Belief and the Error Theory

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):849-856 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

A new kind of debate about the normative error theory has emerged. Whereas longstanding debates have fixed on the error theory’s plausibility, this new debate concerns the theory’s believability. Bart Streumer is the chief proponent of the error theory’s unbelievability. In this brief essay, we argue that Streumer’s argument prevails against extant critiques, and then press a criticism of our own.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 107,826

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

We Can Believe the Error Theory.Hallvard Lillehammer & Niklas Möller - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (3):453-459.
Error Theory, Unbelievability and the Normative Objection.Daniele Bruno - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (2).
Why we can still believe the error theory.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):523-536.
On Believing the Error Theory.Alexander Hyun & Eric Sampson - 2014 - Journal of Philosophy 111 (11):631-640.
Willing Belief.Mark Schroeder - forthcoming - Brill.
We believe the error theory.John Alton Christmann - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (5):632-644.
Can Streumer simply avoid supervenience?Luke Elson - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 16 (3):259-267.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-03-02

Downloads
102 (#229,107)

6 months
8 (#707,720)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Andrew T. Forcehimes
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Robert B. Talisse
Vanderbilt University

Citations of this work

Self-Defeating Beliefs and Misleading Reasons.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1):57-72.
No, We Cannot.Bart Streumer - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):537-546.
Error Theory, Unbelievability and the Normative Objection.Daniele Bruno - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 17 (2).
Doubts about Normative Skepticism.G. F. Schueler - 2024 - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-12.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In John Heil, Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Collected Papers on Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy.Gottlob Frege - 1991 - Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by Brian McGuinness.

View all 12 references / Add more references