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  1. Topological Epistemology as Epistemology First.Thomas Mormann - manuscript
    Abstract. The aim of this paper is to sketch a topological epistemology that can be characterized as a knowledge first epistemology. For this purpose, the standard topological semantics for knowledge in terms of the interior kernel operator K of a topological space is extended to a topological semantics of belief operators B in a new way. It is shown that a topological structure has a kind of “derivation” (its “assembly” or “lattice of nuclei”) that defines a profusion of belief operators (...)
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  2. A Logic for Factive Ignorance.Ekaterina Kubyshkina & Mattia Petrolo - forthcoming - Synthese 198 (6):5917-5928.
    In the current debate there are two epistemological approaches to the definition of ignorance: the Standard View and the New View. The former defines ignorance simply as not knowing, while the latter defines it as the absence of true belief. One of the main differences between these two positions lies in rejecting (Standard View) or in accepting (New View) the factivity of ignorance, i.e., if an agent is ignorant of φ, then φ is true. In the present article, we first (...)
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  3. The Paradox of Epistemic Obligation Avoided.Michael J. Shaffer - forthcoming - The Reasoner.
    This short paper offers a skeptical solution to Åqvist's paradox of epistemic obligation. The solution is based on the contention that in SDL/KDT logics the externalist features of knowledge, about which we cannot have obligations, are obscured.
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  4. Human Foreknowledge.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):50-69.
    I explore the motivation and logical consequences of the idea that we have some (limited) ability to know contingent facts about the future, even in presence of the assumption that the future is objectively unsettled or indeterminate. I start by formally characterizing skepticism about the future. This analysis nudges the anti-skeptic towards the idea that if some propositions about the future are objectively indeterminate, then it may be indeterminate whether a suitably positioned agent knows them. -/- Philosophical Perspectives, Volume 35, (...)
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  5. Measuring the Intelligence of an Idealized Mechanical Knowing Agent.Samuel Alexander - 2020 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science 12226.
    We define a notion of the intelligence level of an idealized mechanical knowing agent. This is motivated by efforts within artificial intelligence research to define real-number intelligence levels of compli- cated intelligent systems. Our agents are more idealized, which allows us to define a much simpler measure of intelligence level for them. In short, we define the intelligence level of a mechanical knowing agent to be the supremum of the computable ordinals that have codes the agent knows to be codes (...)
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  6. Self-Referential Theories.Samuel A. Alexander - 2020 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 85 (4):1687-1716.
    We study the structure of families of theories in the language of arithmetic extended to allow these families to refer to one another and to themselves. If a theory contains schemata expressing its own truth and expressing a specific Turing index for itself, and contains some other mild axioms, then that theory is untrue. We exhibit some families of true self-referential theories that barely avoid this forbidden pattern.
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  7. A History Based Logic for Dynamic Preference Updates.Can Başkent & Guy McCusker - 2020 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (3):275-305.
    History based models suggest a process-based approach to epistemic and temporal reasoning. In this work, we introduce preferences to history based models. Motivated by game theoretical observations, we discuss how preferences can dynamically be updated in history based models. Following, we consider arrow update logic and event calculus, and give history based models for these logics. This allows us to relate dynamic logics of history based models to a broader framework.
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  8. Epistemic Closure and Epistemological Optimism.Claudio de Almeida - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (1):113-131.
    Half a century later, a Dretskean stance on epistemic closure remains a minority view. Why? Mainly because critics have successfully poked holes in the epistemologies on which closure fails. However, none of the familiar pro-closure moves works against the counterexamples on display here. It is argued that these counterexamples pose the following dilemma: either accept that epistemic closure principles are false, and steal the thunder from those who attack classical logic on the basis of similarly problematic cases—specifically, relevance logicians and (...)
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  9. Outline of a Logic of Knowledge of Acquaintance.Samuele Iaquinto & Giuseppe Spolaore - 2019 - Analysis 79 (1):52-61.
    The verb ‘to know’ can be used both in ascriptions of propositional knowledge and ascriptions of knowledge of acquaintance. In the formal epistemology literature, the former use of ‘know’ has attracted considerable attention, while the latter is typically regarded as derivative. This attitude may be unsatisfactory for those philosophers who, like Russell, are not willing to think of knowledge of acquaintance as a subsidiary or dependent kind of knowledge. In this paper we outline a logic of knowledge of acquaintance in (...)
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  10. Vagueness and Imprecise Credence.Anna Mahtani - 2019 - In Richard Dietz (ed.), Vagueness and Rationality in Language Use and Cognition. Springer Verlag. pp. 7-30.
    In this paper I investigate an alternative to imprecise probabilism. Imprecise probabilism is a popular revision of orthodox Bayesianism: while the orthodox Bayesian claims that a rational agent’s belief-state can be represented by a single credence function, the imprecise probabilist claims instead that a rational agent’s belief-state can be represented by a set of such functions. The alternative that I put forward in this paper is to claim that the expression ‘credence’ is vague, and then apply the theory of supervaluationism (...)
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  11. Bootstrapping, Dogmatism, and the Structure of Epistemic Justification.Shyam Nair - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6.
    Dogmatism is the view that perceptual experience provides immediate defeasible justification for certain beliefs. The bootstrapping problem for dogmatism is that it sanctions a certain defective form of reasoning that concludes in the belief that one's perceptual faculties are reliable. This paper argues that the only way for the dogmatist to avoid the bootstrapping problem is to claim that epistemic justification fails to have a structural property known as cut. This allows the dogmatist to admit that each step in the (...)
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  12. On Formal Aspects of the Epistemic Approach to Paraconsistency.Walter Carnielli, Marcelo E. Coniglio & Abilio Rodrigues - 2018 - In Max Freund, Max Fernandez de Castro & Marco Ruffino (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Logic: Recent Trends in Latin America and Spain. London: College Publications. pp. 48-74.
    This paper reviews the central points and presents some recent developments of the epistemic approach to paraconsistency in terms of the preservation of evidence. Two formal systems are surveyed, the basic logic of evidence (BLE) and the logic of evidence and truth (LET J ), designed to deal, respectively, with evidence and with evidence and truth. While BLE is equivalent to Nelson’s logic N4, it has been conceived for a different purpose. Adequate valuation semantics that provide decidability are given for (...)
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  13. Convergence, Continuity and Recurrence in Dynamic Epistemic Logic.Dominik Klein & Rasmus K. Rendsvig - 2017 - In Alexandru Baltag, Jeremy Seligman & Tomoyuki Yamada (eds.), Logic, Rationality, and Interaction (LORI 2017, Sapporo, Japan). Springer. pp. 108-122.
    The paper analyzes dynamic epistemic logic from a topological perspective. The main contribution consists of a framework in which dynamic epistemic logic satisfies the requirements for being a topological dynamical system thus interfacing discrete dynamic logics with continuous mappings of dynamical systems. The setting is based on a notion of logical convergence, demonstratively equivalent with convergence in Stone topology. Presented is a flexible, parametrized family of metrics inducing the latter, used as an analytical aid. We show maps induced by action (...)
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  14. Towards Paraconsistent Inquiry.Can Baskent - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (2).
    In this paper, we discuss Hintikka’s theory of interrogative approach to inquiry with a focus on bracketing. First, we dispute the use of bracketing in the interrogative model of inquiry arguing that bracketing provides an indispensable component of an inquiry. Then, we suggest a formal system based on strategy logic and logic of paradox to describe the epistemic aspects of an inquiry, and obtain a naturally paraconsistent system. We then apply our framework to some cases to illustrate its use.
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  15. Syraya Chin-Mu Yang, Duen-Min Deng, Hanti Lin (Eds.), Structural Analysis of Non-Classical Logics: The Proceedings of the Second Taiwan Philosophical Logic Colloquium (Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2016), 278 Pp. [REVIEW]Kristina Šekrst - 2016 - Prolegomena 15 (2):220-223.
    Review of Syraya Chin-Mu Yang, Duen-Min Deng, Hanti Lin, Structural Analysis of Non-Classical Logics: The Proceedings of the Second Taiwan Philosophical Logic Colloquium, 278 pp.
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  16. Some Non-Classical Approaches to the Brandenburger–Keisler Paradox.Can Başkent - 2015 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 23 (4):533-552.
  17. A Dynamic Epistemic Logic with a Knowability Principle.Michael Cohen - 2015 - In Logic, Rationality, and Interaction. LORI 2015. Lecture Notes in Computer Science. Berlin: Springer. pp. 406-410.
    A dynamic epistemic logic is presented in which the single agent can reason about his knowledge stages before and after announcements. The logic is generated by reinterpreting multi agent private announcements in a single agent environment. It is shown that a knowability principle is valid for such logic: any initially true ϕ can be known after a certain number of announcements.
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  18. Logic of Confidence.Pavel Naumov & Jia Tao - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1821-1838.
    The article studies knowledge in multiagent systems where data available to the agents may have small errors. To reason about such uncertain knowledge, a formal semantics is introduced in which indistinguishability relations, commonly used in the semantics for epistemic logic S5, are replaced with metrics to capture how much two epistemic worlds are different from an agent’s point of view. The main result is a logical system sound and complete with respect to the proposed semantics.
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  19. God’s Omniscience and Logical Virtue.Mirosław Szatkowski - 2015 - In Miroslaw Szatkowski (ed.), God, Truth, and Other Enigmas. De Gruyter. pp. 97-116.
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  20. Reasoning Processes as Epistemic Dynamics.Fernando Velázquez-Quesada - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):41-60.
    This work proposes an understanding of deductive, default and abductive reasoning as different instances of the same phenomenon: epistemic dynamics. It discusses the main intuitions behind each one of these reasoning processes, and suggest how they can be understood as different epistemic actions that modify an agent’s knowledge and/or beliefs in a different way, making formal the discussion with the use of the dynamic epistemic logic framework. The ideas in this paper put the studied processes under the same umbrella, thus (...)
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  21. On Knowledge and Obligation.Can Başķent, Loes Olde Loohuis & Rohit Parikh - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):171-188.
    This article provides a brief overview of several formal frameworks concerning the relation between knowledge on the one hand, and obligation on the other. We discuss the paradox of the knower, knowledge based obligation, knowingly doing, deontic dynamic epistemology, descriptive obligations, and responsibilities as dynamic epistemology.
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  22. Belief Change.Richard Booth & Thomas Meyer - 2010 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 27 (1).
    In this paper we present a brief overview of logic-based belief change, a research area concerned with the question of how a rational agent ought to change its mind in the face of new, possibly conflicting, information. Our intention is to provide the reader with a basic introduction to the work done in this area over the past 30 years. In doing so we hope to sketch the main historical results, provide appropriate pointers to further references, and discuss some current (...)
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  23. Multiple and Iterated Contraction Reduced to Single-Step Single-Sentence Contraction.Sven Ove Hansson - 2010 - Synthese 173 (2):153-177.
    Multiple contraction (simultaneous contraction by several sentences) and iterated contraction are investigated in the framework of specified meet contraction (s.m.c.) that is extended for this purpose. Multiple contraction is axiomatized, and so is finitely multiple contraction (contraction by a finite set of sentences). Two ways to reduce finitely multiple contraction to contraction by single sentences are introduced. The reduced operations are axiomatically characterized and their properties are investigated. Furthermore, it is shown how iterated contraction can be reduced to single-step, single-sentence (...)
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  24. Inference and Update.Fernando Raymundo Velázquez-Quesada - 2009 - Synthese 169 (2):283-300.
    We look at two fundamental logical processes, often intertwined in planning and problem solving: inference and update. Inference is an internal process with which we uncover what is implicit in the information we already have. Update, on the other hand, is produced by external communication, usually in the form of announcements and in general in the form of observations, giving us information that might not have been available (even implicitly) before. Both processes have received attention from the logic community, usually (...)
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  25. On Logics of Knowledge and Belief.Robert Stalnaker - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 128 (1):169-199.
  26. Eligible Contraction.John Cantwell - 2003 - Studia Logica 73 (2):167-182.
    When a belief set is contracted only some beliefs are eligible for removal. By introducing eligibility for removal as a new semantic primitive for contraction and combining it with epistemic entrenchment we get a contraction operator with a number of interesting properties. By placing some minimal constraint upon eligibility we get an explicit contraction recipe that exactly characterises the so called interpolation thesis, a thesis that states upper and lower bounds for the amount of information to be given up in (...)
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  27. Belief Revision and Epistemic Value.Brent Allan Hudak - 1998 - Dissertation, University of Calgary (Canada)
    An account of belief revision is developed which takes account of the cognitive capabilities of human epistemic agents. We begin with an agent's commitment sets, i.e., sets comprised of those sentences which she is both epistemically committed to accepting, and which she should be able to cognitively grasp in a manner sufficient for praiseworthy belief revision. ;Whether an agent is epistemically committed to accepting a sentence depends on those epistemic standards of her epistemic communities which apply in her situation. These (...)
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  28. Probability and Human Rationality.Lyle David Zynda - 1995 - Dissertation, Princeton University
    I argue for the moderate probabilist view that probability theory plays much the same role in epistemology as does logic, and so is as indispensable to epistemology as is logic; but probability theory by itself does not constitute a theory of rational degree of belief, just as deductive logic does not by itself constitute a theory of rational belief. I defend a version of Ramsey's view that degrees of belief, which are defined using the notion of mathematical expectation, must obey (...)
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  29. Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice.Hans Rott - 1993 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 59 (4):1426-1450.
    This paper reorganizes and further develops the theory of partial meet contraction which was introduced in a classic paper by Alchourron, Gardenfors, and Makinson. Our purpose is threefold. First, we put the theory in a broader perspective by decomposing it into two layers which can respectively be treated by the general theory of choice and preference and elementary model theory. Second, we reprove the two main representation theorems of AGM and present two more representation results for the finite case that (...)
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  30. Logic For Reasoning About Knowledge.Ewa Orlowska - 1989 - Zeitschrift fur mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik 35 (6):559-572.
    One of the important issues in research on knowledge based computer systems is development of methods for reasoning about knowledge. In the present paper semantics for knowledge operators is introduced. The underlying logic is developed with epistemic operators relative to indiscernibility. Facts about knowledge expressible in the logic are discussed, in particular common knowledge and joint knowledge of n group of agents. Some paradoxes of epistemic logic are shown to be eliminated in the given system. A formal logical analysis of (...)
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  31. The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance.William L. Harper - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (6):367-376.
  32. Coherence, Logical.Paisley Nathan Livingston - unknown
    Logicians generally employ coherence and consistency as synonyms naming the absence of contradictions in a group of SENTENCES, propositions, or beliefs, where a contradiction is the conjunction of a proposition and its negation. In metaphysical terms, logical incoherence or contradiction is the impossible instantiation of a property and some other, incompatible property, as in "the circle was square." Epistemically, a contradiction is an irrational belief in both a proposition and its denial.
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  33. Belief Sets and Commitment Stores.Roderic A. Girle - unknown
    In this paper we compare central elements of Dialogue Logic and Belief Revision theory. Dialogue Logic of the Hamblin/Mackenzie style, or Formal Dialectic, contains three main features. First, there is a rule governed interaction between dialogue participants—the minimal case being two participants. Second, each participant has a commitment store which changes as the dialogue progresses. Third, the changes in the commitment store are governed by rules for additions and withdrawals of material. Withdrawal of material is one major source of difficulty (...)
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