Over the course of the last four decades, William Leon McBride has distinguished himself as one of the most esteemed and accomplished philosophers of his generation. This volume—which celebrates the occasion of his seventy-fifth birthday—includes contributions from colleagues, friends, and formers students and pays tribute to McBride’s considerable achievements as a teacher, mentor, and scholar.

Human rights declarations are instruments used to introduce universal standards of ethics. The UN’s Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework (Ruggie, Protect, respect, and remedy: A Framework for business and human rights. UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, 2008; Guiding principles on business and human rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” framework. UN Doc A/HRC/17/31, 2011) intends to provide guidance for corporate behavior in regard to human rights. This article applies concepts from the field of organizational justice to the arena of (...) business and human rights for the purpose of operationalizing the UN Framework. This approach facilitates the recognition of gaps between perceptions of justice held by stakeholders versus businesses and/or the State. Such recognition raises the potential for addressing issues that lead to divergent perceptions of justice, thus potentially improving the human rights performance of businesses. The research also shows the potential for complicity of businesses in human rights abuses and exposes a fundamental weakness in the UN Framework, which attempts to draw a sharp distinction between duties of States versus responsibilities of business. We illustrate this approach through analysis of the case of Goldcorp’s Marlin Mine in Guatemala; an extractive industry project that affects indigenous communities. (shrink)

This article argues that considering cross-sector collaborations through the lens of indigenous-corporate engagements yields a more comprehensive understanding of the range of cross-sector engagement types, emphasizes the importance of cross-cultural bridge building which has received little attention in the literature :849–873, 2005), and highlights the potential for innovation via collaborations with fringe stakeholders. The study offers a more overarching typology of cross-sector collaborations and, building on an ethical approach to sustainable development with indigenous peoples, proposes a theoretical framework for cross-cultural (...) bridge building between businesses and fringe stakeholders. By incorporating this framework into the literature on value creation in cross-sector collaborations, we suggest a model for value creation in cross-sector collaborations with fringe stakeholders. Finally, using case studies to illustrate the article’s theoretical arguments, we demonstrate the model’s usefulness for the analysis and development of indigenous-corporate collaborations. (shrink)

In this article, we suggest that one of the unexplored paths toward collaboration between firms and civil society organizations starts with confrontation or potential conflict, and that the transition toward collaboration can be further understood if one focuses on triadic relationships rather than dyadic ones. We analyze the presence of third parties and their different roles to explain how collaboration is facilitated. The article aims at bringing together the bodies of research on business–civil society confrontation and on business–civil society collaboration. (...) It offers a comparative analysis of four case studies, and proposes a typology of third parties composed of facilitating allies, participating allies, mediators, and solution seekers. We conclude with some implications for further research as well as for practice. (shrink)

This article argues that considering cross-sector collaborations through the lens of indigenous-corporate engagements yields a more comprehensive understanding of the range of cross-sector engagement types, emphasizes the importance of cross-cultural bridge building which has received little attention in the literature (Selsky and Parker, J Manag 31(6):849-873, 2005), and highlights the potential for innovation via collaborations with fringe stakeholders. The study offers a more overarching typology of cross-sector collaborations and, building on an ethical approach to sustainable development with indigenous peoples (Lertzman (...) and Vredenburg, J Bus Ethics 56:239-254, 2005), proposes a theoretical framework for cross-cultural bridge building between businesses and fringe stakeholders. By incorporating this framework into the literature on value creation in cross-sector collaborations, we suggest a model for value creation in cross-sector collaborations with fringe stakeholders. Finally, using case studies to illustrate the article's theoretical arguments, we demonstrate the model's usefulness for the analysis and development of indigenous-corporate collaborations. (shrink)

This research uses a survey to analyze types of benefits sought by partners in cross-sector collaborations in Spain and to test and build upon theories that indicate prior collaboration experience and partner alignment will positively affect value creation through the collaboration. Using exploratory factor analysis to operationalize a broad range of potential benefits into more specific concepts, the results of this study identify distinct factors that characterize the types of benefits sought by non-profit organizations and businesses engaged in cross-sector collaborations. (...) Findings show that prior experience and alignment positively affect each factor for value creation. Prior experience is also found to influence the type of benefits sought from cross-sector collaborations and to positively affect alignment in terms of mission and strategy. Unexpectedly, the study also finds that prior experience moderates the effect of alignment on value creation. (shrink)

Rapid tissue donation (RTD) is an advancing oncology research procedure for collecting tumors, metastases, and unaffected tissue 2–6 h after death. Researchers can better determine rates of progression, response to treatment, and polymorphic differences among patients. Cancer patients may inquire about posthumous body donation for research to offer a personal contribution to research; however, there are barriers to recruiting for an RTD program. Physicians must reassure the patient that their treatment options and quality of care will not be compromised due (...) to participating in RTD. In this commentary we discuss how theories of altruism may explain cancer patients’ desire to participate in an RTD program, the ethical concerns of health care professionals and patients and the use of altruism as a recruitment strategy. We offer recommendations for examining the cultural and ethical climate of the institution prior to initiating such a program such as examining the relationship of healthcare professionals and patients, identifying ethical concerns, and examining ways to promote acceptance and buy-in across professionals, patients, and families. (shrink)

About a year after the start of the Iraq War, a story broke about the abuse of Iraqi detainees by American soldiers at the Abu Ghraib prison. Editorialists and science writers noted affinities between what happened at Abu Ghraib and Philip Zimbardo’s famous 1971 Stanford Prison Experiment. Zimbardo’s experiment is part of the “situationist” literature in social psychology, which suggests that the contexts in which agents act have a larger influence on behavior, and that personality traits have a smaller influence, (...) than is ordinarily supposed. Recently, there has been increased interest among philosophers in research like Zimbardo’s and its potential for influencing ethical theories. This increase is due in part to the publication of John Doris’ Lack of Character. More recently, Doris and Dominic Murphy have argued that soldiers, including those at Abu Ghraib, often act under conditions of moral excuse because the situational pressures to which they are exposed impair their capacities for moral judgment. I argue that soldiers can be morally responsible for wartime behavior even if their moral capacities have been substantially impaired. (shrink)

This is a short introduction to a book symposium on Paul Gowder's recent book, _The Rule of Law in thee Real World_ (Cambridge University Press, 2016). The book symposium will appear in the St. Luis University Law Journal, 62 St. Louis U. L.J., -- (2018), with commentaries on Gowder's book by colleen Murphy, Robin West, Chad Flanders, and Matthew Lister, along with replies by Paul Gowder.

We are happy to announce that Volume 8 of Libertarian Papers is now available in a print edition. This volume contains all Libertarian Papers articles for 2016, including contributions by scholars like Jan Narveson, Billy Christmas, Peter Lewin, Ryan Murphy, Aiden P. Gregg, and many others. It also covers a wide range of the most pressing and controversial topics in ….

Postcolonial science studies entails ostensibly contradictory critical and empirical commitments. Science studies scholars influenced by Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers embrace forms of realist, radical empiricism, while postcolonial studies scholars influenced by Jacques Derrida trace the limits of the knowable. This essay takes their common use of the term cosmopolitics as an unexpected point of departure for reconciling Derrida’s program with Stengers’s and Latour’s. I read Derrida’s critique of hospitality and Stengers’s and Latour’s ontological politics as necessary complements for conceiving (...) a care-oriented subalternist cosmopolitics, a process of composing common worlds that remains attentive to the limits of representation. (shrink)

Suppose we consider knowledge to be valuable because of the role known propositions play in practical reasoning. This, I argue, does not provide a reason to think that knowledge is valuable in itself. Rather, it provides a reason to think that true belief is valuable from one standpoint, and that justified belief is valuable from another standpoint, and similarly for other epistemic concepts. The value of the concept of knowledge is that it provides an economical way of talking about many (...) epistemic concepts that are valuable in itself from one standpoint or another. In this way knowledge is like a Swiss Army Knife; a Swiss Army Knife is not useful as such on any occasion, but it provides an efficient way of carrying around different tools that are useful in themselves on different occasions. (shrink)

On the one hand, Hume accepts the view -- which he attributes primarily to Stoicism -- that there exists a determinate best and happiest life for human beings, a way of life led by a figure whom Hume calls "the true philosopher." On the other hand, Hume accepts that view -- which he attributes to Scepticism -- that there exists a vast plurality of good and happy lives, each potentially equally choiceworthy. In this paper, I reconcile Hume's apparently conflicting commitments: (...) I argue that Hume's "Sceptical" pluralism about the character of the happiest life need not conflict with his "Stoic" advocacy of the supreme happiness of the true philosopher, given Hume's flexible understanding of how one might live as a true philosopher. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics X.7–8, Aristotle defends a striking view about the good for human beings. According to Aristotle, the single happiest way of life is organized around philosophical contemplation. According to the narrowness worry, however, Aristotle's contemplative ideal is unduly Procrustean, restrictive, inflexible, and oblivious of human diversity. In this paper, I argue that Aristotle has resources for responding to the narrowness worry, and that his contemplative ideal can take due account of human diversity.

In Plato’s Symposium, the mysterious Apollodorus recounts to an unnamed comrade, and to us, Aristodemus’ story of just what happened at Agathon’s drinking party. Since Apollodorus did not attend the party, however, it is unclear what relevance he could have to our understanding of Socrates’ speech, or to the Alcibiadean “satyr and silenic drama” (222d) that follows. The strangeness of Apollodorus is accentuated by his recession into the background after only two Stephanus pages. What difference—if any—does Apollodorus make to the (...) Symposium? Does his inclusion call the dramatic and philosophical unity of the work into question? I argue that despite initial appearances, Plato has important philosophical reasons for including Apollodorus as a character. Far from being an odd appendage to an otherwise complete narrative, the figure of Apollodorus is useful for our understanding of Socrates’s conception of eros later in the work. (shrink)

The impressive variation amongst biological individuals generates many complexities in addressing the simple-sounding question what is a biological individual? A distinction between evolutionary and physiological individuals is useful in thinking about biological individuals, as is attention to the kinds of groups, such as superorganisms and species, that have sometimes been thought of as biological individuals. More fully understanding the conceptual space that biological individuals occupy also involves considering a range of other concepts, such as life, reproduction, and agency. There has (...) been a focus in some recent discussions by both philosophers and biologists on how evolutionary individuals are created and regulated, as well as continuing work on the evolution of individuality. (shrink)

The Collective Imagination explores the social foundations of the human imagination. A comprehensive audit of the creativity claims of the post-modern age - that finds them badly wanting and looks to the future - this book will appeal to sociologists and philosophers concerned with cultural theory, cultural and media studies and aesthetics.

This chapter offers a general outline of Schopenhauer’s peculiarly named concept of the 'acquired character’ and explains its basic function in his ethical thought. For Schopenhauer, a person of acquired character is someone who knows the ways of acting (Handlungsweise) that are most expressive of their individuality and who allows that self-knowledge to structure their practical and emotional life. In keeping with certain elements of his psychological determinism, acquired character is not the acquisition of a ‘new’ character; rather, it is (...) the acquisition of self-knowledge of one’s essentially fixed empirical character. It is part of the argument of this chapter that by introducing the acquired character into his reflections on human action and agency Schopenhauer weaves a certain view of individual flourishing (eudaimonia) into his ethics. There are two central ingredients of Schopenhauer’s conception of eudaimonia, and both are linked to the acquired character. The first is self-knowledge; the second is a sense of personal autonomy that follows in the wake of the first. The chapter ends with a brief attempt to connect Schopenhauer’s concept of acquired character to contemporary debates in ethics concerning autonomy, practical identity, and what some call the ‘normative significance of self’. (shrink)

This volume identifies, discusses and addresses the wide array of ethical issues that have emerged for engineers due to the rise of a global economy. To date, there has been no systematic treatment of the particular challenges globalization poses for engineering ethics standards and education. This volume concentrates on precisely this challenge. Scholars and practitioners from diverse national and professional backgrounds discuss the ethical issues emerging from the inherent symbiotic relationship between the engineering profession and globalization. Through their discussions a (...) deeper and more complete understanding of the precise ways in which globalization impacts the formulation and justification of ethical standards in engineering as well as the curriculum and pedagogy of engineering ethics education emerges. (shrink)

This book addresses a range of relevant theoretical issues, including the possibility of an interpersonally comparable measure of well-being, or “utility” metric; the moral value of equality, and how that bears on the form of the social welfare function; social choice under uncertainty; and the possibility of integrating considerations of individual choice and responsibility into the social-welfare-function framework. This book also deals with issues of implementation, and explores how survey data and other sources of evidence might be used to calibrate (...) both a utility metric and a social welfare function, and whether distributive goals are ever best pursued through regulation rather than the tax system. In working through this range of theoretical and practical issues, the book draws from a wide variety of literatures, including philosophical scholarship on equality, responsibility, the nature of well-being, and personal identity over time; the social choice literature within economics; applied economic literatures concerning the measurement of inequality and poverty; legal and policy-analysis scholarship on cost-benefit analysis, environmental justice, and the choice between regulation and taxation; and the burgeoning field of “happiness studies”. (shrink)

I distinguish two ways of explaining our capacity for ‘transparent’ knowledge of our own present beliefs, perceptions, and intentions: an inferential and a reflective approach. Alex Byrne (2011) has defended an inferential approach, but I argue that this approach faces a basic difficulty, and that a reflective approach avoids the difficulty. I conclude with a brief sketch and defence of a reflective approach to our transparent self-knowledge, and I show how this approach is connected with the thesis that we must (...) distinguish between a kind of self-knowledge that is of oneself as agent and another kind that is of oneself as patient. (shrink)

In the mathematics education research literature, there is a growing body of scholarship on how mathematicians practice their craft. The purpose of this chapter is to survey some of this literature and explain how it can contribute to the philosophy of mathematical practice. We first describe how mathematics educators use empirical methodologies to investigate the behaviors of mathematicians and argue that findings from these studies can inform the philosophy of mathematical practice. We then illustrate this by summarizing research on mathematicians’ (...) understandings and mathematicians’ proof reading. (shrink)

An apparently quite specific question that was addressed by both Confucius and Socrates has attracted much attention in Sino-Hellenistic comparative philosophy. Their respective responses to the question of how a son should respond if his father commits a crime are found in Confucius' Analects 13:18 and in Plato's Euthyphro. This essay assesses three comparative analyses of these responses with particular reference to their underlying assertions of commonality, that is, the assumptions or presuppositions of commonality that serve to justify the comparative (...) exercise in the first instance. The authors suggest that two of the analyses assert commonality between their two responses from a Confucian standpoint, while the third constructs commonality from a Socratic standpoint. The authors argue that the response of Confucius focuses specifically on the issue of xiao (filial piety) in the concrete situation presented to him, whereas Socrates uses the issue to investigate the different question known as the "Euthyphro dilemma." Some brief conclusions are drawn regarding comparative philosophical analysis in general and about comparing the responses of Confucius and Socrates in these passages in particular. (shrink)

What is it to know someone? Epistemologists rarely take up this question, though recent developments make such inquiry possible and desirable. This paper advances an account of how such interpersonal knowledge goes beyond mere propositional and qualitative knowledge about someone, giving a central place to second-personal treatment. It examines what such knowledge requires, and what makes it distinctive within epistemology as well as socially. It assesses its theoretic value for several issues in moral psychology, epistemic injustice, and philosophy of mind. (...) And it offers an account of the complex content in play if interpersonal knowledge is to be understood in terms of its mental states and their functions. (shrink)

This dissertation develops a reading of Arthur Schopenhauer’s theory of agency and autonomy that centers on the notion of the acquired character. I argue for a non-homuncular functionalist reading of Schopenhauerian self-government. On my reading, to be self-governing in Schopenhauer’s sense is just for a certain organizational structure to obtain between one’s individual character and one’s motivation. This structure is put in place through the hard-fought achievement of acquiring genuine self-knowledge of one’s characteristic patterns of acting, evaluative commitments, and, most (...) importantly, one’s volitional necessities. This is the achievement of what he calls the 'acquired character'. My reading also stresses the importance of the phenomena of self-expression and sublimation for Schopenhauer's view of autonomy. I also explore the overlap between Schopenhauer's views and contemporary non-homuncular models of agency, particularly Harry Frankfurt’s hierarchical model of agency, on the one hand, and Michael E. Bratman’s planning theory of autonomous self-governance, on the other. Whereas others have been skeptical of the very idea of Schopenhauerian autonomy, I argue that these reservations rest on a failure to recognize the non-homuncular option. An exploration of contemporary philosophical work on agency helps make this point stick. In the final chapter, I propose that we can see Nietzsche's famous prescription that we ‘give style' to our character as carrying forward certain elements of Schopenhauer's view of autonomy, particularly its aesthetic dimensions. This accomplishes two things. First, it shows that Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche goes deeper into the latter's ethical thought than many tend to think. Second, it points towards an elaboration of the view of Schopenhauerian autonomy that I establish earlier on. With the aesthetic dimensions of agency in view, acquired character can be seen as a process through which an agent develops an individual style of acting; it is a process through which one comes to fully act within themselves by embodying their character, just as the best stage and screen actors do. (shrink)

Surprisingly little has been written about hedged assertion. Linguists often focus on semantic or syntactic theorizing about, for example, grammatical evidentials or epistemic modals, but pay far less attention to what hedging does at the level of action. By contrast, philosophers have focused extensively on normative issues regarding what epistemic position is required for proper assertion, yet they have almost exclusively considered unqualified declaratives. This essay considers the linguistic and normative issues side-by-side. We aim to bring some order and clarity (...) to thinking about hedging, so as to illuminate aspects of interest to both linguists and philosophers. In particular, we consider three broad questions. 1) The structural question: when one hedges, what is the speaker’s commitment weakened from? 2) The functional question: what is the best way to understand how a hedge weakens? And 3) the taxonomic question: are hedged assertions genuine assertions, another speech act, or what? (shrink)

An apparently quite specific question that was addressed by both Confucius and Socrates has attracted much attention in Sino-Hellenistic comparative philosophy. Their respective responses to the question of how a son should respond if his father commits a crime are found in Confucius' Analects 13:18 and in Plato's Euthyphro. This essay assesses three comparative analyses of these responses with particular reference to their underlying assertions of commonality, that is, the assumptions or presuppositions of commonality that serve to justify the comparative (...) exercise in the first instance. The authors suggest that two of the analyses assert commonality between their two responses from a Confucian standpoint, while the third constructs commonality from a Socratic standpoint. The authors argue that the response of Confucius focuses specifically on the issue of xiao in the concrete situation presented to him, whereas Socrates uses the issue to investigate the different question known as the "Euthyphro dilemma." Some brief conclusions are drawn regarding comparative philosophical analysis in general and about comparing the responses of Confucius and Socrates in these passages in particular. (shrink)

Prioritarianism is a moral view that ranks outcomes according to the sum of a strictly increasing and strictly concave transformation of individual well-being. Prioritarianism is ‘welfarist’ (namel...

This collection of essays forms a lively debate over the fundamental characteristics of legal and moral rights. The essays examine whether rights fundamentally protect individuals' interests or whether they instead fundamentally enable individuals to make choices.

Hope, in its propositional construction "I hope that p," is compatible with a stated chance for the speaker that not-p. On fallibilist construals of knowledge, knowledge is compatible with a chance of being wrong, such that one can know that p even though there is an epistemic chance for one that not-p. But self-ascriptions of propositional hope that p seem to be incompatible, in some sense, with self-ascriptions of knowing whether p. Data from conjoining hope self-ascription with outright assertions, with (...) first- and third-person knowledge ascriptions, and with factive predicates suggest a problem: when combined with a plausible principle on the rationality of hope, they suggest that fallibilism is false. By contrast, the infallibilist about knowledge can straightforwardly explain why knowledge would be incompatible with hope, and can offer a simple and unified explanation of all the linguistic data introduced here. This suggests that fallibilists bear an explanatory burden which has been hitherto overlooked. (shrink)