A “Principally Unacceptable” Theory: Husserl's Rejection and Revision of his Philosophy of Meaning Intentions from the Logical Investigations

Studia Phaenomenologica 20:359-380 (2020)
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This paper accomplishes two goals. First, the essay elucidates Husserl’s descriptions of meaning consciousness from the 1901 Logical Investigations. I examine Husserl’s observations about the three ways we can experience meaning and I discuss his conclusions about the structure of meaning intentions. Second, the paper explores how Husserl reworked that 1901 theory in his 1913/14 Revisions to the Sixth Investigation. I explore how Husserl transformed his descriptions of the three intentions involved in meaningful experience. By doing so, Husserl not only recognized intersubjective communication as the condition of possibility of linguistic meaning acts, but also transformed his account of the structure of both signitive and intuitive acts. In the conclusion, I cash out this analysis, by showing how, on the basis of these new insights, Husserl reconstructs his theory of fulfillment.

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Thomas Byrne
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

Citations of this work

The Origin of the Phenomenology of Feelings.Thomas Byrne - 2022 - Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 53 (4):455-468.
The Origin of the Phenomenology of Instincts.Thomas Byrne - 2023 - Husserl Studies 39 (1):69-83.
Husserl’s Semiotics of Gestures.Thomas Byrne - 2022 - Studia Phaenomenologica 22:33-49.

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