This paper explores the moral responsibility a manager has toward a worker. The primary focus is upon those relationships whereworkers have been led to trust their managers. I argue that in such circumstances, models of the employment relationship based on rational self-interest fail to adequately describe the behavior of the actors. Rather, I show through case studies how trust operates in these environments to supercede pure, self-interested behavior. I then explore the moral implications of this finding relative to those managers (...) who lead their workers to trust them. I make the claim that these managers cannot adequately discharge their moral obligations unless they take on positive moral obligations. I cast this responsibility as one of positive care for some portion of worker welfare and briefly discuss what this might mean in practice. (shrink)

This article probes the advisability of regulating U.S. food and drug safety according to the precautionary principle. To do so, a precautionary regulatory regime is formulated on the basis of the beliefs that motivate most proponents of this initiative. That hypothetical regime is critically analyzed on the basis of an actual instantiation of a similarly stylized initiative. It will be argued that the precautionary principle entails regulatory constraints that are apt to violate basis tenets of political legitimacy. The modifications that (...) would change this finding would also change precautionary regulation to the point that it would be indistinguishable from orthodox safety protocols. It is concluded on the basis of its impoverished content that the precautionary principle should not be taken seriously as a formal approach to the regulation of U.S. food and drug safety. (shrink)

This article explains and criticizes several of Hume's arguments regarding British economic policy. I focus on Hume's methodology, which is essentially utilitarian but also depends heavily on his philosophical account of human psychology. I claim that the arguments examined prevail over competing 18th century approaches to economic policy. And I explain the relevance of this methodology for present day public policy debates.

This study was developed around concerns about how indigenous knowledges have been represented and applied in environment and development education. The first phase of the study is a genealogical analysis after Michel Foucault. This probes representations and applications of plant-based indigenous knowledge in selected anthropological, botanical and environmental education texts in southern Africa. The emerging insights were deepened using a Social Realism vantage point after Margaret Archer to shed light on agential issues in environmental education and development contexts. Here her (...) morphogenetic/morphostatic analysis of social transformation or reproduction is used to trace changes in indigenous knowledge representations and applications over time . The second phase uses the same perspectives and tools to extend the analysis of power/knowledge relationships into the interface of indigenous communities and modern institutions in two case study settings in the Eastern Cape of South Africa. This study reveals colonially-derived hegemonic processes of modern/Western scientific institutional representations/interpretations of the knowledges of indigenous communities. It also tracks a continuing trajectory of their dominating and prescriptive mediating control over local knowledges from the pre-colonial context through into the post-colonial period in southern Africa. The analysis reveals how this hegemony is sustained through the deployment of institutional strategies of representation that transform local knowledges into the disciplinary knowledge discourses of modern scientific institutions. These representational strategies therefore generate/reproduce and validate disciplinary discourses about the other, constructing disciplinary 'regimes of truth'. In this way modern institutions appropriate and displace indigenous/local knowledges, silence the voices of local communities and regulate individual and community agency within a continuing subjugation of indigenous knowledges. This study reveals how working within modern institutions and disciplinary knowledges in participative education and development interactions can serve to implicate indigenous researchers in these institutional hegemonic processes. The study also notes evidence of a continued resistance to hegemonic Western knowledge discourses as indigenous communities have sustained many knowledge practices alongside Western knowledge discourses. There is also evidence of a recent emergence of counter-hegemonic indigenous knowledge discourses in environmental education and development practices in southern Africa. It is noted that these have been contingent upon the changing political terrain in southern Africa as this has opened the way for alternative discourses to the dominant conventional Western knowledges in formal education and development contexts. The counterhegemonic discourses invert power/knowledge relations, decentre hegemonic discourses and reposition indigenous knowledges in formal education and development contexts. This study suggests the need to foreground indigenous knowledges as a process of knowledge decolonisation that gives contextual and epistemic relevance to environmental education and development processes. This calls for a need for new strategies to transform existing institutions by creating enabling spaces for the representational inclusion of indigenous knowledges in formal/conventional knowledge discourses and their application in social contexts. This opens up possibilities for plural knowledge representations and for their integrative and reciprocal co-engagement in situated contexts of environmental education and development in southern Africa. (shrink)

The paper is devoted to a conceptual model of cell patterning, based on a generalized notion of the epigenetic code of a cell determining its state. We introduce the concept of signaling depending both upon the spatial distance between cells and the distance between their cell states (s-distance); signaling can repel cells in the space of cell states (s-space) or attract them. The influence of different types of repelling signaling on the evolution of cells is considered. Stabilizing signaling, namely a (...) signaling monotonically decreasing with s-distance, causes the restoring of cell states after perturbations; destabilizing signaling, i.e., the one in which the signaling monotonically increases with s-distance, causes the appearance of pairs of cells with alternating cell states (one close to the state conventionally called “head”, and another close to the “tail” state). Non-monotonic (in s-space) signaling splits the cells into groups. The model shows that different types of signaling may provide different types of cellular patterns. General principles for applying this model to complex cellular structures are discussed. (shrink)

Aristote, pendant l'Antiquité grecque, affirmait que "tous les hommes ont un désir naturel de savoir". De cette formule sont nées des questions essentielles dont une des plus importantes : comment connaît-on? Pour y répondre, Descartes, au début de la modernité, a également pensé à une disposition naturelle de l'homme à connaître. En supposant que "le bon sens est la chose du monde la mieux partagée", il faisait de la raison le signe distinctif existant entre l'homme et les autres êtres vivants. (...) La raison caractérise l'homme et s'emploie suivant une pluralité de modalités et en fonction des différentes sensibilités intellectuelles. Cet ouvrage, Le pluralisme des rationalités. Etats des lieux, débats et interrogations, est un ensemble de textes dont les auteurs expriment, en fonction de leurs sensibilités philosophiques, des champs d'expression de la raison. (shrink)

La 4e de couverture indique :"Dans une société inflationniste en droit, libérale à cause de la logique capitaliste et où la laïcité conditionne les valeurs démocratiques, il est légitime que l'homme ressente une sorte de dépaysement ou de désenchantement, puisqu'il semble ne plus être au centre des réflexions philosophiques et scientifiques qui faisaient de lui une valeur absolue. Cet ouvrage est un ensemble de textes abordant, à partir des thématiques multilatérales, une question centrale portant sur la re-centration de l'homme. Il (...) s'est agi, pour chacun des auteurs, suivant sa sensibilité philosophique, de savoir si l'homme n'est plus le centre ou au centre du monde. En fait, avec l'économie libérale, une rationalité (bio)-technologiquement conditionnée et enfin une sécularisation de l'humain, l'homme est dans l'obligation de penser les conditions d'une redéfinition de son exceptionnalité.". (shrink)

“Philosophy and Exegesis in the Enneads . The Wings of the Plotinean Soul in his reading of Plato’s Phaedrus ”. In the present paper, we examine the role exegesis plays in the philosophy of the Enneads and, in particular, the way in which Plotinus interprets Plato. With this purpose we analyze, in the first place, some revealing passages of Porphyrius’ Life of Plotinus in order to understand, on the one hand, how late Greek thinkers conceived the exegetic endeavour and, (...) on the other hand, the way in which plotinian philosophy was considered by his contemporaries. In the second section of this work, we examine the treatise IV 8 of the Enneads and try to show some peculiar aspects of Plotinus’ exegetic procedure as well as of his reading of Plato’s Phaedrus. (shrink)

Plotinus’s theory of dual selfhood has ethical norms built into it, all of which derive from the ontological superiority of the higher (or undescended) soul in us overthe body-soul compound. The moral life, as it is presented in the Enneads, is a life of self-perfection, devoted to the care of the higher self. Such a conception of morality is prone to strike modern readers as either ‘egoistic’ or unduly austere. If there is no doubt that Plotinus’s ethics (...) is exceptionally austere, it will be argued below that it is not ‘egoistic.’ To that effect, the following questions will be addressed: Are the virtues, civic as well as purificatory, mere means to Plotinus’s metaphysically conceived ethical goal? To what extent must the lower self abnegate itself so as to enable the higher self to ascend to Intellect and beyond? And if self-perfection lies at the centre of the Plotinian moral life, is there any conceptual room left in it for other-regarding norms of conduct? A close reading of selected passages from Plotinus’s tractate I.2[19] On Virtues and tractate VI.8[39] On Free Will and the Will of the One will, it is claimed, bring elements of answer to these questions. (shrink)

Dans la discussion qui se poursuit parmi les spécialistes plotiniens sur les Formes d’individus, l’âme non descendue et le moi, la notion d’individualité est d’habitude considérée comme acquise. Le but de cet article est de montrer que Plotin soumet cette notion à une vérification rigoureuse. Dans le monde intelligible, l’individualité n’est pas incompatible avec l’universalité, car chaque individu intelligible est « un-et-multiple », exactement comme l’Intellect universel lui-même. Cette compréhension plutôt platonicienne, anti-aristotélicienne, permet à Plotin d’expliquer l’immortalité personnelle – soit (...) la persistance de l’âme de Socrate en tant que telle après la mort – en situant le principium individuationis des âmes dans l’Intellect lui-même. Nos vrais mois, ou âmes individuelles non descendues, qui restent toujours dans l’intelligible et qui ont une connaissance totalement noétique, sont unies entre elles, avec les Formes et l’Intellect comme une totalité, tout en conservant leur individualité totale ; Plotin suggère même qu’elles soient des Formes. Rien ne prouve que Plotin distingue clairement les Formes des âmes non descendues, comme le prétendent certains savants. L’individualité empirique, qui exclut strictement l’unité avec les autres et avec le tout, est une forme insuffisante d’individualité qui appartient au monde sensible ; ses critères, ou plutôt ses limitations, ne sont pas valables pour la vraie individualité intelligible, ni pour le vrai moi.Qu’est-ce qu’un individu? In the ongoing discussion among Plotinian scholars on Forms of individuals, the undescended soul and the Self, the notion of individuality is usually taken for granted. The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that Plotinus subjects this notion to a thorough revision. In the intelligible world, individuality is not incompatible with universality, because each intelligible individual is a One-Many just as the universal Intellect itself. This distinctly Platonic, anti-Aristotelian understanding of individuality enables Plotinus to account for personal immortality – i.e. the persistence of Socrates’ soul as Socrates’ soul after death – by locating the principium individuationis of the souls in Intellect itself. Our true selves or individual undescended souls, which always remain in the intelligible and have full noetic cognition, are one with each other as well as with the Forms and with Intellect as a whole while preserving their full individuality ; Plotinus even suggests that they are Forms themselves. There is no evidence that Plotinus sharply distinguished Forms from undescended souls, as some scholars have maintained. Empirical individuality, which strictly excludes unity with the others and the whole, is a deficient form of individuality that belongs to the sensible world ; its criteria, or rather its limitations, are not valid for true, intelligible individuality or for the true self. (shrink)

Contemporary scholarship accents incipient theurgical practice for Plotinus; this lends a certain urgency to the question of his acceptance of magic. While use of magic recorded in Porphyry's Vita Plotini has received considerable attention, far less has been done to analyze actual discussion in the Enneads. Examination of key passages brings to light the context for discussion of magic, particularly issues of sympathy, prayer, astrology and divination. Equally important is Plotinus' understanding of the cosmos and role of the heavenly bodies. (...) Plotinus' affirmation of the highest part of the soul as undescended, together with the claim that our soul has a common origin with the World Soul in Soul-Hypostasis, is significant for the relative unimportance he attributes to the role and effect of magic. (shrink)

Abstrak: Bertitiktolak dari teori Prosesi (proodos) realitas, Plotinos menyatakan bahwa manusia adalah sebuah pluralitas, sebuah “kami,” di mana sebagai bagian utuh dari realitas, jiwa manusia merangkumi di dalamnya ketiga hipostasis intellingibel (Yang Satu, Intellek, Jiwa). Kesatuan aktual manusia dengan dunia intelligibel diungkapkan Plotinos dalam doktrinnya yang kontroversial tentang bagian jiwa manusia yang tidak turun ke dunia. Pemikiran Plotinos ini merupakan rangkuman orisinal atas ajaran-ajaran Platon tentang imortalitas jiwa, doktrin hylemorfisme Aristoteles dalam ranah Fisika—kategori-kategori forma, materia, potentia actus, entelekheia, dan energeia, (...) motor immobil, noûs yang memikirkan dirinya sendiri—serta teori Logos dari Stoicisme. Sebagaimana tampak dalam prinsip energeia ganda, Plotinos secara kreatif menggunakan sumber-sumber para pendahulunya untuk mengemukakan teori barunya tentang realitas, khususnya tentang jiwa manusia. Kata-kata kunci: imortalitas jiwa, hylemorfisme, logos, prosesi, hipostasis, Yang Satu, Intellek, Jiwa. Abstract: The procession of reality leads Plotinus to assert that man is a plurality. As part of reality, each of us is a “we,” because all three hypostases (the One, the Intellect, and the Soul) are present in us. This is a controversial theory of soul. Plotinus affirms that man is actually present in the intelligible world by the undescended part of his soul. To understand this original theory, one has to consider the way Plotinus used his predecessors’ theories: the Platonic theory of the soul’s immortality, the hylemorphism theory of Aristotle’s Physics (form, matter, potency, actuality, entelechy, energy, unmoved mover, noûs which thinks its noema), and the Stoics’ theory of Logos. As shown in the theory of double energy, Plotinus used creatively the theories of those predecessors to invent his own theory of the procession of reality, more specifically, his unique theory of man’s soul. Keywords: immortality of the soul, hylemorphism, logos, procession, hypostase, the One, Intellect, Soul. (shrink)

The 1962 publication of J. H. Waszink's edition of Calcidius' commentary on Plato's "Timaeus" focussed attention on the question of Calcidius' source for a group of chapters where he presents an interpretation of Plato's account of the creation of soul. I discuss three attempts to answer this question: that of Waszink himself, who argues that the source is Porphyry who was here influenced by the Neopythagorean/Platonist Numenius, that of J. M. Van Winden, who claims Numenius as the direct source, (...) and that of Werner Deuse, who offers reasons for excluding Numenius as either directly or indirectly responsible. I show the weakness of Deuse's critique, but then argue that neither Waszink nor Van Winden has given sufficient consideration to the possibility that Plotinus, either alone or through Porphyry as intermediary, is behind Calcidius' interpretation, where the doctrines of the unity of the soul and of a higher soul that does not descend, both characteristic of Plotinus' psychology, are prominent. However, there is an important but uniformly overlooked feature of this exegesis that rules out both Plotinus and Porphyry as possible sources. This leaves Numenius as the only serious candidate. If, then, the origin of the doctrines of the unity of the soul and of the undescended higher soul can be traced to the work of Numenius, there is the strong possibility that in his formulation of these same doctrines Plotinus was indebted to Numenius. (shrink)

At first glance, Plotinus’ arguments for the immortality of the human soul, principally in Ennead IV 7 (2), constitute a straightforward defense of Plato against Peripatetic and Stoic attacks. And yet, his close reading of his predecessors, especially Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias, led him to confront the following deep problem. The best arguments for immortality rest upon the immateriality of intellect and hence its immunity from destruction along with the body. But, following Aristotle, Plotinus maintains that the nature (...) of intellection is such that the contents of the objects of intellection both identify the agent of intellection and further will be identical for every disembodied intellect. For this reason, it is not clear what it would mean to insist on the personal immortality of anyone. Without personal immortality, though, the ethical dimension of Platonism is, for Plotinus, severely undermined. In the light of this difficulty Plotinus developed an apparently original doctrine that was repudiated by virtually all his successors. He argued that there are Forms of individuals, that is, of individual intellects, and that, since they are eternal Forms, they are ‘undescended’. He argued that the personal identity of any human soul is found paradigmatically in an undescended intellect. (shrink)

A brilliant and comprehensive history of the creation of the modern Western mind. Soul Machine takes us back to the origins of modernity, a time when a crisis in religious authority and the scientific revolution led to searching questions about the nature of human inner life. This is the story of how a new concept—the mind—emerged as a potential solution, one that was part soul and part machine, but fully neither. In this groundbreaking work, award-winning historian George Makari (...) shows how writers, philosophers, physicians, and anatomists worked to construct notions of the mind as not an ethereal thing, but a natural one. From the ascent of Oliver Cromwell to the fall of Napoleon, seminal thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, Diderot, and Kant worked alongside often-forgotten brain specialists, physiologists, and alienists in the hopes of mapping the inner world. Conducted in a cauldron of political turmoil, these frequently shocking, always embattled efforts would give rise to psychiatry, mind sciences such as phrenology, and radically new visions of the self. Further, they would be crucial to the establishment of secular ethics and political liberalism. Boldly original, wide-ranging, and brilliantly synthetic, Soul Machine gives us a masterful, new account of the making of the modern Western mind. (shrink)

The understanding of the soul in the West has been profoundly shaped by Christianity, and its influence can be seen in certain assumptions often made about the soul: that, for example, if it does exist, it is separable from the body, free, immortal, and potentially pure. The ancient Greeks, however, conceived of the soul quite differently. In this ambitious new work, Michael Davis analyzes works by Homer, Herodotus, Euripides, Plato, and Aristotle to reveal how the ancient Greeks (...) portrayed and understood what he calls “the fully human soul.” Beginning with Homer’s _Iliad_, Davis lays out the tension within the soul of Achilles between immortality and life. He then turns to Aristotle’s _De Anima_ and _Nicomachean Ethics_ to explore the consequences of the problem of Achilles across the whole range of the soul’s activity. Moving to Herodotus and Euripides, Davis considers the former’s portrayal of the two extremes of culture—one rooted in stability and tradition, the other in freedom and motion—and explores how they mark the limits of character. Davis then shows how _Helen_ and _Iphigeneia among the Taurians_ serve to provide dramatic examples of Herodotus’s extreme cultures and their consequences for the soul. The book returns to philosophy in the final part, plumbing several Platonic dialogues—the _Republic_, _Cleitophon_, _Hipparchus_, _Phaedrus_, _Euthyphro_, and _Symposium_—to understand the soul’s imperfection in relation to law, justice, tyranny, eros, the gods, and philosophy itself. Davis concludes with Plato’s presentation of the soul of Socrates as self-aware and nontragic, even if it is necessarily alienated and divided against itself. _The Soul of the Greeks_ thus begins with the imperfect soul as it is manifested in Achilles’ heroic, but tragic, longing and concludes with its nontragic and fuller philosophic expression in the soul of Socrates. But, far from being a historical survey, it is instead a brilliant meditation on what lies at the heart of being human. (shrink)

Aristotle's definition of the soul should be interpreted as: 'the soul is the entelechy of a natural body that serves as its instrument'.

I argue that, according to Plato, the body is the sole cause of psychic disorders. This view is expressed at Timaeus 86b in an ambiguous sentence that has been widely misunderstood by translators and commentators. The goal of this article is to offer a new understanding of Plato’s text and view. In the first section, I argue that although the body is the result of the gods’ best efforts, their sub-optimal materials meant that the soul is constantly vulnerable to (...) the body’s influences. In the second section, I argue that every psychic disorder is a disruption of the motions of the inner psychic circles by the body; moreover, I defend my translation of 86b. In the final section, I argue that the goal of education is to restore the circles to their original orbits, and I disarm a possible objection that bad education is also a cause of psychic disorder. (shrink)

This paper concerns Plato’s characterization of the body as the soul’s tool. I take perception as an example of the body’s usefulness. I explore the Timaeus’ view that perception provides us with models of orderliness. Then, I argue that perception of confusing sensible objects is necessary for our cognitive development too. Lastly, I consider the instrumentality relationship more generally and its place in Plato’s teleological worldview.

From Soul to Self takes us on a fascinating journey through philosophy, theology, religious studies and physiological sciences. The contributors explore the relationship between a variety of ideas that have arisen in philosophy, religion and science, each idea seeking to explain why we think we are somehow unique and distinct.

_From Soul to Self_ takes the reader on a fascinating journey through philosophy, theology, religious studies, and physiological sciences. Each of the essays, drawn from a number of different fields, focuses on the idea of the soul and of our sense of ourselves. A stellar line-up of authors explore the relationship between a variety of ideas that have arisen in philosophy, religion and science, each idea seeking to explain why we think that we as individuals are somehow distinct (...) and unique. Contributors: Richard Sorabji, Anthony Kenny, Kallistos Ware, Peter Riviere, Gary Matthews, Susan Greenfield, Galen Strawson. (shrink)

An examination of new forms of alienation in our never-off, plugged-in culture—and a clarion call for a “conspiracy of estranged people.” We can reach every point in the world but, more importantly, we can be reached from any point in the world. Privacy and its possibilities are abolished. Attention is under siege everywhere. Not silence but uninterrupted noise, not the red desert, but a cognitive space overcharged with nervous incentives to act: this is the alienation of our times... —from The (...) Soul at Work Capital has managed to overcome the dualism of body and soul by establishing a workforce in which everything we mean by the Soul—language, creativity, affects—is mobilized for its own benefit. Industrial production put to work bodies, muscles, and arms. Now, in the sphere of digital technology and cyberculture, exploitation involves the mind, language, and emotions in order to generate value—while our bodies disappear in front of our computer screens. In this, his newest book, Franco “Bifo” Berardi—key member of the Italian Autonomist movement and a close associate of Félix Guattari—addresses these new forms of estrangement. In the philosophical landscape of the 1960s and 1970s, the Hegelian concept of alienation was used to define the harnessing of subjectivity. The estrangement of workers from their labor, the feeling of alienation they experienced, and their refusal to submit to it became the bases for a human community that remained autonomous from capital. But today a new condition of alienation has taken root in which workers commonly and voluntarily work overtime, the population is tethered to cell phones and Blackberries, debt has become a postmodern form of slavery, and antidepressants are commonly used to meet the unending pressure of production. As a result, the conditions for community have run aground and new philosophical categories are needed. The Soul at Work is a clarion call for a new collective effort to reclaim happiness. The Soul at Work is Bifo's long overdue introduction to English-speaking readers. This Semiotext edition is also the book's first appearance in any language. (shrink)

In the elaboration of his soul-making theodicy, John Hick agrees with a controversial point made by compatibilists Antony Flew and John Mackie against the free will defense. Namely, Hick grants that God could have created humans such that they would be free to sin but would, in fact, never do so. In this paper, I identify three previously unrecognized problems that arise from his initial concession to, and ultimate rejection of, compatibilism. The first problem stems from the fact that (...) in two important texts, Hick rejects compatibilism for different and seemingly contradictory reasons. His various explanations of soul-making theodicy’s relationship to compatibilism are therefore in conflict. The second problem is closely related to the first. It turns out that when Hick’s concession to compatibilism is closely examined, soul-making theodicy appears unable to explain the existence of moral evil. The final problem consists in understanding why Hick would have made any concessions to compatibilism in the first place given that he ultimately opts for incompatibilist free will. After identifying these three problems, I develop a distinctive way in which to interpret Hick’s soul-making theodicy that solves the first two. This distinctive interpretation, moreover, has the added benefit of solving another, well-recognized problem that has long plagued Hick’s exposition: the problem of the hypnotist metaphor. Finally, I address the third problem by suggesting a rationale for Hick’s initial concession to the compatibilists. (shrink)

Plato’s tripartite soul plays a central role in his account of justice in the Republic. It thus comes as a surprise to find him apparently abandoning this model at the end of the work, when he suggests that the soul, as immortal, must be simple. I propose a way of reconciling these claims, appealing to neglected features of the city-soul analogy and the argument for the soul’s division. The original true soul, I argue, is partitioned, (...) but in a finer manner than how we encounter it in our everyday lives. (shrink)

This issue was discussed with regard to chosen commentaries to Aristotle’s treatise De anima, formed in the so-called via moderna mainstream, in particular those of John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Laurentius of Lindores. In such a context, the Cracovian commentaries referring to Parisian nominalists were presented by those of Benedict Hesse and Anonymus. The analyses carried out above allow one to ascertain that although William of Ockham’s opinion questioning the possibility of knowledge of the soul in the field of (...) philosophy, nominalists of the late Middle Ages did not resign from speculation on the beginning and the separation from the body of the soul, also the fate of the soul after death. They focused on the nature of the matter – human body and his relation with the soul – in the moment of birth. In the aspect of death 14th century scholars undertook the struggle, which was one with the justification of the psycho-physical unity of the human being existing after death solely as an immortal soul. In both thems, they tried to find their solutions, while if they could not solve these aporeticals questions – they had the courage to admit, that is not possible by solely relying on the natural forces of reason. They had to refer to the teaching of christianity, without however falling prey to fideism. This was a methodical endeavour based on the experience that natural reason in searching for the truth is not capable of its own efforts to attain to certain concepts and might on occasion err, it is then that faith becomes its guide and supplies it with more acceptable solutions. This is the courage of one of the greatest philosophers – Plato, who said that you have to have this “great courage” to undertake only probable knowledge, when another is not possible. (shrink)

From Soul to Self takes the reader on a fascinating journey through philosophy, theology, religious studies, and physiological sciences. Each of the essays, drawn from a number of different fields, focuses on the idea of the soul and of our sense of ourselves. A stellar line-up of authors explore the relationship between a variety of ideas that have arisen in philosophy, religion and science, each idea seeking to explain why we think that we as individuals are somehow distinct (...) and unique. Contributors: Richard Sorabji, Anthony Kenny, Kallistos Ware, Peter Riviere, Gary Matthews, Susan Greenfield, Galen Strawson. (shrink)

Apeiron Issue: Ahead of print. This paper is dedicated to exploring the alleged difference between Cleanthes’ and Chrysippus’ accounts of the post-mortal survival of the souls and the conceptions of personal identity that these accounts underpin. I argue that while Cleanthes conceptualised the personal identity as grounded in the rational soul, Chrysippus conceptualised it as an embodied rational soul. I also suggest that this difference between the two early Stoics might have been due to Chrysippus' metaphysical commitments arising (...) from his response to the Growing Argument put forth by the Academics rather than the critique of his teacher. (shrink)

How is consciousness possible? What biological purpose does it serve? And why do we value it so highly? In Soul Dust, the psychologist Nicholas Humphrey, a leading figure in consciousness research, proposes a startling new theory. Consciousness, he argues, is nothing less than a magical-mystery show that we stage for ourselves inside our own heads. This self-made show lights up the world for us and makes us feel special and transcendent. Thus consciousness paves the way for spirituality, and allows (...) us, as human beings, to reap the rewards, and anxieties, of living in what Humphrey calls the "soul niche." Tightly argued, intellectually gripping, and a joy to read, Soul Dust provides answers to the deepest questions. It shows how the problem of consciousness merges with questions that obsess us all--how life should be lived and the fear of death. Resting firmly on neuroscience and evolutionary theory, and drawing a wealth of insights from philosophy and literature..."--Jacket. (shrink)

One of the key concepts in modern science is force (F). In present studies on the history of dynamics, Patricius is either completely omitted or only cursorily mentioned. The aim of this text is to show that Patricius’s concept of the soul, as he developed it in his Nova de universis philosophia from 1591, comes close to the modern (i.e. Newtonian) understanding of force. This should support the more general position that one of the most intriguing aspects of Patricius’s (...) philosophy is his contribution to the emergence of modern science. (shrink)

In the article author analyses the extent to which it is possible to regard the Aristotelian conception of the soul as actually necessary and applicable for modern neuroscience. The framework in which this objective is going to be accomplished is provided by the idea of the coexistence of the “manifest” and “scientific” images of the world and persons, as introduced by Wilfrid Sellars. In subsequent sections, author initially formulates an answer to the questions of what it is that Aristotle (...) sought to explain with his conception of soul as formal cause, and how this notion could be portrayed in terms drawn from contemporary neurological science. It is author’s intention to show that no other concepts—be they the Cartesian “mind” or a Chalmers-style “self”—come anywhere close to matching the breadth of scope of Aristotelian “soul”. At the same time, though, analysis carried out here do not intend to undertake any kind of defence of the soul as a spiritual entity of the sort popular where religious faith is concerned, namely as an entity separable from the body, immortal, and inimitably tied to God. Then, in the second major part of the article, author analyses the extent to which the Aristotelian conception of the soul can be thought of as involving criteria of the sort that we encounter in the contemporary theory of strong emergence. According to the author the theory of strong emergence has, as a heuristic theory, quite general predictive and explanatory power as regards the field of human thought and behaviour. (shrink)

What does the law want? -- How the law thinks -- How the law works -- The litigious mind -- Tyranny of the mind -- Lawyers in love -- Staying and going -- Soul values.

This collection brings together cutting-edge research on the metaphysics of human nature and soul-body dualism.Kevin Corcoran's collection, Soul, Body, and ...