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Douglas Husak [59]Douglas N. Husak [53]DouglasN Husak [3]Douglas Neil Husak [1]
  1.  84
    Overcriminalization: The Limits of the Criminal Law.Douglas N. Husak - 2007 - Oup Usa.
    Husak's primary goal is to defend a set of constraints to limit the authority of states to enact and enforce criminal offenses. In addition, Husak situates this endeavor in criminal theory as traditionally construed. This book urges the importance of this topic in the real world, while most Anglo-American legal philosophers have neglected it.
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  2.  60
    Retributivism and Over-Punishment.Douglas Husak - 2022 - Law and Philosophy 41 (2):169-191.
    Lately it has become a commonplace to complain about the injustice of mass incarceration. I share the sentiment that this phenomenon has been an injustice. But it also has become orthodoxy to allege that the acceptance of a retributive penal philosophy has been one of the chief factors that has brought about mass incarceration in the first place. As a self-proclaimed retributivist, I find these allegations to be troubling and unwarranted. The point of this paper is to take steps to (...)
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  3. The philosophy of criminal law: selected essays.Douglas N. Husak - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Does criminal liability require an act? -- Motive and criminal liability -- The costs to criminal theory of supposing that intentions are irrelevant to permissibility -- Transferred intent -- The nature and justifiability of nonconsummate offenses -- Strict liability, justice, and proportionality -- The sequential principle of relative culpability -- Willful ignorance, knowledge, and the equal culpability thesis : a study of the significance of the principle of legality -- Rapes without rapists : consent and reasonable mistake -- Mistake of (...)
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  4.  54
    Ignorance of Law: A Philosophical Inquiry.Douglas N. Husak - 2016 - Oxford University Press USA.
    This book argues that ignorance of law should usually be a complete excuse from criminal liability. It defends this conclusion by invoking two presumptions: first, the content of criminal law should conform to morality; second, mistakes of fact and mistakes of law should be treated symmetrically.
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  5.  41
    The Objective(s) of Responsible Brains.Douglas Husak - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):267-281.
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  6. Negligence, Belief, Blame and Criminal Liability: The Special Case of Forgetting.Douglas Husak - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):199-218.
    Commentators seemingly agree about what negligence is—and how it is contrasted from recklessness. They also appear to concur about whether particular examples (both real and hypothetical) portray negligence. I am less confident about each of these matters. I explore the distinction between recklessness and negligence by examining a type of case that has generated a good deal of critical discussion: those in which a defendant forgets that he has created a substantial and unjustifiable risk of harm. Even in this limited (...)
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  7. Why punish the deserving?Douglas N. Husak - 1992 - Noûs 26 (4):447-464.
  8. Paternalism and autonomy.Douglas N. Husak - 1981 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (1):27-46.
  9. Paternalism and Consent.Douglas Husak - 2015 - In Thomas Schramme (ed.), New Perspectives on Paternalism and Health Care. Cham: Springer Verlag.
  10. Legal paternalism.Douglas N. Husak - 2003 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The Oxford Hndbk of Practical Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 387--388.
  11.  96
    Retributivism In Extremis.Douglas Husak - 2013 - Law and Philosophy 32 (1):3-31.
    I defend two objections to Tadros’s views on punishment. First, I allege that his criticisms of retributivism are persuasive only against extreme versions that provide no justificatory place for instrumentalist objectives. His attack fails against a version of retributivism that recognizes a chasm between what offenders deserve and the allthings-considered permissibility of treating offenders as they deserve. Second, I critique Tadros’s duty view – his alternative theory of punishment. Inter alia, I object that he derives principles from highly unusual examples (...)
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  12.  86
    Philosophy of criminal law.Douglas N. Husak - 1987 - Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield.
    This volume collects 17 of Douglas Husak's influential essays in criminal law theory. The essays span Husak's original and provocative contributions to the central topics in the field, including the grounds of criminal liability, relative culpability, the role of defences, and the justification of punishment. The volume includes an extended introduction by the author, drawing together the themes of his work, and exploring the goals of criminal theory.
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  13.  87
    On the supposed priority of justification to excuse.Douglas Husak - 2005 - Law and Philosophy 24 (6):557-594.
  14.  71
    Vehicles and Crashes.Douglas Husak - 2004 - Social Theory and Practice 30 (3):351-370.
  15.  81
    The Criminal Law as Last Resort.Douglas Husak - 2004 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 24 (2):207-235.
    In this article I examine one condition a minimalist theory of criminalization might contain: the criminal law should be used only as a last resort. I discuss how this principle should be interpreted and the reasons we have to accept it. I conclude that a theory of criminalization should probably include the (appropriately construed) last resort principle. But this conclusion will prove disappointing to those who hope to employ this principle to bring about fundamental reform in the substantive criminal law. (...)
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  16.  87
    The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing that Intentions are Irrelevant to Permissibility.Douglas Husak - 2009 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (1):51-70.
    I attempt to describe the several costs that criminal theory would be forced to pay by adopting the view (currently fashionable among moral philosophers) that the intentions of the agent are irrelevant to determinations of whether his actions are permissible (or criminal).
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  17. Drugs and Rights.Douglas N. Husak - 1992 - Cambridge University Press.
    This important book was the first serious work of philosophy to address the question: Do adults have a moral right to use drugs for recreational purposes? Many critics of the 'war on drugs' denounce law enforcement as counterproductive and ineffective. Douglas Husak argues that the 'war on drugs' violates the moral rights of adults who want to use drugs for pleasure, and that criminal laws against such use are incompatible with moral rights. This is not a polemical tract but a (...)
     
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  18.  76
    (2 other versions)Motive and criminal liability.Douglas N. Husak - 1989 - Criminal Justice Ethics 8 (1):3-14.
  19. Already Punished Enough.Douglas N. Husak - 1990 - Philosophical Topics 18 (1):79-99.
  20.  32
    Criminal Law at the Margins.Douglas Husak - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (3):381-393.
    I describe how our understanding of some of the central principles long held dear by most criminal theorists may have to be interpreted in light of the need to devise lenient responses for low-level offenders. Several of the most plausible suggestions for how to deal with minor infractions force us to take seriously some ideas that many legal philosophers have tended to resist elsewhere. I briefly touch upon four topics: whether informal can substitute for or count against the appropriate state (...)
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  21.  87
    Date rape, social convention, and reasonable mistakes.Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas - 1992 - Law and Philosophy 11 (1):95-126.
  22.  28
    Larry Alexander and Kimberly Kessler Ferzan on Omissions and Normative Ignorance: A Critical Reply.Douglas Husak - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (3):441-454.
    Reflections on Crime and Culpability seeks to elaborate, extend, and occasionally qualify the insights reached by Larry Alexander and Kim Ferzan in their influential prior collaboration, Crime and Culpability. They deftly explore any number of new issue that all criminal theorists should be encouraged to address. In my essay, I discuss and challenge their positions on omissions as well as on moral ignorance. Their treatment of the latter issue is a clear improvement over that in their earlier book. But their (...)
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  23.  67
    Liberal Neutrality, Autonomy, and Drug Prohibitions.Douglas N. Husak - 2000 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 29 (1):43-80.
  24.  70
    Is Drunk Driving a Serious Offense?Douglas N. Husak - 1994 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1):52-73.
  25. Mistake of Law and Culpability.Douglas Husak - 2010 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (2):135-159.
    When does a defendant not deserve punishment because he is unaware that his conduct breaches a penal statute? Retributivists must radically rethink their answer to this question to do justice to our moral intuitions. I suggest that modest progress on this topic can be made by modeling our approach to ignorance of law on our familiar approach to ignorance of fact. We need to distinguish different levels of culpability in given mistakes and to differentiate what such mistakes may be about. (...)
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  26.  43
    Abetting a Crime.Douglas Husak - 2014 - Law and Philosophy 33 (1):41-73.
    I focus on the set of problems that arise in identifying both the actus reus and (to an even greater extent) the mens rea needed by an abettor before she should be criminally liable for complicity in a crime. No consensus on these issues has emerged in positive law; commentators are enormously dissatisfied with the decisions courts have reached; and critics disagree radically about what reforms should be implemented to rectify this state of affairs. I explicitly deny that I will (...)
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  27. (1 other version)Recreational drugs and paternalism.DouglasN Husak - 1989 - Law and Philosophy 8 (3):353 - 381.
  28. Omissions, causation and liability.Douglas N. Husak - 1980 - Philosophical Quarterly 30 (121):318-326.
  29.  39
    Aspiration, Execution, and Controversy: Reply to My Critics.Douglas Husak - 2018 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 12 (2):351-362.
    I respond to Michael Zimmerman and Gideon Yaffe, both of whom have written thoughtful and constructive criticisms of my “Ignorance of Law”. Zimmerman believes I do not go far enough in exculpating morally ignorant wrongdoers; he accuses me of lacking the courage of my convictions in allowing exceptions for reckless wrongdoers and for willfully ignorant wrongdoers. Yaffe, by contrast, thinks I rely on a defective foundation of moral blameworthiness. He proposes an alternative account he alleges to conform more closely to (...)
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  30.  20
    Introduction.Douglas Husak - 2021 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (3):337-338.
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  31.  69
    The presumption of freedom.Douglas N. Husak - 1983 - Noûs 17 (3):345-362.
  32. Four points about drug decriminalization.Douglas Husak - 2003 - Criminal Justice Ethics 22 (1):21-29.
  33.  48
    Drug Proscriptions as Proxy Crimes.Douglas Husak - 2017 - Law and Philosophy 36 (4):345-366.
    Our drug policy has been widely deemed a failure because the criminalization of drug use has not succeeded in reducing prevalence rates. I contend that the most promising basis to defend the justifiability of drug offenses is to construe them as proxy crimes: offenses designed to prevent the commission of other, more serious crimes. I make a case that many law enforcement officials use drug proscriptions for this purpose in the real world. When construed as proxy crimes, drug prohibitions are (...)
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  34. Intoxication and Culpability.Douglas Husak - 2012 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):363-379.
    I tackle the difficult problem of specifying how voluntary intoxication affects criminal culpability generally and recklessness in particular. I contend that the problem need not be conceptualized as an instance of actio libera in causa, namely the situation in which persons do something at t1 to culpably create the conditions of their own defense at t2. Instead, I argue that we need only consider intoxicated defendants at t2 in order to justify their punishment. In the course of defending my view, (...)
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  35. Why There Are No Human Rights.Douglas N. Husak - 1984 - Social Theory and Practice 10 (2):125-141.
  36.  92
    Date Rape, Social Convention, and Reasonable Mistakes.Douglas N. Husak & George C. Thomas III - 1992 - Law and Philosophy 11 (1/2):95 - 126.
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  37.  95
    Legal rights: How useful is hohfeldian analysis?Stephen D. Hudson & Douglas N. Husak - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (1):45 - 53.
  38.  56
    Conflicts of justifications.Douglas N. Husak - 1999 - Law and Philosophy 18 (1):41 - 68.
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  39.  20
    Ignorance of Law: How to Conceptualize and Maybe Resolve the Issue.Douglas Husak - 2019 - In Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan (eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of Applied Ethics and the Criminal Law. Springer Verlag. pp. 315-333.
    Under what circumstances should ignorance that someone is violating a moral or criminal rule preclude or lessen his moral responsibility and/or penal liability? In this chapter, I first construct a schema or framework for how to think about this issue. Quite a bit of confusion and uncertainty, I am sure, derives from a failure to understand exactly what this question is asking. I next defend some substantive views about how this question should be answered. If my defense is cogent, I (...)
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  40. Transferred Intent.Douglas Husak - 1996 - Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy 10 (1):65-98.
     
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  41. Why Punish Attempts at All? Yaffe on 'The Transfer Principle'.Douglas Husak - 2012 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 6 (3):399-410.
    Gideon Yaffe is to be commended for beginning his exhaustive treatment by asking a surprisingly difficult question: Why punish attempts at all? He addresses this inquiry in the context of defending (what he calls) the transfer principle: “If a particular form of conduct is legitimately criminalized, then the attempt to engage in that form of conduct is also legitimately criminalized.” I begin by expressing a few reservations about the transfer principle itself. But my main point is that we are justified (...)
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  42.  23
    A Theory of Freedom.Douglas N. Husak - 1992 - Noûs 26 (3):400-402.
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  43. Limitations on Criminalization and the General Part of Criminal Law,”.Douglas N. Husak - 2002 - In Stephen Shute & Andrew Simester (eds.), Criminal law theory: doctrines of the general part. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 13--46.
     
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  44.  36
    The Sequential Principle of Relative Culpability: Douglas N. Husak.Douglas N. Husak - 1995 - Legal Theory 1 (4):493-518.
    A rational defense of the criminal law must provide a comprehensive theory of culpability. A comprehensive theory of culpability must resolve several difficult issues; in this article I will focus on only one. The general problem arises from the lack of a systematic account of relative culpability. An account of relative culpability would identify and defend a set of considerations to assess whether, why, under what circumstances, and to what extent persons who perform a criminal act with a given culpable (...)
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  45.  81
    What is so special about [free] speech?DouglasN Husak - 1985 - Law and Philosophy 4 (1):1 - 15.
    Legal and political philosophers (e.g., Scanlon, Schauser, etc.) typically regard speech as special in the sense that conduct that causes harm should be less subject to regulation if it involves speech than if it does not. Though speech is special in legal analysis, I argue that it should not be given comparable status in moral theory. I maintain that most limitations on state authority enacted on behalf of a moral principle of freedom of speech can be retained without supposing that (...)
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  46.  38
    Gardner on the Philosophy of Criminal Law.Douglas Husak - 2008 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 29 (1):169-187.
    Offences and Defences is an outstanding collection of eleven of John Gardner's previously published papers in the philosophy of criminal law. I briefly examine his views on five central issues: his claims about basic responsibility and whether it should be construed as relational; his positions on agent neutrality; his arguments about whether moral and criminal wrongs are typically strict; his thoughts about the structure of defences, and, finally, what his account of rape reveals about the content of the harm principle.
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  47.  33
    Is Fair Opportunity a Comprehensive Theory of Responsibility?Douglas Husak - forthcoming - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-10.
    I challenge the adequacy of David Brink’s “master principle” of culpability. I allege that it fails to account for the moral relevance of ignorance of wrongdoing. I describe three cases in which I believe that Brink’s theory of normative competence cannot account for the significance of a variable that bears on culpability. In most of this paper I attempt to anticipate and reply to the various responses Brink might offer to my challenge.
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  48. In Favor of Drug Decriminalization.Douglas Husak - 2005 - In Andrew I. Cohen & Christopher Heath Wellman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Applied Ethics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 22--335.
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  49.  81
    Is the Distinction between Positive Actions and Omissions Value-Neutral?Douglas N. Husak - 1985 - Tulane Studies in Philosophy 33:83-92.
  50.  15
    Require an Act?Douglas Husak - 1998 - In Antony Duff (ed.), Philosophy and the criminal law: principle and critique. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 60.
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