In response to the growing recognition of informal logic as a discipline in its own right, this collection of essays from leading contributors in the field provides the formative knowledge and historical context required to understand the development of a so far little studied subject area.

We describe here an interdisciplinary lab science course for non-majors using the history of science as a curricular guide. Our experience with diverse instructors underscores the importance of the teachers and classroom dynamics, beyond the curriculum. Moreover, the institutional political context is central: are courses for non-majors valued and is support given to instructors to innovate? Two sample projects are profiled.

The four coauthors describe the twenty-five-year history of efforts of the Council of Learned Societies in Education (CLSE) to represent the interests of the social foundations of education in the National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE), including the evolution of CLSE into the Council for the Social Foundations of Education and its recent departure from NCATE after a quarter century of successful involvement. The coauthors, each personally supportive of foundational involvement in national accreditation, delineate advantages gained by both (...) CLSE and NCATE during the quarter century of involvement, while also describing concerns and arguments that have led to the current disassociation of the Council for Social Foundations of Education (CSFE) fromNCATE. The article concludes with suggestions for the future and the coauthors' hope that this history and chronicle will provide incentive for reinvolvement of the foundations in national accreditation circles. (shrink)

The prospect of using genome technologies to modify the human germline has raised profound moral disagreement but also emphasizes the need for wide-ranging discussion and a well-informed policy response. The Hinxton Group brought together scientists, ethicists, policymakers, and journal editors for an international, interdisciplinary meeting on this subject. This consensus statement formulated by the group calls for support of genome editing research and the development of a scientific roadmap for safety and efficacy; recognizes the ethical challenges involved in clinical reproductive (...) applications of genome editing but, importantly, rejects the idea that human reproductive germline modification is necessarily morally unacceptable; and highlights the importance of meaningful engagement in discussions of genome editing and the development of regulation and oversight mechanisms to govern future uses of such technologies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.2 (2000) 101-115 [Access article in PDF] Case Study of the Use of a Circumstantial Ad Hominem in Political Argumentation Douglas Walton In the 1860s, Northern newspapers attacked Lincoln's policies by attacking his character, using the terms drunk, baboon, too slow, foolish, and dishonest. Steadily on the increase in political argumentation since then, the argumentum ad hominem has been carefully refined as an instrument of (...) "oppo tactics" and "going negative" by the public relations experts who now craft political campaigns at the national level. It has been so prominently used in the major political campaigns, debates, and advertisements of the past few years that there has even been a reaction against it--a feeling that we have gone too far in this direction and that some kind of restraint is needed. 1 But there has been no evidence of such restraint in the argumentation used in recent campaigns. Perhaps what might be helpful is a better understanding on the part of voters and campaigners of how to evaluate ad hominem arguments critically.How does the ad hominem argument really work as a way of molding public opinion, why is it so often so effective, and how can it be defended against? How can it be evaluated as a clearly identifiable type of argument, by some kind of objective standards, in a way that can be applied to particular cases? These appear to be tough questions, but recent research has made some not inconsiderable progress toward answering them.The purpose of this article is to present a new case study of a type of argument commonly used in political discourse, a case study that makes use of the dialectical normative framework for identifying and evaluating personal attack (ad hominem) arguments that is developed in a series of works by Henry W. Johnstone Jr. (1952); Alan Brinton (1985, 1995); Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1984, 1995); Erik C. W. Krabbe and Douglas N. Walton (1993), Walton (1989, chap. 6; 1998); and van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Francisca Snoeck Henkemans et al. (1996). This particular case, although typical of so many ad hominem arguments currently [End Page 101] in use in political discourse, has some special features that turn out to be quite interesting not only in showing how the dialectical framework applies to cases, but also in advancing our knowledge of how the ad hominem type of argument works in political argumentation in a democratic system for which the media reportage of events is a big factor in influencing voting. 1. Framework for analysis and evaluation Although the argumentum ad hominem, or personal attack argument, has been traditionally treated as a fallacy in logic, recent research in argumentation (as cited above) shows that, in many cases,--including cases in political argumentation--ad hominem arguments, as used in conversational arguments, are not fallacious. Research has shown that, while some personal attack arguments can definitely be judged fallacious, many others are quite reasonable (when evaluated in the appropriate context), while still others should be evaluated as weak (insufficiently supported) but not fallacious. As shown in this case study, the real function of an ad hominem argument (when properly used) is to attack an arguer's credibility in order to criticize the argument she advocates.Before going any further, it is necessary to define some terminology brought to use in the research cited above. An ad hominem argument is the use of personal attack in a dialogue exchange between two parties, where the one party attacks the character of the other party as bad, in some respect, and then uses this attack as a basis for criticizing the other party's argument. An argument is fallacious if it is a special baptizable (Johnson 1987) type of argument that is used by one party in a dialogue exchange in such a way that it blocks or interferes with the collaborative realization of the goal of the type of dialogue in which the two participants are supposed to be engaged (Walton 1995). Thus, there is a difference between a weak... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.2 (2000) 101-115 [Access article in PDF] Case Study of the Use of a Circumstantial Ad Hominem in Political Argumentation Douglas Walton In the 1860s, Northern newspapers attacked Lincoln's policies by attacking his character, using the terms drunk, baboon, too slow, foolish, and dishonest. Steadily on the increase in political argumentation since then, the argumentum ad hominem has been carefully refined as an instrument of (...) "oppo tactics" and "going negative" by the public relations experts who now craft political campaigns at the national level. It has been so prominently used in the major political campaigns, debates, and advertisements of the past few years that there has even been a reaction against it--a feeling that we have gone too far in this direction and that some kind of restraint is needed. 1 But there has been no evidence of such restraint in the argumentation used in recent campaigns. Perhaps what might be helpful is a better understanding on the part of voters and campaigners of how to evaluate ad hominem arguments critically.How does the ad hominem argument really work as a way of molding public opinion, why is it so often so effective, and how can it be defended against? How can it be evaluated as a clearly identifiable type of argument, by some kind of objective standards, in a way that can be applied to particular cases? These appear to be tough questions, but recent research has made some not inconsiderable progress toward answering them.The purpose of this article is to present a new case study of a type of argument commonly used in political discourse, a case study that makes use of the dialectical normative framework for identifying and evaluating personal attack (ad hominem) arguments that is developed in a series of works by Henry W. Johnstone Jr. (1952); Alan Brinton (1985, 1995); Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst (1984, 1995); Erik C. W. Krabbe and Douglas N. Walton (1993), Walton (1989, chap. 6; 1998); and van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Francisca Snoeck Henkemans et al. (1996). This particular case, although typical of so many ad hominem arguments currently [End Page 101] in use in political discourse, has some special features that turn out to be quite interesting not only in showing how the dialectical framework applies to cases, but also in advancing our knowledge of how the ad hominem type of argument works in political argumentation in a democratic system for which the media reportage of events is a big factor in influencing voting. 1. Framework for analysis and evaluation Although the argumentum ad hominem, or personal attack argument, has been traditionally treated as a fallacy in logic, recent research in argumentation (as cited above) shows that, in many cases,--including cases in political argumentation--ad hominem arguments, as used in conversational arguments, are not fallacious. Research has shown that, while some personal attack arguments can definitely be judged fallacious, many others are quite reasonable (when evaluated in the appropriate context), while still others should be evaluated as weak (insufficiently supported) but not fallacious. As shown in this case study, the real function of an ad hominem argument (when properly used) is to attack an arguer's credibility in order to criticize the argument she advocates.Before going any further, it is necessary to define some terminology brought to use in the research cited above. An ad hominem argument is the use of personal attack in a dialogue exchange between two parties, where the one party attacks the character of the other party as bad, in some respect, and then uses this attack as a basis for criticizing the other party's argument. An argument is fallacious if it is a special baptizable (Johnson 1987) type of argument that is used by one party in a dialogue exchange in such a way that it blocks or interferes with the collaborative realization of the goal of the type of dialogue in which the two participants are supposed to be engaged (Walton 1995). Thus, there is a difference between a weak... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.4 (2000) 319-335 [Access article in PDF] Rhetoric as a Technique and a Mode of Truth: Reflections on Chaïm Perelman Alan Gross In memoriam: Henry Johnstone, fons et origo.In one of his many criticisms of The New Rhetoric, the philosopher Henry W. Johnstone Jr. complains about its chapter "The Dissociation of Concepts" that "one is never sure whether [Chaïm Perelman is] thinking of rhetoric primarily (...) as a technique or primarily as a mode of truth. One wonders, too, what status [he is] claiming for the book itself" (1978, 99). 1 Since the chapter in question largely concerns philosophical argument, the doubt is very much apropos. But the response to Johnstone's implied question--a response that Johnstone does not think available--is that the correct answer legitimately varies in a systematic way. While in philosophical contexts, and, incidentally, in scientific ones, rhetoric is invariably a mode of truth, in contexts of public address it need not be. To see how this systematic variation might be the case, I will focus, as does Johnstone, on the dissociation of concepts as a test case of the robustness of a rhetoric oriented toward truth. To do so, I must first define dissociation and then come to terms with the way in which concepts are dissociated in public address, in philosophy, and in science. In treating these examples, however, I must be wary. While they will vary systematically according to field, they are not each instances of any general "law" of dissociation. Johnstone is surely right to "doubt whether there is any general logic of dissociation; there is only the logic of each particular dissociation, generated in each case by a particular problem" (99). When I have run through my examples, I can return to Johnstone's question about the status of rhetoric and of Perelman's study of it.Suppose that, in a campaign for the United States Senate, my opponent says that the central issue is high taxes, not the rise of medical costs, while I say that the central issue is medical costs, not high taxes. Neither of us [End Page 319] need be engaged in the dissociation of concepts; we may simply be excluding taxes and medical care, respectively, from political matters that deserve our immediate and full attention; we may simply be breaking the link between these issues and those of high political salience. In Perelman's words, "[T]he technique of breaking up a liaison consists... in asserting that elements that should remain separated and independent are improperly associated" (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 411). Yet, if we think that adequate medical care for all Americans is a moral issue, that it transcends politics, we are dissociating this issue from the category of campaign issues of the ordinary sort, those that deal "merely" with expediency. In the process, we are devaluing matters of mere expediency. Dissociation is a way of taking the argumentative high ground, of putting an issue on a different plane, an act that in this case turns a political race into a moral contest. In Perelman's words, "[T]he dissociation of notions brings about a more or less profound change in the conceptual data that are used as a basis of argument. It is then no more a question of breaking the links that join independent elements, but of modifying the very structure of these elements" (412).To illustrate this difference, I will use two parallel passages on the same topic: one from Stephen Douglas and the other from Abraham Lincoln, both from the debate between them in Alton, Illinois, on 15 October 1858. In his passage, Douglas stoutly defends states' rights: This government was made on the great basis of the sovereignty of the States--the right of each state to regulate its own domestic institutions to suit itself, and that right was conferred with the understanding and expectation that inasmuch as each locality had separate and distinct interests, each state must have different and distinct local and domestic institutions, corresponding to the wants... (shrink)

Geçtiğimiz onca yıl içinde kültürel çalışmaların birçok farklı biçimleri ortaya çıkmıştır. 1980’lerde ve 1990’lardaki küresel genişleme döneminde, kültürel çalışmalar genellikle İngiltere Birmingham’daki Çağdaş Kültürel Çalışmalar Merkezi’nde geliştirilen kültür ve toplum anlayışıyla tanımlanmıştır. Onların kültüre sosyolojik, materyalist ve politik yaklaşımları 20. yüzyılın kültürel Marksizmine dayanır. 20. yüzyıl Marksist teorisyenleri arasında yer alan Georg Lukacs, Antonio Gramsci, Ernst Bloch, Walter Benjamin ve T.W. Adorno’dan Fredric Jameson ve Terry Eagleton’a kadar uzanan birçok düşünür, Marksist teoriyi kültürel formların üretiminin, toplum ve tarihle olan (...) bağını, kitleler ve sosyal hayat üzerindeki etki ve etkileşimlerinin ilişkisini incelemek için kullanmıştır. Kültürel Marksizm, kültürel çalışmaların ve onun günümüzdeki çeşitli tür ve biçimlerine dayanak noktası olması açısından önem arz etmektedir. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Transvaluations: Nietzsche in France, 1872–1972 by Douglas SmithAlan D. SchriftDouglas Smith. Transvaluations: Nietzsche in France, 1872–1972. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. Pp. xiii + 250. Cloth, $67.00.In a letter to his friend Heinrich Köselitz, Nietzsche described himself as “a battlefield more than a human being.” Douglas Smith appropriately frames his survey of Nietzsche’s reception in France with this image, noting that several significant transformations mark the (...) first hundred years of Nietzsche’s French reception. Perhaps more to the point, Smith argues that the contesting readings of Nietzsche’s works represent other conflicts, both philosophical, institutional, and political. The result is an interesting, albeit selective, narrative that seeks to tell a coherent story of the twists and turns in Nietzsche’s French reception from 1872—the year The Birth of Tragedy was published—to 1972—the year of the Nietzsche conference at Cerisy that Smith takes as the apogee of the sixties Nietzsche revival. As Smith wisely notes, Nietzsche’s works lend themselves to widely divergent readings; he also implies the same may be true of the history of his reception.Several interpretive assumptions guide Smith’s narrative; three are most central. First, the “transvalutions” of Nietzsche’s works are themselves supported by Nietzsche’s own “continual interrogation of identity—of the self, of the nation, of culture” (7). As Nietzsche continually called identity into question, the identity of his own texts were contested, and Smith shows how the political and philosophical left and right exploited Nietzsche’s reliance on metaphor to give themselves the task of constructing a coherent meaning for Nietzsche’s texts, a task discharged with progressively “closer,” more “immanent” readings of those texts. [End Page 477]Smith’s second assumption concerns the shifting privilege given to Nietzsche’s two major themes, as the century witnesses a transformation from an emphasis on will to power to eternal recurrence as the central theme. This transformation is conjoined with another, as attention to the ethical questions posed by Nietzsche’s works is replaced by questions concerning Nietzsche’s relationship to the history of metaphysics as its end or reversal. For Smith, these transformations reflect a shift from Nietzsche’s early reception—framed primarily by European political events (first the Franco-Prussian War, then the two World Wars)—to his later reception, framed primarily by French responses to German philosophy. This leads to Smith’s third and guiding assumption, namely, that Nietzsche’s French reception has throughout been a response first to Hegel and then to Heidegger.Smith’s narrative unfolds in five chapters. The first focuses on the “early reception” (1872–1929) and divides neatly into two periods: an initial period emphasizing Nietzsche’s biography (as friend of Wagner, follower of Schopenhauer), and a second period dominated by questions of national interest that move from valorization of Nietzsche’s polemics against German culture to his vilification as a reflection of Prussian militarism. The second chapter discusses Nietzsche’s reception vis-à-vis National Socialism: here we see the first tension between readings centering on eternal recurrence vs. those focused on will to power, as the French right followed the vitalist Nazi emphasis on will to power, while the left (Lefebvre, Bataille) drew greater attention to eternal recurrence.The third chapter is somewhat unexpected, as it follows the Nietzsche-Hegel connection invoked by the “left” readings’ attention to contradiction to a discussion of decolonization that focuses on Sartre, Fanon, and Lévi-Strauss before concluding with an oddly situated discussion of Foucault. While much of this chapter is quite interesting, the attempt to read the disagreements between Sartre and first Fanon and then Lévi-Strauss as, in some sense, playing out a relationship between Hegel and Nietzsche (universal/particular) seems forced at times. In addition, Foucault’s reading of singularity as a way of reading Nietzsche into Fanon both mutes the substantive differences between Fanon and Sartre and insufficiently appreciates the depth of Nietzsche’s impact on Foucault’s early work (for example, there is no discussion of the role Nietzsche plays in The Order of Things).The final two chapters focus on post-1960s reception. In the fourth chapter, Deleuze’s... (shrink)

Turing’s much debated test has turned 70 and is still fairly controversial. His 1950 paper is seen as a complex and multilayered text, and key questions about it remain largely unanswered. Why did Turing select learning from experience as the best approach to achieve machine intelligence? Why did he spend several years working with chess playing as a task to illustrate and test for machine intelligence only to trade it out for conversational question-answering in 1950? Why did Turing refer to (...) gender imitation in a test for machine intelligence? In this article, I shall address these questions by unveiling social, historical and epistemological roots of the so-called Turing test. I will draw attention to a historical fact that has been only scarcely observed in the secondary literature thus far, namely that Turing’s 1950 test emerged out of a controversy over the cognitive capabilities of digital computers, most notably out of debates with physicist and computer pioneer Douglas Hartree, chemist and philosopher Michael Polanyi, and neurosurgeon Geoffrey Jefferson. Seen in its historical context, Turing’s 1950 paper can be understood as essentially a reply to a series of challenges posed to him by these thinkers arguing against his view that machines can think. Turing did propose gender learning and imitation as one of his various imitation tests for machine intelligence, and I argue here that this was done in response to Jefferson's suggestion that gendered behavior is causally related to the physiology of sex hormones. (shrink)

Historians and sociologists chart the consequences of the expansion of knowledge; philosophers of science examine the causes. This book bridges the gap. The focus is on ‘academisation’ — the paradox whereby, as the general public becomes better educated to live and work with knowledge, the ‘academy’ increases its intellectual distance from the public, so that the nature of social and natural reality becomes more rather than less obscure.

A centipede can walk until it thinks about howit does so. Thereafter it stumbles, over thesheer impossibility of the information andcoordination required. Life in the economy islittle different. Those engaged in productionand exchange discover, pragmatically, ways tomake them work. Those observing the processsee, realistically, the immense improbabilitythat it should do so. That most economies workin practice, but must pass such toughteleological tests to succeed in theory,highlights a difference between players' andspectators' outlook which may help to explainwhy the game has repeatedly (...) been thrown wideopen just when conclusive results seemed withinreach.Section 1 of this paper identifies the fourforms of realism which economists have tendedto adopt. Section 2 considers the pragmatism ofeconomic agents, when observed in action bypsychologists and management scholars notoverly steeped in economic theory. Theconcluding section reviews the ways in whicheconomists have tried to blur the distinction,by reclassifying agents as realistic or theirown views as pragmatic, and suggests that amore pragmatic economics might bridge thedivide. (shrink)

"The development of the calculus during the 17th century was successful in mathematical practice, but raised questions about the nature of infinitesimals: were they real or rather fictitious? This collection of essays, by scholars from Canada, the US, Germany, United Kingdom and Switzerland, gives a comprehensive study of the controversies over the nature and status of the infinitesimal. Aside from Leibniz, the scholars considered are Hobbes, Wallis, Newton, Bernoulli, Hermann, and Nieuwentijt. The collection also contains newly discovered marginalia of Leibniz (...) to the writings of Hobbes."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)