It is still a widespread assumption that metaphysics and ontology deal with roughly the same questions. They are supposed to be concerned with the fundamental nature of reality and to give an account of the meaning of 'existence' or 'being' in line with the broadest possible metaphysical assumptions. Against this, Markus Gabriel proposes a radical form of ontological pluralism that divorces ontology from metaphysics, understood as the most fundamental theory of absolutely everything. He argues that the concept of existence is (...) incompatible with the existence of the world and therefore proposes his innovative no-world-view. In the context of recent debates surrounding new realism and speculative realism, Gabriel also develops the outlines of a realist epistemological pluralism. His idea here is that there are different forms of knowledge that correspond to the plurality of fields of sense that must be acknowledged in order to avoid the trap of metaphysics. (shrink)
Where do we come from? Are we merely a cluster of elementary particles in a gigantic world receptacle? And what does it all mean? In this highly original new book, the philosopher Markus Gabriel challenges our notion of what exists and what it means to exist. He questions the idea that there is a world that encompasses everything like a container life, the universe, and everything else. This all-inclusive being does not exist and cannot exist. For the world itself is (...) not found in the world. And even when we think about the world, the world about which we think is obviously not identical with the world in which we think. For, as we are thinking about the world, this is only a very small event in the world. Besides this, there are still innumerable other objects and events: rain showers, toothaches and the World Cup. Drawing on the recent history of philosophy, Gabriel asserts that the world cannot exist at all, because it is not found in the world. Yet with the exception of the world, everything else exists; even unicorns on the far side of the moon wearing police uniforms. Revelling in witty thought experiments, word play, and the courage of provocation, Markus Gabriel demonstrates the necessity of a questioning mind and the role that humour can play in coming to terms with the abyss of human existence. (shrink)
ABSTRACTWhilst agreeing with Robert Pippin that Hegel undertakes his philosophical enterprise in light of Kant's insights into the failings of pre-critical metaphysics, this paper outlines the shortcomings of Pippin's Hegel interpretation by contrasting what I call 'apperceptive idealism' on the one hand with 'transcendental ontology' on the other. By privileging subject over substance, Pippin commits Hegel to an ontologically modest form of Kantianism that, in missing how reality as a whole is the main topic of Hegel’s philosophy, leaves no room (...) for a crucial Hegelian task, namely accounting for the presence of self-conscious thinking in nature. Appreciating the nature of Hegel's true ambitions whilst remaining aware of how his Logic maps a 'realm of shadows', opens up the possibility of understanding his philosophy as forging a middle path: Hegel is neither the subjective idealist of Pippin's interpretation nor the advocate of a revival of first-order metaphysical theorising depicted by so many of Pippin's critics. (shrink)
This collection of essays provides an exemplary overview of the diversity and relevance of current scholarship on German Idealism. The importance of German Idealism for contemporary philosophy has received growing attention and acknowledgment throughout competing fields of contemporary philosophy. Part of the growing interest rests on the claim that the works of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel remain of considerable interest for cultural studies, sociology, theology, aesthetics and other areas of interest. In the domain of philosophy, the renaissance of innovative readings (...) of German Idealism has taken scholarly debates beyond merely antiquarian perspectives. This renaissance has been a major factor of current efforts to bridge the gap between so-called “analytic” and so-called “continental” philosophy. The volume provides a selection of well-chosen examples of readings that contribute to systematic treatments of philosophical problems. It contains contributions by Markus Gabriel, Robert Pippin, Anders Moe Rasmussen, Sebastian Rödl. (shrink)
In this essay I consider the relationship between Heidegger’s famous “turn” and realism. I begin with Heidegger’s critique of the problem of an external world, and I describe how this critique anticipates New Realism. I then provide a reconstruction of Heidegger’s self-critique of Being and Time, showing how this work exhibits a higher-order antirealism. Next, I show how Heidegger’s turn is motivated by the inadequacy of this earlier anti-realism. In his philosophy of the event he moves towards a realist ontology (...) by developing concepts such as “destiny”, which he understands to be independent of human attitudes. Nevertheless, Heidegger ultimately falls back into an anti-realism, because Being still remains dependent upon the involvement of human beings. I therefore conclude this essay by briefly arguing for my own version of New Realism, according to which objects are meaningful in a way that is independent of our attitudes towards them. (shrink)
In Being and Time Heidegger gives preference to Hegel’s ontology of time over earlier conceptions of time, on account of his insight that time is in some sense neither subjective nor objective. However, he objects to Hegel’s method of unfolding the concept of time, which according to him relapses into a “vulgar” conception of presence as an empty point. Heidegger confuses Hegel’s method with an object-level claim about the ontology of time and, therefore, misses—among other things—the crucial Hegelian insight from (...) the philosophy of nature and subjective spirit that time has to be embodied by thinkers. Historical time is not an automated, ontotheological process of absolute spirit’s self-revelation, but rather a conception of the human being as free agent. (shrink)
The paper reconstructs Hegel’s repudiation of any kind of transcendent metaphysics. Hegel argues that transcendent metaphysics is dialectically incoherent because it mistakes its own reflection for an absolute independent of reflection. Hence, it is subject to a reification of philosophical thought. This entails that the relation between logic and philosophy of nature in Hegel must not be interpreted as any kind of emanation. Otherwise, Hegel would himself be subject to his effective critique of transcendent metaphysics.
Palabras pronunciadas por Markus Gabriel en el marco del encuentro internacional "Presente del idealismo alemán" organizado por el Departamento de Filosofía de la Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Conferencia que tuvo lugar el 9 de octubre de 2009.
Speech given by Markus Gabriel within the international meeting “Presente del idealismo alemán” organized by the Philosophy Department of the Universidad Nacional de Colombia. This conference was held on October 9, 2009.
The paper reconstructs Hegel’s repudiation of any kind of transcendent metaphysics. Hegel argues that transcendent metaphysics is dialectically incoherent because it mistakes its own reflection for an absolute independent of reflection. Hence, it is subject to a reification of philosophical thought. This entails that the relation between logic and philosophy of nature in Hegel must not be interpreted as any kind of emanation. Otherwise, Hegel would himself be subject to his effective critique of transcendent metaphysics.
Since it can reasonably be taken for granted that the Gods of pagan mythology have been products of human cognitive activities, there is an obvious relation between our most general concepts of consciousness and the possibility of an understanding of mythology. In order to hint at the insuffiency of the modern idea of an autonomous subject, which is devoid of any content that cannot be construed as a moment of self-conscious reflection, it is necessary to go back to both ancient (...) greek metaphysics and mythology. Ancient metaphysics does not yet fully articulate the idea of an autonomous subjectivity. Therefore, it is better understood in terms of ontonomy, i.e. metaphysical thought of what there ultimately is. In the paper it is argued that metaphysical ontonomy has its origin in mythological theonomy. The very idea of an emancipation of logos from myth is itself mythological. Hence, self-consciousness may be interpreted as a self-explication of mythology. In the very act of reflecting itself in human consciousness, the “Being” hides its mythological, artistic nature. However, this could not be made intelligible without the help of mythology itself because it is impossible to talk about Ontonomy let alone Theonomy in theoretical propositions. (shrink)
Die nicht zuletzt im Zuge der Deklaration eines,,nachmetaphysischen Zeitalters" für überzogen gehaltenen epistemologischen Ansprüche der klassischen Metaphysik scheinen sich auch und vor allem in der Auseinandersetzung mit skeptischen Argumenten bzw. Paradoxien tatsächlich als unhaltbar herauszustellen. Wenn sich bereits alltägliche Wissensansprüche unter dem Seziermesser skeptischen Scharfsinns als insgesamt problematische Klasse entlarven lassen, wie sollte man dann noch sinnvoll Metaphysik betreiben können? Doch der Anschein trügt, wie die Beiträge des vorliegenden Sammelbandes ausführlich darlegen. Dieses Buch reagiert damit auf einen aktuellen internationalen Trend, (...) denn neueste Arbeiten auf dem Gebiet der theoretischen Diagnose des Ursprungs skeptischer Argumente bzw. Paradoxien zeigen deutlich, dass gerade den dominanten neuzeitlichen Formulierungen skeptischer Probleme metaphysische Voraussetzungen zugrunde liegen, die von den großen Projekten der Metaphysik, die im Buch zur Sprache kommen, nicht geteilt werden. MIT BEITRÄGEN VON: Jarnes Conant, Michael Forster, Paul Franks, Hans Friedrich Fulda, Markus Gabriel, Leo Groarke, Jens Halfwassen, Anton Friedrich Koch, Dominik Perler, Jens Rometsch, Klaus Vieweg, Jörg Volbers, Michael Williams und Stephan Zimmermann. (shrink)