In the words of Catharine MacKinnon, "a woman is not yet a name for a way of being human." In other words, women are still excluded, as authors and agents, from identifying what it is to be human and what therefore violates the dignity and integrity of humans. Recognition, Responsibility, and Rights is written in response to that failure. This collection of essays by prominent feminist thinkers advances the positive feminist project of remapping the moral landscape by developing theory that (...) acknowledges the diversity of women. (shrink)

There is a growing resurgence in the study of psychedelic medicines for the treatment of mental health and substance use disorders. However, certain early investigations are marred by questionable research methods, abuses against research participants, and covert Central Intelligence Agency financial involvement. The purpose of this study was to understand how and to what extent people of colour and other vulnerable populations, specifically, individuals who were incarcerated or incapacitated due to mental health issues, were exploited during the first wave of (...) psychedelic research in the USA. To do so, we reviewed available empirical publications according to current ethical standards. Variables of interest included race and ethnicity of participants, population vulnerability, drug administration conditions, informed consent and undue influence. Our findings draw attention to the history of research abuses against people of colour in Western psychedelic research. In light of these findings, we urge a call-to-action to current psychedelic researchers to prioritise culturally inclusive and socially responsible research methods in current and future studies. All data relevant to the study are included in the article. (shrink)

Leo Strauss (1899-1973) a inscrit sa pensée dans l'héritage de la tradition grecque, mais également dans celui de la tradition biblique. Se rapportant au judaïsme comme à une révélation de la Loi (pour laquelle la dimension de la foi est secondaire), il fait retour à une pensée juive (Pourquoi nous restons juifs) et tente de prolonger la réflexion de Maïmonide dans les conditions nouvelles des temps présents. Il s'oppose ainsi à sa rénovation par l'approche phénoménologique de Franz Rosenzweig comme (...) à la pensée de Martin Buber, tout en se tenant à distance de la réflexion sur le mysticisme juif de Gershom Scholem avec lequel il dialogue. Cet ouvrage interroge la manière dont Strauss pense les relations de corrélation et de conflit entre philosophie et judaïsme. En quoi la réflexion sur la Loi, dont il poursuit l'élaboration dans la lignée de la pensée médiévale et à contre-courant de la modernité des Lumières, représente- t-elle un approfondissement de la pensée juive et jette-t-elle une lumière crue sur la situation du judaïsme dans le monde? Quels sont les termes du débat avec les penseurs contemporains du judaïsme avec lesquels il est en relation? Quelles sont aujourd'hui les possibilités et les limites d'une telle réflexion pour la vitalité du judaïsme et de la philosophie? Les études présentes ouvrent des voies différentes, voire divergentes, essentiellement heuristiques, sur les possibilités et les limites de la réflexion straussienne pour la vitalité du judaïsme et de la philosophie. Elles s'accompagnent de la parution d'un texte inédit en français : " La situation religieuse actuelle " (1930), qui représente un moment décisif de la réflexion de Strauss sur la question. (shrink)

The die-hard viewpoint of an influential figure like President M.T. Steyn of the Republic of the Orange Free State led to the lengthening of the Anglo-Boer War by more than a year. The reasons for Steyn leading the Free State into this war, the reasons for his call not to surrender and the effect of the war on the Afrikaner, is discussed in this article. An ethical discussion of factors indicating a bitter end, is also on the cards. There was (...) a strong realisation among the representatives of the Republics of the Free State and the Transvaal in 1902 that this is the end of the war. (shrink)

The attempts at introducing so called "value neutrality" into social sciences did not approve to be the sufficient means against their ideological deformations, which still are a challenge requiring a new complex system of the critique of new ideologies. A more detailed examination of the ancient philosophy could be useful in resolving this task. The works of Eric Voegelin and Leo Strauss represent a specific approach to the study of ancient philosophical systems, They both emphasize, though from different points (...) of view, the complexity in classical philosophers in their examination of human nature. The paper focuses on those doctrines of the above mentioned modern philosophers, which might be useful not only in considering not only the political crisis in the West in the 20th century, but also in creating a better means for the critical analysis of the current problems of global politics. It also introduces examples of practical consequences of modern rejecting the "classical model" and points out several simplifications occurring in contemporary approaches to classical political philosophy. (shrink)

The last two presidents of the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republic and the Republic of the Orange Free State, S.J.P. Kruger and M.T. Steyn, both stood in the tradition of the Christian Afrikaner. Kruger as the symbol of Afrikaner republicanism in the 19th century and Steyn as a younger and more modern Afrikaner, tried to base their policies openly and clearly on Biblical and Christian principles. Kruger as a member and recognised minister of the Reformed Churches in South Africa formulated his views in (...) a typical Dutch neo-Calvinistic way, while Steyn used Reformed concepts combined with his academic background in jurisprudence and the law of nations to foster the same ideas. Kruger and Steyn trusted one another, agreed on core issues and worked together rather well. Each strived to maintain the independence of his republic. (shrink)

Marx, K. Preface to A contribution to the critique of political economy. From Capital.--Freud, S. From The psychopathology of everyday life.--De Saussure, F. From Course in general linguistics.--Tynianov, Y. and Jakobson, R. Problems in the study of language and literature.--Jakobson, R. Linguistics and poetics.--Jakobson R. and Lévi-Strauss, C. Charles Baudelaire's "Les chats."--Barthes, R. The structuralist activity. To write: an intransitive verb?--Lévi-Strauss, C. The structural study of myth. Four winnebago myths. History and dialectic.--Althusser, L. Marx's immense theoretical revolution.--Foucault, M. (...) The human sciences.--Lacan, J. The insistence of the letter in the unconscious. (shrink)

The meaning of κερτομω and its congeners in Homer has been the subject of debate in this journal. Jones has argued that ‘to κερτομω someone is to speak in such a way as to provoke a powerful emotional reaction’, whether of anger or fear, and thus means ‘“to utter stinging words at [someone]”, “pierce to the heart”, “cut to the quick”, rather than merely “provoke” This definition seems to work well enough for some cases, but certainly not for all, and (...) especially not for the passage from which the whole controversy began: Iliad 24.649, where Achilles speaks to Priam ༐πικερτομέωυ. As Richardson says in his Iliad commentary, ‘there is no sign that Akhilleus’ speech has this direct effect [i.e. arouses fear] on Priam’. Jones's article was responding to an earlier one by J. T. Hooker, who attempted to ascertain the sense of Achilles’ ༐πικερτομέυ by surveying the usage of kertom- words throughout Homeric epic. He concluded that the basic meaning is ‘to taunt’ or, more abstractly, it ‘indicates the provocation of another person into behaving in a certain way, whether that is the behaviour desired by the speaker… or is not desired by the speaker’. The problem was that this definition did not seem to fit the very line from which his inquiry began, the words of Achilles to Priam. Hooker then hypothesized that the verse betrayed signs of an ‘imperfect adaptation’ of a different version of the poem in which Achilles taunted a defeated enemy or perhaps preserved his grudge against Agamemnon to its end. This explanation is unpersuasive. (shrink)

The analysis concerns the interpretation of the story about Helen of Troy in the Goethe tragedy “Faust” and in the Hofmannsthal mythological opera “The Egyptian Helen” in terms of succession and development of philosophical and aesthetic conception of image. For the first time the work on the opera “The Egyptian Helen” is considered as a fruitful period of the combined creation of Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Richard Strauss on the basis of Nietzsche’s antiquity reception. It is proved, that in (...) the Hofmannsthal’s philosophical and aesthetic views the conception of the opera “Helen” is the symbol of synthesis of opposite view points on antique perception of the world and the basic sources of the ancient Greek art. The light Olympic Greece of Winckelmann and Goethe and the spontaneous titanism, Dionysus’s ecstasy and Nietzsche’s, Burckhardt’s, Bachofen’s archaic mysticism merged in Helen’s “Mystic wedding”. The basis for such unification serves an invincible life instinct of an ancient Greek, who becomes apparent in ability to moral transformation and revival by force of overcoming inevitable things in human existence of suffering. (shrink)

Disintegration and integration processes of German culture of the end of XX and beginning of XXI are analyzed by giving examples of stage interpretations of mythological plots in theatres of present-day Germany. It is stated that pluralism and multidimensionality of the spiritual experience of modern cultural workers, both writers (such as V. Braun, S. Schutz, B. Strauss etc.) and leading producers (D. Dorn, S. Nubling and others) contribute to the drawing up of a special syncretic style of theatre staging, (...) first of all with the use of the ancient material which is appropriate for it. Ancient myth, as one of the steadiest constants of the European literature, gives a universal key to the interpretation of various cultural and ethic-aesthetic phenomena that are irredundant to nothing else. There is a sociocultural context in which German spectators nowadays try to comprehend these dramaturgy phenomena; and there is a genuine stage director interpretations of them (in Aachen City Theatre, Dramatic Theatre of Hannover, Munich Chamber Theatre etc.) that not only lead to the decanonization of the classic model, but also pinpoint problematique of these performances. (shrink)

Le 7 novembre 2015, avait lieu à la BNF un colloque confrontant les pensées de René Girard et Michel Henry, intitulé "Le désir de l'Autre". Cette rencontre eut lieu trois jours après le décès de René Girard. Elle fut ainsi pour tous les participants l'occasion de lui rendre hommage. A la suite des confrontations déjà organisées par l'Association Recherches Mimétiques entre René Girard et des penseurs français du XXe siècle (Bourdieu, Levinas, Lévi-Strauss, Derrida, Sartre, etc.), il apparaissait nécessaire de (...) mettre la théorie mimétique en présence, cette fois, de la phénoménologie de Michel Henry, chez qui la question de l'Autre est cruciale. Nos travaux nous ont permis de manifester, peut-être contre toute attente chez des penseurs aux méthodes si différentes, une convergence, voire une complémentarité, dans la définition du désir, dans celle de la nature de la violence qu'il suscite, et aussi dans celle de la possibilité de son dépassement."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

The article argues that Rousseau's thought is unified by a non-materialistic, non-deterministic version of naturalism, according to which human beings are intrinsically good and intrinsically free, and at the same time moulded by their natural and social environment. Within that unity the article identifies a deep, creative tension between two competing visions of the best attainable form of human life: on the one hand a vision of a unified, integrated life , in which inner conflicts are at a minimum and (...) the goal is happiness; on the other hand a vision of a divided life whose goal is self-mastery. In support of this interpretation of Rousseau, the article subjects the readings of Cassirer and Strauss-Masters to a detailed critique. It concludes with a brief examination of Rousseau's intriguing claim that he would 'rather be a man of paradoxes than a man of prejudices'. (shrink)

This analytic survey should soon appear in English translation with Cambridge University Press in its new series, "Modern European Philosophy," edited by Alan Montefiore. As the title suggests, its leitmotif is the dialectic of same and other, first stated by Kojève in its explicit Hegelian mode of identity and contradiction and transposed during the sixties into that of difference and repetition. Descombes’s book is an account of how the generation of the three H’s was supplanted by that of the "masters (...) of suspicion," Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. His point of departure is Kojève’s Hegel lectures which, he argues, had a determining influence on subsequent French philosophic thought. Central to the process was Kojève’s humanizing of the negative, le néant. Sartre naturally enters the scene at this point but exits without a hint of his own major study of dialectical reason. Merleau-Ponty receives more extended treatment, probably because he is portrayed as a bridge figure, though not only that, to the semiologists and philosophers of history of the sixties and seventies. When it comes time to define structure, Descombes takes Michel Serres’s quasi-mathematical definition as canonical. In fact, he insists that anything less yields pseudostructuralism, a statement which Foucault would doubtless second, if only to dissociate himself from that party once and for all. Serres and Lévi-Strauss are treated under the rubric of semiology with the aid of some very clear descriptions of the relation between semiology and structuralism in the strict sense. Next Descombes considers the Foucault of The Order Of Things and the complete Althusser as critics of History. The problem of difference enables him to treat Derrida and one aspect of Deleuze together. Deleuze reappears in the final chapter, "The End of Time," accompanied by the later Foucault, Klossowski, and Lyotard. (shrink)

Husik, I. An anonymous medieval Christian critic of Maimonides.--Neuburger, C. Das Wesen des Gesetzes in der Philosophie des Maimonides.--Neubauer, J. Zum ursprünglichen Titel von Maimunis Buch der Gebote und seiner Geschichte.--Teicher, J. Studi su Maimonide.--Wolfson, H. Maimonides and Halevi.--Diesendruck, Z. Die Telelogie bei Maimonides.--Heinemann, I. Maimuni und die arabischen Einheitslehrer.--Strauss, L. Quelques remarques sur la science politique de Maimonide et de Fârâbî.--Teicher, J. Observations critiques sur l'interprétation traditionelle de la doctrine des attributs négatifs chez Maimonide.--Altmann, A. Das Verhältnis Maimunis (...) zur jüdischen Mystik.--Shmiedl, A. Die Auferstehungslehre in der jüdischen Religionsphilosophie des Mittelalters.--Rawidowicz, S. Knowledge of God.--Strauss, L. Der Ort der Vorsehungslehre nach der Ansight Maimunis.--Strauss, L. Maimunis Lehre von der Prophetie und ihre Quellen. (shrink)

Richard Vitzthum, a Professor of English at the University of Maryland, has sought to write a book aimed at specialists and nonspecialists alike, in praise of the materialist tradition which he believes to require a new assessment at the present time. In his view, Lange’s History of Materialism suffered from an excessive neo-Kantian bias, contained too many historical digressions, and focused on figures like Gassendi, Hobbes and David Friedrich Strauss at the expense of figures that he, Vitzthum, finds crucial—and (...) more all-embracing in their materialism—namely Lucretius, the Baron d’Holbach, and Ludwig Büchner. (shrink)

This volume presents an English translation of Nietzsche's Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen or, Unfashionable Observations. The common impulse that links up these four essays is Nietzsche's attitude towards all mainstream and popular movements that constituted contemporary European, and especially German culture. The work offers the foundations for Nietzsche's whole philosophy, prefiguring both his characteristic philosophical style and many of the major ideas he develops in his later writings.

À travers une suite d’œuvres qui cherchaient toujours un autre but, Lévi-Strauss dessine tout de même les contours d’une éthique qui prend acte d’un certain nihilisme - la vie humaine n’a pas un sens qu’elle pourrait « découvrir » et elle ne saurait non plus donner son sens au monde -. Il détermine, en particulier, quelques caractéristiques d’une éthique qui veille à la protection de toutes les cultures et à la préservation de la terre qui abrite tous les vivants (...) et qui verra la fin de l’homme comme elle a connu la fin de tant d’espèces. Le lecteur de Lévi-Strauss s’étonne de constater que le structuralisme que l’auteur met en œuvre par méthode dans son travail anthropologique s’associe à un usage de fictions quand il s’agit de tracer une éthique. Notre enquête consiste à examiner cette association un peu étrange qui fait ressortir que, sans adhérer à l’utilitarisme, qui use d’une théorie des fictions, l’auteur se sert de cette dernière sur des points stratégiques pour éviter les dialectiques de style kantien et hégélien, c’est-à-dire pour que les oppositions se fassent contrepoids entre elles et pour que les contradictions puissent se résoudre en plis plutôt que se déchirer entre elles. (shrink)

The year Leo Strauss published "Persecution and the Art of Writing" (1941), he prepared a lecture ("German Nihilism") that he never published. An analysis of this lecture shows that Strauss hadn't fully mastered the art of writing he'd discovered in others: his secrets are too exposed. In the context of "German Nihilism," it becomes clear that "Persecution and the Art of Writing" is about liberal persecution of authoritarianism, no the reverse, as liberals would assume. In response to recent (...) apologias presenting Strauss as a liberal who didn't "write between the lines," a Strauss-style reading of "German Nihilism" disproves both claims. (shrink)

ResumenLeo Strauss, en un ambiente filosófico adverso, tuvo la osadía de interrogarse acerca de la mejor forma de vida. Sin embargo, no parece haber alcanzado acabadamente su meta. El carácter zetético de su gnoseología, el abandono de conceptos metafísicos indispensables para alcanzar la unidad de ser, su énfasis en la «negatividad» del método socrático que limita la «positividad» propia de la mayéutica: el amor a la verdad, etc. le han conducido a la aporía consistente en la imposibilidad de alcanzar (...) una síntesis entre razón y revelación, consideradas como «totalidades» incompatibles entre sí. Por ello, no llega a dar respuesta a su interrogante más profundo.Palabras claveLeo Strauss, razón-revelación, escepticismo moderado, mayéutica.AbstractIn philosophical adverse times, Leo Strauss dared question about the best way of life. However, he does not seem to have achieved his objective completely. His zetetic epistemology; the abandonment of key metaphysical concepts necessary to comprehend the unity of being; his stress on the negativity stage of the Socratic method, limiting the conclusive positive stage of the maieutic (love of wisdom) have led him to an aporia. This is the impossibility of reaching a synthesis between reason and revelation, considered as «wholes» incompatible with each other. Hence he doesn’t find a convincing answer to his deepest inquiry about the best way of life.KeywordsLeo Strauss, reason-revelation, moderate scepticism, mai. (shrink)

Que valent les formes de pensée traditionnelles face à l'apparition des régimes totalitaires? La démocratie a-t-elle présenté des lacunes favorisant l'émergence en son sein de tels régimes? Que devient l'idéal de progrès, de bonheur et de liberté des citoyens? Leo Strauss et Hannah Arendt ont tous deux affronté ce dilemme et posé la question de la portée de la philosophie politique. C'est leur démarche, strictement parallèle mais radicalement opposée, que Carole Widmaier confronte dans une étude stimulante : du constat (...) de la crise à leur parcours dans l'histoire de la pensée et à leur rapport respectif à la tradition et à la modernité. Tandis que Strauss invite à réhabiliter l'idée classique d'une nature humaine, Arendt montre la nécessité d'abandonner cette idée pour approcher l'existence humaine et ses différentes modalités. D'une part la défense d'un mode de vie philosophique retiré, la recherche de la vérité, de l'autre le « souci du monde » et l'attention à l'événement. Une réflexion salutaire pour affronter les maux de la modernité et s'ouvrir au changement politique. (shrink)

John T. Scott has written a scholarly assessment of Rousseau’s psychological and theological thought. Following in the path of Leo Strauss and his followers such as Allan Bloom, Roger Masters, Arth...

In a letter written to Gadamer after receiving a copy of Truth and Method, Leo Strauss offered many criticisms with which Gadamer took issue. However, he acknowledged the important hint cited in the title. Perhaps strangely, Gadamer never took up this hint and showed very little interest in comedy throughout his Gesammelte Schriften. In this essay, I show that there are ample resources within Gadamerian hermeneutics to answer Strauss positively, also for a rich philosophy of comedy along Gadamerian (...) lines. Toward that end, I use Gadamer’s Aristotelian view of tragedy as a clue; interpretations of play, excess and delight (Ergötzen) also weave into the analyses. (shrink)

In his review on Leo Strauss’ «On tyranny» Eric Voegelin, pointing out importance of his opponent’s work, still disagrees with several crucial Strauss’s findings. Especially important for him is comparing of «ancient» and «modern» tyranny, as well as Strauss’ idea that the text of «Hiero» makes up bounds between ancient and modern political philosophy, «tyrannical teaching» of Xenophon, the author of «Hiero», is very close to the Machiavelli’s point of view as presented in «The Prince». Voegelin points (...) out that this thought is indeed not that true and Machiavelli’s teaching does deal with the same sort of problem as Xenophon’s writing, because these texts were created in different historical contexts. The main aim is to understand modern tyranny, but, Voegelin argues, it won’t happen if we, as Strauss does, think that ancient and modern tyranny are the same. (shrink)

Cet article oppose les traditions anthropologiques française et anglaise sur leur traitement du problème de la magie, en particulier sur les deux questions que pose le phénomène de la magie : quel type de rationalité donne à la magie son efficacité alors qu’elle ne fournit aucune prévision ? Comment passe-t-on de la rationalité magique à une rationalité critique et scientifique ? Après un rappel des rapports entre magie, religion et science tels qu’il sont conçus par Tylor et Frazer, on oppose (...) l’idée d’une plasticité des énoncés magiques en fonction des contextes pragmatiques où ils s’inscrivent, chez Malinowski et Evans-Pritchard, et l’idée d’une structure de la pensée magique qui viendrait prendre corps dans les actes de l’individu magicien, chez Mauss et Lévi-Strauss. On conclut alors sur la façon dont ces deux traditions abordent le problème d’une logique de la pratique, et sur les conséquences qu’une telle différence dans la position des problèmes peut avoir aujourd’hui. (shrink)

Leo Strauss insistiert, dass jedes Ereignis mehr als nur ein singuläres Nu im Fortgang der Geschichte ist, und mehr zu sein hat als ein Eintrag im historischen Protokoll. Stattdessen muss sich historisches Verstehen am Begriff des Menschen und am Ideal der guten Gesellschaft orientieren. Nur so lässt sich eine ethische Verantwortlichkeit menschlichen Tuns einfordern. Folgt man dieser Prämisse, dann bleibt Raul Hilbergs eigenes Unbehagen an seinem Ansatz, die Ereignisse des Holocaust zu sichten und sie immanent zu- und anzuordnen, bestehen; (...) einem solchen Ansatz verschließt sich selbst ein nur anfängliches Verstehen des Holocaust. In der Warum-Frage jedoch, in der sich ein bloß historisches in ein ethisches Fragen wandelt, öffnet sich eine Möglichkeit, dem Rätsel auf die Spur zu kommen. (shrink)

T opicality of the study of eurocentrism essence is caused by progressive globalization, the assertion of the systemic integrity of the world that highlites fundamentally new accent on the nature of the interaction of individual civilizations, leads to the unification of the civilizational process, its subordination to common principles and values. In philosophical and sociopolitical thought, the question of further orientations and development priorities of countries and peoples has recently become particularly acute. Analysis of the literature. We used the works (...) of the authors, who began the study of this problem: Z. Bauman, Zb. Brzezinski, U. Beck, I. Wallerstein, V. Inozemtseva, S. Kara-Murza, M. Castells, Claude Levi-Strauss, I. Osinsky, A. Panarina, A. Toynbe, F. Fukuyama, S. Huntingtonа, O. Spenglera and others, as well as the work of native scientists: Y. Afonina, V. Voronkova, A. Galchinsky, O. Gnatyuk, V. Gorbulina, L. Gubersky, O. Pakhlevskoy, Y. Pakhomova, S. Pirozhkova, M. Popovich, G. Shchekina. Purpose of the article – philosophical understanding of Eurocentrism as an ideological phenomenon and socio-political practice. The objective of the study is an analysis of the essence of the phenomenon of Eurocentrism, a description of its basic principles, a place in the life of Europe and in the world as a whole, the study of the peculiarities of the Ukrainian choice in modern conditions. The methodology of the study relies on an interdisciplinary approach, the principles of historicism and global evolutionism, the use of methods of analysis and synthesis, synergy to solve the complex problems of the dichotomy "we / they", "West-East" and their influence on the formation of a new world order. The results of the study: the article deals with the historiosophical basis of Eurocentrism, European universalism and European civilization. It reveals the methodological vulnerability and limited Western-centric interpretation and periodization of the historical process, reducing the diversity of past and future specific historical forms of its implementation to one of the possible. The idea of polycentricity, the existence of other models of social development is well grounded. In the context of new global trends of world development, each civilization is self-sufficient, distinctive in its originality and historical experience, and should develop through the self-knowledge of thenations inhabiting it and thereby fulfill its mission on the Earth. The conclusions of the study – progressive globalization and the formation of the systemic integrity of the world heighlight fundamentally new accents when it comes to the "unity of civilization", the interaction and interaction of different communities and cultures. The unity and integrity of human existence presupposes its diversity, the preservation of cultural identity and features of lifestyles, the mentality of nations and ethnic groups but not the subordination to a single model of civilizational being. (shrink)

Ce texte présente une tentative de trouver une notion de «prudence philosophique» chez Nietzsche. Il procède de la critique d’une contribution de Daniel Tanguay dans laquelle l’auteur s’oppose au diagnostic posé par certains exégètes de l’œuvre de Leo Strauss d’une certaine proximité entre la pensée du maître américain et celle de Nietzsche. L’argument principal de Tanguay tient en cette idée que la prudence, qui est le propre de la sagesse philosophique et qui est au cœur de la pensée de (...) Strauss, est absente chez Nietzsche. La démonstration proposée est sous-tendue par une thèse sur la figure du philosophe et sur la nature de la vie philosophique. Développant une argumentation contre cette conclusion, je veux préciser les conditions de possibilité et le sens d’une prudence philosophique nietzschéenne. En particulier, la recherche d’une notion de prudence chez Nietzsche demande d’explorer d’une part une possible distinction entre eros et volonté de puissance, et d’autre part une possible distinction entre nature et volonté de puissance. Cette double distinction permet de définir une conception nietzschéenne du philosophe et de la philosophie qui n’est pas dogmatique, et dans laquelle on trouve une autre forme de la prudence, celle du don. [This paper finds its starting point in a critique of Daniel Tanguay’s opposition to the idea of a kind of proximity between the thought of Leo Strauss and Nietzsche. Tanguay’s argument is to the effect that Strauss provides us with a notion of prudence philosophique, while Nietzsche, a dogmatic thinker, doesn’t. Underlying this diagnosis is a thesis regarding the nature of the philosopher and of the philosophical life. To counter this interpretation, this paper attempts to flesh a notion of prudence out of Nietzsche’s published works. More specifically, it explores the distinction between Eros and Will-to-Power on the one hand, and the distinction between Nature and Will-to-Power on the other. This twofold distinction allows for a non-dogmatic Nietzschean notion of philosophy in which can be found another brand of prudence that takes the form of a gift.]. (shrink)

"Y a-t-il une intelligibilité spécifique du problème de l'institution chez Sartre? La question est rarement posée car, trop souvent, on la considère comme d'emblée réglée: Sartre n'aurait pas été capable d'envisager la dimension institutionnelle autrement que sous une forme négative, celle de la pétrification et de la bureaucratisation de l'action insurrectionnelle d'un groupe. Fruit d'un travail collectif, cet ouvrage explore différentes déclinaisons de la notion d'institution dans la réflexion sartrienne des années 1950 et 1960, en montrant son importance pour articuler (...) la question de l'histoire, de la transformation politique et d'une éthique matérialiste. Au fil de ce parcours qui fait dialoguer Sartre avec Merleau-Ponty, Mauss, Lévi-Strauss, Derrida, Riesman, Guattari et bien d'autres, se dessine une conception originale de l'institution. En tant que dynamique historique d'invention collective, elle est porteuse d'une normativité ouverte : c'est moins la stabilité figée que l'instabilité créatrice qui la définit. C'est ce paradoxe d'une 'institution instable' que les contributions ici réunies proposent d'élucider."--. (shrink)

We don't understand the reactionary mind. As a result, argues Mark Lilla in this timely book, the ideas and passions that shape today's political dramas are unintelligible to us. The reactionary is anything but a conservative. He is as radical and modern a figure as the revolutionary, someone shipwrecked inthe rapidly changing present, and suffering from nostalgia for an idealized past and an apocalyptic fear that history is rushing toward catastrophe. And like the revolutionary his political engagements are motived by (...) highly developed ideas. Lilla unveils the structure of reactionary thinking, beginning with three twentieth-century philosophers--Franz Rosenzweig, Eric Voegelin, and Leo Strauss --who attributed the problems of modern society to a break in the history of ideas and promoted a return to earlier modes of thought. He then examines the enduring power of grand historical narratives of betrayal to shape political outlooks ever since the French Revolution. These narratives are employed to serve different, and sometimes expressly opposed, ends. They appear in the writings of Europe's right-wing cultural pessimists and Maoist neocommunists, American theoconservatives fantasizing about the harmony of medieval Catholic society and radical Islamists seeking to restore a vanished Muslim caliphate. The revolutionary spirit that inspired political movements across the world for two centuries may have died out. But the spirit of reaction that rose to meet it has survived and is proving just as formidable a historical force. We live in an age when thetragicomic nostalgia of Don Quixote for a lost golden age has been transformed into a potent and sometimes deadly weapon. Mark Lilla helps us to understand why. (shrink)

Inspired by the work of prominent University of Notre Dame political philosophers Catherine Zuckert and Michael Zuckert, this volume of essays explores the concept of natural right in the history of political philosophy. The central organizing principle of the collection is the examination of the idea of natural justice, identified in the classical period with natural right and in modernity with the concept of individual natural rights. Contributors examine the concept of natural right and rights in all the manifold and (...) interdisciplinary dimensions associated with the Zuckerts’ oeuvre. Part I explores the theme of natural right in the ancient and medieval political philosophy of Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and St. Augustine. Part II examines the early modern break from the classical tradition in the work of Montaigne, Spinoza, Montesquieu, Locke, and Hegel as well as the legacy of the modern natural rights tradition as explored by Leo Strauss and Pope John Paul II. Part III treats the theme of natural rights from the Puritans through the Founding period in such figures as Thomas Jefferson and Gouverneur Morris and up to the Progressive era with Booker T. Washington and Theodore Roosevelt. Part IV addresses questions of natural justice in literature, including works of Euripides, Cervantes, Shakespeare, Edith Wharton, and Tom Stoppard. "In this collection compiled in honor of Catherine and Michael Zuckert, the contributors address a wonderful variety of serious issues in important literary and philosophic texts. Their topics range from Plato on piety to Stoppard on socialist utopianism, and from Aristotle and Augustine to Euripides, Locke, Hegel, Shakespeare, and Booker T. Washington. The volume stands as an impressive introduction to the liberal arts and a lively introduction to many great issues of liberalism, Christianity, justice, and liberty; it is also a tribute to the Zuckerts' breadth of study, teaching, and influence." —_Robert K. Faulkner, Boston College_. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Political Identity of the Philosopher:Resistance, Relative Power, and the Endurance of PotentialSamuel McCormickThe troublemaker is precisely the one who tries to force sovereign power to translate itself into actuality.—Giorgio AgambenBeyond the Straussian Practice of "Philosophic Politics"In the second half of the 1920s, Bertolt Brecht began a series of short stories about a "thinking man" named Mr. Keuner. Among the first stories he published was "Measures Against Power" ("Maßnahmen (...) gegen die Gewalt"), the opening passage of which provides the subject of this essay:As Mr. Keuner, the thinking man [Denkende], was speaking out against power in front of a large audience in a hall, he noticed the people in front of him shrinking back and leaving. He looked around and saw standing behind him—Power [Gewalt]."What were you saying," Power asked him."I was speaking out in favor of Power," replied Mr. Keuner. [End Page 72]After Mr. Keuner had left the hall, his students inquired about his backbone [Rückgrat]. Mr. Keuner replied: "I don't have a backbone to be broken. I'm the one who has to live longer than Power [Gerade ich muß länger leben als die Gewalt]."(2001, 3)How are we to understand the political activity of this "thinking man"? Clearly, Mr. Keuner is no Cynic. Unlike Diogenes, who famously ordered Alexander the Great to step out of the way and then openly rebuked his authority as king, Mr. Keuner refuses to play the part of the parrhesiastes.1 His political activity more closely resembles that of a Stoic philosopher. Consider, for instance, the way his reply to Power echoes that of Seneca the Younger: "It seems to me erroneous to believe that those who have loyally dedicated themselves to philosophy are stubborn and rebellious, scorners of magistrates or kings or of those who control the administration of public affairs. For, on the contrary, no class of man is so popular with the philosopher as the ruler is" (Ep. 73.1–2 [1920, 105]).Given this attitude toward the powers that be, we might also figure Mr. Keuner's conduct in terms of the Straussian practice of "philosophic politics." For Leo Strauss, one of the most striking, and sometimes strident, twentieth-century scholars to consider the political identity of the philosopher, philosophic politics consists in "satisfying the city that the philosophers are not atheists, that they do not desecrate everything sacred to the city, that they reverence what the city reverences, that they are not subversives, in short, that they are not irresponsible adventurers but good citizens and even the best of citizens." This is the defense of philosophy that is required "always and everywhere," Strauss concludes, regardless of what the dominant political order might be (1991, 205–6).Although he is certainly willing to appease Power, Mr. Keuner differs from Strauss's philosophic politician in three fundamental ways, each of which suggests that a closer examination of his speech and action is in order. First, the Straussian practice of philosophic politics does not consist in advocating for political or social change but in defending the discipline of philosophy. For Strauss, "there is no necessary connection between the philosopher's indispensible philosophic politics and the efforts which he might or might not make to contribute toward the establishment of the best regime" (1991, 205). For Mr. Keuner, however, the discipline of philosophy—and with it his identity as a "thinking man"—is neither in need of defense nor distinct from his political activity but, instead, available for use as a persuasive resource in his interaction with Power. How he [End Page 73] avails himself of the tropes and topoi of philosophical inquiry can only be determined by examining his conduct closely.Second, the proper site of philosophic politics is not the political activity of "thinking" men and women but their philosophical tracts and treatises. Thus, in searching for the "philosophic politics" of Mr. Keuner, Strauss would have us focus not on his interaction with Power but on the writings for which he has come to be known as a "thinking man." As I argue in a recent edition of this journal (2005, 302–3), this... (shrink)

IntroductionIn May 2006, the small group of doctoral students working on ecophilosophy at the Higher Institute of Philosophy at K.U.Leuven invited the Dutch environmental philosopher Martin Drenthen to a workshop to discuss his writings on the concept of wilderness, its metaphysical and moral meaning, and the challenge social constructivism poses for ecophilosophy and environmental protection. Drenthen’s publications on these topics had already been the subject of intense discussions in the months preceding the workshop. His presentation on the workshop and the (...) three critical responses by Wim Bollen, Glenn Deliège, and Richard Kover are published here in a thoroughly revised form on the basis of further and ongoing discussions about the issues involved. Three further contributions to the discussion are added: one by Nathan Edward Kowalski, a young Canadian philosopher who studied in Leuven and wrote his as yet unpublished dissertation on “Evil in Nature,” a second one by Kingsley Goodwin who is currently writing a dissertation on deep ecology at University College in Dublin and, finally, my own unsystematic thoughts inspired by Martin Drenthen’s provocative and stimulating hermeneutics of our postmodern understanding of nature and wilderness, as well as the diverse critical responses to Drenthen’s views by the other contributors. I owe gratitude to all of them for enriching my own ecophilosophical thought and enlarging its horizon although as my fragmentary reflections show at the cost of yet greater uncertainty and more questions about the possibilities of arguing for a radical environmentalist position. Such a position would somehow connect or ground our moral obligation to preserve genuine non-human otherness, wild and free nature, in the non-human meaning of such nature and in our essential need to be in direct and concrete contact with that field of wild non-human meaning because we ourselves belong to nature, because we are not only and purely civilized but are also and most fundamentally wild and free. Three fundamental questions need to be distinguished: the question about our moral obligations regarding nature and its preservation, the metaphysical question about the nature of nature or the meaning of nature, and the question of the metaphysical grounding of our morals in general, and of our moral obligation regarding nature in particular, in the nature or meaning of nature. The complex intertwinement between these three questions is at the heart of Martin Drenthen’s reflections.The authors contributing to the present discussion approach the various issues from markedly different philosophical backgrounds and concerns: critical theory, anthropology, analytic philosophy, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and deep ecology are all to some degree or other brought to bear on the question of what wilderness means for us, why we are fascinated by it and what it actually and in the first place is.Another interesting difference between the five respondents to Martin Drenthen’s wilderness-philosophy relates to the place from which they write: while the Canadians Richard Kover and Nathan Edward Kowalski have wilderness of some sort still close at hand, the Belgians Wim Bollen and Glenn Deliège write from a place which has been thoroughly domesticated, cultivated, and industrialised for a long time. Martin Drenthen himself, of course, writes from the same kind of place as these last two, which explains why he only refers to the wilderness that he has read about in novels, seen in movies, or experienced as recreated in the reserves of the Netherlands. The Irish Kingsley Goodwin writes perhaps from a third, intermediate place that is not wild anymore but still much more natural than Belgium or the Netherlands are.The differences in philosophical approach and concern combined with the difference of place generate a rich tapestry of perspectives and voices wrestling with the fundamental questions of our perceived homelessness and alienation from nature, our cultural discontent, our longing for and need for radical alterity, of immanence and transcendence, of who we are and where we belong, and more concretely of whether there is more to ground our efforts to preserve nature than enlightened self-interest and subjective preference. Martin Drenthen deserves praise for inaugurating this fruitful discussion with his intriguing and highly paradoxical effort to hybridize a postmodern deconstruction of the idea and ideal of wilderness as unspoilt and true nature on the one hand with a new metaphysics of wilderness on the other. Arne Naess, who is generally regarded as the founding father of deep ecology, pointed out the positive and stimulating role that vagueness in the expression of ideas can play in political and philosophical debate. Such general and vague but highly suggestive expressions as ‘all life is one’ are not empty at all, as is often claimed; they are rather full of possibilities of ‘precisation’ and differentiation. Drenthen’s wilderness-philosophy is certainly not vague to the degree of ‘all life is one,’ but his expositions are similarly pregnant with a wealth of further questions, precisations, distinctions, and conceptual clarifications. Good examples of different kinds are to be found in the contributions of Nathan Edward Kowalski and Richard Kover. Kowalski points out that Drenthen’s notions of culture and wilderness need to be made more precise by distinguishing them from the notions of civilization and wildness such that wild cultures become a conceptual possibility. Richard Kover takes the lead from Drenthen’s question about the reason for our postmodern fascination for wilderness to confront it with our primordial fascination in terms of the dependence in the evolution of our subjectivity and our consciousness on the focused perceptual attention on wild forms.Glenn Deliège situates Martin Drenthen’s wilderness-philosophy in its original context of the Dutch debate on the preservation of nature, in particular on the new wilderness paradigm. According to this paradigm, the nature to be preserved should be true and pure, truly natural and wild nature, that is nature outside of and free from the cultivating and domesticating influence of humans. In the Netherlands, however, such nature no longer exists; it can only be preserved after it has first been artificially recreated. Deliège gives an informative summary account of the highly charged three-cornered debate between the adepts of this wilderness-paradigm, the proponents of the more traditional form of conservation of remnants of the typical European landscapes created by pre-industrial farming practices and the modern technocratic functionalists. This debate makes obvious that there are quite different views of the nature of nature and its value. Enter social constructivism: the contested nature of nature is nothing more than a social construct, an idea in a collective mind. The contestation itself is a struggle for authority and power between different such social constructs, any claim to scientific objectivity and objective truth for one’s image of nature is an arrogation of a truth which doesn’t exist and is potentially oppressive by silencing other views. Nature then is up for the grabs of politics, political negotiation, and compromise between various interest groups who all want to get some benefit from nature, some use-value.The problem with Drenthen’s effort to articulate a normative concept of nature which cannot be deconstructed in this way is the extreme formality and emptiness of his metaphysical concept of wilderness as that which is always ‘beyond’, always ‘more’ and which can never be exhausted by any image and construction of nature. Any more concrete determination is mere appearance; the thing in itself is a border concept of that which in fact cannot be grasped conceptually. Glenn Deliège is critical of this formality and emptiness from which it will be impossible to derive any concrete guidance for our conservation practices. He then goes on to defend the Arcadian tradition of our appreciation of nature as giving us a historically well-grounded orientation for those practices. Of course that Arcadian tradition is obviously a cultural construction but that doesn’t make it completely arbitrary and contingent since it is itself ultimately grounded in and open to modification by our concrete sensuous experiences of nature.Deliège here raises the very important issue of the relation between our concrete perceptual and bodily experiences in and with nature and our concepts and metaphysical images of nature. Drenthen himself approaches this issue from the hermeneutical perspective of our need to make sense of our experiences and to articulate their meaning. His confrontation with social constructivism and his effort to salvage something from its relativizing acid lead him, however, into the direction of a highly abstract and empty concept of wilderness.Richard Kover shows that perception is, indeed, the key to a radical critique of social constructivism. He does this with the help of the ecological anthropology of Paul Shepard, the structuralist anthropology of Claude Levi-Strauss and the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It needs to be said here that Kover takes his leave from an unpublished paper by Martin Drenthen with the title “How to appropriate wilderness appropriately?” – the paper is accessible though on Drenthen’s web-site - in which Drenthen comments and reflects upon three contemporary wilderness-tales, one of them being Werner Herzog’s much-discussed documentary on Timothy Treadwell, an American environmentalist drop-out who lived thirteen summers among wild grizzlies in the Alaskan wilderness before being killed together with his girlfriend by a grizzly bear.Kover tries to show that we are not imprisoned in the mirror-cabinet of our mind or of our human sociality. To make his case, he starts from Paul Shepard’s thoughtful observation that the evolutionary emergence of the mind did not remove us from the natural world but actually connected us deeper with it. Through our mind we evolved more fully into it because our mind is primordially in our senses and in the ability to articulate a perceptual world. The natural world in the form of the system of natural species and their relations is the primary model for perceptual discriminations, for the fundamental discovery of order with its twin-aspects of distinction and discontinuity on the one side and relations and continuity on the other side. Our cognition is essentially perceptually based, our subjectivity is primordially informed by our inherence in the sensible world. Perceptual cognition is inherently intentional and relational, it is not an autonomous mental construction, it is rather in the world and informed by that which is perceived. The other is always intertwined with the subject. We are always already hooked up with the world, with the others, before we start reflecting, thinking, and conceptualizing. This is one of the major themes in Shepard’s work: what this insight means with regard to our relations to non-human otherness, in particular to our perceptual encounter with wild animals. In our encounter with non-human otherness, we are confronted with an essentially ambiguous sense of both affinity and disjuncture. Wild animals demonstrate to us that we are not homeless or alien to this world, that we fundamentally belong to it and are part of it. Their difference, however, shows us that there are different perspectives and ways of being in the world. “Thus the encounter with non-human others inform humans that we are both of the world and simultaneously not the world and there are horizons of significance beyond our own perspective.”Nathan Edward Kowalski comes to a similar conclusion when he situates our morality in the larger moral order of wild nature. According to Kowalski it is indeed a moral order though not our own, an Other to our morality but not simply a negative one. It is, as Drenthen says, a highly paradoxical amoral morality. But what can it mean to speak of morality here? For Kowalski it means that the issue is not merely the theoretical recognition and acknowledgment of axiological transcendence, of non-human values out there, but whether we will appropriately conform to and comport ourselves towards that axiological transcendence so that we can find a human homeland in wild nature instead of turning it into a wasteland. The question then is, how to fit our own human morality into this larger order and greater reality, to subordinate it to that greater reality as a part of it and encompassed but not denied by it so that we can be moral and natural at the same time, tender carnivores hunting the sacred game. Indigenous people follow a moral protocol in their relationship with non-human others which acknowledge and respects their autonomy, their alterity, and the sacred mystery of their different ways of being. They are not befriended but some of them are hunted and eaten – as an exchange in the gift-economy of nature.The problem of the homelessness and alienation from nature is discussed by Wim Bollen from the radically different vantage point of critical theory. In Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of Enlightenment the human story unfolds as a tragic effort to liberate ourselves from nature and to become fully human through rational control when in the end this effort turns against ourselves and instead of liberation and human flourishing we get social domination and repression of our natural needs. The frustrations and mutilations imposed upon us by a repressive civilization give rise to the regressive desire for a return to a natural existence. Referring to the myth of Odysseus and Circe as interpreted by Adorno and Horkheimer, Wim Bollen equates such a natural existence with animal life. In the light of contemporary knowledge about primitive existence, however, this equation is highly problematic. Palaeolithic foragers were already fully human in all respects. A life without civilization need not be an animal-existence.According to Adorno/Horkheimer, our subjectivity and autonomy have to be wrested from animal-nature through an exertive struggle that cannot but proceed by a threefold strategy of domination: the domination of non-human otherness, of human others, and of our own inner nature. The siren song of nature consists in the temptation to give up that struggle for the promise of an unreflective, non-alienated natural existence without toil.When Odysseus’ men give in to Circe’s seduction they are, however, not transformed into wild animals but into swine. According to Bollen this signifies that we cannot re-wild ourselves, that we remain imprisoned in civilization, either as master-subjects or as domesticated animals. Bollen, by the way, like Drenthen, does not distinguish conceptually between civilization and culture. Since re-wilding for Bollen means the impossibility of returning to animal-existence, which is actually the impossibility of becoming another species since biologically we are animals already, to be imprisoned in civilisation means nothing else than to be imprisoned in our humanity. The fact that we cannot become wild animals again – according to Paul Shepard, however, we are still wild animals – is indeed, as Bollen stresses, a trivial form of alienation. A more meaningful concept of alienation which can be put to critical use must refer to a culturally and historically determined frustration and deficit inside the cultural order that is to be overcome not by an impossible regression but by progressive politics leading beyond the three intertwined forms of domination. Not back to nature but forward towards a reconciliation of culture with nature! Such a reconciliation would neither collapse culture into the immanence of nature nor submerge nature into the transcendence of culture. According with the three forms of domination it would be a three-dimensional form of reconciliation.Odysseus’ men did not got what they thought were promised them: the complete liberation from the burden of being autonomous subjects, of being civilized, but they got something worthwhile, namely a certain from of pleasure, a limited and provisional relief and escape. Bollen sees a critical potential in these piggish pleasures after all and consequently even in the siren song of nature since these pleasures were only experienced because Odysseus’ men gave in to it. But one has to give in to this siren song critically if it is to unfold its liberating potential. The problem with pleasure though in bourgeois society is that it is necessarily betrayed, instrumentalized and sold.Kingsley Goodwin’s paper starts by defending deep ecology against the charge of asserting a naïve and dogmatic metaphysics of nature. For convenience sake, but not quite unproblematically, he identifies deep ecology with the environmental thought of Arne Naess. A metaphysics of nature for Naess is always part of a personal worldview. Worldviews which are partly inspired by ecology Naess calls ecosophies. Naess always stresses the personal character of such a worldview and the irreducible plurality of them. It used to be a common misunderstanding of the platform of deep ecology which Naess conceived together with George Sessions that it expressed in a condensed form the metaphysical beliefs of deep ecology. Naess’ intention, however, was to try to articulate in a general fashion the basic viewpoints on which the supporters of the deep ecology movement agreed. It would be possible then to derive these viewpoints from quite different worldviews. In light of this, I think, that Goodwin’s characterisation of the platform as “pragmatic and activist” is not quite appropriate.Goodwin goes on to compare Drenthen’s conception of wilderness and wildness with the similar position developed by Neil Evernden in his book The Social Creation of Nature. He like Naess in his personal ecosophy stresses the crucial role of perceptual experience of wild otherness to find an antidote to the relativity and contingency of our interpretations of nature. Evernden refers to studies on child development to argue for a non-dualistic and relational conception of the self, similar to Naess’ relational ontology. According to Goodwin, Drenthen, in spite of his hermeneutical approach remains too much indebted to the Western subject/object-dualism. The object, in this case wild nature, is pure otherness.With regard to a compost heap, Goodwin shows that we are not separated from nature by an inseparable gulf, that nature is close at hand, and that we can experience and explore it, appreciate the complex play of identity and difference it consists of, the exchanges and transformations and that we can identify with the organisms involved in these exchanges.*The proceeding remarks only highlight some of the prominent themes and considerations in the various contributions to this topical issue of Ethical Perspectives. Hopefully the reader will feel invited and enticed to read the articles themselves, starting, preferably of course, with the essay by Martin Drenthen, who sparked off this lively discussion on the moral meaning of wild nature. I am honoured and pleased to be able to introduce these rich explorations by such talented young environmental philosophers who are eager to develop environmental philosophy further and lead it into new directions. They all have to wrestle with and find answers to the challenge postmodern deconstruction and social constructivism pose for environmental philosophy. In the face of that challenge, it is even more difficult than it already was to provide solid and convincing arguments for the defence of wild and free nature beyond merely pragmatic arguments in terms of its utilitarian value for us. The reason for that defence is not clear-cut and proves to be just as evasive as the moral meaning of nature itself. But neither that reason nor that meaning are mere phantoms and mirages that vanish when we approach them and try to grasp them. They are more substantial, even if they will never have the solidity of a mathematical proof or a scientific measurement. Their locale is the lifeworld which from the point of view of scientific and logical precision and clarity is a messy place where subject and object, reason and heart, fact and value, experience and thought and, yes, nature and culture cannot be clearly separated. This has important consequences for environmental philosophy and its methodology. Conceptual analysis and logical argumentation have to become sensitive to the richness of experience in the lifeworld and to the diverse efforts of its articulation: i.e., they have to open themselves up and maybe even to subordinate themselves to phenomenological and hermeneutical approaches. For me personally this is one of the most important conclusions I draw from the discussion presented here. (shrink)

La fortune à la fois littéraire et philosophique de Lucrèce ne s'est jamais démentie depuis la Renaissance. Mais comment notre temps a-t-il reçu le De rerum natura, ce poème didactique romain consacré à l'exposition de la physique d'Epicure? Si les contemporains ont exploré en historiens des aspects auparavant négligés ou minorés de la doctrine matérialiste exposée par Lucrèce (la théorie de l'imaginaire, l'analyse critique de l'amour), plusieurs d'entre eux sont entrés en un véritable dialogue spéculatif avec son poème, y cherchant (...) des clés de leur propre compréhension du présent : tels Althusser ou Derrida avec le fascinant concept de la déviation des atomes (clinamen) ou Leo Strauss et l'interrogation sur le rôle de la critique de la religion dans la modernité. Pour d'autres, enfin, l'actualité de Lucrèce tient à l'originalité d'une écriture poétique mise au service d'un projet indissociablement philosophique et didactique (Queneau, Ponge). Les textes réunis dans ce volume ont été présentés au colloque international Lucrèce et la modernité : le 20e siècle, qui s'est tenu à l'Université Paris Est Créteil les 4 et 5 février 2010. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Empirical Questions Deserve Empirical AnswersColin MartindaleWhat is wrong with the current state of humanistic literary studies? On the theoretical level, we find various types of postmodernism, none of which makes much sense. On the other hand, there are approaches such as Marxism, Feminism, and the New Historicism. One can at least understand the contentions of such theorists, but these contentions are generally quite implausible. If poetry were an effective (...) means of maintaining the status quo or of oppressing anyone, one wonders why this was never noticed by politicians or generals. Now that the fact has been “discovered,” one wonders why it is not put to use by the power elite. What has led literary theory to stray onto such strange grounds? I believe that the faulty methods used by many literary theorists offer us at least part of an answer.Humanistic critics have no reasonable way of deciding among alternative answers if theorists happen to ask a question that is answerable—i.e., if they propose an empirical investigation. Their only method is one of producing examples and trying to persuade the reader. 1 Can a scientific approach provide something better? Certainly it can. First, the scientist does not pose unanswerable questions. Second, science provides methods for resolving disputes, for answering questions that are answerable. These methods are the scientific apparatus of counting, measuring, experimenting, and so on. Humanistic inquiry is simply not as effective as scientific inquiry. If a question is meaningful, it is by definition an empirical question. Science is the only method to us available for answering such questions. Humanism has no decision-making methods, no objective methods of choosing amongst competing hypotheses. [End Page 347]To paraphrase Plato, literary critics hypothesize many fine things but know nothing of how to test them. Science already has the methods. We merely need to apply them. To give an example from my own research, Raymond and a number of other literary scholars tried to say that across the course of the nineteenth century, the content of French poetry became more primary process (Freud), dedifferentiated (Werner), associative (Wundt), or mythic (Cassirer) in its content. 2 Unless one can translate Raymond’s comments into these theoretical terms, it is difficult to understand what in the world he is talking about, let alone to test his contention. Because literary critics usually make up their psychology as they go along, it is difficult to understand what they say. Because they have only a proof-by-example method, it is difficult to believe what they say. If we do make the translation and develop a metric to measure the degree to which poetic content is primary process, we can test Raymond’s hypothesis and find out if it is correct. 3 We can not only find out if it is correct. We can fit curves to the data, compute rates of change, relate rates of change to other variables, and so on. One cannot fit curves to what Lotman aptly called “literary chit-chat.” 4 Without such an objective measure of primary process content, one would no doubt assert that twentieth-century poetry is even more mythic in its content, because the poets themselves have said so. 5 In fact, the metric confirms Plato’s warning that poets lie.Some literary theorists, of course, do things that are at least close to science. Numbers would be of great help to such theorists if only as mnemonic devices. Given that people cannot hold more than about seven things in mind at once, the task of sorting out and comparing hundreds of texts is very difficult unless some counting is done. 6 Humanists can count, but they seem not to realize the value of this ability. Lévi-Strauss and the structuralists were doing what might be called zero-degree science. 7 It is reasonable to segment texts and look for regularities. It is not reasonable to look for regularities before one has determined the reliability of the segmentations: that is, before one has determined whether people agree as to how to segment texts. To compute a reliability coefficient, one has to use numbers, and one has to know the formula. Humanists don’t... (shrink)

Transplantation is a medically successful and cost-effective way to treat people whose organs have failed--but not enough organs are available to meet demand. T. M. Wilkinson explores the major ethical problems raised by policies for acquiring organs. Key topics include the rights of the dead, the role of the family, and the sale of organs.

This is the third volume to appear in an edition that will be the first complete, critical, and annotated English translation of all of Nietzsche's work. Volume 2: _Unfashionable Observations_, translated by Richard T. Gray, was published in 1995; Volume 3: _Human, All Too Human _, translated by Gary Handwerk, was published in 1997. The edition is a new English translation, by various hands, of the celebrated Colli-Montinari edition, which has been acclaimed as one of the most important works of (...) scholarship in the humanities in the last half century. The present volume provides for the first time English translations of all of Nietzsche's unpublished notebooks from the summer of 1872 to the end of 1874. The major works published in this period were the first three _Unfashionable Observations_: "David Strauss the Confessor and the Writer," "On the Utility and Liability of History for Life," and "Schopenhauer as Educator." Translations of the preliminary notes for these pieces are coordinated with the translations of the published texts printed in Volume 2: _Unfashionable Observations_. The content of these notebooks goes far beyond the notes and plans for published and unpublished _Unfashionable Observations_, encompassing numerous sketches related to Nietzsche's major philological project from this period, a book on the pre-Platonic Greek philosophers. The ideas that emerged from Nietzsche's deliberations on these early Greek thinkers are absolutely central to his thought from this period and contribute in significant ways to the development of several of his major themes: the role of the philosopher vis-à-vis his age and the surrounding culture; the relationships among philosophy, art, and culture; the metaphorical nature of language and its relationship to knowledge; the unmasking of the modern drive for absolute "truth" as a palliative against the horror of existence; and Nietzsche's "unfashionable" attack on modern science and modern culture, especially on the Germany of the Bismarck Reich. These notebooks represent important transitional documents in Nietzsche's intellectual development, marking, among other things, the shift away from philological studies toward unabashed cultural criticism. (shrink)

This is the third volume to appear in an edition that will be the first complete, critical, and annotated English translation of all of Nietzsche's work. Volume 2: _Unfashionable Observations_, translated by Richard T. Gray, was published in 1995; Volume 3: _Human, All Too Human _, translated by Gary Handwerk, was published in 1997. The edition is a new English translation, by various hands, of the celebrated Colli-Montinari edition, which has been acclaimed as one of the most important works of (...) scholarship in the humanities in the last half century. The present volume provides for the first time English translations of all of Nietzsche's unpublished notebooks from the summer of 1872 to the end of 1874. The major works published in this period were the first three _Unfashionable Observations_: "David Strauss the Confessor and the Writer," "On the Utility and Liability of History for Life," and "Schopenhauer as Educator." Translations of the preliminary notes for these pieces are coordinated with the translations of the published texts printed in Volume 2: _Unfashionable Observations_. The content of these notebooks goes far beyond the notes and plans for published and unpublished _Unfashionable Observations_, encompassing numerous sketches related to Nietzsche's major philological project from this period, a book on the pre-Platonic Greek philosophers. The ideas that emerged from Nietzsche's deliberations on these early Greek thinkers are absolutely central to his thought from this period and contribute in significant ways to the development of several of his major themes: the role of the philosopher vis-à-vis his age and the surrounding culture; the relationships among philosophy, art, and culture; the metaphorical nature of language and its relationship to knowledge; the unmasking of the modern drive for absolute "truth" as a palliative against the horror of existence; and Nietzsche's "unfashionable" attack on modern science and modern culture, especially on the Germany of the Bismarck Reich. These notebooks represent important transitional documents in Nietzsche's intellectual development, marking, among other things, the shift away from philological studies toward unabashed cultural criticism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.2 (2004) 218-219 [Access article in PDF] David Roochnik. Beautiful City: The Dialectical Character of Plato's Republic. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003. Pp. ix + 159. Cloth, $35.00. Plato makes no general assertions, certainly none about "universals" (108). The Republic does not advocate the creation of an ideal state (78, 93) but transcends utopias to acknowledge the merits of democracy and democratic diversity (...) (92). Nor does Plato hold the tripartite psychological theory associated with the Republic (18-20). Such theories are impossible for human souls with their essentially temporal natures (104). The Republic is a dialectical work (2). Its movement shows without Plato's saying it that diversity is a social good; that the psychological theory of Book 4 "is preserved in its partiality as a moment of the dialectical development of the dialogue" (3); and so on.David Roochnik belongs in the tradition of Leo Strauss, unearthing an odd and unknown Republic from beneath the dialogue familiar to hordes of readers (beginning with Aristotle) who evidently read it wrongly. Roochnik brings intelligence to his project, clear writing, and a mind inclined toward originality. Nevertheless Strauss's influence is everywhere. E.g.: The Republic is "a conversation that twists and turns, develops, and at times revises what was earlier said. In its totality it gives voice to the truth about the human soul" (131).Roochnik's main subject is that truth about the soul. He says that the Republic corrects Book 4's tripartite analysis with the temporally oriented psychology told in the anecdotes of Books 8 and 9. The wise reader respects both approaches. The soul is "erotic and therefore necessarily diverse, but... desires arithmetical simplicity," and both diversity and simplicity "must be included in an adequate psychology" (120). "Our souls are... suspended between... time and eternity, the divine and the beastly" (108). The erotic and the arithmetical serve as poles between which Plato navigates. Book 4 proposes a mathematical psychology, but Eros increasingly dominates the Republic and the rigid arithmetic designed to harness Eros fails. Book 4's arithmetical account of the soul is "inadequate, and... it is meant to be inadequate" (19). One should see the soul as arithmetical in one respect, irrepressibly erotic in another.Number plays a defining role in the Platonic city, too (38). Kallipolis battles Eros with an arithmetical ideal but loses (44-45). The failure of arithmetic amounts to the failure of utopia. The Republic "teaches that perfect justice is neither possible (the marriage number fails) nor desirable (we don't really want to exile everybody over ten)" (93). Notice: because "we"—Roochnik and his friends?—don't want to found a city among impressionable children, the Republic teaches that Kallipolis is not desirable.To similar effect: "if Kallipolis were to come into being, then the Republic could not. But since Kallipolis requires the Republic in order to come into being, it contains in itself the seeds of its dissolution" (69). Nonsense! Kallipolis needs the Republic in order to come into existence but not to remain existent. The dialogue's disappearance implies nothing about the city's dissolution.Straussians routinely deny that the Republic constructs its city. Though typical, Roochnik claims not to be (7 n. 4, 75). His reading "is not ironic": "the... revisions I have discussed take place on the surface of the dialogue itself, and the kinds of negations that follow are dialectical ones which... preserve what is negated in its partiality" (91).But garble about surfaces and dialectic will not rescue a hermeneutical method if one begins (Roochnik does, all Straussians do) by calling every flaw in a Platonic argument intentional. That Platonolatry is implausible in itself; it is methodologically shoddy for other reasons too. In the first place, it yields meager results. When every argumentative failure is intentional the Republic becomes platitudinous. Thus Roochnik's dialectical meaning is less memorable than the laziest reader's understanding of the Republic (Forms, cave, archons). He dismisses radical claims as unworthy of Plato but replaces them with the mealy... (shrink)

Depuis l'entrée dans l'âge moderne de l'émancipation, c'est-à-dire depuis l'époque des Lumières et de la Révolution française, on admet en général que les juifs ont brisé un carcan qui les confinait dans des communautés fermées pour participer à la modernité européenne sans se renier et tout en restant juifs. Comment ce cheminement a-t-il eu lieu? Qu'a-t-il réellement impliqué, à la fois pour les juifs et pour les sociétés auxquelles ils s'intégraient? Bruno Karsenti reprend le fil de ce récit. Sous l'angle (...) philosophique, il examine les opérations intellectuelles par lesquelles certaines figures d'exception écrivain (Heine), sociologue (Durkheim), historiens (Salvador, Bloch), philosophe (Strauss) et linguiste (Benveniste) sont entrées dans cette modernité, au prix de quelles tensions et de quels efforts : comment ces hommes ont-ils pensé les liens entre judaïsme et modernité, et comment par là ont-ils éclairé les principes des sociétés démocratiques qui sont aujourd'hui les nôtres? À l'heure où les juifs d'Europe sont inquiets de leur avenir jusqu'à être parfois poussés au départ, à l'heure aussi où théologie et politique, loin de régler leurs rapports, se conjuguent en menace pour les démocraties elles-mêmes, ce livre cherche à redonner tout son sens à l'émancipation sociale et politique qui est notre héritage."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Lettura prospettica di un caposaldo del pensiero hobbesiano: il sorgere del rapporto tra l'uomo ed il potere, tra la naturale condizione umana e la nozione di civiltà, attraverso due frammenti particolarmente rappresentativi della concezione hobbesiana del passaggio dallo stato di natura alla civiltà: il tredicesimo capitolo del Leviathan, sulla condizione naturale dell'uomo, ed il quinto capitolo, sulle cause ed origini della civitas, del De cive, giacché la mera esistenza dell'uomo ed il suo riconoscimento di una legge naturale, a giudizio di (...) Hobbes, non implica affatto necessariamente una qualsiasi forma consolidata di organizzazione sociale. Sebbene il De cive (pubblicato in latino nel 1642 e, in inglese, nel 1651) preceda cronologicamente il Leviathan (pubblicato, viceversa, dapprima in inglese, nel 1651, poi in latino, nel 1668), nell'ordine logico dell'esposizione qui presentata, il brano del Leviathan può essere considerato propedeutico al quinto capitolo del De cive, delineandone i presupposti, segnatamente la condizione di continuo pericolo per tutti causata dallo stato generale di reciproca guerra, che costituisce forse l'aspetto più noto (e frainteso) del pensiero hobbesiano. Per una migliore comprensione dei testi e delle differenti (spesso opposte) interpretazioni cui hanno dato vita, si è ritenuto di proporre, per quanto concerne i brani di Hobbes, tanto la loro traduzione in lingua italiana quanto le stesure originali in latino e inglese, presentate con i testi a fronte; tale scelta fornisce l'opportunità di osservare l'accurata scelta di alcuni dei vocaboli chiave della filosofia di Hobbes, la cui trasposizione da una lingua all'altra è stata spesso causa di fraintendimenti o volgarizzazioni in tutto o in parte ingiustificate. Allo scopo di offrire una più completa prospettiva del pensiero hobbesiano delineato nei brani selezionati, si è ritenuto di affiancare ad essi dei frammenti di interpreti novecenteschi (con delle sintetiche schede bio-bibliografiche) di alcuni concetti formulati da Hobbes e, segnatamente, di F. Tönnies, M. Horkheimer, L. Strauss, C. Schmitt, T. Parsons, N. Bobbio, H. Warrender. (shrink)

Maudemarie Clark is a leading interpreter of Nietzsche’s theory of truth, and as such we are fortunate to have her papers on his ethics, politics and metaphysics collected in one volume. Opening her section on politics – the subject of this review – with a critique of Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind, she condemns Bloom’s Straussian demand that philosophers lie about the fact that no truth exists to protect their way of life as a recurrence of the nihilist (...) ascetic ideal Nietzsche rejected at the end of the Genealogy. In doing so, she definitively frees Nietzsche from Strauss’ grip, and opens up the possibility of questioning anew Nietzsche’s relationship to feminism, queer theory, democracy and community. Her most striking claim is that Nietzsche’s aristocratic ethics can be reconciled with modern democratic politics. Whether that is the case or not is up for debate, but what clearly isn’t, as this collection reminds us, is that we cannot do our thinking about politics without him. (shrink)

Günther Anders, Hannah Arendt, Hans Jonas, Emmanuel Levinas, Karl Làwith, Herbert Marcuse, Leo Strauss, Eric Weil... Non sans quelque paradoxe, la philosophie sociale, politique, métaphysique de l'après-guerre a été largement représentée par des penseurs allemands ou formés en Allemagne, qui avaient la particularité d'avoir été des étudiants de Martin Heidegger et d'être en même temps d'origine juive. Ce volume, issu d'un colloque international tenu à Paris en 2012, a voulu les penser ensemble pour la première fois et étudier sur (...) quel fond historique et intellectuel cette double spécificité a été possible. Quelle dette chacun d'entre eux a-t-il pu contracter à l'égard de ce maître commun et quelle distance ont-ils pu prendre (ou ne pas prendre) par rapport à lui après la Seconde Guerre mondiale? Un double questionnement qui permettra d'écrire une nouvelle page de la philosophie allemande, qui pourrait bien être aussi une page de la philosophie juive au XXe siècle. (shrink)