Essential reading for students and scholars of philosophy of language and mind, Reading Brandom is also an excellent companion volume to Reading McDowell: On ...
Ludwig Wittgenstein has exerted a more powerful influence on contemporary philosophy than any other twentieth-century thinker. But what is the nature of this influence and why has it proved so enduring? In _Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance_, twelve contemporary philosophers explore the issues surrounding Wittgenstein's importance and relevance to modern thought. Their articles, all of which are published here for the first time, cover the entirety of Wittgenstein's major publications: the _Tracatus Logico-Philosophicus_, _Philosophical Investigations_, _On Certainty_ and _Remarks on the Foundations of (...) Mathematics_. They discuss how much originality and continuity can be found in Wittgenstein's thought, how he relates to current traditions and movements within philosophy, and what we can learn from his conceptions of language, knowledge, mathematics and logic. The international set of contributors are renowned for their work in both Wittgenstein studies and other fields of philosophy, making _Wittgenstein's Lasting Significance_ an important collection for anyone interested in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)
Michael Dummett's approach to the metaphysical issue of realism through the philosophy of language, his challenge to realism, and his philosophy of language itself are central topics in contemporary analytic philosophy and have influenced the work of other major figures such as Quine, Putnam, and Davidson. This book offers an accessible and systematic presentation of the main elements of Dummett's philosophy. This book's overarching theme is Dummett's discussion of realism: his characterization of realism, his attack on realism, and his invention (...) and exploration of the anti-realist position. This book begins by examining Dummett's views on language. Only against that setting can one fully appreciate his conception of the realism issue. With this in place, Weiss returns to Dummett's views on the nature of meaning and understanding to unfold his challenge to realism. Weiss devotes the remainder of the book to examining the anti-realist position. He discusses anti-realist theories of meaning and then investigates anti-realism's revisionary consequences. Finally, he engages with Dummett's discussion of two difficult challenges for the anti-realist: the past and mathematics. (shrink)
Michael Dummett's approach to the metaphysical issue of realism through the philosophy of language, his challenge to realism, and his philosophy of language itself are central topics in contemporary analytic philosophy and have influenced the work of other major figures such as Quine, Putnam, and Davidson. This book offers an accessible and systematic presentation of the main elements of Dummett's philosophy. This book's overarching theme is Dummett's discussion of realism: his characterization of realism, his attack on realism, and his invention (...) and exploration of the anti-realist position. This book begins by examining Dummett's views on language. Only against that setting can one fully appreciate his conception of the realism issue. With this in place, Weiss returns to Dummett's views on the nature of meaning and understanding to unfold his challenge to realism. Weiss devotes the remainder of this book to examining the anti-realist position. He discusses anti-realist theories of meaning and then investigates anti-realism's revisionary consequences. Finally, he engages with Dummett's discussion of two difficult challenges for the anti-realist: the past and mathematics. (shrink)
An ambitious work that endorses a broad approach, it argues strongly against the roles both of truth theory and of radical interpretation. Weiss discusses a range of relevant themes relating to language, including translation, interpretation, normativity, community, and rules in order to reshape our understanding of language. A rigorous and systematic analysis, How to Understand Language advances the work of key thinkers in the area.
An ambitious work that endorses a broad approach, it argues strongly against the roles both of truth theory and of radical interpretation. Weiss discusses a range of relevant themes relating to language, including translation, interpretation, normativity, community, and rules in order to reshape our understanding of language. A rigorous and systematic analysis, How to Understand Language advances the work of key thinkers in the area.
The paper is sympathetic to the idea that speakers have implicit knowledge of the semantics of sub-sentential elements of language, loosely, of words. Implicit knowledge is knowledge which the subject need not be capable of articulating yet which is a genuine propositional attitude and it is to be contrasted with tacit knowledge which refers to an information-bearing state which, however, is not a genuine propositional attitude. I begin by defending the implicit knowledge conception of speakers' knowledge of the meanings of (...) words from a challenge articulated by Evans and then go on the offensive against positions which attempt to replace the notion of implicit knowledge in semantic theory by that of tacit knowledge. (shrink)
Wittgenstein never tells us what Tractarian objects are. He never tells us what Tractarian names are. But we do know that states of affairs are combinations of objects; that propositions are logical pictures; that pictures are facts; and that elementary propositions are combinations of names, which name objects. The logical form of an elementary proposition is the same as that of the state of affairs it represents. So names are objects. The paper investigates the consequences of this glimpse into the (...) nature of objects. (shrink)
In this paper I consider metaphysical positions which I label as ‘perspectival’. A perspectivalist believes that some portion of reality cannot extend beyond what an appropriately characterised investigator or investigators can (in some sense) reveal about it. So a perspectivalist will be drawn to claim that a portion of reality is, in some sense, knowable. Many such positions appear to founder on the paradox of knowability. I aim to offer a solution to that paradox which can be adopted by any (...) perspectivalist, which involves no restriction on the claim of knowability and which allows certain sentences to be unknowable. The solution hinges on recognising that what is meant by ‘knowable’ will vary from one type of proposition to another and thus that characterising the modality involved in the notion in terms of possible worlds will be impossible. I thus offer a subjunctive conditional reading of that modality, a reading which, I claim, has the virtues just recounted. (shrink)
The paper examines Wright’s attempt to inflate deflationism about truth. It accepts the details of Wright’s argument but contends that it should best be seen as posing a dilemma for the deflationist: either truth is independent of norms of warranted assertibility—in which case it is substantial—or it is not—in which case epistemicism about truth is a consequence. Some concerns about epistemicism are raised in avoiding the second horn. The first is avoided by distinguishing between independence and substantiality and arguing that (...) only the first applies to truth and only the second is worrisome to deflationism. So, despite its sub-title, the following is not a diatribe against Home Rule but a modest defence of deflationism. (shrink)
: Some twenty years since its publication Putnam's model‐theoretic argument is still much discussed. The present paper aims to defend a reconstruction of the argument but begins by attempting to clarify the form of the argument. Usually, and with good textual grounds, the argument is treated as a reductio argument against metaphysical realism. I argue instead that it should be treated as developing a paradox. I go on to claim that the most promising response to this paradox is to be (...) able to provide a theory of sense, in the style recommended by Dummett. So, according to this reasoning, the argument is not an argument against metaphysical realism but an argument against positions which reject the notion of sense. (shrink)
Antirealism about the past is apparently in conflict with our acceptance of a set of systematic linkages between the truth-values of differently tensed sentences made at different times. Arguments based on acceptance of these so-called truth-value links seem to show that fully accounting for our use of the past and future tenses will involve use of a notion of truth which is not epistemically constrained and is thus antirealistically unacceptable. I elaborate these difficulties through an examination of work by Dummett (...) and Wright. I agree with Wright's rejection of Dummett's proposal but go on to argue that Wright's account fares no better. Building on what I take to be the failure of Wright's account, I offer a solution for the antirealist which diagnoses the problem as stemming from an equivocation in the meanings assigned to the tensed truth predicates. I close by raising a different problem for antirealist accounts of the past, one which is, however, related to more general difficulties for antirealist theories of meaning. (shrink)
Russell takes his paper ?On denoting? to have achieved the repudiation of the theory of denoting concepts and Frege?s theory of sense, and the invention of the notion of incomplete symbols.This means that Russell attempts to solve the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes without making use of a theory of sense.Instead, his strategy is to revise his logical ontology by arguing that certain symbols should be treated as incomplete.In constructing such arguments Russell, at various points, makes use of epistemological and (...) metaphysical considerations.These arguments do not form themselves into a systemic set of considerations to be used in appraising a logical system.Finally, the vicious circle principle is argued for on the basis of considerations, which are presumed evident, about the nature of propositional functions.The stringency of this principle is a basic problem for the system of Principia mathematica.However, even given the terms of the argument, ?On denoting? does not offer a complete repudiation of the notion of sense.This allows the possibility of retaining some of the insights of Principia mathematica whilst rejecting the stringency of the vicious circle principle.The basis of such a system is the theory of sense. (shrink)
Since its disc overy by Fitch, the paradox of knowability has been a thorn in the anti-realist's side. Recently both Dummett and Tennant have sought to relieve the anti-realist by restricting the applicability of the knowability principle -- the principle that all truths are knowable -- which has been viewed as both a cardinal doctrine of anti-realism and the assumption for reductio of Fitch's argument. In this paper it is argued that the paradox of knowability is a peculiarly acute manifestation (...) of a syndrome affecting anti-realism, against which Dummett's and Tennant's manoeuvres are not finally efficacious. The anti-realist can only cope with the syndrome by being much clearer about her notion of knowability. In fact, she'll have to offer an account which relativises the notion of knowability both to the world at which knowability is assessed and to the content of the proposition to which it is applied. This is not, however, merely an ad hoc manoeuvre to counter the problematic syndrome; rather it is just what we should expect from the anti-realist's intuitive use of the notion. A preliminary investigation indicates that there is no way of providing a general, systematic explanation of such a notion of knowability and thus an inherent restriction on the principle of knowability -- but one differing from those offered by either Dummett or Tennant -- is developed. (shrink)
Certain anti-realisms about mathematics are distinguished by their taking proof rather than truth as the central concept in the account of the meaning of mathematical statements. This notion of proof which is meaning determining or canonical must be distinguished from a notion of demonstration as more generally conceived. This paper raises a set of objections to Dummett's characterisation of the notion via the notion of a normalised natural deduction proof. The main complaint is that Dummett's use of normalised natural deduction (...) proofs relies on formalisation playing a role for which it is unfit. Instead I offer an alternative account which does not rely on formalisation and go on to examine the relation of proof to canonical proof, arguing that rather than requiring an explicit characterisation of canonical proofs we need to be more aware of the complexities of that relation. (shrink)
I argue that a practice can only be taken to be one of apparent rule following if it contains a practice of policing moves within the practice. So the existence of an apparently rule-governed practice entails the existence of, what I call, a policing practice. I then argue that this entailment cannot be reconciled with a non-factualist construal of the policing practice. Thus non-factualism about the policing practice is false. Factualism about the policing practice entails realism about rules. So I (...) conclude that we ought to be realists about rules. Finally I distinguish a position which I call ultra-realism about rules and note that this too is a casualty of the view developed here. (shrink)
I begin by contrasting two facets of belief: that belief is a response to a sufficiency of evidence and that belief plays a role in one’s representation of reality. I claim that these conceptions of belief are in tension because whilst the latter – Representationalism – requires Logical Coherence of belief the former – Thresholdism – conflicts with Logical Coherence. Thus we need to choose between conceptions. Many have argued that the Preface Paradox supports Thresholdism. In contrast I argue that (...) Representationalism has a more plausible response to the paradox. (shrink)
Both Brandom and Wittgenstein see meaning and content as emerging from normative social practices. Wittgenstein says little about the constitution of such norms, other than that they are exhibited in practitioners’ judgements of correctness. In addition, they appear already to be content involving, since the moves whose correctness is in question are moves such as asserting that such and such. In contrast, Brandom says a good deal about the constitution of the norms and promises a reductive programme. The norms are (...) essentially inferential and are instituted in the social practice of attributing commitments and entitlements. In particular, we are urged to see the norm-bound move of assertion as capable of being understood in terms of the normative statuses of commitments and entitlements. Jeremy Wanderer calls this Brandom’s bold conjecture. In this paper I use Wittgenstein’s thinking about normativity to reflect on the defensibility of Brandom’s bold conjecture. (shrink)
In this thesis I investigate the implications, for one's account of mathematics, of holding an anti-realist view. The primary aim is to appraise the scope of revision imposed by anti-realism on classical inferential practice in mathematics. That appraisal has consequences both for our understanding of the nature of mathematics and for our attitude towards anti-realism itself. If an anti-realist position seems inevitably to be absurdly revisionary then we have grounds for suspecting the coherence of arguments canvassed in favour of anti-realism. (...) I attempt to defend the anti-realist position by arguing, i) that it is not internally incoherent for anti-realism to be a potentially revisionary position, and ii) that an anti-realist position can, plausibly, be seen to result in a stable intuitionistic position with regard to the logic it condones. The use of impredicative methods in classical mathematics is a site of traditional intuitionistic attacks. I undertake an examination of what the anti-realist attitude towards such methods should be. This question is of interest both because such methods are deeply implicated in classical mathematical theory of analysis and because intuitionistic semantic theories make use of impredicative methods. I attempt to construct the outlines of a set theory which is anti-realistically acceptable but which, although having no antecedent repugnance for impredicative methods as such, appears to be too weak to offer an anti-realistic vindication of impredicative methods in general. I attempt to exonerate intuitionistic semantic theories in their use of impredicative methods by showing that a partial order relying on the nature of our grasp of the intuitionistic meaning stipulations for the logical constants precludes a possible circularity. (shrink)
Since its disc overy by Fitch, the paradox of knowability has been a thorn in the anti‐realist's side. Recently both Dummett and Tennant have sought to relieve the anti‐realist by restricting the applicability of the knowability principle – the principle that all truths are knowable – which has been viewed as both a cardinal doctrine of anti‐realism and the assumption for reductio of Fitch's argument. In this paper it is argued that the paradox of knowability is a peculiarly acute manifestation (...) of a syndrome affecting anti‐realism, against which Dummett's and Tennant's manoeuvres are not finally efficacious. The anti‐realist can only cope with the syndrome by being much clearer about her notion of knowability. In fact, she'll have to offer an account which relativises the notion of knowability both to the world at which knowability is assessed and to the content of the proposition to which it is applied. This is not, however, merely an ad hoc manoeuvre to counter the problematic syndrome; rather it is just what we should expect from the anti‐realist's intuitive use of the notion. A preliminary investigation indicates that there is no way of providing a general, systematic explanation of such a notion of knowability and thus an inherent restriction on the principle of knowability – but one differing from those offered by either Dummett or Tennant – is developed. (shrink)
The paper is sympathetic to the idea that speakers have implicit knowledge of the semantics of sub-sentential elements of language, loosely, of words. Implicit knowledge is knowledge which the subject need not be capable of articulating yet which is a genuine propositional attitude and it is to be contrasted with tacit knowledge which refers to an information-bearing state which, however, is not a genuine propositional attitude. I begin by defending the implicit knowledge conception of speakers' knowledge of the meanings of (...) words from a challenge articulated by Evans and then go on the offensive against positions which attempt to replace the notion of implicit knowledge in semantic theory by that of tacit knowledge. (shrink)
: Some twenty years since its publication Putnam's model‐theoretic argument is still much discussed. The present paper aims to defend a reconstruction of the argument but begins by attempting to clarify the form of the argument. Usually, and with good textual grounds, the argument is treated as a reductio argument against metaphysical realism. I argue instead that it should be treated as developing a paradox. I go on to claim that the most promising response to this paradox is to be (...) able to provide a theory of sense, in the style recommended by Dummett. So, according to this reasoning, the argument is not an argument against metaphysical realism but an argument against positions which reject the notion of sense. (shrink)
