11 found
Matthew Weiner [10]Matthew Carl Weiner [1]
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Matt Weiner
University of Vermont
  1. Must We Know What We Say?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (2):227-251.
    The knowledge account of assertion holds that it is improper to assert that p unless the speaker knows that p. This paper argues against the knowledge account of assertion; there is no general norm that the speaker must know what she asserts. I argue that there are cases in which it can be entirely proper to assert something that you do not know. In addition, it is possible to explain the cases that motivate the knowledge account by postulating a general (...)
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  2. Are All Conversational Implicatures Cancellable.Matthew Weiner - 2006 - Analysis 66 (2):127-130.
  3. How Causal Probabilities Might Fit Into Our Objectively Indeterministic World.Matthew Weiner & Nuel Belnap - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):1-36.
    We suggest a rigorous theory of how objective single-case transition probabilities fit into our world. The theory combines indeterminism and relativity in the “branching space–times” pattern, and relies on the existing theory of causae causantes (originating causes). Its fundamental suggestion is that (at least in simple cases) the probabilities of all transitions can be computed from the basic probabilities attributed individually to their originating causes. The theory explains when and how one can reasonably infer from the probabilities of one “chance (...)
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  4. Norms of Assertion.Matthew Weiner - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):187–195.
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    Accepting Testimony.Matthew Weiner - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):256 - 264.
    I defend the acceptance principle for testimony (APT), that hearers are justified in accepting testimony unless they have positive evidence against its reliability, against Elizabeth Fricker's local reductionist view. Local reductionism, the doctrine that hearers need evidence that a particular piece of testimony is reliable if they are to be justified in believing it, must on pain of scepticism be complemented by a principle that grants default justification to some testimony; I argue that (APT) is the principle required. I consider (...)
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    Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge.Matthew Weiner - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 163--182.
    Suppose we consider knowledge to be valuable because of the role known propositions play in practical reasoning. This, I argue, does not provide a reason to think that knowledge is valuable in itself. Rather, it provides a reason to think that true belief is valuable from one standpoint, and that justified belief is valuable from another standpoint, and similarly for other epistemic concepts. The value of the concept of knowledge is that it provides an economical way of talking about many (...)
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  7. Testimony: Evidence and Responsibility.Matthew Carl Weiner - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Testimony is an indispensable way of gaining knowledge and also a voluntary act for which the teller can be held responsible. This dissertation analyzes these two aspects of testimony, the epistemological and the normative. Indeed, it argues that these two aspects cannot be separated: A satisfactory account of testimony's epistemology must allow for testimony's normative status, while an account of testimony's normative status can be derived from testimony's epistemology. ;Epistemologically, the general reliability of testimony should be treated differently from the (...)
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  8. The Assurance View of Testimony.Matthew Weiner - manuscript
    This essay critically examines the Assurance View of testimony as put forth by Angus Ross (1986) and Richard Moran (1999). The Assurance View holds that someone who offers testimony gives the hearer a non-evidential justification for belief by assuming responsibility for the truth of her testimony. I agree that testimonial justification depends on the teller’s assumption of her responsibility for her testimony, but argue that it is nevertheless evidential justification. Testimonial justification is a sort of evidence that is within the (...)
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  9. Martijn Blaauw, Ed., Epistemological Contextualism. [REVIEW]Matthew Weiner - 2006 - Philosophy in Review 26:389-390.
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    Why Does Justification Matter?Matthew Weiner - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):422–444.
    It has been claimed that justification, conceived traditionally in an internalist fashion, is not an epistemologically important property. I argue for the importance of a conception of justification that is completely dependent on the subject’s experience, using an analogy to advice. The epistemological importance of a property depends on two desiderata: the extent to which it guarantees the epistemic goal of attaining truth and avoiding falsehood, and the extent to which it depends only on the information available to the believer. (...)
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  11. Martijn Blaauw, ed., Epistemological Contextualism Reviewed by.Matthew Weiner - 2006 - Philosophy in Review 26 (6):389-390.
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