Principlism has been advocated as an approach to resolving concrete cases and issues in bioethics, but critics have pointed out that a main problem for principlism is its lack of a method for assigning priorities to conflicting ethical principles. A version of principlism referred to as 'specified principlism' has been put forward in an attempt to overcome this problem. However, none of the advocates of specified principlism have attempted to demonstrate that the method actually works in resolving detailed clinical cases. (...) This paper shows that when one tries to use it, specified principlism fails to provide practical assistance in deciding how to resolve concrete cases. Proponents of specified principlism have attempted to defend it by arguing that it is superior to casuistry, but it can be shown that their arguments are faulty. Because of these reasons, specified principlism should not be considered a leading contender in the search for methods of making justifiable decisions in clinical cases. (shrink)

Various theories have been put forward in an attempt to explain what makes moral judgments justifiable. One of the main theories currently advocated in bioethics is a form of coherentism known as wide reflective equilibrium. In this paper, I argue that wide reflective equilibrium is not a satisfactory approach for justifying moral beliefs and propositions. A long-standing theoretical problem for reflective equilibrium has not been adequately resolved, and, as a result, the main arguments for wide reflective equilibrium are unsuccessful. Moreover, (...) practical problems that arise in using the method of wide reflective equilibrium undermine the idea that it is a viable approach for justifying moral judgments about cases and policies. Given that wide reflective equilibrium is the most prominent version of coherentism, these considerations call into question the coherentist approach to justification in bioethics. (shrink)

Although there are important moral arguments against cloning human beings, it has been suggested that there might be exceptional cases in which cloning humans would be ethically permissible. One type of supposed exceptional case involves infertile couples who want to have children by cloning. This paper explores whether cloning would be ethically permissible in infertility cases and the separate question of whether we should have a policy allowing cloning in such cases. One caveat should be stated at the beginning, however. (...) After the cloning of a sheep in Scotland, scientists pointed out that using the same technique to clone humans would, at present, involve substantial risks of producing children with birth defects. This concern over safety gives compelling support to the view that it would be wrong to attempt human cloning now. Thus, we do not reach the debate about exceptional cases unless the issue of safety can be set aside. I ask the reader to consider the possibility that in the future humans could be cloned without a significantly elevated risk of birth defects from the cloning process itself. The remainder of this paper assumes, for sake of argument, that cloning technology has advanced to that point. Given this assumption, would cloning in the infertility cases be ethically permissible, and should it be legally permitted? (shrink)

Casuistic methods of reasoning in medical ethics have been criticized by a number of authors. At least five main objections to casuistry have been put forward: (1) it requires a uniformity of views that is not present in contemporary pluralistic society; (2) it cannot achieve consensus on controversial issues; (3) it is unable to examine critically intuitions about cases; (4) it yields different conclusions about cases when alternative paradigms are chosen; and (5) it cannot articulate the grounds of its conclusions. (...) Two main versions of casuistry have been put forward, and the responses to these objections depend in part on which version one is defending. Jonsen has advocated a version modeled on the approach to casuistry used by moral theologians in the 15th and 16th century, involving comparison of the case at hand with a single paradigm and a lineup of cases. The present author has advocated another version, drawn from experience with cases in clinical ethics, which involves comparing the case at hand with two or more paradigms. Four of the five objections are unsuccessful when directed against Jonsen'sapproach, and all of them are unsuccessful when directed against the approach involving comparison with two or more paradigms. (shrink)

Some defenders of the view that there is a common morality have conceived such morality as being universal, in the sense of extending across all cultures and times. Those who deny the existence of such a common morality often argue that the universality claim is implausible. Defense of common morality must take account of the distinction between descriptive and normative claims that there is a common morality. This essay considers these claims separately and identifies the nature of the arguments for (...) each claim. It argues that the claim that there is a universal common morality in the descriptive sense has not been successfully defended to date. It maintains that the claim that there is a common morality in the normative sense need not be understood as universalist. This paper advocates the concept of group specific common morality, including country-specific versions. It suggests that both the descriptive and the normative claims that there are country-specific common moralities are plausible, and that a country-specific normative common morality could provide the basis for a country's bioethics. (shrink)

Several methods have been reported for extracting sperm from a man after he dies or enters a persistent vegetative state. Although such sperm retrieval could be performed for nonprocreative purposes, such as research, in this paper I focus on cases involving procreative intent. Since 1980, more than ninety cases have occurred in which family members requested sperm retrieval from patients who died or were irreversibly unconscious, with the intent that a wife, girlfriend, or other woman would be inseminated. Recently, the (...) first report of pregnancy and birth following postmortem sperm retrieval appeared in the media.In these cases, death or PVS typically is caused by anoxic injuries, trauma, or rapidly progressing infections. (shrink)

Laurence B. McCullough and Frank A. Chervenak (2008) provide a lucid and convincing account of the conceptual errors made by abortion opponents in using the term unborn child as a rhetorical device...

(2001). How Should IVF Programs Handle Initial Disclosure of Information to Prospective Ovum Donors? The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 23-25.

ABSTRACT In previous articles I discussed the ethics of human reproductive cloning, focusing on a possible future scenario in which reproductive cloning can be accomplished without an elevated risk of anomalies to the children who are created. I argued that in such a scenario it would be ethically permissible for infertile couples to use cloning as a way to have genetically related children and that such use should not be prohibited. In ‘Reproductive Cloning and a (Kind of) Genetic Fallacy’, Neil (...) Levy and Mianna Lotz raise objections to my conclusions. They disagree with the view, for which I argued, that some couples can have defensible reasons for desiring genetically related children. They also offer several new arguments against reproductive cloning, including an argument that it would diminish the number of adoptions, thereby adversely affecting the welfare of children who need to be adopted. In this paper I point out that Levy and Lotz's criticisms misconstrue my arguments and that there are serious problems with their arguments for prohibiting infertile couples from using cloning, including their argument from adoption. (shrink)

In an earlier essay in this journal I critiqued Don Marquis's well-known argument against abortion. I distinguished two versions of Marquis's argument, which I refer to as ‘the essence argument’ and ‘the sufficient condition argument’. I presented two counterexamples showing that the essence argument was mistaken, and I argued that the sufficient condition argument should be rejected because Marquis had not adequately responded to an important objection to it. In response to my critique, Marquis put forward in this journal a (...) revised version of his argument. In his modified approach he no longer advocates the essence argument and he offers a new version of the sufficient condition argument. In the current essay, I discuss how Marquis's revised argument deals with my original objections, and I argue that his new sufficient condition argument is unsuccessful. (shrink)

In this case, one should expect that providing hydration sufficient to maintain fluid balance would tend to prolong the dying process. In a well-known case at Johns Hopkins University, fluids (and feedings) were withheld from a newborn with anomalies, and the infant died after 15 days, compared to three weeks in the present case, in which fluids were given. In the famous Baby Doe case, fluids and nutrition were withheld and the infant lived only six days. In the case at (...) hand, prolonging the dying process risks causing suffering for the infant from various complications that can arise, and it adds to the emotional burden on the family. We learned from the Johns Hopkins case that prolonged dying is also emotionally difficult for the nurses and other health professionals caring for the infant. (shrink)

The first reported case of postmortem sperm retrieval occurred in 1978, involving a man who became brain dead after a motor vehicle accident and whose wife requested removal of his sperm so that she could be artificially inseminated. Physicians performed the retrieval by surgically excising the ducts that transport sperm from the testes and removing sperm from them. Since that time, several other methods for retrieving sperm from such patients have been reported, and at least 141 cases have been documented (...) in which requests were made for removal of sperm from men who were dead or irreversibly unconscious. Moreover, there have been several reports of pregnancies and births resulting from assisted reproduction using sperm retrieved in such cases. (shrink)

Various arguments have been given against positive euthanasia, but little attention has been given to the question of whether these arguments are uniformly effective in all contexts. There appears to be a range of cases, involving non-voluntary killing of irreversibly unconscious patients, in which these arguments do not succeed. Various reasons have been given in support of positive killing in such cases. It can be argued that there is a range of cases for which a policy of allowing positive killing (...) is morally required. However, currently there are legal obstacles to implementing such a policy. (shrink)

From the perspective of investigators conducting research involving pregnant women and fetuses, a woman's decision about whether to have an abortion can sometimes be relevant to the suitability of the woman and fetus as research subjects. However, prominent ethicists disagree over whether it is permissible for a woman's decision about abortion to be an inclusion or exclusion criterion for participation in research. A widely held view is that fetuses to be aborted and fetuses to be carried to term should be (...) treated equally as research subjects. Some hold that this principle implies that a woman's decision about whether to have an abortion should not be an inclusion or exclusion criterion. This paper identifies types of research in which investigators might want to have inclusion or exclusion criteria based on decisions about abortion. It examines the arguments for and against having the woman's decision about abortion included in such criteria. It is argued that there are types of research in which such criteria are ethically permissible. (shrink)

: Continuing the dialogue begun in the March 2006 issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, I suggest that Bernard Gert's response to my paper does not adequately address the criticisms I make of his theory's application to bioethics cases.

: Bernard Gert's theory of morality has received much critical attention, but there has been relatively little commentary on its practical value for bioethics. An important test of an ethical theory is its ability to yield results that are helpful and plausible when applied to real cases. An examination of Gert's theory and his own attempts to apply it to bioethics cases reveals that there are serious difficulties with regard to its application. These problems are sufficiently severe to support the (...) conclusion that Gert's theory is unacceptable as an approach for resolving bioethics cases, even relatively noncontroversial cases. (shrink)

How should the definition of “minimal risk” in the federal research regulations be interpreted in regard to pregnant women and fetuses? Surprisingly, there has been little discussion of this question. There is, after all, a substantial amount of published work addressing the question of how “minimal risk” should be interpreted. Similarly, there is a large body of literature on the ethics of research involving pregnant women and fetuses, particularly maternal-fetal surgery. However, in neither of these bodies of work can one (...) find an analysis of minimal risk in regard to fetuses or pregnant women.The concept of minimal risk is defined in the regulations as follows:Minimal risk means that the probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests. (shrink)

Two factors are discussed which have important implications for the issue of paternalism in the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU): the physician's role as advocate for the patient; and the range of typical responses of parents who learn that their neonate has a serious illness. These factors are pertinent to the task of identifying those actions which are paternalistic, as well as to the question of whether paternalism is justified. It is argued that certain behavior by physicians which is often (...) thought to be paternalistic is not in fact so. Furthermore, an argument in defense of paternalism which has largely been overlooked is presented. Examples are given to illustrate how paternalism actually arises in the NICU, and it is argued that paternalism is justified in some cases. (shrink)

Assisted reproductive technology has enabled thousands of infertile couples to experience the joys of parenthood. At various times, however, significant problems have come to light concerning the providing of infertility treatment in the United States. An early problem was misleading advertising by some infertility programs, particularly in regard to pregnancy success rates. This unacceptable activity suggested the need for more oversight of assisted reproductive technology and prompted the passage of a federal law requiring the reporting of success rates in a (...) standardized format. Another problem, one that was especially disturbing, was the transfer of preembryos to infertile women at the University of California, Irvine, without the consent of the progenitor couples. Disclosure of these events added fuel to the debate over whether assisted reproductive technology should be subject to greater governmental regulation. (shrink)

An objection often is raised against the use of reproductive technology to create "nontraditional families," as in ovum donation for postmenopausal women or postmortem artificial insemination. The objection states that conceiving children in such circumstances is harmful to them because of adverse features of these nontraditional families. A similar objection is raised when parents, through negligence or willful disregard of risks, create children with serious genetic diseases or other developmental handicaps. It is claimed that such reproduction harms the children who (...) are created. In reply to this Harm to the Child Argument, it has been pointed out that the procreative acts that supposedly harm the child are the very acts that create the child. This reply has been developed into an argument that, in most of the types of cases under consideration, creating the child does not harm her. This reply, the No Harm Argument, has been stated in three main ways, and it is one of the most misunderstood arguments in bioethics. This paper examines the main rebuttals that have been made to the No Harm Argument and argues that none of them is successful. (shrink)

The President’s Council on Bioethics has addressed the moral status of human preembryos in its reports on stem cell research and human therapeutic cloning. Although the Council has been criticized for being hand-picked to favor the right-to-life viewpoint concerning human preembryos, it has embraced the idea that the right-to-life position should be defended in secular terms. This is an important feature of the Council’s work, and it demonstrates a recognition of the need for genuine engagement between opposing sides in the (...) debate over stem cell research. To promote this engagement, the Council has stated in secular terms several arguments for the personhood of human preembryos. This essay presents and critiques those arguments, and it concludes that they are unsuccessful. If the best arguments in support of the personhood of human preembryos have been presented by the Council, then there are no reasonable secular arguments in support of that view. (shrink)