Let P be any one of the following combinatorial properties: weak P-pointness, weak (semi-) Q-pointness, weak (semi-)selectivity, ω-closedness. We deal with the following two questions: (1) What is the least cardinal κ such that there exists an ideal with κ many generators that does not have the property P? (2) Can one extend every ideal with the property P to a prime ideal with the property P?

The variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\) of dually hemimorphic semi-Heyting algebras was introduced in 2011 by the second author as an expansion of semi-Heyting algebras by a dual hemimorphism. In this paper, we focus on the variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\) from a logical point of view. The paper presents an extensive investigation of the logic corresponding to the variety of dually hemimorphic semi-Heyting algebras and of its axiomatic extensions, along with an equally extensive universal algebraic study of their corresponding algebraic semantics. Firstly, (...) we present a Hilbert-style axiomatization of a new logic called "Dually hemimorphic semi-Heyting logic" (\(\mathcal{DHMSH}\), for short), as an expansion of semi-intuitionistic logic \(\mathcal{SI}\) (also called \(\mathcal{SH}\)) introduced by the first author by adding a weak negation (to be interpreted as a dual hemimorphism). We then prove that it is implicative in the sense of Rasiowa and that it is complete with respect to the variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\). It is deduced that the logic \(\mathcal{DHMSH}\) is algebraizable in the sense of Blok and Pigozzi, with the variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\) as its equivalent algebraic semantics and that the lattice of axiomatic extensions of \(\mathcal{DHMSH}\) is dually isomorphic to the lattice of subvarieties of \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\). A new axiomatization for Moisil's logic is also obtained. Secondly, we characterize the axiomatic extensions of \(\mathcal{DHMSH}\) in which the "Deduction Theorem" holds. Thirdly, we present several new logics, extending the logic \(\mathcal{DHMSH}\), corresponding to several important subvarieties of the variety \(\mathbb{DHMSH}\). These include logics corresponding to the varieties generated by two-element, three-element and some four-element dually quasi-De Morgan semi-Heyting algebras, as well as a new axiomatization for the 3-valued Łukasiewicz logic. Surprisingly, many of these logics turn out to be connexive logics, only a few of which are presented in this paper. Fourthly, we present axiomatizations for two infinite sequences of logics namely, De Morgan Gödel logics and dually pseudocomplemented Gödel logics. Fifthly, axiomatizations are also provided for logics corresponding to many subvarieties of regular dually quasi-De Morgan Stone semi-Heyting algebras, of regular De Morgan semi-Heyting algebras of level 1, and of JI-distributive semi-Heyting algebras of level 1. We conclude the paper with some open problems. Most of the logics considered in this paper are discriminator logics in the sense that they correspond to discriminator varieties. Some of them, just like the classical logic, are even primal in the sense that their corresponding varieties are generated by primal algebras. (shrink)

In ”Skepticism,” Peter Klein distinguishes between the “Academic Skeptic” who proposes that we cannot have knowledge of a certain set of propositions and the “Pyrrhonian Skeptic” who refrains from opining about whether we can have knowledge. Klein argues that Academic Skepticism is plausibly supported by a “Closure Principle‐style” argument based on the claim that if x entails y and S has justification for x, then S has justification for y. He turns to contextualism to see if it can contribute to (...) the discussion between one who claims that we can have knowledge about some epistemically interesting class of propositions and the Academic Skeptic. He outlines the background of Pyrrhonian Skepticism, pointing out that the Pyrrhonist withholds assent concerning our knowledge‐bearing status because reason cannot provide an adequate basis for assent. He assesses three possible patterns of reasoning, and concludes that the Pyrrhonist view, that reason cannot resolve matters concerning the nonevident, is vindicated. (shrink)

... 243-) INTRODUCTION §§243- constitute the eighth 'chapter' of the book. Its point of departure is a natural query with respect to the conclusion of the ...

Covering the major issues of the field succinctly and lucidly, this text takes an analytically rigorous approach and makes it accessible in presentation. Pojman writes from an impartial perspective, presenting various options and points of view while guiding students in their own search for truth over these often emotion-laden, crucial issues.

We report a series of experiments in which subjects were required to make spatial discriminations about naturally obtained images, as follows. Subjects were shown two natural images on a computer screen, side by side and for a period of 500 ms. Subjects were then shown, on a separate part of the computer screen, a small patch of one of the images selected at random. Subjects were required to decide which of the two full images the patch comes from, and whereabouts (...) in that image it is taken from. They indicated their response by clicking the mouse cursor at the appropriate point on the screen. -/- The proportion of trials on which the subjects selected the correct image and the accuracy of the spatial position of their correct responses were calculated. These two measures independently indicate the general discriminability of the two image sets, and the extent to which the spatial layout of the image has been perceived. By comparing response accuracy for images that are from different sets (such as mountain or town scenes) with response accuracy when the two images are from the same set it is possible to establish the image properties that underlie coarse scene apprehension. By using sets of images that are perhaps best described as being natural textures (such as patterns of foliage or rock surface) it is possible to measure the extent to which texture is processed spatially. Our results are interpreted in the light of statistical differences between the image sets that we have used. (shrink)

This paper is about the similarity between the appreciation of a piece of art, such as a cherished music album, and the loving appreciation of a person whom one knows well. In philosophical discussion about the rationality of love, the Qualities View (QV) says that love can be justified by reference to the qualities of the beloved. I argue that the oft-rehearsed trading-up objection fails to undermine the QV. The problems typically identified by the objection arise from the idea that (...) love-worthy qualities could be coarse-grained, when in fact they must be fine-grained. The analogy with appreciation of aesthetic qualities helps to draw out this point. Once the fine-grained nature of love-worthy qualities is properly understood, it is clear that critics of the QV cannot rely on the trading-up objection to motivate its rejection. Moreover, the paper’s core argument helps to illuminate the persistently aesthetic nature of interpersonal affections. (shrink)

In this paper, I will give a three-stage analysis of the origin of phenomenal consciousness. The first one has to do with a non-causal stage. The second one has to do with a causal stage. The third one has to do with a correlation stage. This paper is divided into three sections. In section I, I will discuss a non-causal stage which focuses on finite consciousness as an irreducible emergent property—i.e., a simple non-structural property that is unique to the “emergent” (...) level of reality. I will examine currently dominant accounts of the emergence of phenomenal consciousness—which require consciousness to have some sort of causal link to its base level. Those who think of the emergence of consciousness in casual terms, often have in mind, brain complexity as a source of such causality. However, the causal proposal faces two serious empirically supported objections, namely: the gametes problem and the complexity problem, respectively. The first objection deals with conception (i.e., fertilization) and the impossibility of tracking down/spotting the origin of consciousness at any point during the process of the development of a foetus. The second objection focuses on demonstrating that, no amount of analysis of the physical basis of complex brain will unfold anything substantial about the origin of consciousness. Both of these two objections show why the diachronic account of the origin of the phenomenal consciousness is hard to come by. In section II, I will discuss a causal stage which focuses on, how once it emerges, consciousness enters into the domain of causal interaction with brain states. This is the stage where we come across both ‘the explanatory gap problem’ and ‘the hard problem of consciousness.’ In section III, I will discuss the correlation stage which focuses on the manner in which phenomenal consciousness continues to co-exist with its physical base (e.g., brain). To show this, I will discuss the notion of correlation and its relation to causation. The upshot of my discussion in the above three sections will constitute the view I call the non-causal spontaneous emergence of phenomenal consciousness. According to the view I am proposing, there is no causal-link between strongly emergent property (in this case, consciousness) and its base level—although the base level (as far as we know) serves as a sufficient condition (but not as a necessary condition) for its emergence. In light of this, I conclude this paper by claiming that phenomenal consciousness is a strongly emergent property. (shrink)

Hybridization is a method invented by Arthur Prior for extending the expressive power of modal languages. Although developed in interesting ways by Robert Bull, and by the Sofia school , the method remains little known. In our view this has deprived temporal logic of a valuable tool.The aim of the paper is to explain why hybridization is useful in temporal logic. We make two major points, the first technical, the second conceptual. First, we show that hybridization gives rise to (...) well-behaved logics that exhibit an interesting synergy between modal and classical ideas. This synergy, obvious for hybrid languages with full first-order expressive strength, is demonstrated for a weaker local language capable of defining the Until operator; we provide a minimal axiomatization, and show that in a wide range of temporally interesting cases extended completeness results can be obtained automatically. Second, we argue that the idea of sorted atomic symbols which underpins the hybrid enterprise can be developed further. To illustrate this, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of a simple hybrid language which can quantify over paths. (shrink)

One approach to validating simulation models is to formally compare model outputs with independent data. We consider such model validation from the point of view of Frequentist statistics. A range of estimates and tests of goodness of fit have been advanced. We review these approaches, and demonstrate that some of the tests suffer from difficulties in interpretation because they rely on the null hypothesisHypothesis that the model is similar to the observationsObservations. This reliance creates two unpleasant possibilities, namely, a model (...) could be spuriously validated when dataData are too few, or inappropriately rejected when data are too many. Finally, these tests do not allow a principled declaration of what a reasonable level of difference would be considering the purposes to which the model will be put. We consider equivalence tests, and demonstrate that they do not suffer from the previously identified shortcomings. We provide two case studies to illustrate the claims of the chapter. (shrink)

The planning/control distinction is an important tool in the study of sensorimotor transformations. However, published data from our laboratories suggest that, contrary to what is predicted by the proposed model, (1) structures in the superior parietal lobe of both monkeys and humans can be involved in movement planning; and (2) fast pointing actions can be immune to visual illusions even if they are performed without visual feedback. The planning–control model as proposed by Glover is almost certainly too schematic.

The essays in this volume make it abundantly clear that there is no shortage of disagreement about the plausibility of the simulation theory. As we see it, there are at least three factors contributing to this disagreement. In some instances the issues in dispute are broadly empirical. Different people have different views on which theory is favored by experiments reported in the literature, and different hunches about how future experiments are likely to turn out. In 3.1 and 3.3 we will (...) consider two cases that fall under this heading. With a bit of luck these disputes will be resolved as more experiments are done and more data become available. Faulty arguments are a second source of disagreement. In 3.2 and 3.4 we will set out two dubious arguments advanced by our critics and try to explain exactly why we think they are mistaken. The third source of disagreement is terminological. Terms like "theory-theory," "simulation theory" and a number of others are often not clearly defined, and they are used in different ways by different authors. (Worse yet, we suspect they are sometimes used in different ways by a single author on different occasions). Thus it is sometimes the case that what appears to be a substantive disagreement turns out to be simply a verbal dispute. Moreover, since the labels "theory-theory" and "simulation theory" are each used to characterize a broad range of theories, it may well turn out that some of the theories falling under both headings are correct. In Sections 1 and 2, we will set out a variety of different views for which the labels "theory-theory" and "simulation theory" might be used. As we proceed we'll point out a number of places where disagreements diminish when distinctions among different versions of the theory-theory and the simulation theory are kept clearly in mind. (shrink)

Extended cognition theorists claim that the definition of cognition can be extended to include not only the brain, but also the body and environment. In a series of works, Mark Rowlands has envisioned a new science of mind that explores the externalism of consciousness and cognition. This paper connects Rowlands’ work with the phenomenology of Aron Gurwitsch. It shows how Gurwitsch’s field of consciousness, in particular his conception of the marginal halo, can provide a distinct, organized way of thinking about (...) extended cognition. A key question considered is from where do cognitive processes project and disclose meanings? By thinking of location as locus—a projecting pathway of points of intentional opportunity—organization in extended cognition becomes organization in a field of consciousness. The marginal halo in the field of consciousness is articulated as this locus of intentionality, what Rowlands calls “the noneliminable intentional core”. Problems of cognitive bloat and personal character are addressed in light of the findings. In addition to situating Gurwitsch’s work within the extended mind movement for the first time, this study highlights the importance of the marginal halo, largely neglected in previous Gurwitsch scholarship. (shrink)

This paper explores the philosophical aspects of the "Great Introduction" of Abū Ma'šar, one of the great figures of Arabic astrology and an associate of al-Kindī, the great 9th century philosopher. I argue that the following points of philosophical interest may be found in this text: 1. Astrology is described as a "master science" along the lines proposed by Aristotle, i.e. it provides principles for lower sciences. Also he supplies arguments to ground astrology on methodological grounds, such as the (...) use of empirical evidence and testimony. 2. Abū Ma'šar broadly follows al-Kindī's explanation of how the stars influence the sublunary world, by heating the elements. This agrees with al-Kindī's work "On the Proximate Agent Cause of Generation and Corruption," and I identify some parallels between the two works. 3. Finally, Abū Ma'šarr considers whether human freedom is compatible with this causal account. He holds that human actions do fall under the class of the "possible" and not the "necessary," but only because for him the "possible" is what happens sometimes, not always. Thus he seems tacitly to hold that genuine choice is compatible with causal necessitation. (shrink)

This article will examine McCormick's moral epistemology both at the level of how human persons know values and disvalues, which hereinafter will be referred to as synderesis, and at the level of how human persons know the rightness and wrongness of an action, which hereinafter will be referred to as normative moral judgment. On the one hand, from this investigation it appears that McCormick operates with a dual moral epistemology, at least at the level of synderesis. This means that at (...) one point in time it appears that a significant shift may have occurred in his moral epistemology at the level of synderesis. This may also be true at the level of normative moral judgment. On the other hand, McCormick's moral epistemology may in fact be a synthesis, which is the product of development and maturity in his thought process. This article will articulate, examine, and analyse both moral epistemologies. The first moral epistemology is operative in McCormick's writing up until 1983. The second moral epistemology corresponds to McCormick's decision in 1983 to write primarily in the area of bioethics from a theological perspective. Since the year 1983 seems to be the pivotal time when these two moral epistemologies converge, I will refer to the first moral epistemology as “prior to 1983” and I will refer to the second moral epistemology as “after 1983.” Because of the numerous criticisms that surround McCormick's moral epistemology, and the ambiguity that it entails, McCormick needed to articulate his theoretical foundations clearly and develop them systematically and coherently. Numerous moral theologians called for him to do this, yet he never responded. A systematic understanding of McCormick's moral epistemology is not only necessary but crucial in examining various issues in bioethics. It is necessary because it is the basis of moral decision making. It is crucial because the life and death of individuals may hang in the balance. (shrink)

The no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are arguably the main considerations for and against scientific realism. Recently these arguments have been accused of embodying a familiar, seductive fallacy. In each case, we are tricked by a base rate fallacy, one much-discussed in the psychological literature. In this paper we consider this accusation and use it as an explanation for why the two most prominent `wholesale' arguments in the literature seem irresolvable. Framed probabilistically, we can see very clearly why realists (...) and anti-realists have been talking past one another. We then formulate a dilemma for advocates of either argument, answer potential objections to our criticism, discuss what remains (if anything) of these two major arguments, and then speculate about a future philosophy of science freed from these two arguments. In so doing, we connect the point about base rates to the wholesale/retail distinction; we believe it hints at an answer of how to distinguish profitable from unprofitable realism debates. In short, we offer a probabilistic analysis of the feeling of ennui afflicting contemporary philosophy of science. (shrink)

A provocative, insightful explanation for why it is that belief—not religion—keeps us in a perilous state of willful ignorance In The Religious Case Against Belief , James Carse identifies the twenty-first century’s most forbidding villain: belief. In distinguishing religions from belief systems, Carse works to reveal how belief—with its restriction on thought and encouragement of hostility—has corrupted religion and spawned violence the world over. Galileo, Martin Luther, Abraham Lincoln, and Jesus Christ—using their stories Carse creates his own brand of parable (...) and establishes a new vocabulary with which to study conflict in the modern world. The Religious Case Against Belief introduces three kinds of ignorance: ordinary ignorance (a mundane lack of knowledge, such as ignorance of tomorrow’s weather or the reason why your stove is malfunctioning), willful ignorance (an intentional avoidance of accessible knowledge), and finally higher ignorance (a learned understanding that no matter how many truths we may accumulate, our knowledge falls infinitely short of the truth). While ordinary ignorance is common to all people, Carse associates the strongest manifestation of willful ignorance with the most fervent (and dangerous) of believers. He points to the historic conflict between Martin Luther and Holy Roman Emperor Charles V both to reveal this seemingly religious collision as a clash of belief and to identify belief ’s inherently destructive characteristics. From Luther to the contemporary Christian right, we learn that believers construct identity by erecting boundaries and by fostering aggression between the believer and the other. This is why belief systems choose—at great cost—to remain locked in bloody conflict rather than to engage in dialogue, recognizing the great deal they have in common. This is willful ignorance. In fierce contrast to willful ignorance, higher ignorance is an acquired state enhanced by religion. Those traveling the path to higher ignorance recognize faith teachings (such as the Bible) as poetry intended to promote contemplation, interpretation, and a sense of wonder. For evidence of religion’s deeply embedded rejection of singular truth and its acceptance of diverse dialogue, Carse looks to the many faces of Jesus presented in the books of the Bible and elsewhere. Uncontaminated by belief systems, religion rejects the imagined boundaries that falsely divide people and ideas, working to expand horizons. The Religious Case Against Belief exposes a world in which religion and belief have become erroneously (and terrifyingly) conflated. In strengthening their association with powerful belief systems, religions have departed from their essential purpose as agencies of higher ignorance. Carse uses his wideranging understanding of religion to find a viable and vital path away from what he calls the Age of Faith II and toward open-ended global dialogue. Far from abstract philosophical musing, The Religious Case Against Belief is required reading for our age. (shrink)

The relationship between humanity and the soil is an increasingly important topic in social theory. However, conceptualisations of the soil developed by anticolonial thinkers at the high point of the movement for self-determination between the 1940s and the 1970s have remained largely ignored. This is a shame, not least because theorists like Eric Williams, Walter Rodney, Suzanne Césaire and Amílcar Cabral were concerned with the soil. Building on recent work on human-soil relations and decolonial ecology, we argue that these four (...) thinkers conceptualised the connection between soil, empire, and anticolonial revolt. Williams and Rodney ground understanding of soil degradation in global relations of economic power, while Césaire and Cabral reconceptualise postcolonial nationhood in terms of the mutability and diversity of the soil. The article concludes by suggesting that these two anticolonial counterpoints, global connectivity and more-than-human identification, anticipate and deepen contemporary attempts to decolonise ecological thinking. (shrink)

We consider various concepts associated with the revision theory of truth of Gupta and Belnap. We categorize the notions definable using their theory of circular definitions as those notions universally definable over the next stable set. We give a simplified account of varied revision sequences-as a generalised algorithmic theory of truth. This enables something of a unification with the Kripkean theory of truth using supervaluation schemes.

I will offer a conceptual analysis of different notions of structure and function of viral immunogens and of different structure-function relationships. My focus will then be on the mechanisms by which the desired immune response is induced and why strategies based on three-dimensional molecular antigen structures and their rational design are limited in their ability to induce the desired immunogenicity. I will look at the mechanisms of action of adjuvants (thus the wordplay with Janeway's "immunologist's dirty little secret"). Strategies involving (...) adjuvants and other (more successful) vaccination strategies rely on taking into account activities and functions ("what is going on"), and not just the structures involved ("who is there"), in binding in a "lock and key" fashion. Functional patterns as well as other organizational and temporal patterns, I will argue, are crucial for inducing the desired immune response and immunogenicity. The 3D structural approach by itself has its benefitsand its limits, which I want to highlight by this philosophical analysis, pointing out the importance of structure-function relationships. Different functional aspects such as antigenicity, immunogenicity, and immunity need to be kept separate and cannot be reduced to three-dimensional structures of vaccines. Taking into account different notions of structure and function and their relationships might thus advance our understanding of the immune system and rational HIV vaccine design, to which end philosophy can provide useful tools. (shrink)

This essay makes a case for the metaphysical status of the human fetus. I argue that personhood begins at conception as opposed to at some point in the post-conception continuum. However, there is a deep division over this matter. Defenders of the pro-life position grant that life begins at conception. In contrast, defenders of the pro-choice position deny that life begins at conception. Even if it were the case that life begins at conception, proponents of abortion claim that a woman’s (...) bodily autonomy should come first over protecting the fetus’s life. Contemporary discussions regarding this matter continue to lack a clear and adequate account of why we continue to face a stalemate in terms of settling the issue of the metaphysical status of the human fetus. In section I, I discuss what I call the less central issues that stand in the way when it comes to addressing the main question of the personhood of the human fetus. In section II, I discuss the personhood problem as it relates to the fetus. In section III, I sketch out a conception- grounded theory of fetal personhood. In section IV, I consider some objections. In section V, I discuss the origin problem as it relates to the fetus within the broader context of the challenge, we face in answering the question of the nature of life. Finally, in section VI, I conclude this paper by claiming that conception plays a decisive metaphysical role in the personhood status of the fetus. (shrink)

Upshot: For communicating second-order science, von Foerster’s ethical imperative provides a viable starting point. Proceeding from this, we plead in favour of emphasising the common grounds of diverging scientific opinions and of various approaches in second-order science instead of focussing on the differences. This will provide a basis for communication and stimulate scientific self-reflection.

For medical humanitarian organizations, making their sources of legitimacy explicit is a useful exercise, in response to: misperceptions, concerns over the ‘humanitarian space’, controversies about specific humanitarian actions, challenges about resources allocation and moral suffering among humanitarian workers. This is also a difficult exercise, where normative criteria such as international law or humanitarian principles are often misrepresented as primary sources of legitimacy. This essay first argues for a morally principled definition of humanitarian medicine, based on the selfless intention of individual (...) humanitarian actors. Taking Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) as a case in point, a common source of moral legitimacy for medical humanitarian organizations is their cosmopolitan appeal to distributive justice and collective responsibility. More informally, their legitimacy is grounded in the rightfulness of specific actions and choices. This implies a constant commitment to publicity and accountability. Legitimacy is also generated by tangible support from the public to individual organizations, by commitments to professional integrity, and by academic alliances to support evidence-based practice and operational research. (shrink)

At the beginning of the twentieth century in the Russian-speaking philosophical space philosophical projects emerged which brought ontology and gnoseology closer together. One can observe this process, for example, in the philosophical doctrines of the Russian intuitivists Nikolay Lossky and Semyon Frank. I demonstrate that the emergence of these doctrines and the development of their onto-gnoseological categorial apparatus were mainly connected with the criticism of the Neo-Kantian theory of cognition and the possibility of transcendent knowledge as such. The main sources (...) of my study are The Intuitive Basis of Knowledge and The World as an Organic Whole by N. O. Lossky and The Object of Knowledge and The Unknowable by S. L. Frank. My investigation makes it possible to treat Lossky’s categorial framework as the representation of a system of levels of the universe each of which is characterised by two aspects: the ontological, i.e. it is part of the unity of the world, and the gnoseological, i.e. it has an independent cognitive significance. Frank considers categories to be an organic part of the ontological proof of intuitivism. A common trend in the construction of categorial schemes by Lossky and Frank is their striving to combine gnoseological and ontological descriptions of categories. The key difference is the way an onto-gnoseological system as a whole is justified. In revealing the contradictions in Lossky’s conception, I proceed from the critical remarks of S. A. Askoldov, pointing out that these contradictions stem from an absolutisation of intuition in cognition, the renunciation of the idea of gnoseological transcendence, incompleteness of the theory of immanence and discordance between onto-gnoseological categories. Askoldov’s critical comments clarify the substantive features of Lossky’s theory and the essence of the transformations carried out in Frank’s absolute ideal-realism. (shrink)

In a recent New Yorker cartoon, a man is fixing a sink. His partner, standing nearby skeptically asks, “Do you really know what you are doing, or do you only google-​know?” This cartoon perfectly captures the mixed relationship we have with googling, or knowing via digital interface, particularly via search engines. On the one hand, googling is now the dominant source of socially useful knowledge. The use of search engines for this purpose is almost completely integrated into many of our (...) lives. On the other, the point the cartoon is making resonates with nearly all of us: users often recognize that there are risks and trade-​offs associated with gaining certain kinds of information via online search. These facts about googling make it particularly interesting to the applied epistemologist. Our practices involving search engines not only have a distinctive character, that character puts some traditional epistemic questions in a new light. This chapter will examine two of those questions. The first concerns the extent to which googling raises problems similar to familiar quandaries surrounding testimonial knowledge. The second –​and more radical –​concerns whether googling is a type of distributed or extended knowledge. (shrink)

Upshot: I describe my perception of deconstruction, including the controversial point of view that deconstruction is actually construction. I also provide more details about the some of the design decisions in the software, and how these affected the students’ experience.

Quelle est la nature et la fonction des sentiments dans l’activité de connaissance et, plus largement, dans l’existence humaine? Cette question, massive, n’a cessé d’inquiéter la philosophie, dont l’histoire paraît à bien des égards se confondre avec celle d’une opposition entre la lucidité de la raison et l’obscurité dangereuse des passions. Si le discours philosophique n’a jamais nié l’importance des sentiments, ni leur rôle dans l’ordonnancement général de la vie humaine, ce discours est cependant empreint d’ambiguïtés, comme l’est, déjà, le (...) statut du « cœur » dans la tripartition fonctionnelle de l’âme présentée par Platon : ni réductible à la droite raison, ni relégué dans la sphère des désirs qui nous empêchent de contempler les Idées, le sentiment est cet intermédiaire allié de la raison qui met en mouvement nos réactions morales. Cette ambiguïté se retrouve à l’âge classique, lorsque le discours philosophique découvre le fonctionnement des passions et cherche les modèles scientifiques susceptibles d’en rendre compte, hésitant entre la physiologie , la géométrie , la médecine et les sciences de la nature .En faisant de l’affectivité l’une des structures fondamentales de l’existence, la phénoménologie a replacé au centre du questionnement philosophique la problématique des sentiments. Mais comment décrire ces expériences singulières – celle de l’amour, de l’angoisse, du désespoir ou de la joie – sans les confondre avec des objets? Comment donner du sens aux affects sans adopter ce point de vue surplombant des sciences de la nature, qui confond le discours des causes et celui des raisons? Comment, en d’autres termes, continuer à parler des sentiments de manière raisonnée, tout en reconnaissant que les sentiments nous font autant que nous les connaissons – tout en continuant, par conséquent, à être réceptifs à leur pouvoir de nous ébranler? (shrink)

Context: Public universities in South Africa are currently facing the challenge of decolonising knowledge. This change requires a review of curriculums, as well as teaching and learning with the goal of embracing the epistemology of the learners, addressing issues such as social justice and transformation. Problem: Human communication is subject to several perceptual errors in both listening and seeing, which challenges the success of the communication in the education system. The ability of the teacher and the learners to effectively communicate (...) with one another is a factor for the success of each reaching their goals. The teacher imparts her knowledge in the classroom, but according to von Foerster, “[i]t is the listener, not the speaker, who determines the meaning of an utterance,” for the listener contextualises this information based on her own past lived experience. Thus, the student’s epistemology and her expression of her understanding is integral in the classroom context and should be actively included into the education system. Method: I present a cybernetic approach to the teacher-learner system, challenging traditional ideas about the role of each actor within the system, with special attention given to Pask’s conversation theory. Results: Early empirical findings suggest that a conversational contextual approach results in higher student involvement and better memory retention among the learners. Conversational approaches that are epistemologically inclusive diffuse social problems where the student groups require their individual worldviews to be reflected within the curriculum. This reduces the friction of competing epistemologies within the education system, moving toward a co-created contextually-driven knowledge system. Implications: Many educators would like deeper engagement from their learners but have not found a way to successfully engage the student group. A cybernetic approach is one method that can be adopted to remedy this. This is particularly useful in contexts where there is cultural diversity and impending social change. Constructivist content: I address von Glasersfeld’s points on human cognition, linking it to Austin’s speech acts. (shrink)

This article argues that Virgil includes an allusion to the fourth-century censor Appius Claudius Caecus in Book 8 of the Aeneid. Three pieces of evidence point to this allusion: (1) wordplay, especially the near echo of ‘Caecus’ in ‘Cacus’; (2) semantic associations between Cacus and darkness; and (3) repeated references to sight and Cacus’ eyes. By invoking the memory of Appius, whose blinding in 312 b.c.e. allegedly came at the hands of Hercules as punishment for transferring control of the god's (...) rites at the Ara Maxima to the state, Virgil underscores the importance of properly observing religious rituals. This aligns with Evander's original intent with the Hercules–Cacus story to prove to Aeneas and the Trojans that the Arcadians’ religious practices are no uana superstitio (8.187). (shrink)

A. R. W. Harrison in The Law of Athens, i , 63–5, argued that the exclusion of bastards from the phratries and the severe restriction of their right of inheritance does not entail their exclusion from Athenian citizenship; and that the form of Pericles' citizenship law, not stating that were to be , and Solon's law restricting the inheritance rights of , both point to the conclusion that bastards were not ipso facto debarred from citizenship. D. M. MacDowell in CQ (...) N.S. 26 , 88–91, rightly finds Harrison's positive arguments inconclusive, but suggests that three texts provide more definite support for this conclusion. (shrink)

An instrument to assess 'ethical sensitivity' has been developed. The instrument presents four clinical vignettes and the respondent is asked to list the ethical issues related to each vignette. The responses are classified, post hoc, into the domains of autonomy, beneficence and justice. This instrument was used in 1990 to assess the ethical sensitivity of students in all four medical classes at the University of Toronto. Ethical sensitivity, as measured by this instrument, is not related to age or grade-point average. (...) Sensitivity increases between the 1st and 2nd year and then decreases throughout the rest of undergraduate medical training, such that the 4th-year students identify fewer issues than those entering medical school. Students expressing a career choice of family medicine identify more issues than their peers. Several problems with the use of the instrument and the interpretation of the data were found. Nonetheless, these findings, if reproducible, are important and their meaning needs further discussion. (shrink)

History of Science is a many-sided subject, permitting approach from the point of view of various human interests, and presenting a wide variety of problems, many of them paradoxical and perhaps not capable of satisfactory solution. In the following it will probably seem to the reader a number of times that I am talking at cross purposes. Anything that I can say is of necessity limited by my background as a physicist.

Abstract In this chapter, we challenge the presupposed concept of innovation in the responsible innovation literature. As a first step, we raise several questions with regard to the possibility of ‘responsible’ innovation and point at several difficulties which undermine the supposedly responsible character of innovation processes, based on an analysis of the input, throughput and output of innovation processes. It becomes clear that the practical applicability of the concept of responsible innovation is highly problematic and that a more thorough inquiry (...) of the concept is required. As a second step, we analyze the concept of innovation which is self-evidently presupposed in current literature on responsible innovation. It becomes clear that innovation is self-evidently seen as (1) technological innovation, (2) is primarily perceived from an economic perspective, (3) is inherently good and (4) presupposes a symmetry between moral agents and moral addressees. By challenging this narrow and uncritical concept of innovation, we contribute to a second round of theorizing about the concept and provide a research agenda for future research in order to enhance a less naïve concept of responsible innovation. (shrink)

As emphasized by Milne, an observer ultimately depends on the transmission and reception of light signals for the measurement of natural lengths and periods remote from his world point. The laws of geometry which are obeyed when these lengths and periods are plotted on a space-time depend, inevitably, on assumptions concerning the dependence of light velocity on the spatial and temporal coordinates. A convention regarding light velocity fixes the geometry, and conversely. However, the convention of flat space-time implies nonintegrable “radar (...) distances” unless the concept of coordinate-dependent units of measure is employed. Einstein's space-time has the advantage of admitting a special reference system $\hat R$ with respect to which the aether fluid is at rest and the total gravitational field vanishes. A holonomic transformation from $\hat R$ to another reference systemR belonging to the same space-time introduces a nonpermanent gravitational field and holonomic aether motion. A nonholonomic transformation from $\hat R$ to a reference systemR* which belongs to a different space-time introduces a permanent gravitational field and nonholonomic aether motion. The arbitrariness of geometry is expressed by extending covariance to include the latter transformation. By means of a nonholonomic (or units) transformation it is possible, with the aid of the principle of equivalence, to obtain the Schwarzschild and de Sitter metrics from the Newtonian fields that would arise in a flat space-time description. Some light is thrown on the interpretation of cosmological models. (shrink)

A frequent feature of pharmaceutical research is the open label extension study, in which patients participating in double blind placebo controlled trials of new medications are invited, on completion of the initial trial, to take the study drug for some further period. Patients are openly given the active substance at this stage, regardless of their assignment in the initial trial. Investigators are typically reluctant to unblind the patients’ assignment at the point of entry into the open label phase, on the (...) grounds that this may introduce ascertainment bias in the main study.It is argued that patients invited to participate in open label extension studies cannot give a proper consent to such research unless they know to which arm of the main trial they were recruited. It is further argued that to recruit certain groups of patients from placebo controlled trials into open label extension studies may also be unethical for clinical reasons. (shrink)

Problem: Ernst von Glasersfeld’s radical constructivism has been highly influential in the fields of mathematics and science education. However, its relevance is typically limited to analyses of classroom interactions and students’ reasoning. Methods: A project that aims to support improvements in the quality of mathematics instruction across four large urban districts is framed as a case with which to illustrate the far-reaching consequences of von Glasersfeld’s constructivism for mathematics and science educators. Results: Von Glasersfeld’s constructivism orients us to question the (...) standard view of policy implementation as a process of travel down through a system and to conceptualize it instead as the situated reorganization of practice at multiple levels of a system. In addition, von Glasersfeld’s constructivism orients us to understand rather than merely evaluate policies by viewing the actions of the targets of policies as reasonable from their point of view. Implications: The potential contributions of von Glasersfeld’s constructivism to mathematics and science education have been significantly underestimated by restricting the focus to classroom actions and interactions. The illustrative case of research on the application of these ideas also indicates the relevance of constructivism to researchers in educational policy and educational leadership. (shrink)

À la suite d’Ebeling, René Marlé s’était intéressé à cette question centrale de Bultmann « Quel sens cela a-t-il de parler de Dieu ? », au point d’en tirer le titre de son ouvrage sur Ebeling, Parler de Dieu aujourd’hui. La question ne porte pas sur le sens du mot Dieu ni sur la connaissance de Dieu, mais sur le sens du parler de Dieu : elle se situe donc sur le terrain de l’herméneutique , celui de l’analyse du langage.« (...) Si on veut parler de Dieu, répond Bultmann, on doit nécessairement parler de soi-même ». Il veut dire qu’on ne peut parler de Dieu qu’à partir de l’expérience personnelle de l’avoir rencontré, d’avoir été rencontré par sa Parole. Il n’interdit donc pas d’introduire le nom de Dieu dans le langage ; mais pas dans le langage objectivant propre à la condition spatio-temporelle, mais dans le parler existentiel, dont Heidegger a fait la théorie, qui est celui de l’expérience humaine et interpersonnelle, en tant que Dieu donne sens à ma vie. Il est alors possible de parler de lui avec sens, dans la mesure où Dieu se fait appréhender comme le Tout-Autre par l’obéissance de la foi.Following Ebeling, René Marlé became interested in the principal question of Bultmann “What meaning does talk about God have ?”, to the extent that the title of his book on Ebeling came from there, Speaking about God Today. The question is not about the meaning of the word God, not about knowledge of God, but about the sense in talking about God : it is situated, therefore, in the field of hermeneutics , that of the analysis of language.“If you want to talk about God“, Bultmann said, “you must necessarily talk about yourself”. He means that one cannot speak of God except from personal experience of having encountered Him, of having encountered Him through his Word. He does not, then, forbid introducing the name of God in language ; but not in the objectivizing language that belongs to the space-time condition, but rather in existential speech, about which Heidegger theorized. It is that of human and interpersonal experience, in so far as God gives meaning to my life. Then it is possible to speak of Him meaningfully, to the extent that God makes Himself understood as the Wholly Other by the obedience of faith. (shrink)

We describe and analyse how large herbivores strongly diminished a woody vegetation, dominated by the unpalatable shrub Sambucus nigra L. and changed it into grassland. Density of woody species and cover of vegetation were measured in 1996, 2002 and 2012 in the grazed Oostvaardersplassen. In 2002 and 2012 we also measured density and cover in an ungrazed control site. In 2002 we measured intensity of browsing and bark loss of Sambucus shrubs in the grazed and control sites. In the grazed (...) site the density of Sambucus and Salix spp. declined significantly between 1996 and 2012, and large areas changed into grassland. In the control site the density of Sambucus increased significantly during this period, the density of Salix spp. did not change, and the vegetation consisted of a mixture of woody species and a field layer dominated by tall herbs. In 2002 and 2012 the percentages of dead Sambucus shrubs were significantly higher in the grazed site than in the control site. In 2002 the percentages of twigs browsed and ring barked stems of Sambucus shrubs were significantly higher in the grazed site than in the control site. Our results show that debarking caused mature Sambucus shrubs to die, but that heavy browsing may have helped this process. Our results also point to a significant neighbour effect on the break down of Sambucus, suggesting that Aggregational Resistance and Associational Palatability were both active. Essential conditions for the break down of this woody vegetation were the presence of large herbivores, the low ratio between the areas of summer and winter feeding habitats and the competition amongst herbivores. Browsing may have been responsible for seedling death, as seedlings were found only in the control site and not on the old and newly established grasslands in the grazed site. (shrink)