Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz

The study investigates the epistemological premises of the so-called "anthropological turn" of the eighteenth century within the German-speaking territories. Contrary to the dominant scholarly narrative of the past two decades, this shift is shaped less by the empirical sciences than by semiotics and exercises of the self, which find expression in the newly re-evaluated rhetorical tradition of the eighteenth century. As a discipline attuned to both semiotics and exercises, rhetoric offers a framework for reconfiguring human formation within the bourgeois Enlightenment. (...) On this basis, three key concepts organize Enlightenment anthropology in its effort to form the human being as a "good" human being: character, 'Bildung' (cultivation or formation), and 'Bestimmung' (vocation or destiny). -/- Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, drawing on Aristotle and Leibniz, argues in his "Ethica philosophica" (1740) for a perfection of the human being conceived as a dynamic process. This process, he claims, is dependent upon regimes of signs and exercises of the self. Given that these are primarily operative on the level of sensibility, Baumgarten subsequently sees the necessity to develop a science of sensate cognition—an endeavor he undertakes with his "Aesthetica" (1750/58). Through the artistic figure of the 'felix aestheticus', he outlines a set of exercises that serve the formation of the "good" human being. -/- Johann Georg Sulzer adopts this model of the human being as a subject in formation in his "Versuch von der Erziehung und Unterweisung der Kinder" (1745), thereby introducing the concept of 'Bildung' into Enlightenment pedagogy and establishing it as a central concept of the period. As he argues, the optimal formation of the human being into a "good" individual is achieved through poetry. This insight motivates Sulzer to implement such poetic pedagogy in practice with his "Unterredungen über die Schönheit der Natur" (1750), through which he seeks to cultivate the human being as he imagines it. -/- This dynamic model of human formation is further reflected in Immanuel Kant's concept of the 'Bestimmung des Menschen' (vocation or destiny of the human being), which becomes a central trope of German Enlightenment discourse. Since this vocation cannot be promoted through transcendental philosophy alone, Kant, in the methodological sections of his Critiques, shifts toward ethical askesis. From this point forward, it is through exercises that the human being is shaped and brought toward the ideal Kant envisions. In his pedagogical treatise "Über Pädagogik" (1803), Kant elaborates these formative exercises. Yet because the pragmatic formation of the human being never fully attains the ideal, Kant ultimately locates the telos of this formation in a social context—die Tischgesellschaft (the table society)—in his "Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht" (1798). (shrink)

Die Vorschläge zu einer nothwendigen Sprachlehre erschienen 1811 anonym als Werk des eutiner Justizrats und Kantianers Ludwig Benedict Trede. Nach etwa dreißigjähriger Bearbeitungszeit legte er damit in Anknüpfung an Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft eine Schrift vor, die nach eigenen Angaben die notwendigen Gesetze des Denkens und Anschauens beinhalten soll, um Wörter zu bilden und miteinander zu verbinden. Dabei geht Tredes Schrift weit darüber hinaus, präsentiert sie doch eine Art ars inveniendi im Sinne Leibnizens, durch die sich ausnahmslos alle reinen (...) Begriffe aus den kantischen Kategorien ableiten lassen. Tredes komplexe Darstellung des Themas und seiner innovativen Herangehensweise ist der Umstand geschuldet, dass die Sprachlehre von seinen Zeitgenossen und Nachfolgern weitestgehend missverstanden wurde und letztlich in Vergessenheit geraten ist. Der vorliegende Band beinhaltet zu allererst einen Nachdruck der Vorschläge zu einer nothwendigen Sprachlehre, aber auch eine umfassende und einleitende Kommentierung. Diese bietet eine Aufarbeitung der historischen Rezeptionsgeschichte der Vorschläge, linguistische Einordnungen zu Tredes Sprachverständnis sowie philosophische Interpretationen und Analysen der logischen Struktur der Sprachlehre, die von Jakob Meier und Sebastian Simmert besorgt wurden. (shrink)

The volume explores the various 'labyrinths' of Leibniz's philosophy, i.e. hard-to-solve problems in which the human mind in entangled. In addition to the two well-known mazes of freedom and continuum, the authors examine other issues collected in mazes of theodicy, consciousness and absolute and relative differences.

In this article, I revisit Leibniz's early views on physical causation, more specifically, his relation to physical occasionalism focusing on the period from 1668 to 1676. An in-depth analysis of the Confession of Nature against the Atheists taken together with the Catholic Demonstrations, Leibniz's correspondence with Jakob Thomasius from 1668/69, and the Pacidius Philalethi (1676) serve as evidence that his position leads to physical occasionalism. This receives further confirmation by taking into account Leibniz's familiarity with Weigel's occasionalism in contrast to (...) Leibniz's later encounter of French occasionalism à la Cordemoy, La Forge, or Malebranche. Leibniz's exposure to Weigel's occasionalism, in turn, helps us better understand Leibniz's later critical reaction to occasionalism and how occasionalism helped him develop his own distinct views on causation as expressed in his mature philosophy. (shrink)

There are two axes of Leibniz’s philosophy about bodies that are deeply inter- twined, as this paper shows: the scientific investigation of bodies due to the application of mathematics to nature – Leibniz’s mixed mathematics – and the issue of matter/bodies ide- alism. This intertwinement raises an issue: How did Leibniz frame the relationship between mathematics, natural sciences, and metaphysics? Due to the increasing application of mathe- matics to natural sciences, especially physics, philosophers of the early modern period used the (...) reliability of mathematics to predict phenomena as the basis to infer the metaphysical outlook of nature. I argue that although Leibniz thought metaphysics must be scientifically informed and that mathematics is a valuable instrument to understand nature, metaphysics is more fun- damental than mathematics and natural sciences. By highlighting the foundational relation be- tween metaphysics and the sciences, this paper showcases an argument for the reality of bodies: the ideality of bodies, necessary for epistemic purposes, is not proof that they are not real. Keywords: Metaphysics, Application of Mathematics, Body, Idealism, Fundamentality. (shrink)

The aim of this dissertation is to develop an account of Gilles Deleuze’s philosophical project as a departure from ontology and ontological thinking. Ontology can be broadly understood as the study of being or the study of the meaning of being. Traditional ontology examines the nature of being while more contemporary philosophy often understands being itself as becoming or a process. In this respect, Deleuze has often been interpreted as a process or differential ontologist. This project departs from that interpretation (...) by arguing for a non-ontological Deleuze. The dissertation is broken into three papers where each presents a different account of what I call the non-ontological Deleuze through his work on the major pre-Kantian modern philosophers: David Hume, Benedict Spinoza, and Gottfried Leibniz. Each paper then uses the non-ontological Deleuze to engage with a related movement in post-Deleuzian Continental Philosophy. The first paper focuses on Deleuze’s early work on Hume to argue for a re-reading of the history of modern philosophy with a basis in transcendental empiricism rather than Kantian transcendental idealism. This paper uses Deleuze’s reading of Hume to respond to and critique the Speculative Realist movement’s charge that post-Kantian philosophy suffers from what they call correlationism. The second paper uses Deleuze’s work on Spinoza to argue for what the former calls ethology as a replacement for ontology. The claim here is that we should think of things in terms of what they do rather than what they are: in terms of their motion and affects rather than their being. There I contrast my reading of Deleuze’s Spinoza with those thinkers who have recently used that work to develop what is often referred to as New Materialism. The final paper argues that understanding things in terms of what they can do requires a nomadology, which is Deleuze’s play on Leibniz’s monadology. This paper uses Deleuze’s nomadology to create a dialogue with the emerging literature on Critical Posthumanism and subjectivity that has been influenced by Deleuze to suggest that posthumanist subjectivity should be understood in non-ontological terms. (shrink)

This paper seeks to initiate a theory of “imaginative dialogues” by articulating four dialogical principles that enable such a dialogue to occur. It is part of a larger project that takes the Socratic dialogue, a widely utilized conversation technique in philosophy education, as a starting point and aims to reinterpret it by shifting emphasis to the pre-reflective, pre-linguistic, and multimodal aspects of dialogues, involving both their verbal and embodied dimensions. To integrate the verbal dimensions of a dialogue with its more (...) elusive embodied dimensions, the paper will examine the notion ‘dialogue’ from the perspective of two different strategies. The first strategy chiefly focuses on the dialogic encounter. The ‘in-between’ of this dialogic encounter enables something to emerge that transcends the individual perspective of the speakers involved. The second strategy is primarily concerned with internal differentiation. The minor differences that constitute this internal differentiation, differentiate a dialogue from within. These strategies are not mutually exclusive but indicate a variation in starting point and orientation. This paper proposes to combine these two strategies by linking accounts of the productive moments in verbal dialogues to an account of the imaginative potential of embodied dialogues. This will enable the articulation of four dialogical principles (derived from Lev Yakubinsky, Oswald Ducrot, Martin Buber, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz) through which an imaginative dialogue can proceed. (shrink)

This volume presents original essays on the ideas of philosophical optimism and the best possible world. It highlights the historical and philosophical nuances of an idea that remains under-treated within the literature despite its long and influential history. Optimism--broadly, the thesis that God does the best, or that this is the best possible world--is often associated with the philosophy of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz. However, there exists a rich tradition of philosophical optimism not only after Leibniz, but before him as well. (...) The chapters in this volume address the philosophical nuances of optimism within the ancient, medieval, enlightenment, modern, and contemporary eras. They cover a variety of thinkers ranging from Plato, Aquinas, Rousseau, Voltaire, Jonathan Edwards, the new optimists of 19th-century France, and the non-theistic optimists of the 20th century. Optimism and the Best Possible World will be of interest to scholars and advanced students working in philosophy of religion, history of philosophy, religious history, and intellectual history. (shrink)

In this outstanding introduction to his philosophy, Nicholas Jolley introduces and assesses the whole of Leibniz's philosophy. The 2nd edition has been revised throughout and includes a new chapter on Leibniz and philosophy of language.

Historical Dictionary of Leibniz's Philosophy, Second Edition contains a chronology, an introduction, and an extensive bibliography. The dictionary section has more than 500 cross-referenced entries on Leibniz's philosophy, written work, teachers, contemporaries, and philosophers influenced by him.

1.-2. Bd. Hauptschriften zur Grundlegung der Philosophie; übers. von A. Buchenau, durchgesehen und mit Einleitungen und Erläuterungen hrsg. von E. Cassirer. 1904-1906.--3. Bd. Neue Abhandlungen über den menschlichen Verstand; ins Deutsche übers., mit Einleitung, Lebensbeschreibung des Verfassers und erläuternden Anmerkungen versehen von C. Schaarschmidt. 2. Aufl. 1904. Erläuterungen zu den Neuen Abhandlungen ... hrsg. von C. Schaarschmidt. 1874.--4. Bd. Die Theodicee; uebers. von J. H. v. Kirchmann. 1879.

The aim of this paper is to show how the understanding of Leibniz’s notion of toleration in matters of faith should be considered not merely as a pragmatic, but also as an epistemologically and metaphysically relevant concept. Following Maria Rosa Antognazza’s account, I will argue that Leibniz’s view on the belief of mysteries is ‘above reason’ and the relation between faith and experience plays an important role in his discussion of transubstantiation with Des Bosses, but also that Leibniz allows for (...) presumptions based on faith to enter metaphysical discussions. Doing so, despite the fact that we cannot achieve certainty in these matters and have to accept a variety of different beliefs regarding the same objects, enriches our understanding of the world and of God—and also gives us reason to take seriously Leibniz’s engagement with corporeal substances, albeit only as presumptions rather than as necessary consequences of his basic metaphysical system. Finally, I will illustrate this point by showing how it is also in play in Leibniz’s response to Tournemine regarding the mind-body-union. (shrink)

This paper argues that Wolff’s rejection of Leibnizian monads is rooted in a disagreement concerning the general notion of substance. Briefly, whereas Leibniz defines substance in terms of activity, Wolff retains a broadly scholastic and Cartesian conception of substance as that which per se subsists and sustains accidents. One consequence of this difference is that it leads Wolff to interpret Leibniz’s concept of a constantly striving force as denoting a feature of substance separate from its static powers, and not as (...) their replacement. For Wolff, powers are essential possibilities of acting in subjects suited for independent existence. Force is a further ingredient that provides a reason for the contingent operation of powers. Unlike Leibniz, Wolff conceives force narrowly as a principle of actuality, which he calls the “nature” of substance, as distinct from its principle of possibility, or essence. (shrink)

Toute l'essence du rationalisme allemand en un ouvrage d'anthologie, pièce maîtresse de la philosophie européenne. Texte intégral. La table des matières permet de se rendre immédiatement au chapitre désiré, puis revenir au sommaire à tout instant. Sans doute à ce jour l'édition la plus fluide et pratique de ce livre d'exception. Idéal pour étudiants, chercheurs et philosophes. Une œuvre de 1765 qui n'a pas pris une ride. Différentes illustrations de l'auteur viennent agrémenter la lecture.

En el presente artículo abordamos la relación filosófica entre Spinoza y Leibniz, y planteamos la hipótesis de que Leibniz tuvo un período amistoso con éste, en el que llegó a sostener ideas spinozistas. En particular, analizamos la concepción monista de la substancia que creemos puede encontrarse en algunos de los escritos metafísicos del período 1675-1676, hoy conocidos como De summa rerum. Planteamos que la relación entre lo uno y lo múltiple, uno de los problemas con mayor pregnancia en el sistema (...) leibniziano, encontrará en la filosofía de Spinoza una formulación de gran atractivo para el joven filósofo. Asimismo, atenderemos a algunas de las diferentes lecturas que pueden encontrarse sobre la influencia spinoziana en Leibniz. (shrink)

Rodriguez-Pereyra (2013) points to at least six different principles referred to as the principle of contradiction in Leibniz and states: ‘The texts suggest that on different occasions he used ‘Principle of Contradiction’ to refer to different principles. This is puzzling, given the subtlety and power of Leibniz’s mind, for it suggests that he did not really distinguish between the different versions of the principle.’ Rodriguez-Pereyra himself suggests that the ‘different principles’ are versions of the PC, as they are all principles (...) which exclude true contradiction and serve to ground mathematical and necessary truths but thinks that it needs to be spelled out more clearly how it is possible that different principles are one principle, without Leibniz taking note of this. The present paper builds on Rodriguez-Pereyra’s and shows that the different formulations of the PC amount to different logical contents. I shed light, however, on their unity and argue that the different logical contents are expressions of one epistemic principle, which I argue is the PC. The PC in my interpretation defines an act of reason by virtue of which the contrary of the contradiction is concluded to be necessarily true. I show that all of Leibniz’ formulations of the PC refer to different logical contents of this one principle and that this principle matches the two criteria Rodriguez-Pereyra establishes as constants in all six formulations. I argue that it is this epistemic unity that makes the PC a principle and one principle and that the PC itself should thus be seen to lie in this epistemic unity and not in the different logical expressions of it. (shrink)

This article presents formal correspondences between the ontological and logical structures of Deleuze’s theory of sense-events in the Logic of Sense as a “post-Cantorian orientation of thought” (Livingston 2012), grappling with an essential incompleteness or inconsistency at the heart of both Being and thought, one which Deleuze champions positively under the equation Ungrounding = Becoming. Through it, Deleuze’s sometimes slippery use of the concept of singularity (and its relation to the virtual) is elaborated, elucidating a post-Cantorian metaphysics of events, distinct (...) from and preceding Badiou’s, that concretely defines the role of the singular in Deleuze’s early major works. (shrink)