Linguistic interventions aim to change our linguistic practices. A commonly discussed type of linguistic intervention is meaning revision, which seeks to associate existing words with new or revised meanings. But why does retaining old words matter so much? Why not instead introduce new words to express the newly defined meanings? Drawing on relevant psycholinguistic research, this paper develops an empirically motivated, general, and practically useful pro tanto reason to retain rather than replace the original word during the process (...) of conceptual improvement. (shrink)

In this wide-ranging conversation, Michael Hardt reflects on recent transformations within Empire. Several unique themes emerge concerning power and pedagogy as they intersect with subjectivity and global crisis. Drawing on the common in conjunction with the tradition of love in education uncovers a different path that attends to today’s real political, ecological, and social needs. Finally, a focus on collectivity points to a possible strategy—collective intellectuality—for educators to revise traditional notions of leadership to encourage more ethical, democratic, and sustainable futures. (...) Yet, what this looks like in practice remains for us to imagine. (shrink)

Recently there has been much philosophical interest in the analysis of concepts to determine whether they should be removed, revised, or replaced. Enquiry of this kind is referred to as conceptual engineering or conceptual ethics. We will call it revisionary conceptual analysis (RCA). It standardly involves describing the meaning of a concept, evaluating whether it serves its purposes, and prescribing what it should mean. However, this stands in tension with prescriptivism, a metasemantic view which holds that all meaning (...) claims are prescriptions. If prescriptivism is correct, then one is faced with two options: either (1) give up on the possibility of RCA, or (2) come up with a version of RCA that is consistent with the idea that all meaning claims are prescriptive. In this paper we offer an argument for (2). (shrink)

A 10,000+ word critical overview of analytic philosophy devoted to life's meaning, with some focus on books and more recent works.

SummaryIn this article, I seek to develop a genetic/diachronic approach to the phenomenon of authorial revision, and to the interpretation of texts that exist in multiple versions. In all such cases, the reconstruction of textual meaning cannot be separated from the reconstruction of the process through which the text in its ‘final’ form came into being; furthermore, an understanding of the author's intentions in (re)writing cannot be entirely separated from an understanding of his/her motives for (re)writing. This article (...) is divided into three sections. In the first section, I consider recent trends in editorial and literary theory that aim at characterising texts in terms of processes rather than products, in order to uphold the equal dignity of each version without losing sight of its connectedness to other stages in the history of the text. In the second section, I discuss how Quentin Skinner's views on meaning and context apply to cases of authorial revision, and I suggest that some key aspects of Skinner's contextualism need to be reconsidered. In the concluding section, I focus on a case study in order to demonstrate the operational value of such a genetic and motive-based approach to authorial revision: more particularly, I seek to show how a close examination of Jean Bodin's rewriting practices in the Methodus (1566–1572) and the République (1576) can throw new light on his shift from a concept of limited sovereignty to one of absolute sovereignty. (shrink)

An updated version of the initial, 2007 entry, adding in discussion of key works that have appeared since then.

Revisions of the King James Version of 1611 continued into the 20th and 21st centuries as literal or word-for-word translations. This development corresponds with a new age in Bible translation that started in the second half of the 20th century, which involves at least six changes in the philosophy of Bible translation. Firstly, Bible translation is characterised by interconfessional cooperation. Secondly, the plain meaning intended in the incipient texts is made accessible to readers. Thirdly, new critical editions of the (...) Hebrew and Greek incipient texts on the basis of new discoveries of texts are utilised. Fourthly, there is the tendency to remove archaic language to make versions intelligible. Fifthly, there is a tendency to use gendered and inclusive language. Sixthly, the move is from print communication, which can be typified as typographic interpretive culture, to electronic or media communication, which can be typified as digital-media interpretive culture, where sound and visuality become prominent as a contextual supplement to words. In the analysis it will be determined which of these aspects are reflected in the Revised Standard Version and its revisions as part of the linear emergence of the Tyndale–King James Version tradition. However, unlike the King James Version, the Revised Standard Version and its revisions failed to achieve widespread approval from satisfied readers, thus opening the door to alternative revisions.Contribution: Instead of viewing the Revised Standard Version and its revisions as new and independent from the Tyndale–King James Version tradition, it is demonstrated that they are a linear continuation of the emergence of the pre-20th century translation complex within this tradition without replicating the success of the King James Version. (shrink)

This paper examines the evolution of Husserl’s philosophy of nonintuitive intentions. The analysis has two stages. First, I expose a mistake in Husserl’s account of non-intuitive acts from his 1901 Logical Investigations. I demonstrate that Husserl employs the term “signitive” too broadly, as he concludes that all non-intuitive acts are signitive. He states that not only meaning acts, but also the contiguity intentions of perception are signitive acts. Second, I show how Husserl, in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth (...) Logical Investigation, amends his 1901 theory of non-intuitive acts, which he now calls “empty” intentions. He there accurately distinguishes empty meaning acts from the empty intentions of perception. In the conclusion, I reveal how Husserl’s alterations to his theory of non-intuitive intentions can inform our understanding of a larger shift in his philosophy. (shrink)

This paper accomplishes two goals. First, the essay elucidates Husserl’s descriptions of meaning consciousness from the 1901 Logical Investigations. I examine Husserl’s observations about the three ways we can experience meaning and I discuss his conclusions about the structure of meaning intentions. Second, the paper explores how Husserl reworked that 1901 theory in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Investigation. I explore how Husserl transformed his descriptions of the three intentions involved in meaningful experience. By doing so, (...) Husserl not only recognized intersubjective communication as the condition of possibility of linguistic meaning acts, but also transformed his account of the structure of both signitive and intuitive acts. In the conclusion, I cash out this analysis, by showing how, on the basis of these new insights, Husserl reconstructs his theory of fulfillment. (shrink)

Gupta’s Rule of Revision theory of truth builds on insights to be found in Martin and Woodruff and Kripke in order to permanently deepen our understanding of truth, of paradox, and of how we work our language while our language is working us. His concept of a predicate deriving its meaning by way of a Rule of Revision ought to impact significantly on the philosophy of language. Still, fortunately, he has left me something to.

In this paper we apply the idea of Revision Rules, originally developed within the framework of the theory of truth and later extended to a general mode of definition, to the analysis of the arithmetical hierarchy. This is also intended as an example of how ideas and tools from philosophical logic can provide a different perspective on mathematically more “respectable” entities. Revision Rules were first introduced by A. Gupta and N. Belnap as tools in the theory of truth, (...) and they have been further developed to provide the foundations for a general theory of (possibly circular) definitions. Revision Rules are non-monotonic inductive operators that are iterated into the transfinite beginning with some given “bootstrapper” or “initial guess.” Since their iteration need not give rise to an increasing sequence, Revision Rules require a particular kind of operation of “passage to the limit,” which is a variation on the idea of the inferior limit of a sequence. We then define a sequence of sets of strictly increasing arithmetical complexity, and provide a representation of these sets by means of an operator G(x, φ) whose “revision” is carried out over ω2 beginning with any total function satisfying certain relatively simple conditions. Even this relatively simple constraint is later lifted, in a theorem whose proof is due to Anil Gupta. (shrink)

The meaning of the wave function has been a hot topic of debate since the early days of quantum mechanics. Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in this long-standing question. Is the wave function ontic, directly representing a state of reality, or epistemic, merely representing a state of knowledge, or something else? If the wave function is not ontic, then what, if any, is the underlying state of reality? If the wave function is indeed ontic, then exactly what (...) physical state does it represent? In this book, I aim to make sense of the wave function in quantum mechanics and find the ontological content of the theory. The book can be divided into three parts. The first part addresses the question of the nature of the wave function. After giving a comprehensive and critical review of the competing views of the wave function, I present a new argument for the ontic view in terms of protective measurements. In addition, I also analyze the origin of the wave function by deriving the free Schroedinger equation. The second part analyzes the ontological meaning of the wave function. I propose a new ontological interpretation of the wave function in terms of random discontinuous motion of particles, and give two main arguments supporting this interpretation. The third part investigates whether the suggested quantum ontology is complete in accounting for our definite experience and whether it needs to be revised in the relativistic domain. (shrink)

In this new book, the author of the classic Truth presents an original theory of meaning, demonstrates its richness, and defends it against all contenders. He surveys the diversity of twentieth-century philosophical insights into meaning and shows that his theory can reconcile these with a common-sense view of meaning as derived from use. Meaning and its companion volume Truth (now published in a revised edition) together demystify two central issues in philosophy and offer a controversial but (...) compelling view of the relations between language, thought, and reality. (shrink)

Theories of truth and vagueness are closely connected; in this article, I draw another connection between these areas of research. Gupta and Belnap’s Revision Theory of Truth is converted into an approach to vagueness. I show how revision sequences from a general theory of definitions can be used to understand the nature of vague predicates. The revision sequences show how the meaning of vague predicates are interconnected with each other. The approach is contrasted with the similar (...) supervaluationist approach. (shrink)

This article explores traditional views of advance care planning in the broader context of advance personal planning, which also accounts for legal and financial matters. Criticisms of existing processes are noted, while the significance of interprofessional collaboration is highlighted. Reframing the purpose of advance personal planning as planning for the rest of life, rather than the end-of-life, and adopting a more holistic perspective informed by theory may help individuals to view advance personal planning as a routine, preventative exercise that safeguards (...) their autonomy and well-being. Both lawyers and healthcare providers have an important role to play in reframing the purpose of advance personal planning. This revised approach is underpinned by the unification of two separate theoretical lenses: Preventive Law Theory and Therapeutic Jurisprudence. This combination enhances our understanding of what it means for people to truly achieve “the good result” (Holtz 2017) when planning ahead for their future legal, financial, health, and personal interests. Preventive Law Theory encourages an ongoing, collaborative relationship between lawyers and their clients, or healthcare providers and their patients, while Therapeutic Jurisprudence ensures an ethical approach to advance personal planning that accounts for all aspects of the individual’s well-being, including consideration of vulnerability, autonomy, and empowerment. (shrink)

We have good reason to believe that Nicomachean Ethics VI. 2 is a Nicomachean revision of an originally Eudemian text. Aristotle seems to have inserted lines 1139a31-b11 by means of a marginal note, which the first editor then mistakenly added in the wrong place, and I propose that we move these lines so that they follow the word κοινωνεῖν at 1139a20. The suggested note appears to be Nicomachean for several reasons but most importantly because it contains a desire-based account (...) of the practical intellect as teleologically oriented to action. The NE articulates consequences of this account regarding practical philosophy’s methodology and teleological orientation to action. The EE does not articulate such consequences, and instead seems to assume an object-based account of the practical intellect. Consequently, it would seem that, between the EE and the NE, Aristotle revised his conception of the practical intellect and consequently his conception of practical philosophy. (shrink)

The theory of belief revision deals with models of states of belief and transitions between states of belief. The goal of the theory is to describe what should happen when you update a state of belief with new information. In the most interesting case, the new information is inconsistent with what you believe. This means that some of the old beliefs have to be deleted if one wants to remain within a consistent state of belief. A guiding idea is (...) that the change should be minimal so that as few of the old beliefs as possible are given up.A central problem for the theory of belief revision is what is meant by a minimal change of a state of belief. The solution to this problem depends to a large extent on the model of a state of belief that is adopted. (shrink)

The Doctrine of Double Effect has been challenged by the claim that what an agent intends as a means may be limited to those effects that are precisely characterized by the descriptions under which the agent believes that they are minimally causally necessary for the production of other effects that the agent seeks to bring about. If based on so narrow a conception of an intended means, the traditional Doctrine of Double Effect becomes limitlessly permissive. In this paper I examine (...) and criticize Warren Quinn's attempt to reformulate the Doctrine in such a way that it retains its force and plausibility even if we accept the narrow conception of an intended means. Building on Quinn's insights, I conclude by offering a further version of the Doctrine that retains the virtues of Quinn's account but avoids the objections to it. I The key element in the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) is the claim that there is a stronger presumption against action that has harm to the innocent as an intended effect than there is against otherwise comparable action that causes the same amount of harm to the innocent as a foreseen but unintended effect. Since it is relatively uncontroversial that, except perhaps in cases involving desert, it is wrong to cause harm as an end in itself, the DDE is normally invoked to distinguish morally between harm that is intended as a means and harm that is considered a merely foreseen side-effect. (shrink)

_Purpose._ To substantiate the definition of technics as the attributive characteristics of a human being and the necessity of its orientation towards human flourishing in the context of new anthropological models of the 21st century. _Theoretical basis._ Correlation between technics, technology and the human essence is examined. The role of technics is traced at different historical stages of human development. Negative and positive effects of digital technology development upon a contemporary human being is analysed in the light of new anthropological (...) models: homo technologicus, homo digitalis and homo eudaimonicus. The content of a new worldview-value paradigm of defining goals of technology is outlined. _Originality._ Transformation of the role of technics correlates with value and worldview shifts in person’s understanding of his/her purpose in both natural and social worlds. Nowadays, philosophical analysis of anthropological dimension of technics and technology opens a horizon for seeking effective solutions in the face of the contemporary challenges and anti-utopian threats by means of focusing on the fact that, indeed, technological development is subordinate to the humanist goal that is flourishing, wellbeing and comprehensive development of a human being. _Conclusions._ The essence of technology reveals not through its functional but anthropogenic definitions in a sense of a source of institutionalization and in a sense of a source of realization of a human way of self-identification and self-objectification of human subjectivity. Technics/technology is the attributive characteristics of human essence and being: a human being is as much human as much he/she is a creator of technics. The purpose of technics is not to master the nature and to transform the world; technics is, above all, a tool of human self-improvement and self-creation through broadening the horizon of human capacities. The analysis of new modern anthropological models shows that it is the orientation of technology/technology towards human flourishing that is, on the one hand, a response to the existential demands of modern man, and on the other hand, a way of preventing future threats related to technological development. (shrink)

Meaning and Argument shifts introductory logic from the traditional emphasis on proofs to the symbolization of arguments. Another distinctive feature of this book is that it shows how the need for expressive power and for drawing distinctions forces formal language development. This revised edition includes expanded sections, additional exercises, and an updated bibliography. Updated and revised edition includes extended sections, additional exercises, and an updated bibliography. Distinctive approach in that this text is a philosophical, rather than mathematical introduction to (...) logic. Concentrates on symbolization and does all the technical logic simply with truth tables and no derivations at all. Contains numerous exercises and a corresponding answer key. Extensive appendix which allows the reader to explore subjects that go beyond what is usually covered in an introductory logic course. Features accompanying website at www.meaningargument.com. (shrink)

In this Hypothesis and Theory paper, we consider the problem of learning deeply structured knowledge representations in the absence of predefined ontologies, and in the context of long-term learning. In particular, we consider this process as a sequence of re-representation steps, of various kinds. The Information Dynamics of Thinking theory (IDyOT) admits such learning, and provides a hypothetical mechanism for the human-like construction of hierarchical memory, with the provision of symbols constructed by the system that embodies the theory. The combination (...) of long-term learning and meaning construction in terms of symbols grounded in perceptual experience entails that the system, like a human, be capable of memory consolidation, to manage the complex and inconsistent structures that can result from learning of information that becomes more complete over time. Such consolidation changes memory structures, and thus changes their meaning. Therefore, memory consolidation entails re-representation, while re-representation entails changes of meaning. Ultimately, the theory proposes that the processes of learning and consolidation should be considered as repeated re-representation of what is learned. (shrink)

This book aims to lay bare the logical foundations of tractable reasoning. It draws on Marvin Minsky's seminal work on frames, which has been highly influential in computer science and, to a lesser extent, in cognitive science. Only very few people have explored ideas about frames in logic, which is why the investigation in this book breaks new ground. The apparent intractability of dynamic, inferential reasoning is an unsolved problem in both cognitive science and logic-oriented artificial intelligence. By means of (...) a logical investigation of frames and frame concepts, Andreas devises a novel logic of tractable reasoning, called frame logic. Moreover, he devises a novel belief revision scheme, which is tractable for frame logic. These tractability results shed new light on our logical and cognitive means to carry out dynamic, inferential reasoning. Modularity remains central for tractability, and so the author sets forth a logical variant of the massive modularity hypothesis in cognitive science. (shrink)

Three chapters on the meaning of life composed for undergraduate philosophy majors, now revised and updated for a second edition.

Krister Segerberg proposed irrevocable belief revision, to be contrasted with standard belief revision, in a setting wherein belief of propositional formulas is modelled explicitly. This suggests that in standard belief revision is revocable: one should be able to unmake (‘revoke’) the fresh belief in the revision formula, given yet further information that contradicts it. In a dynamic epistemic logical setting for belief revision, for multiple agents, we investigate what the requirements are for revocable belief (...) class='Hi'>revision. By this we not merely mean recovering belief in non-modal propositions, as in the recovery principle for belief contraction, but recovering belief in modal propositions: beliefs about beliefs. These requirements are almost never met, a surprising result. (shrink)

This study aims to develop systems of belief revision in which acquisition of knowledge and interactive aspects of meaning are captured as a set of questions and answers with respect to an initial set of assumptions expressed in the object language. This process is performed by a progressive deployment of hypothetical insights contained in a context of interaction of information received by an agent. This study also gives the opportunity to express interactive aspects of meaning in semantics (...) tableaux. And thus highlights the notions of speech acts by the connection between tableaux and dialogues in the context of belief revision. (shrink)

This book, the last one written by Piaget, presents a new line of empirical studies based on a revised formulation of his theory of the development of logical reasoning. The amended theory overcomes many problems and criticisms of his earlier formulations by providing a fresh explanation for the origin of mental operations and mental organization based on the concept of meaning. It also offers a more elegant vision of the continuity in mental development from birth to adulthood. As the (...) final revision of Piaget's theory -- and one that opens up new areas of inquiry -- this book calls for a reinterpretation of his earlier work -- a task which will occupy scholars for decades to come. (shrink)

The central concern of this article is whether early induction of labor for an anencephalic fetus can ever be morally justified, particularly by a Catholic healthcare ethics committee. By revisiting and refining arguments in articles by Drane (1992) and Bole (1992) published in this journal, a revised argument – consistent with the Catholic moral tradition – can seemingly be constructed that a Catholic healthcare ethics committee might use to justify early induction of labor in some pregnancies involving an anencephalic fetus. (...) Such a revised argument depends upon two central claims; first, that the anencephalic fetus in question is necessarily in the process of dying when early induction of labor occurs, and second, that the fetus is judged to be undergoing extraordinary or disproportionate means of preserving their life as a result of receiving ongoing maternal support of a mother’s womb. The revised argument developed in this article aims to utilize the doctrine of double effect in conjunction with these two central claims to justify early induction of labor for anencephalic fetal persons in some circumstances. Unfortunately, the revised argument – if successful – would be at odds with a stance taken in the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (USCCB) 1996 statement “Moral Principles Concerning Infants with Anencephaly.” However, there is reason to believe the revised argument offered in this article is well aligned with other guidance from the USCCB, contained in the publication _Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Healthcare Services_ (2018). This article concludes by noting some important limitations of the argument and offering hope that consideration of the argument ultimately helps to strengthen the Catholic moral tradition. (shrink)

Philosophers have almost always relegated the topic of revision to the sidelines of their discipline, if they have thought about it at all. This book contends that acts of revision are central and indispensable to the project of philosophizing and that philosophy should be construed essentially as a practice of rereading and rewriting. The book focuses chiefly on Heidegger's highly influential interpretation of Nietzsche, conducted in lectures during the 1930s and 1940s and published in 1961. The author closely (...) analyzes the rhetorical means by which Heidegger repositions Nietzsche's thinking within a broad history of metaphysics, even as Heidegger positions his own reinterpretation as that history's more 'proper' reading. In addition to being the first book-length published study of Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche, the book also examines the work of Hans-Robert Jauss, Harold Bloom, and other critics of revision. (shrink)

El primer capítulo del libro The Varieties of Reference de Gareth Evans, denominado ‘Frege’, abre las puertas a nuevas perspectivas de análisis de la teoría fregeana. Este artículo tiene como objetivo revisar la interpretación que Evans presenta de la teoría semántica fregeana, analizar algunas de las consecuencias que se derivan de tal interpretación y proponer una versión de la teoría semántica fregeana que pueda dar cuenta de los casos problemáticos para el análisis de un lenguaje natural. El presente artículo está (...) dividido en dos partes generales: en los primeros ocho apartados se reconstruye y analiza el argumento de Evans; y en las conclusiones, se presenta un análisis de las conclusiones a las que llega Evans a partir de su argumento y una propuesta para hacer compatible el principio de composicionalidad y el principio de contexto en el marco fregeano con el fin de resolver algunos de los casos conflictivos para una teoría semántica fregeana para el lenguaje natural. (shrink)

In ‘Finkish Dispositions’, David Lewis proposed a revised conditional analysis of dispositions, designed to rule out counterexamples based on finkish dispositions and finkish lacks of dispositions. Bird and Choi have argued that Lewis’s amended analysis is vulnerable to two further types of counterexamples trading on mimicked and masked dispositions. This paper provides a diagnosis of why Lewis’s analysis inherits these problems, and investigates whether the means can be found—in Lewis’s paper or elsewhere—to defend his analysis against the counterexamples. A range (...) of strategies for defending conditional analyses against masking and mimicking counterexamples are assessed. The conclusion is that none of them will save Lewis’s analysis; some strategies fail, while the rest threaten to make Lewis’s amendments redundant. The discussion offers a number of general lessons about how to defend conditional analyses of dispositions. (shrink)

A distinguished Scandinavian scholar has undertaken a fresh study of themes he examined in earlier writings. Meaning and Method contains the results of Nygren's lifetime of thought, addressed to the most fundamental concerns of philosophy and theology. In this book Anders Nygren delves into these and other questions: What is the meaning of meaning? What are we to do when one person declares meaningless what another finds supremely meaningful? Is there any way of knowing which is right? (...) Can we arrive at a common understanding of what is meaningful? The author contends that contemporary philosophy does point to such a common understanding. Philosophy, as put forth by Nygren, involves a recognition of diverse contexts of meaning. Through philosophy we can also develop a method by which the validity of these contexts may be scientifically tested. Nygren shows that the debate about the meaningfulness of religious language is not insoluble. He further establishes the scientific status of the two disciplines concerned with religious language--theology and the philosophy of religion. The author's approach calls for drastic revision in these disciplines, and he indicates many new directions for future work in them. Students and specialists will be fascinated by Nygren's own account of the philosophical ideas undergirding his theological work. This book also makes a major contribution to today's questions in both philosophy and theology. (shrink)

Since 1968, the irreversible loss of functioning of the whole brain, called brain death, is assimilated to individual’s death. The almost universal acceptance of this neurological criterion of death had decisive consequences for the contemporary medicine, such as the withdrawal of mechanical ventilation in these patients and organ retrieval for transplantation. The new criterion was successfully accepted in part because the assimilation of brain death state to death was presented by medicine --and acritically assumed by most of societies-- as a (...) scientific and objective fact. Nevertheless, many people do not think that the patients suffering brain death are actually dead. We show here that those people are not necessarily wrong. It can be argued that, in fact, the justification of the neurological criterion is not scientific but moral. We outline the thesis that the problem surrounding the vital status of brain dead patients is due to a confusion between factual and normative questions. Furthermore, we claim that the donation of organs and the withdrawal of life-support could be ethically acceptable even if the patients suffering brain death are considered as alive. As an alternative to the dead donor rule, we propose a justification for organ donation of brain-dead patients based on the (moral) concepts of harm and consent : what truly justifies the procurement of organs on those patients is not that they are dead, but that they wish to donate their organs and that, since they have irreversibly lost their brain, they cannot be harmed. (shrink)

This volume is a newly revised and updated edition of _Evolution and Consciousness_ (Brill, 2019) and provides a comprehensive and accessible introduction to the emerging concept of the evolution of consciousness. It presents an overarching model that moves us to a new level of meaning and understanding of our place in the world.

This book investigates what it means, and whether it is coherent, to say that there is a God.

In this paper, I examine Hegel’s and Priest’s answers to three questions: “What is logic?” “Can logic be revised?” “If so, how is this done?” Considering that the two views are separated by more than 150 years in which logic has experienced its perhaps most radical revolution, the two accounts are surprisingly close. Both authors admit different meanings of “logic”. In both accounts what could be called a metaphysical concept of logic plays an important role. Moreover, both authors hold that (...) logic as theory can be revised. Yet the two conceptions also differ in some relevant respect. (shrink)

There are several interconnected themes in Roger Scruton’s The Aesthetics of Architecture, including an account of aesthetic experience, a criticism of reductive theories of architecture, and an account of the self. Through each of these themes Scruton spins a web of argument which supports some manner of conservatism about architecture, and, even more broadly, a conservatism about culture. In this paper I want, from a broadly Scrutonian perspective, to discuss whether it would be appropriate to use architecture in the same (...) way as some have used the visual arts this century, particularly in 1950s and 60s New York, as a vehicle for criticising certain ingrained habits of seeing. By this I mean art which deliberately frustrates prior expectations of what would be something pleasing to look at. I shall work with an example, which I take to be only a placeholder for any number of candidates, of architecture which pays no regard to symmetry and what I will broadly call ‘laws of proportion’. (shrink)

This is a short version of Lindström & Rabinowicz 1991.In earlier papers, we proposed a generalization of the AGM approach to belief revision. The proposal was to view belief revision as a relation rather than as a function on theories (or belief sets). Going relational means that one allows for several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. In the present paper, we show that the relational approach is the natural result of generalizing in a (...) certain way an approach to belief revision due to Adam Grove. In his (1988) paper, Grove presented two closely related modelings of functional belief revision, one in terms of a family of "spheres" around the agent's theory G and the other in terms of an epistemic entrenchment ordering of propositions. The "sphere"-terminology is natural when one looks upon theories and propositions as sets of possible worlds. Grove's spheres may be thought of as possible "fallback" theories relative to the agent's original theory: theories that he may reach by deleting propositions that are not "sufficiently" entrenched (according to standards of sufficient entrenchment of varying stringency). The entrenchment ordering can be recovered from the family of fallbacks by the definition: A is at least as entrenched as B iff A belongs to every fallback to which B belongs. To revise a theory T with a proposition A, we go to the smallest sphere that contain A-worlds and intersect it with A. The relational notion of belief revision that we are interested in, results if one allows that some propositions may be incomparable with respect to epistemic entrenchment. As a result, the family of fallbacks around a given theory will no longer have to be nested. This change opens up the possibility for several different ways of revising a theory with a given proposition. (shrink)

In this thesis I investigate the implications, for one's account of mathematics, of holding an anti-realist view. The primary aim is to appraise the scope of revision imposed by anti-realism on classical inferential practice in mathematics. That appraisal has consequences both for our understanding of the nature of mathematics and for our attitude towards anti-realism itself. If an anti-realist position seems inevitably to be absurdly revisionary then we have grounds for suspecting the coherence of arguments canvassed in favour of (...) anti-realism. I attempt to defend the anti-realist position by arguing, i) that it is not internally incoherent for anti-realism to be a potentially revisionary position, and ii) that an anti-realist position can, plausibly, be seen to result in a stable intuitionistic position with regard to the logic it condones. The use of impredicative methods in classical mathematics is a site of traditional intuitionistic attacks. I undertake an examination of what the anti-realist attitude towards such methods should be. This question is of interest both because such methods are deeply implicated in classical mathematical theory of analysis and because intuitionistic semantic theories make use of impredicative methods. I attempt to construct the outlines of a set theory which is anti-realistically acceptable but which, although having no antecedent repugnance for impredicative methods as such, appears to be too weak to offer an anti-realistic vindication of impredicative methods in general. I attempt to exonerate intuitionistic semantic theories in their use of impredicative methods by showing that a partial order relying on the nature of our grasp of the intuitionistic meaning stipulations for the logical constants precludes a possible circularity. (shrink)

Gupta's and Belnap's Revision Theory of Truth defends the legitimacy of circular definitions. Circularity, however, forces us to reconsider our conception of meaning. A readjustment of some standard theses about meaning is here proposed, by relying on a novel version of the sense-reference distinction.

What is the meaning of life? In today's secular, post-religious scientific world, this question has become a serious preoccupation. But it also has a long history: many major philosophers have thought deeply about it, as Julian Young so vividly illustrates in this thought-provoking second edition of _The Death of God and the Meaning of Life_. Three new chapters explore Søren Kierkegaard’s attempts to preserve a Christian answer to the question of the meaning of life, Karl Marx's attempt (...) to translate this answer into naturalistic and atheistic terms, and Sigmund Freud’s deep pessimism about the possibility of any version of such an answer. Part 1 presents an historical overview of philosophers from Plato to Marx who have believed in a meaning of life, either in some supposed ‘other’ world or in the future of this world. Part 2 assesses what happened when the traditional structures that give life meaning began to erode. With nothing to take their place, these structures gave way to the threat of nihilism, to the appearance that life is meaningless. Young looks at the responses to this threat in chapters on Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Camus, Foucault and Derrida. Fully revised and updated throughout, this highly engaging exploration of fundamental issues will captivate anyone who’s ever asked themselves where life’s meaning really lies. It also makes a perfect historical introduction to philosophy, particularly to the continental tradition. (shrink)

Some people have found my distinction between meaning and significance useful. In the following revision of that distinction, I hope to improve its accuracy and perhaps, therefore, its utility as well. My impulse for making the revision has been my realization, very gradually achieved, that meaning is not simply an affair of consciousness and unconsciousness. In 1967, in Validity in Interpretation, I roundly asserted that “there is no magic land of meanings outside human consciousness.” 1 That (...) assertion would be true if, godlike, we could oversee the whole of human consciousness, past, present, and future. But we language users, being limited creatures, intend our verbal meanings to go beyond what we can pay attention to at any moment. We intend our meanings to transcend our momentary limitations of attention and knowledge. Hence there is a land of meanings beyond past and present human consciousness—the land of the future. What I should have said originally is that there is no magic lance of meanings beyond the whole extent of human consciousness, past, present, and future. This correction of my original statements leads to a deepening of the concept of meaning.In 1960 I first proposed the analytical distinction between two aspects of textual interpretation. One of them, meaning, was fixed and immutable; the other, significance, was open to change.2 I acknowledged that significance, changeable or not, is the more valuable object of interpretation, because it typically embraces the present use of texts, and present use is present value. But I argued that, in academic criticism, the significance and use of a text ought to be rooted in its fixed meaning, since otherwise criticism would lack a stable object of inquiry and would merely float on tides of preference. The claim that one reader’s opinion is as valid as another’s would then be right, despite any indignant protest to the contrary. I did not wish to dissuade people from floating on the tides of preference if that was what they wished to do. I intended to provide a firm justification for those who wished to pursue historical scholarship. 3 I also assumed that even those who did not pursue historical scholarship might sometimes wish to exploit the possibility of historically fixed meaning. In my experience, even antiauthorial theorists sometimes with to regard their own texts as having a historically fixed meaning and will complain if someone misunderstands that meaning. 1. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation, p. 4.2. See my “Objective Interpretation,” PMLA 75 : 463-79.3. See, for instance, W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” in Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry, which ends:We submit that this is the true and objective way of criticism, as contrasted to what the very uncertainty of exegesis might tempt a second kind of critic to undertake: the way of biographical or genetic inquiry …. Our point is that such an answer to such an inquiry would have nothing to do with the poem “Prufrock”; it would not be a critical inquiry. Critical inquiries, unlike bets, are not settled in this way. Critical inquiries are not settled by consulting the oracle. [P. 18] E. D. Hirsch, Jr., professor of English at the University of Virginia, is the author of numerous works, including Validity in Interpretation and The Aims of Interpretation. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are “Against Interpretation?”, “The Politics of Theories of Interpretation, and “Stylistics and Synonymity”. (shrink)

This paper addresses some of Sellars's views on conceptual change and revision, spread across several books and articles. It begins with Sellars's distinction between rules of criticism and rules of action. I argue that Sellars's distinction here actually sheds light on the epistemology of theoretical revision. Many revisions of theoretical commitments can be motivated by the force of rules of action that govern the maintenance of our theories. I offer a partial account of this, positing two rules of (...) action. A rule of maximizing explanatory strength compels us to refine and revise theories to improve their performance, while a rule of conservatism puts boundaries on the acceptable pursuit of those goals. The dynamic between these two guides revision, narrowing the range of acceptable options. Sellars's conception of the roles of analogy and affinity are considered, as well as an elaboration of a Sellarsian point about meaning change. (shrink)

What kind of evidence will lead people to revise their moral beliefs? Moral beliefs are often strongly held convictions, and existing research has shown that morality is rooted in emotion and socialization rather than deliberative reasoning. In addition, more general issues—such as confirmation bias—further impede coherent belief revision. Here, we explored a unique means for inducing belief revision. In two experiments, participants considered a moral dilemma in which an overwhelming majority of people judged that it was inappropriate to (...) take action to maximize utility. Their judgments contradicted a utilitarian principle they otherwise strongly endorsed. Exposure to this scenario led participants to revise their belief in the utilitarian principle, and this revision persisted over several hours. This method provides a new avenue for inducing belief revision. (shrink)