- Questions, content and the varieties of force.Michael Schmitz - manuscriptdetails
- Moore's Paradox and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
- A Commitment-Theoretic Account of Moore's Paradox.Jack Woods - forthcoming - In An Atlas of Meaning: Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface).details
- Rejection, denial and the democratic primaries.Luca Incurvati - 2022 - Think 21 (61):105-109.details
- Immoral lies and partial beliefs.Neri Marsili - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (1):117-127.details
- The Modal Future: A Theory of Future-Directed Thought and Talk.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.details
- How to Understand Rule-Constituted Kinds.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):7-27.details
- Assertion.Peter Pagin & Neri Marsili - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
- Representing knowledge.Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (1):97-143.details
- True lies and Moorean redundancy.Alex Wiegmann & Emanuel Viebahn - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13053-13066.details
- Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.details
- Assertion and Modality.Fabrizio Cariani - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 505-528.details
- Assertions, Handicaps, and Social Norms.Peter J. Graham - 2020 - Episteme 8:1-15.details
- Epistemic multilateral logic.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-32.details
- On the nature of indifferent lies, a reply to Rutschmann and Wiegmann.Vladimir Krstić - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (5):757-771.details
- Proxy Assertion.Kirk Ludwig - 2020 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
- Lying, speech acts, and commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.details
- Lying with Presuppositions.Emanuel Viebahn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):731-751.details
- Assertion and its Social Significance: An Introduction.Bianca Cepollaro, Paolo Labinaz & Neri Marsili - 2019 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 13 (1):1-18.details
- Are Selfless Assertions Hedged?Grzegorz Gaszczyk - 2019 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 13 (1):47-54.details
- Weak Assertion.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):741-770.details
- The norm of assertion: a ‘constitutive’ rule?Neri Marsili - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-22.details
- Utterances without Force.Richard Moore - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (3):342-358.details
- Testimonial worth.Andrew Peet - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2391-2411.details
- Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating.Jessica Pepp - 2019 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
- The Aesthetic Significance of the Lying-Misleading Distinction.Jessica Pepp - 2019 - British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (3):289-304.details
- On the Pragmatic Approach to Counterpossibles.Maciej Sendłak - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):523-532.details
- Silencing and assertion.Alessandra Tanesini - 2019 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 749-769.details
- Three Problems for the Knowledge Rule of Assertion.Savas L. Tsohatzidis - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (3):264-270.details
- Scorekeeping.Paal Antonsen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):589-595.details
- Lying, accuracy and credence.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):195-198.details
- Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977.details
- Sneaky assertions.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):188-218.details
- Grounding Assertion and Acceptance in Mental Imagery.Christopher Gauker - 2018 - In Ondřej Beran, Vojtěch Kolman & Ladislav Koreň (eds.), From rules to meanings. New essays on inferentialism. New York, USA: Routledge. pp. 49-62.details
- Constituting assertion: a pragmatist critique of Horwich’s ‘Truth’.Andrew Howat - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):935-954.details
- Lying and Fiction.Emar Maier - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 303-314.details
- Truth and assertion: rules vs aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.details
- Lying and Certainty.Neri Marsili - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford University Press. pp. 170-182.details
- The Oxford Handbook of Lying.Jörg Meibauer (ed.) - 2018 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks.details
- Commitment Accounts of Assertion.Lionel Shapiro - 2018 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
- La visión pragmatista de C.S. Peirce sobre la aserción.Jaime Alfaro Iglesias - 2017 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 71:123-136.details
- Googled Assertion.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):490-501.details
- Relativism and Assertion.Alexander Dinges - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):730-740.details
- Bullshitting, Lying, and Indifference toward Truth.Don Fallis & Andreas Stokke - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
- Weak Rejection.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):741-760.details
- Bilateralist Detours: From Intuitionist to Classical Logic and Back.Nils Kürbis - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 60 (239):301-316.details
- Bilateralism: Negations, Implications and some Observations and Problems about Hypotheses.Nils Kürbis - 2017 - In Thomas Piecha & Jean Fichot (eds.), Beyond Logic. Proceedings of the Conference held in Cerisy-la-Salle, 22-27 May 2017. Tübingen, Germany:details
- A Wittgensteinian Role-Based Account of Assertion.Ivan Milić & Reining Stefan - 2017 - Philosophical Investigations 40 (2):139-153.details
- A Bridge from Semantic Value to Content.Brian Rabern - 2017 - Philosophical Topics 45 (2):181-207.details
- Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):492-508.details
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