It has been hypothesized that psychedelic experiences elicit lasting psychological benefits by altering narrative selfhood, which has yet to be explicitly studied. The present study investigates retrospective reports (n = 418) of changes to narrative self that participants believe resulted from, or were catalysed by, their psychedelic experience(s). Responses to open-ended questions were analysed using inductive and deductive thematic coding and interpreted within agent-centred approaches to development and well-being. Themes include decentred introspection, greater access to self-knowledge, positive shifts in self-evaluation (...) processes, greater psychological and behavioural autonomy, and enhanced connectedness with others and the world. While this explorative qualitative study offers some initial support for the explanation that changes to narrative self are a cornerstone of psychedelics' therapeutic and transformative potential, methodological and recruiting limitations preclude the ability to make objective claims and generalizations. Future scientific research is necessary to further elucidate this hypothesized mechanism. (shrink)

The picture of L. Appuleius Saturninus' last days is usually derived from the straightforward narrative account found in Appian's Civil Wars, an account which modern analysis has shown to be flawed. That narrative may be glossed as follows. At the consular elections for the year 99, Saturninus and Glaucia instigated the death of a more hopeful contender. Chaos followed. On the following day, when the People had made its intention to do away with the ‘malefactors’ absolutely plain, Saturninus, Glaucia and (...) the quaestor Saufeius seized the Capitol with followers from the country. The Senate voted for their suppression and Marius invested the hill. With hopes of a safe conduct, the beseiged surrendered and Marius detained them in the curia. Those who feared that the seditiosi might escape rough justice broke in and killed, amongst others, ‘a quaestor, a tribune and a praetor, still decorated with the insignia of office. Many others also perished in the stasis, including another tribune, thought to be the son of Gracchus and being a tribune for the first time on that very day’: ταμίαν τε κα δήμαρχον κα στρατηγόν, τι περικειμνους τ σμβολα τς ρχς. πολς δ κα λλος μιλος ν τ στάσει διφθαρτο κα δήμαρχος τερος, το Γράκχου πας εναι νομιζμενος, πρτην δημαρχν κενην μραν. (shrink)

The picture of L. Appuleius Saturninus' last days is usually derived from the straightforward narrative account found in Appian's Civil Wars, an account which modern analysis has shown to be flawed. That narrative may be glossed as follows. At the consular elections for the year 99, Saturninus and Glaucia instigated the death of a more hopeful contender. Chaos followed. On the following day, when the People had made its intention to do away with the ‘malefactors’ absolutely plain, Saturninus, Glaucia and (...) the quaestor Saufeius seized the Capitol with followers from the country. The Senate voted for their suppression and Marius invested the hill. With hopes of a safe conduct, the beseiged surrendered and Marius detained them in the curia. Those who feared that the seditiosi might escape rough justice broke in and killed, amongst others, ‘a quaestor, a tribune and a praetor, still decorated with the insignia of office. Many others also perished in the stasis, including another tribune, thought to be the son of Gracchus and being a tribune for the first time on that very day’: ταμίαν τε κα⋯ δήμαρχον κα⋯ στρατηγόν, ἔτι περικειμ⋯νους τ⋯ σ⋯μβολα τ⋯ς ⋯ρχ⋯ς. πολὺς δ⋯ κα⋯ ἄλλος ὅμιλος ⋯ν τῇ στάσει δι⋯φθαρτο κα⋯ δήμαρχος ἕτερος, ⋯ το⋯ Γράκχου παῖς εἶναι νομιζ⋯μενος, πρώτην δημαρχ⋯ν ⋯κε⋯νην ⋯μ⋯ραν. (shrink)

In this innovative study, Lea David critically investigates the relationship between human rights and memory, suggesting that, instead of understanding human rights in a normative fashion, human rights should be treated as an ideology. Conceptualizing human rights as an ideology gives us useful theoretical and methodological tools to recognize the real impact human rights has on the ground. David traces the rise of the global phenomenon that is the human rights memorialization agenda, termed 'Moral Remembrance', and explores what happens once (...) this agenda becomes implemented. Based on evidence from the Western Balkans and Israel/Palestine, she argues that the human rights memorialization agenda does not lead to a better appreciation of human rights but, contrary to what would be expected, it merely serves to strengthen national sentiments, divisions and animosities along ethnic lines, and leads to the new forms of societal inequalities that are closely connected to different forms of corruptions. (shrink)

Dans son livre Le Temps messianique, Gérard Bensussan parle d’un « messianisme kafkaïen ». Cette expression paraît poser un certain nombre de problèmes : comment associer à l’œuvre de Kafka, sombre et apparemment désespéré, l’idée d’un messianisme faisant signe vers une forme d’espérance? Comment, en outre, comprendre les références à la venue du Messie sous la plume d’un Kafka dont le rapport à la tradition juive est pour le moins complexe? En dépit de cet aspect problématique, nous voudrions montrer en (...) quoi il est possible et fécond de parler d’un messianisme kafkaïen. Présent dans les fragments et récits écrits au cours de la guerre dans les Cahiers in-octavo, ce messianisme est à comprendre au prisme de l’effondrement de la Raison historique, et de la nécessité d’affronter le « négatif » au cœur de l’histoire. (shrink)

In international human rights law ‘jurisdiction’ is the centre of the debate on extraterritorial obligations. The purpose of the present paper is to a) analyse how facts and principles contribute t...

Young children judge that violations of ordinary, causal constraints are impossible. Yet children’s religious beliefs typically include the assumption that such violations can occur via divine agency in the form of miracles. We conducted two studies to examine this potential conflict. In Study 1, we invited 5- and 6-year-old Colombian children attending either a secular or a religious school to judge what is and is not possible. Children made their judgments either following a minimal prompt or following a reminder of (...) God’s extraordinary powers. Irrespective of their education, and whether or not they had been reminded of God’s extraordinary powers, children systematically judged violations of ordinary, causal constraints to be impossible. In Study 2, we asked if more extensive reminders of God’s special powers would prompt religious children to say that the impossible can happen. Five- and 6-year-old Colombian children attending either a secular or a religious school were presented with narratives in which the protagonist desired an ordinarily impossible outcome. In half the stories, the protagonist prayed to God for the desired outcome. Irrespective of education and of whether the protagonist prayed, children systematically concluded that the desired outcome would not occur and justified that conclusion by reference to ordinary causal constraints. Nevertheless, in a minority of their replies children did assert that violations of ordinary causality are possible. Overall, irrespective of their religious education, young children judge that events rarely deviate from their natural course; only occasionally do they acknowledge exceptions. (shrink)

A well-known debate in normative ethics is that between proponents of Act Consequentialism and Rule Consequentialism. Given the structural similarities between Rule Consequentialism and existing forms of Contractualism, one might expect a similar debate to arise among contractualists. However, this is not the case. Some, following T. M. Scanlon, even argue that this question is “misconceived” – that there is something deeply mistaken about considering the possibility of an act-based form of contractualism. In this paper, I challenge this claim.

Michel Surya revient, dans l’entretien qu’il a accordé aux Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg, sur sa lecture de Kafka : sur les différentes étapes qu’elle a traversées au fil des œuvres, sur les différentes hypothèses auxquelles elle a donné naissance. À partir de plusieurs thématiques (pourquoi la honte semble-t-elle revenir sans cesse chez Kafka? En quoi peut-on dire qu’il y a dans ses textes une pensée de l’histoire qui est à l’œuvre, et comment celle-ci s’inscrit-elle dans une histoire de la taupe (...) et du souterrain en littérature? Que donne à penser la métamorphose, comme texte et comme processus, de ce que devient l’homme au xxe siècle?, etc.), Michel Surya continue de lire Kafka – si c’est en philosophe ou non, cela fait problème, et c’est précisément l’un de ceux qu’aborde cet entretien. 291-303. (shrink)

The “happy fish” passage in the Zhuangzi 莊子 is often interpreted as endorsing some form of perspectivism which precludes objective claims of knowledge and displaces the significance of human perspectives. Relativism has gained particular currency in contemporary readings. However, this essay aims to show the limited explanatory power of such relativist positions, with focus on Chad Hansen’s “perspectival relativism” and Lea Cantor’s “species relativism.” I will also offer a new, “transitional contextualist” reading, which intends to demonstrate that Zhuangzi’s utterance is (...) grounded in his epistemic context and that Huizi’s 惠子 disputation arises from his changing of the epistemic context, from one with quotidian “low standards” to one with “high-standards” skeptical demands. I further argue that when “wandering” (you 遊) is understood as a freedom from one’s partial perspective, it becomes clear how Zhuangzi analogizes a parallel with the fish’s “wandering” through a continuity between his “world” and that of the fish. (shrink)

Our objective was to explore the relationships between adult attachment and various aspects of emotional awareness, including alexithymia and level of emotional awareness. Participants were 112 university students who completed the Attachment Style Questionnaire, the Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ), and the Level of Emotional Awareness Scale. We found that alexithymia was positively related to the avoidant attachment style and negatively with the anxious attachment style. Anxious style-but not avoidance-was also related to the level of emotional awareness. An analysis of the (...) four attachment categories revealed subtle differences regarding the subscales of the BVAQ. Findings are discussed with reference to internal working models of self and others, highlighting the relationship between emotional awareness impairment and interpersonal behaviour. Keywords: alexithymia; emotional awareness; attachment; internal working model; BVAQ; LEAS (Published: 7 March 2012) Citation: Socioaffective Neuroscience & Psychology 2012, 2 : 10744 - DOI: 10.3402/snp.v2i0.10744. (shrink)

On July 2021, the UK High Court of Justice heard the Case CO/2066/2020 on the application of Heidi Crowter who lives with Down’s syndrome, and Máire Lea-Wilson whose son Aidan has Down’s syndrome. Crowter and Lea-Wilson, with the support of the disability rights campaign, ‘Don’t Screen Us Out’, have been taking legal action against the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care (the UK Government) for a review of the 1967 Abortion Act: the removal of section 1(1)(d) making termination (...) of pregnancy lawful for ‘severe’ fetal indications detected after 24 weeks' gestation. On 23 September 2021, the High Court dismissed the claim. This action came at a time when non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) was introduced into the NHS England Fetal Anomaly Screening Programme for the trisomies 21, 13 and 18. The implementation of NIPT has been heavily criticised, in particular by ‘Don’t Screen Us Out’ campaigners, for increasing fetal selection and discrimination of people living with disabilities. The case of Crowter and Lea-Wilson echoes debates in other European countries such as in France and Germany, where the introduction of NIPT in the public healthcare system has provoked equally vehement public reactions and discussions. The comparison between these three countries allows contextualising the public discourses around NIPT and the ground for termination of pregnancy in relation to different socio-cultural and political contexts. We examine how each country, and particularly England, deals with the conflict between the principles of promoting the rights of people living with disabilities and preserving women’s reproductive autonomy. (shrink)

Du Bois-Reymond’s Ignorabimus could have been a game changer in the last decades of 19th century, but it wasn’t. The sound argument of the German physiologist concerning the limits of natural science, although it was indeed taken seriously and confronted by all means, was in fact so severely distorted by opponents that one could hardly recognize it in the straw men generated in the process. By scrutinizing three less known approaches dug up from 19th century Romanian literature, the present paper (...) focuses on the theoretical commitments that prevented the consciousness issue to be properly addressed. (shrink)

In recent work, Andrew T. Forcehimes and Robert B. Talisse correctly note that G.A. Cohen’s fact-insensitivity thesis, properly understood, is explanatory. This observation raises an important concern. If fact-insensitive principles are explanatory, then what role can they play in normative deliberations? The purpose of my paper is, in part, to address this question. Following David Miller, I indicate that on a charitable understanding of Cohen’s thesis, an explanatory principle explains a justificatory fact by completing an otherwise logically incomplete inference. As (...) a result, the explanatory role such a principle plays is inseparable from its status as a (not necessarily successful) justificatory reason. With this interpretation in hand, I then proceed to argue that Lea Ypi’s and Robert Jubb’s recent criticisms fail to undermine Cohen’s thesis, and that fact-insensitive principles, once discovered, are especially helpful for purposes of deliberation in circumstances characterized by changing and changeable feasibility constraints. (shrink)

The Saami assert that "to move on is better than to stay put" (jot'tit lea buorit go orrot). The senior (in more ways than one) author, Myrdene Anderson, found as a Saami ethnographer that her life history resonated well with this Saami philosophy. In addition, Anderson had adopted from her own heritage the adage that "one can't hit a moving target". The Saami would also be comfortable with that formula. Together, one might minimally collapse and paraphrase both adages as: "a (...) rolling agent invests in the moment". Devika Chawla, the junior author, interrogates Anderson in nuancing this philosophy. To what degree is our research overdetermined and underdetermined by such factors as life history, culture, personality, and narrative reflections? The inquiry proceeds to unpack the opacities and transparencies in semiosic constructions. (shrink)

Th e basi c pu r pos e o f thi s w or k consist s o f eliminatin g som e o f th e m yth s an d paradigms tha t cu r rent ly info r m th e assessmen t o f scienti f i c e vidence . I n orde r t o accomplis h this object i v e , th e autho r sta r t s fro m th e (...) premis e tha t thes e m yth s an d paradigms , produce d with th e d ev elopmen t o f forensi c science , ar e minimizin g th e rol e o f judge s i n judicia l proceedings fo r th e bene f i t o f e xpe r ts . Thi s ca n lea d t o a violatio n o f du e proces s an d n e glectin g that judicia l processe s ar e aime d a t resolvin g conflicts . Th e autho r refer s speci f ical l y t o th e m yth o f in f allibilit y an d th e pa r adig m o f identi f ication , accordin g t o w hic h scienti f i c e vidence ca n posit i v e ly identif y a n ind i vidua l o r objec t throug h p h ysica l traces . B y ana l yzin g the recen t doctrin e o n th e assessmen t o f scienti f i c e vidence , th e autho r conclude s o n th e need t o adop t th e pa r adig m o f likelihood . Thus , th e judg e stil l hold s th e rol e i n th e ev aluation o f e vidence , an d guarantee s tha t th e goal s o f th e proces s wil l b e respected. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 187 standing. He picks his way philosophicelly ~darough the many preludes, interludes and epilogues of the long, autobiographical poem, The Prelude. He succeeds in interpreting philosophically.Wordsworth's absorption in "the life of things" and the "immanence of the world soul." These ideas remain, it seems to me, in Wordsworth's mind as well as in.his art primarily "lyrical ballads." But Melvin Rader has given us a thoroughly intelligible account, (...) both historical and philosophical, of both Coleridge and Wordsworth as reflectiveminds, without detracting item them as artists. HERBERTW. SCHNEIDER Claremont Graduate School and Unlver~i~y Center gchelting et la R~alit~ Finis: Essai sur la Philosophic de la Nature et de l'[dentit~. By Judith E. Schlanger. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966. Pp. 162. = Biblioth~que de Philosophie Contemporaine: Histoire de ta Philosophie et Philosophie Gfin6rale. Paper, F. 12.--) L'dtude de Judith E. Schlanger pr~se~te un bref expos6 des th~mes princ~paux de la pens~e philosophlque de Schelling en retra~ant de fa~on plus ou moius syst6matique l'itindraire spirituel de ce grand penseur qui a crd6 les fondsments spdculatifs du romantisme aIlemand. La philosophie de Schelling refl~te une ardeur,constants de recherche toujours progressive miroitant lea rythmes intimes de son articulation/~ la fois subtile et intensive. Nous allons donner en raccourci la principale ligne d'6volution de cette pens~e. L'essai de Schlanger a pour objet propre le probl~me philosophique qui rdsulte de la connexion 6troite de deux th~mes constituant les fondoments de la philosophie schellingienne, notamment le bh6me d'une philosophie concrAte qui rdcupAre intdgralement l'intuition et celui de la simultan6it6 de l'absolu et du finidans une rdalitdqui n'est constitu6e que par des totas diserAtes. Pour Schelling l'absolu n'est autre chose que la rdalitd concrete constitude par l'ensemble des totalitds individuelles et particuli6res qui sent con~ues comme dtant organiques et qui sent intelligibles, c'est-~.dire leur prdsence et leur raison d'etre coincident et ne peuvent ~tre saisiesque par l'immddiatetd de l'intuition intellectuelle et non par une rationslitd ddductive. L'absolu eat organicitd intelligibleau moyen d'un mode de connaissance intdgralement intuitif, done de rationalitd/t dvidence pleine et non de rationalitd ~t mddiation conceptuelle. L'absolu est done un total, une totalitd complexe ~ cause do ses articulations ind6finiment multiples ~tl'intdrieur. La philosophie enest la transposition aussi bien dans son d6veloppement actuel que dans l'embrassement des multiples ddterminations en un totalitarisme du savoir. L'instrument opdrationnel et cognitif capable d'61aborer cette transposition est l'intuition,la "Anschauung". En effet l'intuition joue un r61e capital dans la philosophie de Schelling. Issue directement de l'exp6rience sensible, c'est-~-dire, concrbte et individuelle, ellepermet d'englober dans l'immddiatetd d'une seule dvidence ~ la fois coner ~te et totale la coprdsence et la contemporandit6 de l'absolu et du finien une unit6 positive, non-dialectique, mais organique. Il est vrai que le scheme de l'organisme et de l'organicitd detains la pensde de ScheUing. L'absolu et le finisent en correlation organique. L'actualit6 dvidents de leur opposition manifeste leur copr~ence simultande, ce qui traduit leur unit~ absolue, sous-jacente qui a rendu possible cette opposition. La liaison effective, rdelle,empiriquement constatde des deux termes opposds leur suppose un fondement commun absolu. La dichotomie n'estpas primordiale, l'antith~sea pour support affirmatifun absolu. L'absolu est le lieu de l'identitd des opposds. C'est la coincidence immddiate entre des termes antinomiques qui d6finitl'unitd absolue. Et de cet absolu, la philosophic poss~de un savoir imm6diat, c'est-~dire absolu. II en rdsulte que l'intuitionest le principe m~me de l'intelligibilitd.Le probIAme phUosophique capital qui se pose et que Schlanger dtudie dana l'ceuvre de Schelling depuis les ddbuts de sa pensde en 1794jusqu'au moment o~1la philosophie de l'Identitd eat constitude, en 1804environ s'dnonce comme suit: La vision de l'identit6 immddiate des opposds comme forme de la rdalitd absolue pourra-t-elle s'articuler dans un savoir systdmatique et objective- 188 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ment communicable de la totalit6... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A COMMENT ON POLANYI AND KUHN MABEN WALTER POIRIER Concordia University Montreal, Quebec FOR SOME TIME NOW we have noted tha:t the names Michael Polanyi and Thomas S. Kuhn are frequently mentioned together in articles and books dealing with specialized topics in the philosophy of science. And if we genera.Ily accept what is said in these publications, there appears to be a belief afield, which is broadly shared amongst (...) students of scientific thought, to the effect that the philosopher of science, Michael Polanyi, and the historian of science, Thomas Kuhn, are in some fundametal manner in accord with one another as to the chara.cter and nature of scientific thinking. In fact, there seems to be no disputing this question amongst some of the most prestigious philosophers of science, nor does there seem to be even the slightest suspicion that maybe Polanyi does not belong to the same school of thought as Kuhn. We are told explicitly, or we are led to believe, that PoJanyi and Kuhn are in lea;gue to do battle against empiricism and empiricists, and that as a result they share a number of perspectives on scientific thinking. This is taken to mean tha;t they broadly hold the same point of view when it comes to thinking about various issues. Now, it is largely true that both are opposed to empiricism, and to the understanding that empiricists have about the way that scientific knowledge is advanced. However, this does not mean that Polanyi and Kuhn are in funOLANYI AND KUBN ~6'/ cessive the,ories grow ever closer to, or approximate more and more closely to, the truth. Apparently generalizations like that refer not to the puzzle-solutions and the concrete predictions derived from a theory but rather to its ontology, to the match, that is, b~tween the entities with which theory populates nature and what is " really there." · Perhaps there is some other way of salvaging the notion of ' truth' for application to whole theories, but this one will not do. There is, I think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'; the notion of a match between the ontology of a theory and its "real" counterpart in nature now seems to me illusive in principle.6 This is no afterthought with Kuhn, nor is it a course correction which he may have felt was required when he wrote "Postscript-1969," for we read the following in the main part of his magnum opus1 in which there are many similar passages: We may,... have to relinquish the notion, explicit or implicit, that changes of paradigm carry scientists and those who learn from them closer and closer to the truth [and to the real].1 Clearly this is not Michael Polanyi's point of view on this matter. Polanyi may not be an empiricist, but he is by no means a relativist either, radical or otherwise. He is simply not prepared to deny the existence of reality, or to claim that it is nothing more than a fabrication of the creative imagination of practicing natural scientists, great though they ma.y be. He repeatedly makes it very clear that natural scientists investigate what is real-what exists independently of themselves, in the world 'beyond their minds-and not some subjective entity which is a construction of their minds. It is true that Polanyi believ,es that it is very difficult to establish beyond a doubt that this is what the natural scientist investigates, but the fact is that at no point does Polanyi sa.y or even imply that the natural scientist is exploring, either in an arbitrary or reasonable manner, his imaginative constructions. For Polanyi, scientists are simply not engaged in the exploration of s Thomas S. Kuhn, The Btruoture of Boientifio Revolutions, p. 206. 1 Ibid., p. 170. 268 MABEN W.ALTER POIRIER imaginative constructions which are resident in the mind. They are involved in the exploration of what is other and of what is real. He makes this point in many ways and on a number of different occasions during his career as a philosopher of ·science. For example, in the following paissage from his work The... (shrink)

This volume brings together a range of influential essays by distinguished philosophers and political theorists on the issue of global justice. Global justice concerns the search for ethical norms that should govern interactions between people, states, corporations and other agents acting in the global arena, as well as the design of social institutions that link them together. The volume includes articles that engage with major theoretical questions such as the applicability of the ideals of social and economic equality to the (...) global sphere, the degree of justified partiality to compatriots, and the nature and extent of the responsibilities of the affluent to address global poverty and other hardships abroad. It also features articles that bring the theoretical insights of global justice thinkers to bear on matters of practical concern to contemporary societies, such policies associated with immigration, international trade, and climate change. -/- Contents: Introduction; Part I Standards of Global Justice: (i) Assistance-Based Responsibilities to the Global Poor: Famine, affluence and mortality, Peter Singer; We don't owe them a thing! A tough-minded but soft-hearted view of aid to the faraway needy, Jan Narveson; Does distance matter morally to the duty to rescue? Frances Myrna Kamm. (ii) Contribution-Based Responsibilities to the Global Poor: 'Assisting' the global poor, Thomas Pogge; Should we stop thinking about poverty in terms of helping the poor?, Alan Patten; Poverty and the moral significance of contribution, Gerhard Øverland. (iii)Cosmopolitans, Global Egalitarians, and its Critics: The one and the many faces of cosmopolitanism, Catherine Lu; Cosmopolitan justice and equalizing opportunities, Simon Caney; The problem of global justice, Thomas Nagel; Against global egalitarianism, David Miller; Egalitarian challenges to global egalitarianism: a critique, Christian Barry and Laura Valentini. Part II Pressing Global Socioeconomic Issues: (i) Governing the Flow of People: Immigration and freedom of association, Christopher Wellman; Democratic theory and border coercion: no right to unilaterally control your own borders, Arash Abizadeh; Justice in migration: a closed borders utopia?, Lea Ypi. (ii) Climate Change: Global environment and international inequality, Henry Shue; Valuing policies in response to climate change: some ethical issues, John Broome; Saved by disaster? Abrupt climate change, political inertia, and the possibility of an intergenerational arms race, Stephen M. Gardiner; Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change, Elinor Ostrom. (iii) International Trade: Responsibility and global labor justice, Iris Marion Young; Property rights and the resource curse, Leif Wenar; Fairness in trade I: obligations arising from trading and the pauper-labor argument, Mathias Risse; Name index. -/- See: www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&calctitle=1&pageSubject=483&sort=pubdate&forthcoming=1&title_i d=9958&edition_id=13385. (shrink)

A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wanting. Though not dispositive, the failure of these approaches supplies strong evidence that the dogma of Reasons Pluralism is ill-founded.

A new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s believability. Bart Streumer is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. In this brief essay, we argue that Streumer’s argument prevails against extant critiques, and then press a criticism of our own.

When it comes to the duty of beneficence, a formidable class of moderate positions holds that morally significant considerations emerge when one's actions are seen as part of a larger series. Agglomeration, according to these moderates, limits the demands of beneficence, thereby avoiding the extremely demanding view forcefully defended by Peter Singer. This idea has much appeal. What morality can demand of people is, it seems, appropriately modulated by how much they have already done or will do. Here we examine (...) a number of recent proposals that appeal to agglomeration. None of them, we argue, succeeds. (shrink)

Many thinkers have said that a God whose existence is argued for metaphysically would have no religious significance even if he existed. This book examines the God or Absolute which emerges in various metaphysical systems and asks whether he, she, or it could figure in any genuinely religious outlook. The systems studied are those of Spinoza, Hegel, T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley (very briefly), Bernard Bosanquet, Josiah Royce, A. N. Whitehead, Charles Hartshorne. There is also a chapter on Kierkegaard (...) as the most important critic of metaphysical religion (especially Hegelian Christianity). The book ends with a statement of a form of absolute or pantheistic idealism espoused by the author and an indication of what religious significance it may have. (shrink)

T H McLaughlin; Parental Rights and the Religious Upbringing of Children, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 75–83, http.

T H McLaughlin; Parental Rights and the Religious Upbringing of Children, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 18, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 75–83, http.

One vexing question for Desire Satisfactionism is this: At what time do you benefit from a satisfied desire? Recently Eden Lin has proposed an intriguing answer. On this proposal – Asymmetrism – when past-directed desires are satisfied, the time interval during which you benefit is the time of the desire; and, when future-directed desires are satisfied, the time interval during which you benefit is the time of the object. In this essay, I argue that Asymmetrism forces us to give implausible (...) answers to a different question: To what extent does a given satisfied desire benefit you? (shrink)

T H McLaughlin; Religion, Upbringing and Liberal Values: a rejoinder to Eamonn Callan, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Page.

T H McLaughlin; Religion, Upbringing and Liberal Values: a rejoinder to Eamonn Callan, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 19, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Page.

I am pleased by the degree of agreement about reasons between the three of us, which is much greater than I might have guessed. I have no objection whatever to the project of giving the kind of psychological description of deliberation about reasons that Gibbard proposes. I agree that “weighing X in favor of A isn’t mysterious,” but I do confess to some doubt about how a psychological description of this process of weighing “explains, indirectly, X’s counting in favor of (...) A in such circumstances.” If there is any disagreement between Gibbard and me on this point, I think it is over the degree to which such an explanation is to be expected. (shrink)

We argue that abduction does not work in isolation from other inference mechanisms and illustrate this through an inference scheme designed to evaluate multiple hypotheses. We use game theory to relate the abductive system to actions that produce new information. To enable evaluation of the implications of this approach we have implemented the procedures used to calculate the impact of new information in a computer model. Experiments with this model display a number of features of collective belief-revision leading to consensus-formation, (...) such as the influence of bias and prejudice. The scheme of inferential calculations invokes a Peircian concept of ‘belief’ as the propensity to choose a particular course of action. (shrink)

The aim of this analysis was to examine the effects on stature in two nationally representative samples of Polish 19-year-old conscripts of maternal and paternal education level, and of degree of urbanization, before and after the economic transition of 1990. Data were from two national surveys of 19-year-old Polish conscripts: 27,236 in 1986 and 28,151 in 2001. In addition to taking height measurements, each subject was asked about the socioeconomic background of their families, including paternal and maternal education, and the (...) name of the locality of residence. The net effect of each of these social factors on stature was determined using four-factor analysis of variance. The secular trend towards increased stature of Polish conscripts has slowed down from a rate 2·1 cm per decade across the period 1965–1986 to 1·5 cm per decade between 1986 and 2001. In both cohorts, mean statures increase with increasing size of locality of residence, paternal education and maternal education. The effect of each of these three social factors on conscript height is highly significant in both cohorts. However, the effect of maternal education has increased substantially while that of size of locality of residence and paternal education diminished between 1986 and 2001. These results imply that the influence of parental education on child growth cannot be due solely to a relationship between education and income, but is also perhaps a reflection of household financial management which benefits child health and growth by better educated parents, regardless of level of income. In addition they suggest that, irrespective of whether there are one or two breadwinners in the family, it is the mother, more so than the father, who is principally responsible for the extent to which such management best favours child health and growth. The asymmetry between the importance of maternal as against paternal education for child growth, clearly seen in the 1986 cohort, became more accentuated in 2001, after the abrupt transition from a command to a free-market economy in the early 1990s. (shrink)