Nature of Law, Misc

This is part of a proposed monograph on the Law, and jurisprudence and is to be used for understanding punishment through wergild to the early Modern and to even the post-modern. The paper is just a draft and in the future will be published as a monograph.

Almost twenty years ago, a genuinely new school of thought emerged in the field of jurisprudential methodology. It is a pragmatist school. Roughly, the pragmatists contend that, when inquiring about the nature of law, we should evaluate potential answers based on practical criteria. For many legal philosophers, this contention seems both unclear and unhinged. That appearance is lamentable. The pragmatist approach to jurisprudential methodology has received insufficient attention for at least two reasons. First, the pragmatists do not conceive of themselves (...) as comprising a school; in fact, these proponents have different names for their common position, which makes it hard to see the commonalities. Second, the most famous statement of the pragmatist view has received withering criticism, criticism that has not been sufficiently answered. That fact may lead opponents of pragmatism, as well as potential supporters, to doubt that a viable view of this kind can be held. This Essay aims to serve as a corrective to both problems. (shrink)

How can legal orders coexist? Contemporary lawyers and philosophers frequently accept that a legal system operates under its own terms and is shaped by its own participants. Any problems posed by the plurality of legal orders in the world are to be dealt with by each legal order separately. So persons that are caught in transnational disputes because they are subject to two or more jurisdictions, have recourse to private international law, which is always part of domestic law, i.e. the (...) law where the case happens to arise. But this analysis does not capture international law. This is, or appears to be, a distinct legal order that is certainly not the law of a distinct nation or a people but aspires to cover the whole of the world and – perhaps surprisingly – does seem to meet many of the ordinary criteria of a legal order. This review essay discusses two recent attempts at accommodating international law, Regulating Jurisdictional Relations Between National and International Courts, by Yuval Shany and A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights, by George Letsas. In their own ways both books outline a ‘substantive’ theory of international law, which is to be welcomed. (shrink)

When we say that we interpret customary international law, what is this thing that we actually interpret? Depending on how we answer this question, our view on interpretative methodology will change. It seems that the most promising approach is to say that interpretation of customary international law is an interpretation of certain legal practices. However, here we also encounter some problems. The dominant doctrine of customary international law requiring state practice and opinio juris assumes that only by adding a psychological (...) element to a regularity of behaviour can we speak of customary international law. That is, opinio juris performs a function of generating both legality and normativity of practices. -/- The article challenges this view by drawing on jurisprudential ideas that define practices as inherently normative. State practices are normative regardless of opinio juris, otherwise they are not practices at all. This view allows to differentiate between two instances of interpretation of customary international law. One is focused on clarification of the normative content of state practices, another is focusing on identification of these practices as legal ones. -/- Interpretation as clarification involves assessing structures of practical reasoning inherent in given practices. Drawing on Joseph Raz's theory of normativity, the article suggests that interpretation of customary rules implies establishing connections between first- and second-order reasons that form the practice and give it meaning. This entails that interpretation of customary international law focuses on dynamics of reasons, their inclusion and exclusion within an existing normative framework. That is, evolutive interpretation of customary international law is not only possible, it is inevitable. -/- Interpretation as identification does not focus on the normative content of practices, but rather involves showing that existing second-order reasons meet a threshold of legal validity. This threshold may take shape of opinio juris, but may as well be treated functionally, when legality of a practice is linked to its relevance in a broader set of legal practices. (shrink)

Hart’s account of law has long been acknowledged to be vulnerable to counterexamples which show that it is over-inclusive, since organisations such as private clubs, trade unions, and the mafia sat...

The relationship between law and coercion has been, and still is, a central topic in legal philosophy. Despite this, discussion about it is immersed in confusion. Some philosophers have noticed this, but hardly any work has been done to attempt to solve or even identify the confusions. This paper aims to fill this gap. Here I propose distinctions and qualifications that help us clarify the relationship between law and coercion and avoid confusion. Building on the clarificatory work, I then argue (...) that despite there being several distinct philosophical discussions about the relationship between law and coercion, one of them should be prioritised. (shrink)

Whether legal systems are necessarily coercive raises normative concerns. Coercion carries a presumption of illegitimacy and a special justificatory burden. If legal systems are necessarily coercive, coerciveness necessarily taints our legal institutions. Traditionally, legal systems have been regarded as contingently coercive. This view is mainly supported by the society of angels thought experiment. For the past few years, however, this traditional view has been under attack. Critics have challenged the reliability of the thought experiment and have urged us to centre (...) the discussion on typical legal systems: legal systems made by humans to address human needs. Once we do so – they claim – we would inevitably reject the traditional view. This paper argues that the critics are wrong. After discussing key features of the society of angels thought experiment and responding to objections, it is argued that even typical legal systems are contingently coercive. Coerciveness is a feature that our legal systems can and should strive to get rid of. (shrink)

Sample chapter from H. Asgeirsson, The Nature and Value of Vagueness in the Law (Hart Publishing, 2020), in which I present and partially defend a version of what has come to be called the communicative-content theory of law. Book abstract: Lawmaking is – paradigmatically – a type of speech act: people make law by saying things. It is natural to think, therefore, that the content of the law is determined by what lawmakers communicate. However, what they communicate is sometimes vague (...) and, even when it is clear, the content itself is sometimes vague. The monograph examines the nature and consequences of these two linguistic sources of indeterminacy in the law with the aim of providing plausible answers to three related questions: In virtue of what is the law vague? What might be good about vague law? How should courts resolve cases of vagueness? (shrink)

The chapter explores the ways in which philosophical thinking about public reason and public justification can shed light on some deep issues regarding the legitimacy or purpose of law, as well as shallower yet no less important questions of constitutional engineering and institutional desing.

ABSTRACT Many prominent legal philosophers believe that law makes some type of moral claim in virtue of its nature. Although the law is not an intelligent agent, the attribution of a claim to law does not need to be as mysterious as some theorists believe. It means that law-making and law- applying acts are intelligible only in the light of a certain presupposition, even if a lawmaker or a law-applier subjectively disbelieves the content of that presupposition. In this paper, I (...) aim to clarify what type of moral claim would be suitable for law if law were to make a claim to be morally justified. I then argue that legal practice is perfectly intelligible without moral presuppositions - that is, that the law does not necessarily make moral claims. RESUMO Muitos filósofos do direito proeminentes acreditam que o direito levanta algum tipo de pretensão moral em virtude de sua natureza. Embora o direito não seja um agente inteligente, a atribuição de uma pretensão ao direito não precisa ser tão misteriosa como alguns teóricos acreditam que seja. Significa que atos pelos quais fazemos e aplicamos leis são inteligíveis apenas à luz de uma certa pressuposição, mesmo se um legislador ou um aplicador do direito não acreditar subjetivamente no conteúdo dessa pressuposição. Neste artigo, eu busco esclarecer que tipo de pretensão moral seria adequada ao direito se o direito levantasse a pretensão de ser moralmente justificado. Eu então argumento que a prática jurídica é perfeitamente inteligível sem pressuposições morais - isto é, que não é necessário que o direito levante pretensões morais. (shrink)

Scott Shapiro’s Legality argues the positivist Planning Theory of law meets the anti-positivist challenge posed by the argument from theoretical disagreements about law in Ronald Dworkin’s Law’s Empire. Legality equates theoretical disagreements with what Shapiro calls meta-interpretive disagreements, and then offers a legal theory of meta-interpretation that purportedly accounts for the existence of meta-interpretive disagreements by showing how it is rational or intelligible for legal actors to have such disagreements. This paper argues Legality misconstrues Law’s Empire. The true challenge of (...) ATD was to provide a theory of law that would vindicate the judgment that law is discovered in cases of theoretical disagreements, rather than made. Legality sees the challenge of Law’s Empire to be to show how it is rational or intelligible for legal actors to have theoretical disagreements, which is different from showing how there really is pre-existing law to be found in cases of theoretical disagreements. So the challenge Legality addresses is circumscribed. But Legality does not even succeed at addressing its own more circumscribed challenge, because, under the Planning Theory of meta-interpretation, legal actors are mistaken to think they are finding law in cases of theoretical disagreements. (shrink)

This paper explores the possibility that Hobbesian jurisprudence is best understood as a ‘third way’ in legal theory, irreducible to classical natural law or legal positivism. I sketch two potential ‘third theories’ of law -- legal pragmatism and legal dualism -- and argue that, when considered in its broadest sense, Leviathan is best viewed as an example of legal pragmatism. I consider whether this legal pragmatist interpretation can be sustained in the examination of Leviathan’s treatment of civil law, and argue (...) that the pragmatic interpretation can only be successful if we can resolve two textual issues in that chapter. First, while Hobbes argues that law entails the existence of public (sharable) reasons, he does not adequately defend the view that the sovereign is the unique authority over such reasons in all cases, especially as far as they concern known collective emergencies. Second, Hobbes both affirms and denies that a sovereign can fail to do justice, which is paradoxical. Both problems are best resolved by legal pragmatism, though the second problem resists a fully satisfying resolution. The upshot is that, although Leviathan ought to be regarded as an episode of legal pragmatism, there are trade-offs on every reading. (shrink)

Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom has been interpreted as a general warning against state intervention in the economy.1 We review this argument in conjunction with Hayek’s later work and discern an institutional thesis about which forms of state intervention and economic institutions could threaten personal and political freedom. Economic institutions pose a threat if they allow for coercive interventions, as described by Hayek in The Constitution of Liberty: by giving someone the power to force others to serve one’s will by (...) threatening to inflict harm, in the absence of general rules of conduct. According to the logic of the argument, welfare-state provisions are not coercive insofar as they do not allow the identification and discriminatory treatment of individuals. By contrast, we claim that a structure of coercion is likely to emerge from the command-and-control nature of protectionist institutions and immigration restrictions currently advocated by the radical right. (shrink)

In this response to eight commentaries on my article “Kelsen, Hart, and legal normativity” I clarify some points in my original analysis and agree with some comments regarding work that still needs to be done. In particular, I attempt to distinguish my position from both Berkeleyan idealism and mere subjective perception. I agree with the commentators who urge that more must be done to analyze the nature of normativity in general, and legal normativity in particular.

Law being a derivative feature of reality, it exists in virtue of more fundamental things, upon which it depends. This raises the question of what is the relation of dependence that holds between law and its more basic determinants. The primary aim of this paper is to argue that grounding is that relation. We first make a positive case for this claim, and then we defend it from the potential objection that the relevant relation is rather rational determination (Greenberg 2004, (...) 2006). Against this challenge, we argue that the apparent objection is really no objection, for on its best understanding, rational determination turns out to actually be grounding. Finally, we clarify the framework for theories on law-determination that results from embracing our view; by way of illustration, we offer a ground-theoretic interpretation of Hartian positivism, and show how it can defuse an influential challenge to simple positivist accounts of law. (shrink)

This paper explores the effect that conformity to the rule of law has on the ends which might legitimately be pursued within a legal system. The neat distinction between formal and substantive conceptions of the rule of law will be challenged: even apparently formal conceptions necessarily affect the content of law and necessarily entail the protection of certain fundamental rights. What remains of the formal/substantive dichotomy is, in fact, a distinction between conceptions of the rule of law which guarantee the (...) substantive justice of each and every law and those which entail some commitment to basic requirements of justice while nevertheless leaving room for unjust laws. Ultimately, the only significant distinction between competing theories of the rule of law concerns the nature of the connection between legality and justice, not whether there is any such connection at all. (shrink)

Placed between constituting and constituted power, homo sacer reveals the state of exception, which through sovereign ban, is kept both inside and outside the law. Agamben’s latest political and legal philosophy is based upon this concept. As the victim of sovereignty, homo sacer unfolds the paradox of sovereign power, criticiz- ing its fundaments and showing the emptiness of law. However, for potentiality which is at the centre of Agamben’s argument, we need to look not only outside sovereignty and sovereign power, (...) but also outside homo sacer. This ar- ticle aims to examine such space, arguing that through absolute potentiality, the fulfilment of law is possible with the content to be focused on reaching conditions of justice and happy life. (shrink)

Taking as its starting-point Guido Calabresi’s latest book – The Future of Law and Economics – the present article aims to explore the often neglected issue of value judgments and normativity in Law and Economics. I will show the importance of enquiring Calabresi’s methodological distinction between Law and Economics and Economic Analysis of Law and the related bilateralism thesis in order to understand the problematic relationship between methodological value judgments and ethical value judgments, the ‘distance’ between Calabresi and Posner and (...) the problematic notion of reformism. Then I will try to introduce a different notion of normativity. I will also show the existence of an unresolved tension in Calabresi’s methodological discourse between a positive approach, which seems to be privileged in this book, and his insistence on the inevitability of value judgments in economic analysis. Finally, I clarify the reasons for the ‘ignorance’ of values by the economist by distinguishing between economists’ “lack of self-awareness”, economists’ idolatry and the economists’ lenses. (shrink)

The publication of Guido Calabresi’s book “The Future of Law and Economics” has drawn a substantial amount of attention among law and economics scholars. We thought that the best way to devote special attention to this book was to devote a Special issue to it. This article situates Calabresi’s book among other reflections on the future of the discipline, introduces and explains the reasons behind this Special issue and discuss the organization and content of it. -/- We emphasize how Calabresi’s (...) historical-conceptual standpoint allows him to isolate the stakes of different future developments around the question of how could further appreciation of legal institutions that defy the standard economic assumptions help the field develop theoretically. Overall, the contributors all shared Calabresi’s attempt to restore the balance between Law and Economics and the need to better account for the “whole unanalysed experience of human race”, often neglected by the Economic Analysis of Law approach. Most disagreements are about the ‘how’. In any case, the search for the Law and Economics ‘not (yet) taken’ or for other “Law and … ” approaches is always open to the Future. (shrink)

How to distinguish law from non-legal but systematic and rule-guided practices of legal officials? This issue features prominently in the debate on ‘positive originalism’ in US constitutional law, and in similar fundamental controversies in other legal orders. I take it as a question about content and constitution of ultimate rules of recognition. Legal philosophers have been too quick in dealing with this problem. I argue that there is more space to claim that non-officials have a constitutive relationship with the content (...) of the law, thus potentially providing a standard to distinguish legal and non-legal practices of officials. However, to the extent officials play a constitutive role in the law, what matters is their genuine acceptance of ultimate rules of recognition. To show this, I develop the concept of acceptance of a social rule by specifying the requirement of genuineness of acceptance and the role of mental dispositions associated with acceptance. (shrink)

This article focuses on issues relating to legal normativity, emphasizing the way these matters have been elaborated in the works of Kelsen and Hart and later commentators on their theories. First, in Section 2, the author offers a view regarding the nature of law and legal normativity focusing on Kelsen's work (at least one reasonable reading of it). The argument is that the Basic Norm is presupposed when a citizen chooses to read the actions of legal officials in a normative (...) way. In this Kelsenian approach, all normative systems are structurally and logically similar, but each normative system is independent of every other system – thus, law is, in this sense, conceptually separate from morality. Second, in Section 3, the author turns to Hart's theory, analyzing the extent to which his approach views legal normativity as sui generis. This approach raises questions regarding what has become a consensus view in contemporary jurisprudence: that law makes moral claims. The author shows how a more deflationary (and less morally-flavored) understanding of the nature of law is tenable, and may, in fact, work better than current conventional (morality-focused) understandings. (shrink)

I have argued that law is a genre of institutionalized abstract artifact, meaning that laws are purposive products of human creation designed to signal norms of behavior with respect to them. Its institutional nature is seen in the fact that it is a system of artificial statuses that convey deontic powers to status holders understood in their institutional roles. Following Searle in explaining institutions, however, is also to see the institution as the 'continuing possibility of a practice.' Hence there is (...) no tension in seeing law as both a practice and a genre of artifact. (shrink)

This book investigates law's interaction with practical reasons. What difference can legal requirements—e.g. traffic rules, tax laws, or work safety regulations—make to normative reasons relevant to our action? Do they give reasons for action that should be weighed among all other reasons? Or can they, instead, exclude and take the place of some other reasons? The book critically examines some of the existing answers and puts forward an alternative understanding of law's interaction with practical reasons. -/- At the outset, two (...) competing positions are pitted against each other: Joseph Raz's view that (legitimate) legal authorities have pre-emptive force, namely that they give reasons for action that exclude some other reasons; and an antithesis, according to which law-making institutions (even those that meet prerequisites of legitimacy) can at most provide us with reasons that compete in weight with opposing reasons for action. These two positions are examined from several perspectives, such as justified disobedience cases, law's conduct-guiding function in contexts of bounded rationality, and the phenomenology associated with authority. -/- It is found that, although each of the above positions offers insight into the conundrum at hand, both suffer from significant flaws. These observations form the basis on which an alternative position is put forward and defended. According to this position, the existence of a reasonably just and well-functioning legal system constitutes a reason that fits neither into a model of ordinary reasons for action nor into a pre-emptive paradigm—it constitutes a reason to adopt an (overridable) disposition that inclines its possessor towards compliance with the system's requirements. (shrink)

In response to Frederick Schauer's book The Force of Law, I argue that the available evidence indicates that non-coercive law could influence many people's behavior. It may sometimes be best to forgo coercive enforcement of an important law.

This essay introduces the philosophy of legal information (PLI), which is a response to the radical changes brought about in philosophy by the information revolution. It reviews in some detail the work of Luciano Floridi, who is an influential advocate for an information turn in philosophy that he calls the philosophy of information (PI). Floridi proposes that philosophers investigate the conceptual nature of information as it currently exists across multiple disciplines. He shows how a focus on the informational nature of (...) traditional philosophical questions can be transformative for philosophy and for human self-understanding. The philosophy of legal information (PLI) proposed here views laws as a body of information that is stored, manipulated, and analyzed through multiple methods, including the computational methodologies. PLI offers resources for evaluating the ethical and political implications of legal infomatics (also known as "legal information systems"). -/- This essay introduces PLI. Parts I and II describe Floridi's philosophy of information. First, Part I introduces the transformation in the concept of information that occurred in the twentieth century through the work of Alan Turning and Claude Shannon. Part II describes Floridi's approaches to traditional questions in epistemology, ontology, and ethics. Part III applies PI to the analysis of legal positivism. It suggests that PLI is a viable project that has potential for transforming the understanding law in the information age. -/- . (shrink)

This is a short introduction to a book symposium on Paul Gowder's recent book, _The Rule of Law in thee Real World_ (Cambridge University Press, 2016). The book symposium will appear in the St. Luis University Law Journal, 62 St. Louis U. L.J., -- (2018), with commentaries on Gowder's book by colleen Murphy, Robin West, Chad Flanders, and Matthew Lister, along with replies by Paul Gowder.

Cet article s’intéresse au problème de la maintenance, c’est-à-dire au moment où les membres d’un collectif social tentent d’assurer dans le temps l’existence de leur collectif en instituant des règles pour réguler leurs comportements. Ce problème se pose avec acuité lorsque certains membres ne respectent pas ces règles communes. Pour maintenir la coopération sociale, les membres peuvent décider d’instituer des règles secondaires visant à sanctionner les transgressions des règles primaires déjà établies. La maintenance d’un collectif peut ainsi reposer sur l’émergence (...) de pouvoirs déontiques qui donnent aux membres l’autorité de légitimement punir et expulser les transgresseurs. Mais d’où viennent ces règles ? On peut penser qu’elles émergent des émotions éprouvées par les membres envers les transgresseurs. Je le démontre à l’aide d’une étude de cas qui établit que, dans le collectif Occupy Geneva, l’institutionnalisation de normes pour punir, exclure et réintégrer les déviants s’ancraient respectivement dans l’indignation, le mépris et le pardon. -/- This article focuses on the problem of maintenance; that is the moment when the members of a social collective attempt to ensure the existence of their collective over time by instituting rules to regulate their behavior. This problem becomes critical when certain members do not respect the common rules. To maintain social cooperation, members can decide to institute secondary rules aimed at sanctioning the transgressions of the already established primary rules. The maintenance of a collective can thus rely on the emergence of deontic powers that give members the authority to legitimately punish and expel transgressors. But where do these rules come from? The hypothesis is that they emerge from the emotions felt by the members towards the transgressors. I show this with the help of a case study, which establishes that the institutionalization of norms allowing the punishment, the exclusion, and the reintegration of deviants within the “Occupy Geneva” collective, was grounded in indignation, contempt, and forgiveness respectively. (shrink)

Some legal philosophers regard the use of deontic language to describe the law as philosophically significant. Joseph Raz argues that it gives rise to ‘the problem of normativity of law’. He develops an account of what he calls ‘detached’ legal statements to resolve the problem. Unfortunately, Raz’s account is difficult to reconcile with the orthodox semantics of deontic language. The article offers a revised account of the distinction between committed and detached legal statements. It argues that deontic statements carry a (...) Gricean generalized conversational implicature to the effect that the rules in question reflect the speaker’s own commitments. Detached legal statements are made when this implicature is either explicitly cancelled or when the conversational context is sufficient to defeat the implicature. I conclude by offering some tentative reflections on the theoretical significance of deontic language in the law. (shrink)

In an increasingly inward-looking world governed by populist governments, existing theories of rights are struggling to protect and expand individual rights. This failure can be attributed both to the present conception of rights as well as the absence of a unifying theme to address the existence and conflict of rights. In the present paper I argue that this unifying theme, which is necessary for protection and expansion of individual rights, is provided by “meaning” in an existential and linguistic sense. I (...) assert that the greatest challenge faced by individual rights is in form of a faceless populist doctrine called “public interest.” As long as the issue of conflict of rights will be addressed in a numerical manner, individual rights will stand defeated. We need to come up with a new model for resolution of conflict of rights, which does not examine right holders as integers but as human beings. This paper, which is a continuation of my previous effort on the subject, elaborates upon the existential role of rights and seeks to construct an inviolable nucleus of rights by examining the essence and core meaning of rights. The paper’s final contribution lies in developing a semantical framework for resolution of conflict of rights. (shrink)

Neste artigo, trago a uma maior explicitação o conceito de direito da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel, buscando reabilitá-lo como alternativa às concepções jusnaturalistas e juspositivistas tradicionais. Busco uma resposta à questão “o que significa ter um direito?” a partir da Filosofia do Direito hegeliana. Questiono pela gênese e locus do direito e argumento que este se origina de uma relação de reconhecimento recíproco intersubjetivo, posteriormente consubstanciando-se objetivamente na eticidade, por meio das instituições sociais. A partir das conclusões de que (...) (i) ter um direito significa ser intersubjetivamente reconhecido como possuidor de uma reivindicação legítima a algo; e que (ii) tal reconhecimento intersubjetivo se torna progressivamente objetivo nas instituições, proponho a ideia de “título de reconhecimento” como definidora do conceito de direito. (shrink)

Social scientists have paid insufficient attention to the role of law in constituting the economic institutions of capitalism. Part of this neglect emanates from inadequate conceptions of the nature of law itself. Spontaneous conceptions of law and property rights that downplay the role of the state are criticized here, because they typically assume relatively small numbers of agents and underplay the complexity and uncertainty in developed capitalist systems. In developed capitalist economies, law is sustained through interaction between private agents, courts (...) and the legislative apparatus. Law is also a key institution for overcoming contracting uncertainties. It is furthermore a part of the power structure of society, and a major means by which power is exercised. This argument is illustrated by considering institutions such as property and the firm. Complex systems of law have played a crucial role in capitalist development and are also vital for developing economies. (shrink)

This chapter examines three approaches to applied political and legal philosophy: Standard activism is primarily addressed to other philosophers, adopts an indirect and coincidental role in creating change, and counts articulating sound arguments as success. Extreme activism, in contrast, is a form of applied philosophy directly addressed to policy-makers, with the goal of bringing about a particular outcome, and measures success in terms of whether it makes a direct causal contribution to that goal. Finally, conceptual activism (like standard activism), primarily (...) targets an audience of fellow philosophers, bears a distant, non-direct, relation to a desired outcome, and counts success in terms of whether it encourages a particular understanding and adoption of the concepts under examination. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that with regard to the President, the Emoluments Clause is not law. I argue for this on the basis of two premises. First, if something is a law, then it has a legal remedy. Second, EC does not have a legal remedy. This premise rests on one or more of the following assumptions: EC does not apply to the President; if EC were to apply to the President, it does not provide a remedy; or, if (...) EC were to apply to the President and have a remedy, it is not law because it is vague. The conclusion that EC does not apply to the President has a practical upshot. As a practical matter, President Trump’s worldwide business tentacles and his refusal to put his business assets into a blind trust does not violate EC and, arguably, does not violate federal conflict-of-interest law. (shrink)

The paper explicates the stages of the author’s philosophical evolution in the light of Kopnin’s ideas and heritage. Starting from Kopnin’s understanding of dialectical materialism, the author has stated that category transformations of physics has opened from conceptualization of immutability to mutability and then to interaction, evolvement and emergence. He has connected the problem of physical cognition universals with an elaboration of the specific system of tools and methods of identifying, individuating and distinguishing objects from a scientific theory domain. The (...) role of vacuum conception and the idea of existence (actual and potential, observable and nonobservable, virtual and hidden) types were analyzed. In collaboration with S.Crymski heuristic and regulative functions of categories of substance, world as a whole as well as postulates of relativity and absoluteness, and anthropic and self-development principles were singled out. Elaborating Kopnin’s view of scientific theories as a practically effective and relatively true mapping of their domains, the author in collaboration with M. Burgin have originated the unified structure-nominative reconstruction (model) of scientific theory as a knowledge system. According to it, every scientific knowledge system includes hierarchically organized and complex subsystems that partially and separately have been studied by standard, structuralist, operationalist, problem-solving, axiological and other directions of the current philosophy of science. 1) The logico-linguistic subsystem represents and normalizes by means of different, including mathematical, languages and normalizes and logical calculi the knowledge available on objects under study. 2) The model-representing subsystem comprises peculiar to the knowledge system ways of their modeling and understanding. 3) The pragmatic-procedural subsystem contains general and unique to the knowledge system operations, methods, procedures, algorithms and programs. 4) From the viewpoint of the problem-heuristic subsystem, the knowledge system is a unique way of setting and resolving questions, problems, puzzles and tasks of cognition of objects into question. It also includes various heuristics and estimations (truth, consistency, beauty, efficacy, adequacy, heuristicity etc) of components and structures of the knowledge system. 5) The subsystem of links fixes interrelations between above-mentioned components, structures and subsystems of the knowledge system. The structure-nominative reconstruction has been used in the philosophical and comparative case-studies of mathematical, physical, economic, legal, political, pedagogical, social, and sociological theories. It has enlarged the collection of knowledge structures, connected, for instance, with a multitude of theoreticity levels and with an application of numerous mathematical languages. It has deepened the comprehension of relations between the main directions of current philosophy of science. They are interpreted as dealing mainly with isolated subsystems of scientific theory. This reconstruction has disclosed a variety of undetected knowledge structures, associated also, for instance, with principles of symmetry and supersymmetry and with laws of various levels and degrees. In cooperation with the physicist Olexander Gabovich the modified structure-nominative reconstruction is in the processes of development and justification. Ideas and concepts were also in the center of Kopnin’s cognitive activity. The author has suggested and elaborated the triplet model of concepts. According to it, any scientific concept is a dependent on cognitive situation, dynamical, multifunctional state of scientist’s thinking, and available knowledge system. A concept is modeled as being consisted from three interrelated structures. 1) The concept base characterizes objects falling under a concept as well as their properties and relations. In terms of volume and content the logical modeling reveals partially only the concept base. 2) The concept representing part includes structures and means (names, statements, abstract properties, quantitative values of object properties and relations, mathematical equations and their systems, theoretical models etc.) of object representation in the appropriate knowledge system. 3) The linkage unites a structures and procedures that connect components from the abovementioned structures. The partial cases of the triplet model are logical, information, two-tired, standard, exemplar, prototype, knowledge-dependent and other concept models. It has introduced the triplet classification that comprises several hundreds of concept types. Different kinds of fuzziness are distinguished. Even the most precise and exact concepts are fuzzy in some triplet aspect. The notions of relations between real scientific concepts are essentially extended. For example, the definition and strict analysis of such relations between concepts as formalization, quantification, mathematization, generalization, fuzzification, and various kinds of identity are proposed. The concepts «PLANET» and «ELEMENTARY PARTICLE» and some of their metamorphoses were analyzed in triplet terms. The Kopnin’s methodology and epistemology of cognition was being used for creating conception of the philosophy of law as elaborating of understanding, justification, estimating and criticizing legal system. The basic information on the major directions in current Western philosophy of law (legal realism, feminism, criticism, postmodernism, economical analysis of law etc.) is firstly introduced to the Ukrainian audience. The classification of more than fifty directions in modern legal philosophy is suggested. Some results of historical, linguistic, scientometric and philosophic-legal studies of the present state of Ukrainian academic science are given. (shrink)

For many years now Allen Buchanan has been one of the most important theorists working on the philosophy of human rights, producing a large number of papers and two books significantly devoted to the topic. In the work under consideration in this symposium, Buchanan breaks new ground by examining what he claims to be the “heart” of international human rights practice – the international legal human rights (“ILHR”) system, subjecting it to moral and philosophical analysis and criticism. Buchanan's book was (...) the subject of an author meets critics session sponsored by the APA Committee on Law and Philosophy at the 2015 Pacific APA Meeting. The following paper introduces the resulting special issue of the journal, _Law and Philosophy_, summarizing Buchanan's important contribution and criticisms by William Talbot, Brooke Ackerley, Erin Kelly, and Mathias Risse, as well as Buchanan's replies. (shrink)

My analysis here is an attempt to bring out the main through-line in the development of Bulgarian philosophy of law today. A proper account of Bulgarian philosophy of law in the 20th century requires an attempt to find, on the one hand, a solution to epistemological and methodological problems in law and, on the other, a clear-cut influence of the Kantian critical tradition. Bulgarian philosophy of law follows a complicated path, ranging from acceptance and revision of Kantian philosophy to the (...) development of interesting theories on the logic of legal reasoning. (shrink)

What is the nature of law and what is the best way to discover it? This book argues that law is best understood in terms of the social functions it performs wherever it is found in human society. In order to support this claim, law is explained as a kind of institution and as a kind of artefact. To say that it is an institution is to say that it is designed for creating and conferring special statuses to people so (...) as to alter their rights and responsibilities toward each other. To say that it is an artefact is to say that it is a tool of human creation that is designed to signal its usability to people who interact with it. This picture of law's nature is marshalled to critique theories of law that see it mainly as a product of reason or morality, understanding those theories via their conceptions of law's function. It is also used to argue against those legal positivists who see law's functions as relatively minor aspects of its nature. -/- This method of conceptualizing law's nature helps us to explain how the law, understood as social facts, can make normative demands upon us. It also recommends a methodology for understanding law that combines elements of conceptual analysis with empirical research for uncovering the purposes to which diverse peoples put their legal activities. (shrink)

In The Rule of Law in the Real World, Paul Gowder defends a new conception of the rule of law as the coordinated control of power and demonstrates that the rule of law, thus understood, creates and preserves social equality in a state. In a highly engaging, interdisciplinary text that moves seamlessly from theory to reality, using examples ranging from Ancient Greece through the present, Gowder sheds light on how societies have achieved the rule of law, how they have sustained (...) it in the face of political upheaval, and how it may be measured and developed in the future. The Rule of Law in the Real World is an essential work for scholars, students, policymakers, and anyone else who believes the rule of law is critical to the proper functioning of society. (shrink)

While Autonomous Weapons Systems have obvious military advantages, there are prima facie moral objections to using them. By way of general reply to these objections, I point out similarities between the structure of law and morality on the one hand and of automata on the other. I argue that these, plus the fact that automata can be designed to lack the biases and other failings of humans, require us to automate the formulation, administration, and enforcement of law as much as (...) possible, including the elements of law and morality that are operated by combatants in war. I suggest that, ethically speaking, deploying a legally competent robot in some legally regulated realm is not much different from deploying a more or less well-armed, vulnerable, obedient, or morally discerning soldier or general into battle, a police officer onto patrol, or a lawyer or judge into a trial. All feature automaticity in the sense of deputation to an agent we do not then directly control. Such relations are well understood and well-regulated in morality and law; so there is not much challenging philosophically in having robots be some of these agents — excepting the implications of the limits of robot technology at a given time for responsible deputation. I then consider this proposal in light of the differences between two conceptions of law. These are distinguished by whether each conception sees law as unambiguous rules inherently uncontroversial in each application; and I consider the prospects for robotizing law on each. Likewise for the prospects of robotizing moral theorizing and moral decision-making. Finally I identify certain elements of law and morality, noted by the philosopher Immanuel Kant, which robots can participate in only upon being able to set ends and emotionally invest in their attainment. One conclusion is that while affectless autonomous devices might be fit to rule us, they would not be fit to vote with us. For voting is a process for summing felt preferences, and affectless devices would have none to weigh into the sum. Since they don't care which outcomes obtain, they don't get to vote on which ones to bring about. (shrink)

Introduction to the Law and Coercion Symposium.

Human beings intrinsically seek meaning. We readily accept and absorb a proposition or even a legal stipulation, if it is meaningful. This human trait coupled with law’s ability to create, select and infuse meaning ensures that in case of conflict between rights, those rights that are perceived to be ‘more meaningful’ triumph over those that are viewed to be less so. Hence, it is important to study the relationship between meaning and law and its impact on rights and identity of (...) an individual. In order to do so, we need to address the following questions: What is the meaning of meaning? How is it constructed? How is one meaning adopted to the exclusion of all others? What is the role played by law in construction and adoption of meaning? What is the effect of a grant of legal sanction to a particular meaning? Why does this meaning remain unchallenged? Does the role of law in creation of meaning change depending upon the right in question? I address these questions on the basis of three strands of classical theory of meaning, constitutional jurisprudence, and a few landmark cases that I have had the privilege to be part of. This paper begins by exploring the meaning of meaning and then examines a few models to better understand the role played by law in construction of meaning. I then study the conflict between the plurality of meaning of the public interest and the singularity of meaning of individual rights and the resultant effect on the identity of an individual. The paper’s final assertion lies in envisaging scenarios where the singularity of meaning of individual rights can triumph over the plurality of meaning of the public interest. (shrink)

In an age of constitutional revolutions and reforms, theory and practice are moving in opposite directions. As a matter of constitutional practice, human dignity has emerged in jurisdictions around the world as the organizing idea of a groundbreaking paradigm. By reconfiguring constitutional norms, institutional structures and legal doctrines, this paradigm transforms human dignity from a mere moral claim into a legal norm that persons have standing to vindicate. As a matter of constitutional theory, however, human dignity remains an enigmatic idea. (...) Some explicate its meaning in abstraction from constitutional practice, while others confine themselves to less exalted ideas. The result is a chasm that separates constitutional practice from a theory capable of justifying its innovations and guiding its operation. By expounding the connection between human dignity and the constitutional practices that justify themselves in its light, Jacob Weinrib brings the theory and practice of constitutional law back together. (shrink)

The Sovereignty of Law presents Trevor Allan's most recent and fully elaborated defence of common law constitutionalism - an account of the unwritten or non-codified constitution as a complex articulation of legal and moral principles, defining what in the British context are the requirements of the rule of law. The British constitution is conceived as a coherent set of fundamental principles of the rule of law, legislative supremacy, and separation of powers. These principles.

This essay discusses a foundation of the connection argued to exist between law and practical reason that has proved to be highly influential and debated in contemporary legal philosophy – Alexy’s. After reconstructing Alexy’s conception of practical reason as well as its foundation, I criticise the weak transcendental-pragmatic argument Alexy uses to ground the authority of practical reason. This argument, I argue, can only show why occasionally, as opposed to necessarily, we ought to follow the guidance of practical reason, and (...) consequently makes the authority of practical reason ultimately dependent on an individual decision. By building on this criticism, in the second part of the essay I introduce and discuss an alternative argument that, by appealing to the idea of constitutive necessity, can provide a non-contingent basis for the validity of practical reason. (shrink)