Contributors: Sabina Leonelli Nancy J. Nersessian Michel Janssen Jacob G. Foster James A. Evans Mark A. Bedau Marshall Abrams Gilbert B. Tostevin Salikoko S. Mufwene Massimo Maiocchi Joseph D. Martin Paul E. Smaldino Claes Andersson Anton Törnberg Petter Törnberg Beyond the Meme assembles interdisciplinary perspectives on cultural evolution, providing a nuanced understanding of it as a process in which dynamic structures interact on different scales of size and time. The volume demonstrates how a thick understanding of change in culture emerges (...) from multiple disciplinary vantage points, each of which is required to understand cultural evolution in all its complexity. (shrink)

According to one historic view of liberal education, such education is incompatible with the express pursuit of civic goods. Call that view ‘pure liberal education’. Students engaged in pure liberal education are set free, temporarily, from utilitarian concerns, for a course of study aimed at intrinsic goods—most notably knowledge but also the formation of a virtuous mind. Proponents claim that a direct pursuit of civic goods would compromise the mode, matter, and/or integrity of pure liberal education—that is, its freedom from (...) utilitarian concern, its wide-ranging and intrinsically valuable subject matter, and its commitment to following the truth wherever it leads. In reply, I offer a pedagogy that requires (almost) no departure from the pure liberal ideal yet which reserves a modest, though important, place for civic formation. That place emerges from the fact that academic and civic life ‘overlap’ in an important respect: both involve a conversation and thus a common set of virtues. The latter consist in those practices and dispositions that enable the conversation to go well, by encouraging mutual understanding and the formation of true beliefs. The existence of this overlap provides a way for pure liberal educators, who already expressly influence their students’ academic formation, to likewise influence their civic formation. It consists in teachers consciously developing those virtues in their students, along with an awareness of the virtues’ relevance for civic life. This pedagogy retains the matter and integrity of pure liberal education, with only brief introductions of the practical mode. (shrink)

Reductionism concerns a set of ontological and epistemological claims, and methodological strictures based on them, about the relationship between two different scientific domains. The critical assumption is that one of these domains is privileged over the other in the sense that the concepts, rules, laws, and other elements of the privileged domain can be used to specify, constitute, or account for those of the other “reduced” domain. This specification often consists of explanation, such that the “reducing” domain is epistemically privileged (...) over the reduced one. Explanations of this type are “reductionist” (or, are “reductions”) and reductionism is then the thesis that such explanations will always be forthcoming or at least are possible in principle. Reductionism is most plausible if the entities of the reduced domain can be interpreted as arising from (e.g., as aggregates of) entities of the reduced domain. This ontological claim is controversial but motivates many reductionist theses and associated scientific research programs. Thus, epistemological and ontological claims about reductionism have the methodological implication that they should govern and guide scientific research. When such research proves to be fruitless over a period of time, the associated reductionist claims themselves become suspect. Although issues connected with reductionism arise in the physical and social sciences, most attention to reductionism in philosophy of science over the last few decades has focused on the biological sciences, especially after the advent of molecular biology made it plausible to believe that biological phenomena can be uniformly explained (in detail) from their physical basis. However, the program of finding such explanations has a long philosophical history often couched in terms of seeking “mechanical,” “mechanistic,” or “materialistic” explanations. The contrast here is with traditional vitalism and various forms of teleology and holism. (shrink)

William Pennel Rock argues with Center fellows about the roles of love and reason in the dialogue.

This paper takes up some themes in Peter Jonkers’s essay, ‘Philosophy and Wisdom’, but discusses, more specifically, philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’. After a short summary of what is commonly understood by wisdom, why people value wisdom, and how one may acquire wisdom, I briefly note why the philosophy that we generally encounter today has seemed, to some, to be disconnected from wisdom and the love of wisdom. I argue that, if we are more attentive to the role (...) of love in philosophy and to texts, frequently marginalized, that reflect a ‘sapiential philosophy’, philosophy can again be ‘love of wisdom’. (shrink)

The first and greatest commandment according to Jesus, and so the one most central to Christian practice, is the command to love God. We argue that this commandment is best interpreted in aretaic rather than deontic terms. In brief, we argue that there is no obligation to love God. While bad, failure to seek and enjoy a union of love with God is not in violation of any general moral requirement. The core argument is straightforward: relations of (...) intimacy should not be morally imposed upon autonomous beings. We contend that such reasoning applies to human beings’ relationship to God. So, even if our ultimate end is to enjoy communion with God, God has no right that human beings seek a relationship with him. If this is correct, then the command to ‘love God’ is not the sort of moral principle that can be supported by threats of hellfire or other forms of coercion. (shrink)

With fascinating insight, Love, Power, and Justice explores issues of authentic morality using precepts and arguments from philosophy, science and religion, as well as the profound concepts contained in the Baha'i revelation. This work, now in its second edition, is an innovative contribution to one of the more intractable debates of our time--a time when so many different factions and individuals each claim to speak with moral authority.

The monotheistic religions that valorize love typically believe that their love for God should be extended to God's creatures and, in particular, to one's fellow human beings. Yet, in practice, the love of the Christian or Muslim or Hindu monotheist doesn't always extend to the love of the religious other. Precisely how, then, should the adherents of the major monotheistic religions respond to the obvious diversity of these religions? The arguments of philosophical theology largely depend on (...) what John Henry Newman called our "illative sense" or faculty of informal reasoning. Even the most fully developed illative sense can vary from one person to another, however. As a consequence, Christian, Muslim, and Hindu monotheists are unlikely to fully agree on matters of philosophical theology. I argue that this precludes neither mutual respect, though, nor a rational adherence to the philosophical and theological views of one's own tradition. (shrink)

Kierkegaard presents two radically different conceptions of love in his writings, in three different ways. Kierkegaard’s prime literary model for eros is Plato’s Symposium, which culminates in Diotima’s argument for a continuum between immediate, sensate, erotic love and the divine. Kierkegaard repeatedly parodies the notion of eros as a scala paradisi in his pseudonymous “first authorship,” in order to show its inadequacy from the point of view of Christian faith. In his “second authorship” Kierkegaard presents a very different (...) notion of love from this pagan, aesthetic notion — the Christian notion of agape, the selfless love of one’s neighbor. Eros and agape are characterized in mutually exclusive terms. But the conceptual presentation of agape, as a divine gift and as a self-effacing duty to others, results in aporia. It suffers from irresolvable conceptual puzzles and is emotively counter-intuitive. As long as we try to grasp agape conceptually or intuitively via Kierkegaard’s writings, the latter will themselves constitute a scala paradisi — and must be thrown away. The only proper presentation of agape is as edification, using God’s own words of love. Kierkegaard’s “Edifying Discourses” presuppose that “the single individual” to whom they are addressed has already received agape as a divine gift. The proper work of Christian love, then, is to build up this love that already exists in the reader. This paper traces these two notions of love in Kierkegaard’s writings, and their three modes of presentation, though it focuses in particular on the parodies of eros in the “aesthetic authorship” and the aporias of agape in the “second authorship.” It leaves the “Edifying Discourses” to build up the reader on their own terms. The paper also shows how Kierkegaard superimposes Hegel’s dialectic of selfhood on his parodies of the Symposium, with particular attention to Hegel’s discussion of mutual recognition in the constitution of selfhood, and the relations between self-recognition and work in the master/slave dialectic. These Hegelian inflections are in turn explored in the aporetic treatment of love and self in the “second authorship.”. (shrink)

This is the first work to combine an introduction to Augustine's _Confessions_ with a larger outline of his mature theology. Mallard provides guidance for reading the narrative _Confessions_ and at the same time, by certain extensions and comments, reveals the three major topical divisions within Augustine's thought: creation, salvation, and the City of God. Mallard is able to do this because Augustine's affirmation of the good of Creation, his view of the human will and God's grace, his sense of a (...) religious people's identity and their hope, and his view of faith and reason were all essentially in place at the time of the _Confessions_. Mallard argues that Augustine was not "in search of himself" in a modern sense but in search of a language of prayer, praise, and truth that would locate him within God's grace. That language turned out to be the language of Incarnation, which remains compelling and inviting today. As a classic work, the _Confessions_ is a monument to its own time, but it has striking resonances for our own. Mallard's interpretation will challenge readers to begin working out their own. The _Confessions_ endures because it is a story that illumines the stories of many, even to the present day. To analyze how it is like, and unlike, modern experiences is to exercise both mind and heart. In that respect, _Language and Love_ is a kind of theological meditation on the Confessions testing out a horizon of belief. Mallard views Augustine as a master of the spoken word in an age of broken and abused language and the _Confessions_ as a historic masterpiece of rhetoric. He contends that Augustine is the ancestor of many today who offer social and political hope through fresh rhetorical vitality. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

William Rothman argues that the driving force of Hitchcock's work was his struggle to reconcile the dark vision of his favorite Oscar Wilde quote, "Each man kills the thing he loves," with the quintessentially American philosophy, articulated in Emerson's writings, that gave classical Hollywood movies of the New Deal era their extraordinary combination of popularity and artistic seriousness. A Hitchcock thriller could be a comedy of remarriage or a melodrama of an unknown woman, both Emersonian genres, except for the (...) murderous villain and godlike author, Hitchcock, who pulls the villain's strings -- and ours. Because Hitchcock believed that the camera has a murderous aspect, the question "What if anything justifies killing?," which every Hitchcock film engages, was for him a disturbing question about his own art. Tracing the trajectory of Hitchcock's career, Rothman discerns a progression in the films' meditations on murder and artistic creation. This progression culminates in _Marnie _(1964), Hitchcock's most controversial film, in which Hitchcock overcame his ambivalence and fully embraced the Emersonian worldview he had always also resisted. Reading key Emerson passages with the degree of attention he accords to Hitchcock sequences, Rothman discovers surprising affinities between Hitchcock's way of thinking cinematically and the philosophical way of thinking Emerson's essays exemplify. He finds that the terms in which Emerson thought about reality, about our "flux of moods," about what it is within us that never changes, about freedom, about America, about reading, about writing, and about thinking are remarkably pertinent to our experience of films and to thinking and writing about them. He also reflects on the implications of this discovery, not only for Hitchcock scholarship but also for film criticism in general. (shrink)

This paper analyzes in some detail what an ethics of love would be like if interpreted rigorously as an ethics of being rather than of doing. It delineates the metaethical structure of such an ethics and suggests the characteristics of love appropriate to the structure. The author then indicates some problems that arise for such an ethical theory.

Kierkegaard presents two radically different conceptions of love in his writings, in threedifferent ways . Kierkegaard’s prime literary model for eros is Plato’sSymposium, which culminates in Diotima’s argument for a continuum between immediate, sensate, eroticlove and the divine. Kierkegaard repeatedly parodies the notion of eros as a scala paradisi in hispseudonymous “first authorship,” in order to show its inadequacy from the point of view of Christian faith.In his “second authorship” Kierkegaard presents a very different notion of love from (...) this pagan, aestheticnotion — the Christian notion of agape, the selfless love of one’s neighbor. Eros and agape arecharacterized in mutually exclusive terms . But the conceptual presentationof agape, as a divine gift and as a self-effacing duty to others, results in aporia. It suffers from irresolvableconceptual puzzles and is emotively counter-intuitive . As long as we try to grasp agape conceptually or intuitively via Kierkegaard’swritings, the latter will themselves constitute a scala paradisi — and must be thrown away.The only proper presentation of agape is as edification, using God’s own words of love. Kierkegaard’s“Edifying Discourses” presuppose that “the single individual” to whom they are addressed has alreadyreceived agape as a divine gift. The proper work of Christian love, then, is to build up this love thatalready exists in the reader.This paper traces these two notions of love in Kierkegaard’s writings, and their three modes ofpresentation, though it focuses in particular on the parodies of eros in the “aesthetic authorship” and theaporias of agape in the “second authorship.” It leaves the “Edifying Discourses” to build up the reader ontheir own terms. The paper also shows how Kierkegaard superimposes Hegel’s dialectic of selfhood on hisparodies of the Symposium, with particular attention to Hegel’s discussion of mutual recognition in theconstitution of selfhood, and the relations between self-recognition and work in the master/slave dialectic.These Hegelian inflections are in turn explored in the aporetic treatment of love and self in the “secondauthorship.”. (shrink)

I show that in Epictetus’ view (1) the wise man genuinely loves (στέργειv) and is affectionate (φιλόστoργoς) to his family and friends; (2) only the Stoic wise man is, properly speaking, capable of loving—that is, he alone actually has the power to love; and (3) the Stoic wise man loves in a robustly rational way which excludes passionate, sexual, ‘erotic’ love (’έρως). In condemning all ’έρως as objectionable πάθoς Epictetus stands with Cicero and with the other Roman Stoics, (...) Seneca and Musonius Rufus, and against the Greeks of the early Stoa. Epictetus’ conception of love excludes erotic passion because of its intrinsic excessiveness and uncontrollableness, which inevitably endanger mental serenity, but includes and emphasizes the soberly rational, purely positive joy of interpersonal affiliation. Epictetus’ account of how the Stoic Sage loves is, I think, more consistent and less problematic than that of the Greek Stoics. (shrink)

Selections on romantic love, agape and eros, friendship, the possibility of love, love and emotion, and caring.

This chapter contains sections titled: Hegel on Love: The Early Theological Writings Recognition and Spirit: Hegel's Appropriation and Critique of Fichte Hegel's Philosophical Theology: Love, Reconciliation, True Infinity.

“Daher der Schleier der Schwermut, der über die ganze Natur aufgebreitet ist, die tiefe unzerstörliche Melancolie alles Lebens.” This remark of the German idealist philosopher Schelling seems to be as ungraspable as any discussion involving God, “the ground of darkness,” and the existence of Evil. Do these questions belong only to those who are motivated by antiquarian concerns and find such interests in philosophers whose speculations take them into the “mysteries” of life, divine and human, and into those forces of (...) evil and chaos which are inseparable from love and creativity? If this is true, then Schelling is the happing hunting ground for these souls whose interests drive them to speculate and ruminate in the “deep” of the dialectic of eros and in the gnostic reflections about the positive nature of evil. But more is involved in our thinking about such philosophers as Schelling, whose System of Transcendental Idealism is one of the great works of German idealism, and this can be stated simply: with Schelling we can speak of metaphysical concerns. God, Freedom, and Evil remain the fundamental problems of speculation. We can speculate about them because our predecessors found these questions of such vitality that they identified them with philosophy. What would philosophy be without these concerns? I believe that there is no such thing as fashion in philosophy. The problems are eternal; they have been from the beginning and will be as long as philosophy is philosophy. Schelling in his Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen asked how a philosophical system was possible and answered it: “The true system cannot be discovered, it can be found already existent in the divine understanding.” There is a simple conclusion to be drawn from this: philosophy already is, it must forever be found, and we must learn to remember it. This is a notion which our Greek predecessors would never have us forget. Different from their endeavors, philosophy already has its truths; our task is to reexamine them and make them again explicable to ourselves. We need to recall that the system has already been given, “es hat lange schon ein System gegeben,” before we ever had the intention to think the system. The philosopher looks back and, different from his colleagues in the sciences and humanities, he does not seek new truths, but only attempts to develop the capacity to comprehend “old” truths, which are not old in the sense of decaying, but old as primal truths. He knows, however, that these “old” truths will always be truths not simply for him, but for all thinking men. He knows that they are “the” truths in and through which he recognizes himself as a thinking being, as philosopher, as the ground of his self-awareness. (shrink)

These days we hear a lot about the way our eschatological belief can affect our social action. Indeed it can: but do contemporary evangelicals satisfactorily show us how? In this article it is argued that our exact beliefs about the world's future should affect our present activity less than people think. The proposal is made that we distinguish between love and hope as springs of social action, not by rejecting hope but by showing its limitations. One advantage of this (...) suggestion is that it keeps us from over-emphasizing eschatological differences as we pursue a theology of social action. (shrink)

William of Ockham (d. 1347) was among the most influential and the most notorious thinkers of the late Middle Ages. In the twenty-seven questions translated in this volume, most never before published in English, he considers a host of theological and philosophical issues, including the nature of virtue and vice, the relationship between the intellect and the will, the scope of human freedom, the possibility of God's creating a better world, the role of love and hatred in practical (...) reasoning, whether God could command someone to do wrong, and more. In answering these questions, Ockham critically engages with the ethical thought of such predecessors as Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus. Students and scholars of both philosophy and historical theology will appreciate the accessible translations and ample explanatory notes on the text. Eric W. Hagedorn is Associate Professor of Philosophy at St. Norbert College, Wisconsin. He has published a number of articles and book reviews on medieval philosophy of mind, language, and logic in journals including Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy and Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. (shrink)

Igniting a long-overdue dialogue about how the legacy of racial injustice and white supremacy plays out in society at large and Buddhist communities in particular, this urgent call to action outlines a new dharma that takes into account the ways that racism and privilege prevent our collective awakening. The authors traveled around the country to spark an open conversation that brings together the Black prophetic tradition and the wisdom of the Dharma. Bridging the world of spirit and activism, they urge (...) a compassionate response to the systemic, state-sanctioned violence and oppression that has persisted against black people since the slave era. With national attention focused on the recent killings of unarmed black citizens and the response of the Black-centered liberation groups such as Black Lives Matter, Radical Dharma demonstrates how social transformation and personal, spiritual liberation must be articulated and inextricably linked. Rev. angel Kyodo williams, Lama Rod Owens, and Jasmine Syedullah represent a new voice in American Buddhism. Offering their own histories and experiences as illustrations of the types of challenges facing dharma practitioners and teachers who are different from those of the past five decades, they ask how teachings that transcend color, class, and caste are hindered by discrimination and the dynamics of power, shame, and ignorance. Their illuminating argument goes beyond a demand for the equality and inclusion of diverse populations to advancing a new dharma that deconstructs rather than amplifies systems of suffering and prepares us to weigh the shortcomings not only of our own minds but also of our communities. They forge a path toward reconciliation and self-liberation that rests on radical honesty, a common ground where we can drop our need for perfection and propriety and speak as souls. In a society where profit rules, people's value is determined by the color of their skin, and many voices--including queer voices--are silenced, Radical Dharma recasts the concepts of engaged spirituality, social transformation, inclusiveness, and healing. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Epicureans and Pleasure Freedom from Anxiety and Types of Desires Sex, Shoes, and the Needs of College Students The Dangers of Sex Sex and Sensibility Romance, Beautiful Illusions, and Sound Minds Skip the Sex and Keep the Friend.

Science can reveal or conceal the breathtaking wonders of creation. On one hand, knowledge of the natural world can open us up to greater love for the Creator, give us the means of more neighborly care, and fill us with ever-deepening astonishment. On the other hand, knowledge feeding an insatiable hunger for epistemic mastery can become a means of idolatry, hubris, and damage. Crucial to world-respecting science is the role of wonder: curiosity, perplexity, and astonishment. In this volume, philosopher (...) William Desmond explores the relation of the different modes of wonder to modern science. Responding to his thought are twelve thinkers across the domains of science, theology, philosophy, law, poetry, medicine, sociology, and art restoration. (shrink)

Lamy probing rich analysis focuses more on the criteria necessary to spark or produce a potential lover’s readiness to “fall in love.” His analysis is silent, however, about the feeling state of congeniality or mutual attachment. This raises the intriguing question: if romantic love requires some form of cognitive realization or awareness of the love object, then does long-time companionship or comfort love anchored in a deep attachment have a similar cognitive horizon?

This paper argues that those critics of Hannah Arendt's thought who have protested at her disavowal of ‘moral standards’ as being appropriate in the judgment of political action have, in fact, misjudged the structure of her thought. My argument is, however, a constructive one: the paper seeks to demonstrate how Arendt arrives at her sweeping rejection of conventional standards of moral judgment, and what solution she proposes. I do this in three stages. First, I address Arendt's understanding of self as (...) opposed to world: especially how the moral absolutes which may be claimed by the former may threaten the very structure of the latter. Second, I draw upon her model of action to discover the idea of a worldly ethics, one of principle. And third, I consider the fate of our goals when we act into the world, paying particular attention to the idea of responsibility and the on-going responsiveness to the world that belongs to action under a principle. (shrink)

Our global community desperately needs overt awakening to an age of reason and faith. Reasonable Faith for a Post-Secular Age meets this need by interpreting faith not in terms of belief in propositions but in terms of living surrender to having been seized by agape for every Face, including one's own. Virtually all faith traditions, from Buddhism to Humanism to Wiccan, are rooted in agape and therefore share considerable spiritual and ethical common ground (a truth long veiled). In contrast to (...) ethically feckless secular rationality--over which a devastating, global social Darwinism currently runs roughshod--faith qua living surrender to agape grounds moral realism, awakens us to love for all creatures, and inspires struggles for justice. Inspired by the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas and Christian spirituality, Greenway engages, on the one hand, intellectuals like Stanley Hauerwas, Richard Rorty, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Jeffery Stout, Charles Taylor, and Bernard Williams, and, on the other, contemporary debates over consciousness, free will, evil, and metaethics. He details the character of secular rationality's devastating scission from moral reality and clarifies the promise of understanding faith and spirituality in terms of agape. (shrink)

Overview The evolution of multicellularity raises questions regarding genomic and developmental commonalities and discordances, selective advantages and disadvantages, physical determinants of development, and the origins of morphological novelties. It also represents a change in the definition of individuality, because a new organism emerges from interactions among single cells. This volume considers these and other questions, with contributions that explore the origins and consequences of the evolution of multicellularity, addressing a range of topics, organisms, and experimental protocols. Each section focuses on (...) selected topics or particular lineages that present a significant insight or challenge. The contributors consider the fossil record of the paleontological circumstances in which animal multicellularity evolved; cooptation, recurrent patterns, modularity, and plausible pathways for multicellular evolution in plants; theoretical approaches to the amoebozoa and fungi (cellular slime molds having long provided a robust model system for exploring the evolution of multicellularity), plants, and animals; genomic toolkits of metazoan multicellularity; and philosophical aspects of the meaning of individuality in light of multicellular evolution. Contributors Maja Adamska, Argyris Arnellos, Juan A. Arias, Eugenio Azpeitia, Mariana Benítez, Adriano Bonforti, John Tyler Bonner, Peter L. Conlin, A. Keith Dunker, Salva Duran-Nebreda, Ana E. Escalante, Valeria Hernández-Hernández, Kunihiko Kaneko, Andrew H. Knoll, Stephan G. König, Daniel J. G. Lahr, Ottoline Leyser, Alan C. Love, Raul Montañez, Emilio Mora van Cauwelaert, Alvaro Moreno, Vidyanand Nanjundiah, Aurora M. Nedelcu, Stuart A. Newman, Karl J. Niklas, William C. Ratcliff, Iñaki Ruiz-Trillo, Ricard Solé . (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to provide a comment on Simone Weil’s brief but seminal essay ‘Reflections on the Right Use of School Studies with a View to the Love of God.’ It complements an earlier one on Weil’s Lectures on Philosophy. The essay was sent via a letter to her friend and mentor, the Catholic priest, and Dominican friar, Father Joseph-Marie Perrin O.P. It set out her belief that school studies should provide the individual pupil or student (...) with an education in the value and acquisition of attention. This, Weil believed, would be of fundamental value when reaching out to God through prayer. Such a capacity for attention would also enhance the student’s general academic and social learning providing a basis for authentic dialogue with others, and not only teachers and schoolfellows. The article introduces her as a religious philosopher, explains the origins of the essay, and Weil’s friendship with Father Perrin, who was her Christian religious mentor, examines the text itself, considers some critical commentaries, and assesses its relevance to the philosophy and practice of education today. (shrink)

This paper examines Todd Feinberg's theory of the misidentification syndromes.

It has long been a commonly held belief among classicists that traditional Romans frowned upon male homosexuality and associated it with the influence of Greek culture. There have always been exceptions to this belief, but when Paul Veyne published the following remarks in his 1978 article ‘La famille et l'amour sous le hautempire romain’, his views were quite heterodox: Il est faux que l'amour ‘grec’ soit, à Rome, d'origine grecque: comme plus d'une société méditerranéenne de nos jours encore, Rome n'a (...) jamais opposé l'amour des femmes à celui des garçons: elle a opposé l'activité à la passivité; être actif, c'est être un mâle, quel que soit le sexe du partenaire passif. (shrink)