A brief review is given of the continuous spontaneous localization (CSL) model, in which a classical field interacts with quantized particles to cause dynamical wavefunction collapse. One of the model's predictions is that particles “spontaneously” gain energy at a slow rate. When applied to the excitation of a nucleon in a Ge nucleus, it is shown how a limit on the relative collapse rates of neutron and proton can be obtained, and a rough estimate is made from data. When applied (...) to the spontaneous excitation of 1s electrons in Ge, by a more detailed analysis of more accurate data than given previously, an updated limit is obtained on the relative collapse rates of the electron and proton, suggesting that the coupling of the field to electrons and nucleons is mass proportional. (shrink)

A brief review is given of the continuous spontaneous localization (CSL) model, in which a classical field interacts with quantized particles to cause dynamical wavefunction collapse. One of the model's predictions is that particles “spontaneously” gain energy at a slow rate. When applied to the excitation of a nucleon in a Ge nucleus, it is shown how a limit on the relative collapse rates of neutron and proton can be obtained, and a rough estimate is made from data. When applied (...) to the spontaneous excitation of 1s electrons in Ge, by a more detailed analysis of more accurate data than given previously, an updated limit is obtained on the relative collapse rates of the electron and proton, suggesting that the coupling of the field to electrons and nucleons is mass proportional. (shrink)

This study proposes and tests a model that integrates culture, attitudes, subjective norms, and attributions into a theoretical framework that explains tolerance toward nepotism in a Latin American country. The participants were 202 Ecuadorian middle and upper managers. The results suggested that attitudes, subjective norms, and attributions significantly predict managerial intention to discipline those employees who favored a family member when hiring. Furthermore, subjective norms and internal attributions mediated the relationship between culture and intentions to discipline employees who engaged in (...) nepotistic acts. Our findings highlight the need to implement culture-congruent HR practices to effect mission-driven changes in talent management practices. (shrink)

The cross-cultural literature is reviewed and integrated together with attitude theories, thereby outlining a model through which certain values influence the intervening variables that ultimately lead managers to tolerate employee bribery. The case of Latin America is employed to illustrate how regionally dominant cultural values may shape managers' attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control, which in turn affect tolerance of employee bribery. A series of research propositions and practical recommendations are derived from the model.

The goal of this study was to introduce a model explaining how managers' attitudes, subjective norms, attributions, and the individualism-collectivism cultural dimension affect the way managers' deal with employee bribery in organizations. Twenty-six internal and external attributions related to bribery were identified through a series of structured interviews with 65 subject matter experts. These attributions, together with the other variables in the model, were evaluated by 354 Ecuadorian managers. Hierarchical regression analyses indicated that attitudes and external attributions significantly predicted managers' (...) intentions to discipline employees who accepted a bribe. In addition, external attributions mediated the relationship between individualism-collectivism and intent to discipline corrupt employees. Implications for the management of bribery in Latin American organizations are discussed. (shrink)

En 1993 y 2012 la poeta irlandesa Mary O’Malley publicó Valparaiso y Where the Rocks Float que edificó alrededor de la figura del mar y de la zona costera irlandesa donde nació. En ambas colecciones, la figura del mar se transforma en un potente agente activo que denuncia el rol de la mujer en la sociedad irlandesa y la explotación de los espacios azules con fines de consumo. Utilizando el análisis de Donna Haraway en Manifiesto cíborg (1985), este artículo analizará (...) una selección de textos de ambos poemarios para estudiar el vínculo entre mujer y mar como agentes activos contra la opresión patriarcal y la explotación capitalista. (shrink)

El pensamiento filosófico ha encontrado en el problema del mal un difícil y provocativo desafío. Cuando el mal aparece, el pensamiento llega a sus límites. El siglo veinte ha sido testigo del horror. El pensamiento necesita reconciliarse con un mundo en el que el horror ha sucedido. Hannah Arendt fue una de las intelectuales más importantes que enfatizó la relación entre comprensión y reconciliación. Para ella, la consecuencia inherente de la comprensión es la reconciliación. En este trabajo analizo el alcance (...) de su argumento. Intento conectar la mirada arendtiana con otros autores que confrontan con su perspectiva. (shrink)

El artículo busca caracterizar la noción y práctica de la filosofía de un grupo de profesores colombianos del siglo XX. Se parte de la revisión historiográfica del relato “normalizador” en la historia de la filosofía local. El análisis cualitativo de textos escritos entre 1940 y 1960 propone una lectura ambivalente sobre algunas características del oficio de la filosofía, al exponer las tensiones entre una vocación filosófica y las modestas condiciones del oficio. Otras tensiones mostrarán los dos ejes desde donde aquellos (...) profesores pretendieron hacer filosofía: el técnico y el cultural. En 1950, el relato del proceso normalizador de la filosofía fue reforzado por Francisco Romero desde unos referentes ejemplarizantes, “adánicos”, e incluso épicos. Luego, el relato sobre las décadas comprendidas entre 1940 y 1960 se cristalizó bajo el lente retrospectivo de 1980, pero desde una mirada unilateral de la categoría de “normalización”, enfocada solo en aspectos técnicos y disciplinares de la filosofía. Para recuperar el eje cultural, se perfila la figura del “intelectual” de mediados de siglo XX a partir de lo que Renán Silva ha caracterizado como el “pastor de almas”, como aquel que podía interpretar la cultura popular y dictarle un derrotero. Una segunda entrega, ocupada del análisis de distintos registros textuales de la escritura filosófica de mitad de siglo XX, más centrados en el eje de la interpretación y orientación cultural. (shrink)

Juan Manuel Burgos presents his own version of personalism, which is nevertheless well rooted in the personalist tradition. He has been developing his project for years and is among a group of world-renowned personalists who study the complexity and mystery of the human person. His new book deals with the relationship between personalism and metaphysics. He poses the question of whether personalism can be considered a first philosophy. The answer is positive: it is indeed a sectorial first philosophy, which (...) may or may not be supported by traditional metaphysical projects, especially Thomistic ones. Not every personalist has to agree with its final thesis, although its position is well-founded and deserves much scholarly attention. It provokes further questions and opens up new areas of personalist discussion. This book confirms that personalism is a dynamic and growing school of thought that goes beyond describing the mere phenomena of the person and seeks deeper reasons for his being. I highly recommend this book as a new step to help us better understand the reality of the human person. (shrink)

The humanist treatises presented here are only peripheral to the history of logic, but I think historians of logic may read them with interest, if perhaps with irritation. In the early sixteenth century the humanists set about to demolish medieval logic based on syllogistic and disputation, and to replace it in the university curriculum with a 'rhetorical' logic based on the use of topics and persuasion. To a very large extent they succeeded. Although Aris totelian logic retained a vigorous life (...) in the schools, it never again attained to the overwhelming primacy it had so long enjoyed in the northern universities. It has been the custom to take the arguments of the humanists at face value, and the word 'scholastic' has continued to have pejorative overtones. This is easy to understand, because until recently our knowledge of the high period of medieval logic has been slight, and the humanists' testimony as to its decadent state in the sixteenth century has, for the most part, been accepted uncritically. Within the past two decades important work on medieval logic has recovered the brilliant achievement of thirteenth and fourteenth century logicians, philosophers, and natural scientists. New studies are constantly appearing, and the logico-semantic system of the terminists has become fruitful territory not only for historians of logic but also for students of modern linguistics and semiotics. (shrink)

The US neutrino community gathered at the Workshop on the Intermediate Neutrino Program at Brookhaven National Laboratory February 4-6, 2015 to explore opportunities in neutrino physics over the next five to ten years. Scientists from particle, astroparticle and nuclear physics participated in the workshop. The workshop examined promising opportunities for neutrino physics in the intermediate term, including possible new small to mid-scale experiments, US contributions to large experiments, upgrades to existing experiments, R&D plans and theory. The workshop was organized into (...) two sets of parallel working group sessions, divided by physics topics and technology. Physics working groups covered topics on Sterile Neutrinos, Neutrino Mixing, Neutrino Interactions, Neutrino Properties and Astrophysical Neutrinos. Technology sessions were organized into Theory, Short-Baseline Accelerator Neutrinos, Reactor Neutrinos, Detector R&D and Source, Cyclotron and Meson Decay at Rest sessions.This report summarizes discussion and conclusions from the workshop. (shrink)

The volume addresses a variety of issues on Stance and Inter/Subjectivity, and the expression of Identity in discourse. It focuses on the multifaceted nature of stance, and the use of resources of epistemicity, effectivity, and evaluation and metaphor, as well as other dimensions within the domain of stance, such as mirativity, emotion and attribution. In this way it provides a more in-depth and a wider perspective into the nature of stance. The contributions feature the use of stance resources in several (...) languages, and in various discourse domains and genres, such as oral discourse, political and newspaper discourse, and science popularization and medical research articles, as well as online fora on social issues, mental health and peer support platforms. (shrink)

In the last decades there has been a great controversy about the scientific status of emotion categories. This controversy stems from the idea that emotions are heterogeneous phenomena, which precludes classifying them under a common kind. In this article, I analyze this claim—which I call the Variability Thesis—and argue that as it stands, it is problematically underdefined. To show this, I examine a recent formulation of the thesis as offered by Scarantino (2015). On one hand, I raise some issues regarding (...) the logical structure of the claim. On the other hand, and most importantly, I show that the Variability Thesis requires a consensus about what counts as a relevant pattern of response in different domains, a consensus that is lacking in the current literature. This makes it difficult to assess what counts as evidence for or against this thesis. As a result, arguments based on the Variability Thesis are unwarranted. This raises serious concerns about some current empirical theories of emotions, but also sheds light on the issue of the scientific status of emotion categories. (shrink)

The paper first examines the difference between Wolff’s demonstration of my present existence and Descartes’ intuitive connection of my thinking with my existence. The results of this investigation enable us to analyse two controversial answers to the question of the knowledge of existence in Wolff’s works. The first answer is from Jürgen Stolzenberg, who discusses Wolff’s proof of the statement: I am. The second is written by Luigi Cataldi Madonna, who investigates the concept of contingent existence in Wolff’s works. The (...) problems of the interpretations they propose are different. The first uses in his analysis meanings of central terms that were foreign to Wolff. The second does not pay attention to Wolff’s framework and aims. These difficulties in their interpretations distort what Wolff does and plans in his treatment of the knowledge of existence. Wolff builds a demonstration to prove how we know that we are, because for Wolff there is only science if we prove all that we claim. According to him, philosophy is a science. With this paper I plan to clarify the context of Wolff’s demonstration of my present existence as well as the demonstration itself, to which the analysis of the above two interpretations can contribute. (shrink)

Je rappelle ici l’une des plus constantes préoccupations de la pensée de Jean-Luc Nancy : celle du destin d’un Occident qui, au moment même où il paraît accomplir son élargissement au monde entier, est amené à faire, de plus en plus, le constat de son propre effacement, de son déclin, ou de sa finitude. Je le fais tout en déplaçant quelque peu le point de vue d’où le problème se pose « normalement » car, comme c’est arrivé maintes fois dans (...) mes échanges avec Nancy lui-même, j’y fais jouer mon écart, ou mon arrabal hispanique. (shrink)

From our everyday commuting to the gold medalist’s world-class performance, skillful actions are characterized by fine-grained, online agentive control. What is the proper explanation of such control? There are two traditional candidates: intellectualism explains skillful agentive control by reference to the agent’s propositional mental states; anti-intellectualism holds that propositional mental states or reflective processes are unnecessary since skillful action is fully accounted for by automatic coping processes. I examine the evidence for three psychological phenomena recently held to support anti-intellectualism and (...) argue that it supports neither traditional candidate, but an intermediate attention-control account, according to which the top-down, intention-directed control of attention is a necessary component of skillful action. Only this account recognizes both the role of automatic control in skilled action and the need for higher-order cognition to thread automatic processes together into a unified, skillful performance. This applies to bodily skillful action in general, from the world-class performance of experts to mundane, habitual action. The attention-control account stresses that, for intentions to play their role as top-down modulators of attention, agents must sustain the intention’s activation; hence, the need for reflecting throughout performance. (shrink)

I think that the ideas of “an objective conception of reality” and of “a scientific method” are neither clear nor useful. In this paper I want to say why I think that, and to recommend a Deweyan approach to science, one which emphasizes the utility rather than the objectivity of laws and theories.

Researchers often claim that self-control is a skill. It is also often stated that self-control exertions are intentional actions. However, no account has yet been proposed of the skillful agency that makes self-control exertion possible, so our understanding of self-control remains incomplete. Here I propose the skill model of self-control, which accounts for skillful agency by tackling the guidance problem: how can agents transform their abstract and coarse-grained intentions into the highly context-sensitive, fine-grained control processes required to select, revise and (...) correct strategies during self-control exertion? The skill model borrows conceptual tools from ‘hierarchical models’ recently developed in the context of motor skills, and asserts that self-control crucially involves the ability to manage the implementation and monitoring of regulatory strategies as the self-control exercise unfolds. Skilled agents are able do this by means of flexible practical reasoning: a fast, context-sensitive type of deliberation that incorporates non-propositional representations into the formation and revision of the mixed-format intentions that structure self-control exertion. The literatures on implementation intentions and motivation framing offer corroborating evidence for the theory. As a surprising result, the skill of self-control that allows agents to overcome the contrary motivations they experience is self-effacing: instead of continuously honing this skill, expert agents replace it with a different one, which minimizes or prevents contrary motivations from arising in the first place. Thus, the more expert you are at self-control, the less likely you are to use it. (shrink)

A chronicled approach to the notion of computer simulations shows that there are two predominant interpretations in the specialized literature. According to the first interpretation, computer simulations are techniques for finding the set of solutions to a mathematical model. I call this first interpretation the problem-solving technique viewpoint. In its second interpretation, computer simulations are considered to describe patterns of behavior of a target system. I call this second interpretation the description of patterns of behavior viewpoint of computer simulations. This (...) article explores these two interpretations of computer simulations from three different angles. First, I collect a series of definitions of computer simulation from the historical record. I track back definitions to the early 1960s and show how each viewpoint shares similar interpretations of computer simulations—ultimately clustering into the two viewpoints aforementioned. This reconstruction also includes the most recent literature. Second, I unpack the philosophical assumptions behind each viewpoint, with a special emphasis on their differences. Third, I discuss the philosophical implications of each viewpoint in the context of the recent discussion on the logic of scientific explanation for computer simulations. (shrink)

A chronicled approach to the notion of computer simulations shows that there are two predominant interpretations in the specialized literature. According to the first interpretation, computer simulations are techniques for finding the set of solutions to a mathematical model. I call this first interpretation the problem-solving technique viewpoint. In its second interpretation, computer simulations are considered to describe patterns of behavior of a target system. I call this second interpretation the description of patterns of behavior viewpoint of computer simulations. This (...) article explores these two interpretations of computer simulations from three different angles. First, I collect a series of definitions of computer simulation from the historical record. I track back definitions to the early 1960s and show how each viewpoint shares similar interpretations of computer simulations—ultimately clustering into the two viewpoints aforementioned. This reconstruction also includes the most recent literature. Second, I unpack the philosophical assumptions behind each viewpoint, with a special emphasis on their differences. Third, I discuss the philosophical implications of each viewpoint in the context of the recent discussion on the logic of scientific explanation for computer simulations. (shrink)

Functionalism as a philosophical position has been recently applied to the case of emotion research. However, a number of objections have been raised against applying such a view to scientific theorizing on emotions. In this article, I argue that functionalism is still a viable strategy for emotion research. To do this, I present functionalism in philosophy of mind and offer a sketch of its application to emotions. I then discuss three recent objections raised against it and respond to each of (...) them. These objections claim that functionalism is intractable because (i) it does not support a scientifically interesting taxonomy of emotions for experimental settings, (ii) it is inherently teleological, and (iii) it cannot be falsified. I argue that these objections either rely on a simplified version of functionalism as a philosophical position or they pose challenges that functionalists can readily address. Lastly, I conclude by drawing some lessons these objections suggest for a tractable functionalist account of emotions. (shrink)

We discuss two modal claims about the phenomenal structure of color experiences: (i) violet experiences are necessarily experiences of a color that is for the subject on that occasion phenomenally composed of red and blue (the modal claim about violet) and (ii) no subject can possibly have an experience of a color that is for it then phenomenally composed of red and green (the modal claim about reddish green). The modal claim about reddish green is undermined by empirical results. We (...) discuss whether these empirical results cast doubt on the other modal claims as well. We argue that this not the case. Our argument is based on the thesis that the best argument for the modal claim about violet is quite different from the best argument for the modal claim about reddish green. To argue for this disanalogy we propose a reconstruction of the best available justification for both claims. (shrink)

In this paper we discuss the notions of adequacy and truth functionality in quantum logic from the point of view of a non-deterministic semantics. We give a characterization of the degree of non-functionality which is compatible with the propositional structure of quantum theory, showing that having truth-functional connectives, together with some assumptions regarding the relation of logical consequence, commits us to the adequacy of the interpretation sets of these connectives. An advantage of our proof is that it is independent of (...) the number of truth values involved, generalizing previous works. We also show the failure of the adequacy of every Nmatrix that is a model of the non-distributive lattice of quantum propositions. En este trabajo discutimos las nociones de adecuación y veritativo-funcionalidad en la lógica cuántica, desde el punto de vista de una semántica no determinista. Damos una caracterización del grado de no-funcionalidad compatible con la estructura proposicional de la teoría cuántica, mostrando que tener conectivos veritativo-funcionales, junto con algunos presupuestos relativos a la relación de consecuencia lógica, nos compromete con la adecuación de los conjuntos de interpretación de estos conectivos. Un punto ventajoso de nuestra prueba es que se independiza de la cantidad de valores de verdad involucrados, generalizando trabajos previos. Probamos también que falla la adecuación de cualquier Nmatriz que sirva como modelo para el retículo no distributivo de proposiciones cuánticas. (shrink)

In recent years, Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni have proposed to understand emotions as embodied evaluative attitudes we take towards objects that figure in nonevaluative representational states. Although their account nicely explains some of the key features that emotions are widely taken to have, it runs into a version of what I call the problem of integration. In the case of the attitudinal view, the integration problem takes the form of explaining how, from the point of view of the subject, (...) the bodily responses that make up the attitude part of the emotion and the representational states that provide the particular object of the emotion come to form an intentionally structured unitary experience, that is, one in which the bodily responses are intentionally directed towards the object. I argue that what explains this integration is the way in which the experience of bodily responses and the experience of the representational states interact. This, I propose, produces what I call an experience of convergence. I also suggest that understanding emotional experience in this way not only solves the problem of the integration but also provides a more solid ground for the claim that emotions qua embodied attitudes are evaluative. (shrink)