by people with disabilities. The author does not reject the use of ChatGPT or preimplantation genetic diagnosis, but argues that for them to be compatible with human flourishing, we need to consider the way they are sold to us, the need for regulation, and the assumptions they embed. (shrink)

The detection and categorization of animate motions is a crucial task underlying social interaction and perceptual decision making. Neural representations of perceived animate objects are partially located in the primate cortical region STS, which is a region that receives convergent input from intermediate-level form and motion representations. Populations of STS cells exist which are selectively responsive to specific animated motion sequences, such as walkers. It is still unclear how and to what extent form and motion information contribute to the generation (...) of such representations and what kind of mechanisms are involved in the learning processes. The article develops a cortical model architecture for the unsupervised learning of animated motion sequence representations. We demonstrate how the model automatically selects significant motion patterns as well as meaningful static form prototypes characterized by a high degree of articulation. Such key poses are selectively reinforced during learning through a cross talk between the motion and form processing streams. Furthermore, we show how sequence-selective representations are learned in STS by fusing static form and motion input from the segregated bottom-up driving input streams. Cells in STS, in turn, feed their activities recurrently to their input sites along top-down signal pathways. We show how such learned feedback connections enable predictions about future input as anticipation generated by sequence-selective STS cells. Network simulations demonstrate the computational capacity of the proposed model by reproducing several experimental findings from neurosciences and by accounting for recent behavioral data. (shrink)