Pyrrhonists

This chapter examines the reception of the thought of the so-called skeptical Academy, as expounded in Cicero’s Academics, within contemporary philosophy. This task is more complex than evaluating the reception of Pyrrhonian skepticism. While Pyrrhonism, as presented in the surviving works of Sextus Empiricus, has been the subject of considerable discussion among contemporary philosophers, Academic skepticism is rarely mentioned. Moreover, when it is mentioned, the ancient source cited is more often Sextus than Cicero. Finally, rather than observing a direct influence (...) of the skeptical Academy on certain present-day philosophers, we sometimes find similarities between the Academics’ stance and certain views adopted in contemporary analytic epistemology. (shrink)

This chapter examines the reception of the thought of the so-called skeptical Academy, as expounded in Cicero’s Academics, within contemporary philosophy. This task is more complex than evaluating the reception of Pyrrhonian skepticism. While Pyrrhonism, as presented in the surviving works of Sextus Empiricus, has been the subject of considerable discussion among contemporary philosophers, Academic skepticism is rarely mentioned. Moreover, when it is mentioned, the ancient source cited is more often Sextus than Cicero. Finally, rather than observing a direct influence (...) of the skeptical Academy on certain present-day philosophers, we sometimes find similarities between the Academics’ stance and certain views adopted in contemporary analytic epistemology. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s portrayal of Pyrrho is predominately contained in two of his notebooks from 1888, and they present a somewhat ambivalent attitude toward him. In this article, I offer an explanation for Nietzsche’s variegated observations, and contend that his interest in Pyrrho is not really founded upon his radical scepticism as one might expect. Rather, it is Nietzsche’s preoccupation with decadence in general – and its ancient Greek philosophical incarnations in particular – that drives his scrutiny of Pyrrho. I describe Nietzsche’s (...) evolving depiction of Pyrrho as one that ultimately develops into a critique, whereby Pyrrho is associated with a number of types of decadence, as well as exhibiting the characteristic traits of a decadent. I close by examining the cogency and soundness of Nietzsche’s interpretation of Pyrrho as a specific exemplar of decadence. (shrink)

In this article, evidence is briefly presented for three facts that together point to something puzzling. (1) That major continental philosophers of the nineteenth century tended to engage in some detail, as part of a broader preoccupation with ancient Greek thought, with Pyrrhonian scepticism. (2) That major continental philosophers of the twentieth century tended to engage in some depth with their nineteenth-century forebears and maintained their tendency to engage significantly with ancient Greek thought. (3) That twentieth-century continental philosophers demonstrate little (...) to no interest in Pyrrhonian scepticism. This raises the question: why does engagement with Pyrrhonism disappear from continental philosophy? The article discusses two hypotheses that might explain this disappearance. (shrink)

Arithmetic deals with numbers: but what is the nature of their existence, of their parts, and of their relationship with countable items? These questions nourished a lively debate between the Platonico-Pythagorean tradition (trying to answer them) and the Pyrrhonian tradition (trying to show that these answers were unsatisfactory). The debate lies at the heart of Sextus Empiricus' Against the Arithmeticians. The present book aims at facing the remarkable historical and philosophical questions raised by Sextus' treatise by offering a new translation (...) of it and the first dedicated commentary to it. (shrink)

This Element offers a systematic outline of ancient conceptions and uses of suspension of belief (understood broadly) while engaging with contemporary philosophy. It discusses the notion of epochē ('suspension of judgement') and other related terms, like aporia, aphasia, paradox, hypothesis, agnosticism, and Socratic wisdom. It examines the Academic and Pyrrhonian sceptics and some of their arguments and strategies for suspension. It also includes the use and conditions for suspension of belief in other philosophers like Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Plotinus, (...) Protagoras, and Democritus. The Element is divided into four thematic sections, each addressing one of the following questions: What is suspension of belief? When does it arise? What could its scope be? And what are its practical and moral implications? (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse Agrippa’s trilemma, an old skeptical argument that questions the possibility of justifying any arbitrary belief p and its paradox about jus-tification. Assuming that neither infinitism nor skepticism are satisfactory positions, the main alternatives available to face the problem (foundationism, coherentism and epistemic externalism) are outlined, as well as some central arguments that show the serious difficulties they face. In the case of foundationalism, these problems arise from two dilemmas, which work together with the trilemma to (...) make our philosophical life even more difficult: the so-called Sellar’s dilemma and Bergmann’s dilemma —although the latter is a very general attack on internalism. The former calls into question the inte-lligibility of a key idea of standard foundationalism: the notion of justified basic belief. The second casts doubt on the rational sustainability of epistemic internalism, which is a usual presupposition of the presentation of the trilemma. I explore a Humean way out of the trilemma that also manages to escape such dilemmas. Like any position in this difficult territory the way out has costs. However, they do not seem unaffordable. Here I only intend to tentatively present the idea, as a possible way out of our difficulties, which deserves to be seriously discussed. (shrink)

Sextus Empiricus tells us that the sceptics conduct investigations. Genuine investigations are commonly taken to have some connection with the aim of discovering truth. Sextus also tells us that the sceptics aim at tranquillity in their investigations. But they do this only by suspending judgement. In what sense, then, are their investigations connected with the aim of discovering truth? This article argues that there is a sense in which Sextus can reasonably take sceptical investigations to be connected with the aim (...) of discovering truth, even though the sceptics only aim at preserving their tranquillity by suspending judgement. (shrink)

A study of the philosophical and theological thought of Henry Cornelius Agrippa of Nettesheim (1486-1535). It contains new perspectives on Agrippa's place in the world of humanism and offers a new approach to the interpretation of Renaissance declamations.

Renaissance magic was an attempt to supply Platonism with a philosophy of nature that could compete with Aristotelian physics. It was expected to heal the increasing breach between science and faith. However, the basic presupposition of every magic worldview, the notion of a living universe, favors immanentism and arguably hastened the rise of secularism. Secularism, it should be noted, was not an identifiable set of theories but a process towards modernity with its correspondent philosophical theology. Three different stages in that (...) development can be shown in the philosophical systems of three famous Renaissance magicians: Henry Cornelius Agrippa, Giordano Bruno, and Tommaso Campanella. (shrink)

Pyrrhonism, named after the scepticism of Pyrrho of Elis, as one of the significant philosophical doctrines in the history of philosophy, was revived by Aenesidemus and Agrippa, and defended by Sextus Empiricus, its last follower, against criticisms in the theoretical and practical contexts. Pyrrhonian scepticism, based on three tenets as the state of equipollence, suspension of judgment and ataraxia, accepts adherence to appearances as a practical guide for life. The aim of this study is to discuss Sextus’ objections regarding two (...) main problems, the nature of good and evil and the art of living, elaborated in Outlines of Pyrrhonism and Against the Ethicists and contemporary remarks on the subject. Thus, it will be addressed whether the sceptic way of life prescribed by Sextus is compatible with his theoretical framework and therefore, whether it can be applied in practice. (shrink)

The author`s aim is to prove, that scepsis in aspects of scepticism can be compared in wider perspective with other philosophical movements. Because Sextus Empiricus says about sceptical abiloty in general, then he says about its transcendental dimension. Hence we can speak about scepsis as such. Fundamentality of sceptical ability allows it to stay the same in thinking of Sextus Empiricus, Kant, Descartes, Plato. Scepsis differs from scepticism as general from local. Scepsis arguments, in contrast with scepticism arguments, are universal, (...) hence actual for philosophers of any movement or time. Therefore sceptics lack prioritized acces to scepsis. Sceptics can be called victims of scepsis, because scepsis has to be considered regardless of scepticism. Sceptical way of thinking is included in Kant`s thought adequately, in its prior form, nonetheless it does not lead to scepticism. Hence, Sextus Empiricus is not writing everything real about himself: his words do represent essence of scepsis. Kant has won. (shrink)

Arithmetic deals with numbers: but what is the nature of their existence, of their parts, and of their relationship with countable items? These questions nourished a lively debate between the Platonico-Pythagorean tradition (trying to answer them) and the Pyrrhonian tradition (trying to show that these answers were unsatisfactory). The debate lies at the heart of Sextus Empiricus' Against the Arithmeticians. The present book aims at facing the remarkable historical and philosophical questions raised by Sextus' treatise by offering a new translation (...) of it and the first dedicated commentary to it. (shrink)

Review of Vogt, K., & Vlasits, J. (Eds.). (2020). Epistemology After Sextus Empiricus. New York: Oxford UP.

Pyrrho of Elis advises us not to trust our sensations and opinions, but instead to be without opinions about individual things. He suggests that such a state is to be achieved by saying, concerning each individual thing, that it is “no more” a certain way than it is not. This paper argues that the current metaphysical reading of Pyrrho’s views falls short of explaining why we should not trust our sensations and opinions; in addition, it does not explain how to (...) achieve the state of being “without opinions” about individual things. It is argued that a Fregean analysis of Pyrrho’s views can provide satisfactory answers to both questions. The purpose of the paper, however, is to refine, rather than rebut, the metaphysical reading. (shrink)

Agrippa was the main expounder of the occult philosophy, which is the knowledge of the hidden causes of things and is finalized to their manipulation by magic. Magic, in turn, is the highest form and the end of philosophy. According to his De occulta philosophia, magic is threefold: natural (concerning sublunar world), celestial (concerning stars and heavenly intelligences), and divine (concerning God and higher angels). It consists of the manipulation of concrete objects and of the summoning of intelligences and God, (...) which is performed on the basis of the precepts of the Kabbalah. Agrippa’s overall aim was to purify magic from its necromantic and irrational components: this would enable the restoration of the prelapsarian condition of man (in accordance with the Hermetic ideal of deification) and a Christian reform of culture. The critique of philosophical knowledge and of every science, presented in Agrippa’s De vanitate, and his critique to the subordination of woman typical of Scholastic theology, contained in the De nobilitate foeminei sexus, are functional to these ends. (shrink)

In this chapter, Robb Dunphy is concerned with the nature of G.E. Schulze's scepticism as he presents it in his 1792 work Aenesidemus, and with its relation to the metaphysical projects of Kant, Reinhold, and later German Idealists. After introducing Schulze's text, Dunphy turns to a recent interpretation offered by Jessica Berry, who claims that the extent to which Schulze endorsed a genuinely Pyrrhonian Scepticism has gone unacknowledged, both by his idealist contemporaries and by the majority of the secondary literature (...) on the period. Berry suggests that this unacknowledged Pyrrhonism in Aenesidemus provides the resources for a more radical criticism of the German Idealists' scientific, systematic metaphysical ambitions, to which they remain fundamentally vulnerable. Despite agreeing that an exploration of Schulze's debt to Pyrrhonism represents a valuable addition to our understanding of his scepticism, in the latter parts of the chapter Dunphy suggests that the Berry's attribution of a Pyrrhonian Scepticism to Schulze should to some extent be rejected, and that such a scepticism is perhaps not quite as problematic for the projects of Kant and the German Idealists as she suggests. (shrink)

In a day in which there are different religious system vying for acceptance and probably even dominance, it is high time to identify a peaceful model for inter-religious understanding and communication. St. Paul had several interactions with the Jewish leaders, monarchs and government officials on religious topics and issues in between A.D. 60 to A.D 62 at Caesarea. His interaction with King Agrippa II and Governor Festus can be used as a paradigm for contemporary inter-religious understanding and communication. Even though (...) Paul’s life was hanging on a balance as a prisoner about to be transported to Rome, he did not resort to violence, verbal abuse or rain down curses, when his religious claims were questioned. Instead, he argued as a seasoned philosopher, prayed as a pious saint and appealed as a prisoner in chains with humility for the ‘veracity and the reasonability’ of his truth claim. The article will interact with few philosophical themes that surface during this discourse and dialogue and also attempt to trace St Paul’s use of rhetoric in his discourse. The title of this article is ‘St. Paul’s discourse and dialogue with King Agrippa and Governor Festus as a model for contemporary inter-religious understanding and communication’. The primary source for this article is the book of Acts in the New Testament and the secondary source would be dictionaries and books. (shrink)

This essay develops an intercultural approach to the skeptical way of life through an interpretation of two classical traditions: the Pyrrhonian tradition of ancient Greece and the Madhyamaka Buddhist tradition of classical India. The skeptical way of life is characterized by several important features, including a goal of tranquility or of freedom from disturbance and suffering, a philosophical strategy of dialectical argument that terminates in the suspension of judgment or the abandonment of views, a purgative philosophic therapy, and life without (...) belief. A constellation of practical questions that emerge from the skeptical way of life are also considered, including the skeptic’s character, conformity, and care. One of the principal aims of the essay will be to develop this intercultural account of the skeptical way of life and to show by way of this illustrative example how our understanding of skepticism and ancient philosophy is enhanced through an intercultural approach. (shrink)

t. 1. Dve knigi protiv logikov. Dve knigi protiv fizikov.--t. 2. Protiv uchenykh. Tri knigi Pirronovykh polozheniĭ.

This is the first dedicated commentary to Sextus Empiricus’ treatise _Against the Arithmeticians_, dealing with crucial issues in the history of the sceptical, Platonic and Pythagorean traditions and in the ancient philosophy of mathematics.

This article considers two alternative responses to the question of the motivation behind the suspensive argumentation developed by the Pyrrhonic version of the ancient scepticism and also shows their respective difficulties: a) the therapeutic motivation, that takes the suspension of assent for the condition to reach not only a state of mental tranquillity concerning matters of opinion but also a moderate attitude towards passions; b) the epistemic motivation, which states that the suspension corresponds to the unique possibility to preserve philosophical (...) life in the absence of rational criteria to decide among competing philosophical theories. The latter kind of motivation, which consists in creating propitious conditions for the search for the truth, has nothing to do with the methodic motivation characterizing the modern reception of ancient scepticism. Although this motivation was not present in the Pyrrhonic scepticism, it could not be unknown to the academic sceptics because of their Socratic origins. (shrink)

Outlines of Scepticism, by the Greek philosopher Sextus Empiricus, is a work of major importance. It is the fullest extant account of ancient Scepticism, and also one of our most copious sources of information about the other Hellenistic philosophies. Moreover, the rediscovery of Sextus in the sixteenth century brought about a revolution in philosophy. Anyone interested in the history of philosophy must have at least an acquaintance with Sextus, and for students of Hellenistic philosophy his writings are indispensable. Julia Annas (...) and Jonathan Barnes provide an accurate and readable English translation of the Outlines, with a short introduction and brief annotation. (shrink)

双子のようによく似たギリシャ懐疑哲学と仏教の〈空〉の思想。両者を丹念に読み解くとき、透徹した「縁起=言語ゲーム」の世界に揺らめくわれわれの生の真実が浮かびあがる。ウィトゲンシュタインを起点に世界史的規 模で展開する哲学の本当の意味を求める旅。.

La distancia se menciona aquí con la pretensión de aludir de un golpe a cosas como la theoría, la sképsis, la epokhé. En el caso de un decir relevante, distancia resulta ser a la vez lo que hay en ese decir, lo que en él se efectúa y se expone, y también la actitud o el acontecimiento en el que es posible entender ese decir.

I offer reasons against reading Hume as a Pyrrhonian sceptic. I argue that Hume's scepticism is motivated differently, that his sceptical strategies are not analogous to Pyrrhonism's, and that it is profitable to read Hume as a critic of Pyrrhonism. I hold that the most informative point of comparison between Hume and Sextus Empiricus is a point of difference, namely, their stands on the connection between suspension of judgement (epochê) and tranquillity (ataraxia). For Sextus, tranquillity flows naturally from suspending judgement (...) on all opinions. Hume, by contrast, consistently treats radical suspension of judgement as resulting in despair and social detachment. I take a firmer stance than past commentators on this issue by affirming that Hume and Sextus do not merely disagree on this issue, but that Hume's view is more plausible. Reading Hume's sceptical crisis, I propose, reveals an insightful criticism of Pyrrhonism, one that sheds light on human nature's response to radical doubt. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to determine how a Pyrrhonian considers the Law and can respond to Aristocles’ objection that a Pyrrhonian is unable to obey laws. First, we analyze the function of the Law in the 10th Mode of Aenesidemus, in order to show laws as a dogmatic source of value. But Sextus shows also that the Sceptic can live in a human society by following laws and customs, according to so-called ‘sceptical conformism’. In the light of Pyrrhonian (...) Hypotyposes 1.23–24 and Against the Mathematicians 11.162–164, I discuss the validity of the label ‘conformism’ in order to understand the nature of the political effect of the suspension of judgement. The real nature of the political position of Pyrrhonian Scepticism – that lack of commitment does not mean indifference to politics but rather a criticism of fanaticism and praise for political cautiousness – appears by comparison with the Scepticism of the New Academy. (shrink)

Alan Bailey offers a clear exposition and defence of the philosophy of Sextus Empiricus, one of the most influential of ancient thinkers, the father of philosophical scepticism.

Peter Fosl presents an engaging and historically rich account of Hume's skepticism. For those readers interested in deepening their knowledge and understanding of Pyrrhonian and Academic skepticism, both in regard to their origins and their legacy, I highly recommend it. But I also recommend it for those who would like to better understand Hume's skepticism, although I do think there is some tension in Fosl's reading. Before I discuss this tension, a brief summary of the book is in order. Fosl's (...) primary claim is that Hume's skepticism is a hybrid of Academic and Pyrrhonian skepticism. To show this, Fosl divides the book into two parts. In the first, Fosl presents a detailed account of the ancient and modern versions... (shrink)

By means of the Ten Modes, Pyrrhonian skeptics appeal to conflicting appearances to bring about suspension of judgment. However, precisely how the skeptic might do so in a nondogmatic manner is not entirely clear. In this paper, I argue that existing accounts of the Modes face significant objections, and I defend an alternative account that better explains the logical structure, rational nature, and effectiveness of the Modes. In particular, I clarify how the Modes appeal to concerns about epistemic impartiality and (...) circularity, the nature of the skeptic's nondoxastic attitude(s), and how the skeptic can employ the Modes nondogmatically. (shrink)

This is the first complete English translation of Sextus Empiricus' Against Those in the Disciplines that includes substantial interpretive aids, including introduction, extensive notes, and glossary. The work discusses six specialized fields of study: grammar, rhetoric, geometry, arithmetic, astrology, and music.

Przełożył, wstępem i przypisami opatrzył Zbigniew Nerczuk Zarysy Pyrrońskie – traktat w trzech księgach będący dziełem sceptyka Sekstusa Empiryka (II/III wiek n.e.), należy do kanonu tekstów filozoficznych, będąc jednym z niewielu zachowanych okruchów wielkiej tradycji krytycznej i sceptycznej, swymi źródłami sięgającej presokratyków, sofistyki i Sokratesa, rozwiniętej przez Pyrrona, a zwieńczonej wielkim dziełem Sekstusa Empiryka. Tradycja ta przez stulecia lekceważona i marginalizowana wskutek założonej przez kulturę europejską dominacji myśli Platona i Arystotelesa, odkryta i rozpowszechniona w XVI wieku, wyznaczyła kierunek rozwoju dalszej (...) myśli filozoficznej, zwracając ją w stronę rozważań dotyczących problemów poznawczych. Jedyne dotychczas opublikowane w języku polskim tłumaczenie Zarysów sporządzone przez Adama Krokiewicza ukazało się w 1931 roku i mimo jego niewątpliwej wnikliwości, niepowtarzalnego stylu, a także wielkiej roli, jaką odegrało w upowszechnianiu wiedzy o antycznym sceptycyzmie w Polsce, tak jak każdy przekład z biegiem czasu i ono powinno zostać skonfrontowane z nowszą wersją. Prezentując nowe tłumaczenie, jego Autor może mieć tylko nadzieję, że będzie ono stanowiło wartościową alternatywę dla niezwykłego dzieła Adama Krokiewicza. (shrink)

Sextus Empiricus (IIe-IIIe s. ap. J.-C.) est le dernier philosophe sceptique de l'Antiquite et le seul dont l'uvre soit en grande partie conservee. Son Contre les dogmatiques prend pour cible la connaissance philosophique. Cet ensemble de traites tres argumente est articule suivant la distinction, d'epoque hellenistique, entre trois parties de la philosophie, la logique, la physique et l'ethique. On donne ici la premiere traduction francaise de la premiere et plus importante partie de cet ouvrage, le Contre les logiciens, qui conteste (...) la possibilite meme de connaitre. Prenant appui sur la distinction entre " choses apparentes " et " choses cachees ", Sextus Empiricus traite en premier lieu du " critere de la verite " ou des voies d'acces a la connaissance des choses apparentes. Un long developpement doxographique qui conduit des philosophes presocratiques aux Stoiciens, aux Epicuriens et aux Academiciens precede l'expose des arguments qui plaident en faveur de l'inexistence d'un tel critere. Au livre II, Sextus Empiricus met en question, a propos des choses cachees, le " vrai " lui-meme, avant de faire ressortir la faiblesse de l'inference semiotique et celle de la demonstration. L'ouvrage porte ainsi a notre connaissance tout a la fois des doctrines dogmatiques - comme la logique stoicienne - auxquelles nous aurions moins acces sans son temoignage, et une bonne partie de l'argumentaire sceptique deploye depuis la renaissance du pyrrhonisme, a l'epoque d'Enesideme, qui serait autrement perdue. (shrink)