Meaning and circular definitions

Journal of Philosophical Logic 29 (2):155-169 (2000)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Gupta's and Belnap's Revision Theory of Truth defends the legitimacy of circular definitions. Circularity, however, forces us to reconsider our conception of meaning. A readjustment of some standard theses about meaning is here proposed, by relying on a novel version of the sense-reference distinction.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,164

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Circular Justifications.Harold I. Brown - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:406 - 414.
When is circularity in definitions benign?J. A. Burgess - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):214–233.
What 'must' and 'can' must and can mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
98 (#170,449)

6 months
9 (#242,802)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

References found in this work

Quality and concept.George Bealer - 1982 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Gupta's rule of revision theory of truth.Nuel D. Belnap - 1982 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116.

View all 10 references / Add more references