Philosophy of Consciousness, Miscellaneous

Phenomenal color space, which is three-dimensional, contains six unary colors, i.e., colors that are not perceived as being composed of a combination of other colors. These colors are organized into three antipodal pairs which form three orthogonal axes in color space: red–green, yellow–blue, white–black. The three pairs of unary colors divide naturally into two phenomenally distinct groups: an achromatic group and a chromatic group. Here I show that if it is assumed that both the Hilbert space of quantum state vectors (...) and the space of observables acting on this Hilbert space have intrinsic (i.e., privileged) bases, then the Bloch space representation of two-state quantum systems exhibits analogous properties to those of phenomenal color space. This leads me to suggest that color experience is the phenomenal dual aspect of some two-state quantum system in the brain. I then generalize this suggestion and hypothesize that all types of phenomenal experience—not only color—are dual aspects of quantum systems. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to challenge the continued exclusion of Indian philosophies from the Western philosophical canon on the supposed basis that such philosophies are really religion, mysticism, and mythology. I argue that many schools of Indian philosophy, such as Advaita Vedānta, resist and problematize historically particular Euro-Western conceptions of both philosophy and religion, and the conceptual borders between them, where philosophy is understood as grounded in various substantive notions of reason and rationality, defined as a purely theoretical (...) enterprise. In addition, I question the predominant tendency to see philosophy as opposed to “religion”, which is often presumed to rest on faith in a Judeo-Christian conception of God: The singular and wholly other, creator of all souls, ex nihilo, the ultimate judge of humankind, where salvation is granted in proportion to the intrinsic value of faith. I suggest that Advaita challenges these prevailing conceptions. A part of my larger purpose is to dislodge the view that the Euro-Western philosophical enterprise constitutes the universal, neutral, and objective standard from which all other approaches to philosophy are to be judged as legitimate. My hope is to lay some of the groundwork required to re-think dominant historical and conceptual categories from a broader global perspective, with the aim of developing a deeper and more plural understanding of the diverse nature of both philosophical and religious inquiry. (shrink)

The question of what happens when we die may just be the most intriguing of them all. Unfortunately, I am not a ghost, and could not tell you what definitely occurs when we sink our lungs in and close our eyes for the last time. However, one can speculate. If the theories of reincarnation, Heaven and Hell, or void of nothingness fail to convince you, surely there are more possibilities to contemplate - especially ones that focus on experiencing the afterlife (...) through your consciousness. (shrink)

Susan Schneider (2019) has proposed two new tests for consciousness in AI (artificial intelligence) systems, the AI Consciousness Test and the Chip Test. On their face, the two tests seem to have the virtue of proving satisfactory to a wide range of consciousness theorists holding divergent theoretical positions, rather than narrowly relying on the truth of any particular theory of consciousness. Unfortunately, both tests are undermined in having an ‘audience problem’: Those theorists with the kind of architectural worries that motivate (...) the need for such tests should, on similar grounds, doubt that the tests establish the existence of genuine consciousness in the AI in question. Nonetheless, the proposed tests constitute progress, as they could find use by some theorists holding fitting views about consciousness and perhaps in conjunction with other tests for AI consciousness. (shrink)

This special issue addresses the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological viewpoint, especially contemporary phenomenological research on selfhood. In the introduction, we first offer a brief survey of the various classic questions related to personal identity according to Locke’s initial proposal and sketch out key concepts and distinctions of the debate that came after Locke. We then characterize the types of approach represented by post-Hegelian, German and French philosophies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. We argue that whereas the (...) Anglophone debates on personal identity were initially formed by the persistence question and the characterization question, the “Continental” tradition included remarkably intense debates on the individual or the self as being unique or “concrete,” deeply temporal and—as claimed by some philosophers, like Sartre and Foucault—unable to have any identity, if not one externally imposed. We describe the Continental line of thinking about the “self” as a reply and an adjustment to the post-Lockean “personal identity” question. These observations constitute the backdrop for our presentation of phenomenological approaches to personal identity. These approaches run along three lines: debates on the layers of the self, starting from embodiment and the minimal self and running all the way to the full-fledged concept of person; questions of temporal becoming, change and stability, as illustrated, for instance, by aging or transformative life-experiences; and the constitution of identity in the social, institutional, and normative space. The introduction thus establishes a structure for locating and connecting the different contributions in our special issue, which, as an ensemble, represent a strong and differentiated contribution to the debate on personal identity from a phenomenological perspective. (shrink)

It is most likely for anyone to ask himself at least once if it would be possible to live in a dream? Questioning the fabric of “reality” we live in consciously was one of the main doubts man ever had. It is so likely for us to answer positively to it due to so many factors; starting from the many and various facets of reality each individual envision the world, from the enormous differences we all have while perceiving and defining (...) the reality, etc. That is why, at the conscious level, life seems almost like a dream in a dream, always hoping to wake up from the negative, unwanted version of it. That is why my assertion here, based on latest theories on consciousness and AI, aim to say that we live in between reality and dream, being “conscious” of ourselves, but not really wanting to be “aware” of what is really going on with us. Living as a human is not a path towards improvement in the way of getting rid of subjectiveness and valorization because these so-called errors make the most of human living. (shrink)

It is most likely for anyone to ask himself at least once if it would be possible to live in a dream? Questioning the fabric of “reality” we live in consciously was one of the main doubts man ever had. It is so likely for us to answer positive to it due to so many factors; starting from the many and various facets of reality each individual envision the world, from the enormous differences we all have while perceiving and defining (...) the reality, etc. That is why, at the conscious level, life seems almost like a dream in a dream, always hoping to wake up from the negative, unwanted version of it. That is why my assertion here, based on latest theories on consciousness and AI, aim to say that we live in between reality and dream, being “conscious” of ourselves, but not really wanting to be “aware” of what is really going on with us. (shrink)

Consider the following three claims. (i) There are no truths of the form ‘p and ~p’. (ii) No one holds a belief of the form ‘p and ~p’. (iii) No one holds any pairs of beliefs of the form {p, ~p}. Irad Kimhi has recently argued, in effect, that each of these claims holds and holds with metaphysical necessity. Furthermore, he maintains that they are ultimately not distinct claims at all, but the same claim formulated in different ways. I find (...) his argument suggestive, if not entirely transparent. I do think there is at least an important kernel of truth even in (iii), and that (i) ultimately explains what’s right about the other two. Consciousness of an impossibility makes belief in the obtaining of the corresponding state of affairs an impossibility. Interestingly, an appreciation of this fact brings into view a novel conception of inference, according to which it consists in the consciousness of necessity. This essay outlines and defends this position. A central element of the defense is that it reveals how reasoners satisfy what Paul Boghossian calls the Taking Condition and do so without engendering regress. (shrink)

We suggest a teleological approach to subjective experiencing or phenomenal consciousness. Like living, subjective experiencing is a teleology-constituting mode of being, which is made up of coupled, functional processes. We explicate our notion of a 'teleological mode of being' and distinguish between three different modes: a living (non-sentient) mode of being, a sentient mode of being, and a rational-symbolic (human) mode of being, which correspond to the three levels of soul suggested by Aristotle. These evolved teleological modes of being are (...) characterized by the possession of distinct, hierarchically nested goals and value systems. We argue that the functions of parts and processes within living systems have to be situated within the appropriate teleological frame of reference. Our evolutionary and comparative approach to the mode of being of subjectively experiencing animals clarifies why functions are best attributed to the parts that constitute sentience. Our proposal resolves the problem of attributing functions to phenomenal consciousness, resonates with basic teleological intuitions and distinctions, and corresponds to the modern broad understanding of selection and evolution. (shrink)

This paper is about whether consciousness flows. Evan Thompson (2014) has recently claimed that the study of binocular rivalry shows that there are some moments where consciousness does not flow, contra William James (1890). Moreover, he’s claimed that Abhidharma philosophers reject James’s claim that consciousness flows. I argue that binocular rivalry poses no special challenge to James. Second, I argue that because Thompson did not take up the question of how James and Abhidharma philosophers analyse or define flow, he under-described (...) their disagreement in a way that obscures an important conceptual contribution that Abhidharma philosophers make to the study of flow. They reject James’s claim that there are only two conceivable ways for consciousness to fail to flow, and suggest that there is a third way for consciousness to fail to flow – a way that James’s imagination did not reveal to be possible. (shrink)

A pdf sample that contains the cover, contents page, preface and the back cover with endorsements and blurb.

La recente pubblicazione in lingua italiana del Libro Rosso, che è stato definito l’inedito forse più importante nella storia della psicologia, è stata celebrata in numerosi convegni specialistici, compreso quello da cui originano i saggi che costituiscono questo libro. Il Libro Rosso è il libro segreto di Jung, quello sul quale egli trascrisse in parole e immagini, per oltre sedici anni, i sogni e le visioni che popolarono la sua autoanalisi. Negli ultimi anni di vita Jung lo definiva come il (...) nucleo vitale da cui erano sbocciate tutte le intuizioni che poi aveva elaborato nei suoi testi scientifici; malgrado ciò, fu sempre riluttante alla sua pubblicazione. Al massimo, permise che qualche copia circolasse tra gli amici più intimi; progettò anche di vincolarne la pubblicazione ad almeno cinquant’anni post mortem. (shrink)

In this work, we will approach some of the essential questions about the collective imaginary and their relations with reality and truth. We should face this subject in a conceptual framework, followed by the corresponding factual analysis of demonstrable behavioral realities. We will adopt not only the methodology, but mostly the tenets and propositions of the analytic philosophy, which for sure will be apparent throughout the study, and may be identified by the features described by Perez : Rabossi (1975) defends (...) the idea that analytic philosophy can be identified by considering certain family resemblances. He suggests the following family traits: a positive attitude toward scientific knowledge; a cautious attitude toward metaphysics; a conception of philosophy as a conceptual task, which takes conceptual analysis as a method; a close relationship between language and philosophy; a concern with seeking argumentative answers to philosophical problems; search for conceptual clarity Perez, Diana Ines, "Analytic Philosophy in Latin America”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ). These core concepts involve cultural, social, religious, scientific, philosophic, moral, and political contents, belonging to the individual and collective existence of each one of us. In this paper, we will not debate nor demonstrate. Our purpose is not to systematically methodize, criticize, or bring to evidence anything, anyhow. The present work grounds itself on analytical reflection. We will just speculate the most comprehensive and profound way we can and express the results of our thoughts. Notwithstanding the multidisciplinary nature of the subject and the methodological openness for accepting contributions from any field of science, this work belongs to the aim of psychology and ontology or, in other terms, social and ontological psychology. The free methodology guiding such reflections embraces and takes into account everything approaching coherence with the philosophical and psychological epistemology. This methodology does not pursue reaching evidence but just looks for the interrelation among already existing evidence, of any nature and magnitude, inferring a coherent meaning to the real things. Many of the great thinkers at any time never searched for demonstrations, theorizations, or systematizations. These thinkers just thought, meditated, and with the enlightenment of their humility could approach the truth. They will be our reference and the example to be followed. For sure, we will not find the truth, but we may be sure about something: in many moments, we will get close to the truth, and in all moments, we will be retreating from untruth and lie. The main scope of this paper is to observe how some of the essential evolutionary attributes of humankind, like creativity, imagination, and association, can become a hazardous sickness, sheltered in the misty shadows of the intelligence. (shrink)

Focusing solely on the near-death cognizance of the dying, rather than the material perspective of the living, reveals a new understanding of death. Its significance to psychology, philosophy, and religion is huge for what emerges is a long overlooked phenomenon: a nonsupernatural, relativistic, and timelessly eternal consciousness, which can be a natural afterlife. Ironically, the validity of the theory of a natural eternal consciousness (NEC) assumes the loss of all materially based consciousness with death—more specifically, the permanent loss of time (...) perception. The theory claims, and the article deduces from empirical knowledge, that by imperceptibly entering the timelessness before death, one’s last conscious moment, whatever the type, becomes by default—psychologically, from one’s perspective—a forever present moment. To help explain and validate the theory, the article presents thought experiments and a formal model of all of life’s moments and all transitions between periods of time perception and those of timelessness. An open-minded reading should reveal that the NEC does not threaten faith in a god or a heaven. (shrink)

In this commentary on Chalmers’s work on the meta-problem of consciousness, I defend an approach to the meta-problem that Chalmers finds unpromising (i.e., what Chalmers has called the “use-mention fallacy” strategy.) The core of this strategy is the idea that thinking about consciousness requires a special mode of thought that activates phenomenal consciousness itself, which then facilitates a (mistaken) intuition that a first-person thought of consciousness and a third-person thought of a brain state cannot refer to the same thing. Chalmers (...) considers this strategy as offering a diagnosis in terms of the “use-mention fallacy” and dismisses it quickly. However, close examination shows that the strategy is not about a use-mention confusion. Also, a revision to this strategy can provide an account that withstands counterexamples and connects with many ideas that may lead to a solution to the meta-problem. (shrink)

In “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”, David Chalmers draws a new framework in which to consider the mind-body problem. In addition to trying to solve the hard problem of consciousness – the problem of why and how brain processes give rise to conscious experience –, he thinks that philosophy, psychology, neuro-science and the other cognitive sciences should also pursue a solution to what he calls the “meta-problem” of consciousness – i.e., the problem of why we think there is a problem with (...) consciousness. My claim is that, while Chalmers’s project is generously ecumenical as well as beautiful in its meticulous detail, it is mistaken in its core assumption that the meta-problem can be formulated as an “easy problem” for science to solve. Furthermore, the project tilts the field toward illusionism against Type-B materialism, as far as physicalist solutions to the hard problem and the meta-problem are concerned. I will argue that Type-B materialism emerges unscathed from this dialectic. (shrink)

ABSTRACTTononi’s Integrated Information Theory explains consciousness as integrated information, that is, the informational state produced by the whole system over the sum of its parts. M...

In this paper the autopoietic model of consciousness is employed to analyze dynamic being of philosophic concepts. It will be demonstrated that this being consists in permanent transformation within human mind. The autopoietic model of consciousness presupposes that consciousness builds itself anew in each moment of its duration, durée. It doesn’t rest in immobility, but persists in becoming, and so maintains permanent assimilation and production of new meanings. Autopoiesis is viewed as a process of simultaneous loss and acquiring by creative (...) consciousness of its identity. To keep identity for consciousness means to change without cease, i.e. to lose it to some extent. A living human – empirical subject – that is subject possessing unique attributes: corporality, biographic situation, psychological and physiological features, individualized, different from others by his opportunities and abilities, belongs in a peculiar way to transcendental in E. Husserl’s sense of “pure flow of consciousness as such”. The concept of transcendental imagination is introduced to analyze phenomenon of imagination in respect of its contribution into being of philosophical concepts apart from numerous psychological characteristics of imagination. (shrink)

From the perspective of the Informational Model of Consciousness elaborated and reported recently on the basis of the last discoveries of the quantum mechanics and astrophysics, the meeting horizon between some ancient coherent empirical models of the humanity and our modern scientific results is analyzed. These results are discussed in terms of information, as a central axis relating the universe, the human and inter-humanity connections, and consciousness as an informational tool for the exploration of the reality. Bringing into discussion the (...) relevant recent discoveries of quantum mechanics (Higgs’ boson, disembodiment of information from the physical particles), and matter/information properties near the black holes, it is reinforced the concept of information as one of the fundamental constituent of matter and of our universe, showing that information is actually the base fabric of matter structures, living structures and universe. The huge quantity of dynamic information engaged in the living structures, particularly in the human organism, necessary to maintain the life’s functions and to allow the adaptation requirements, differentiates the living from non-living entities. It is shown that consciousness, human and universe cannot be really understood if it is not introduced on the panoramic scene a new player – dark matter, with more than 20% contribution, besides more than 70% dark energy and only 5% observable matter from the matter total quantity. It is shown also that the Informational Model of Consciousness, consisting in an architecture of seven cognitive centers, converges with the ancient models of chakras, of etheric body and aura concepts, with dual Taoist concepts of universe and human body, contributing with answers to the “mind-body”, “nature or nurture” problems and even to Qualia “hard” problem, and supporting the Jung’s concepts on the mind. Finally, some questions are addressed to the quantum mechanics, concerning the retro-causal effect and non-locality principle. (shrink)

In this article we study the question of free will from an interdisciplinary angle, drawing on philosophy, neurobiology and physics. We start by reviewing relevant neurobiological findings on the functioning of the brain, notably as presented in (Koch 2009); we assess these against the physics of (in)determinism. These biophysics findings seem to indicate that neuronal processes are not quantum but classical in nature. We conclude from this that there is little support for the existence of an immaterial ‘mind’, capable of (...) ruling over matter independently of the causal past. But what, then, can free will be ? We propose a compatibilist account that resonates well with neurobiology and physics, and that highlights that free will comes in degrees – degrees which vary with the conscious grasp the ‘free’ agent has over his actions. Finally, we analyze the well-known Libet experiment on free will through the lens of our model. We submit this interdisciplinary investigation as a typical case of naturalized philosophy: in our theorizing we privilege assumptions that find evidence in science, but our conceptual work also suggests new avenues for research in a few scientific disciplines. (shrink)

Direct neurological and especially imaging-driven investigations into the structures essential to naturally occurring cognitive systems in their development and operation have motivated broadening interest in the potential for artificial consciousness modeled on these systems. This first paper in a series of three begins with a brief review of Boltuc’s (2009) “brain-based” thesis on the prospect of artificial consciousness, focusing on his formulation of h-consciousness. We then explore some of the implications of brain research on the structure of consciousness, finding limitations (...) in biological approaches to the study of consciousness. Looking past these limitations, we introduce research in artificial consciousness designed to test for the emergence of consciousness, a phenomenon beyond the purview of the study of existing biological systems. (shrink)

Auf den folgenden Seiten finden Sie Gedanken und Anreize zum grossen Thema Bewusstsein. Die Broschüre soll, wie es der Titel „denkundsprich” vermuten lässt, zum Denken und Sprechen anregen, und zwar zum selbstständigen Denken, inspiriert durch Gespräche oder durch die Lektüre von uns verfassten Beiträgen zum Thema Bewusstsein. Diese vorliegende Broschüre ist in zwei Abschnitte unter- gliedert: In „Bewusstsein und Ethik” und in „Bewusstsein und Neurowissenschaften”.

Many hold that (1) consciousness poses a uniquely hard problem. Why is this so? Chalmers considers 12 main answers in 'The Meta-Problem of Consciousness'. This paper focuses on number 11, and is principally addressed to those who endorse (1) because they think that (2) consciousness can't possibly be physical. It argues that to hold (2) is to make the mistake of underestimating the physical, and that almost all who make this mistake do so because they think they know more about (...) the physical than they do. When we see things right, we see that there is nothing in physics nor in our everyday experience of the physical that gives us any good reason to hold (2). This leaves us free to embrace the overwhelmingly strong reasons for accepting that (3) consciousness is wholly physical. The correct general response is the same as the response to wave-particle duality: acceptance without expectation of understanding. (shrink)

To explain the origin of anything, we must be clear about that which we are explaining. There seem to be two main meanings for the term consciousness. One might be called open in that it equates consciousness with awareness and experience and considers rudimentary sensations to have evolved at a specific point in the evolution of increasing complexity. But certainly the foundation for such sensation is a physical body. It is unclear, however, exactly what the physical requirements are for a (...) “central experiencer” to emerge in the course of evolution. Some suggest that it would require a basic brain, others a central nervous system, and others stipulate only a cellular membrane. The open definition is most often assumed by the so-called hard sciences. -/- The closed meaning of consciousness differentiates between a special sort of experience, i.e., conscious experience, and a special sort of awareness (i.e., self-awareness). This is the approach of psychoanalysis and psychology that accepts the existence of an unconscious mind. It is also the view of most phenomenological philosophers and psychologists (Martin Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Lacan, etc.). This entry discusses several scientific and philosophical views of consciousness and its origins. (shrink)

This special issue of Journal of Consciousness Studies brings together work from a range of philosophers, neuroscientists, psychologists, cognitive scientists, behavioural scientists, and computer scientists who are all united in their approach to answering questions about consciousness. The contributions to this journal are inspired by work presented at the inaugural Designed Mind Symposium, held at the University of Edinburgh Informatics Forum on 7-8 November 2017.

Two of the staunchest critics of astrology presented their case in an article published in this journal that has since become a standard reference. The authors argue that the astrological experience is more likely to work by 'hidden persuaders' than by either objective or psychic criteria, yet their argument provides no evidence of this. The authors demand careful testing yet their own examples and claims against astrology are not careful. The metaanalysis claim mixes studies with widely disparate data types. The (...) parental tampering argument against Michel Gauquelin's planetary eminence findings lacks supportive evidence. The 'definitive' time twins test fails to define the criteria of resemblance. The test of predicting psychological test profiles does not discriminate between permanent personality dimensions and psychological states as astrology requires. The blind chart matching studies evaluated skills on the wrong parties where they would not be expected by either astrology or psychology. The authors fail to mention the most interesting and promising peer-reviewed astrological research studies that were available to them. Improved discourse with astrological subject matter experts is recommended. (shrink)

Husserl’s phenomenology is developed in explicit contrast to naturalism. At the same time, various scholars have attempted to overcome this opposition by naturalizing consciousness and phenomenology. In this paper, I argue that, in order to confront the issue of the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism, we must distinguish between different forms of naturalism. In fact, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is developed in contrast to a metaphysical form of naturalism, which conceives of nature as a mind-independent ontological domain that can be known (...) as it is “in itself”, independently of the cognitive relationship. At the same time, I argue that the genetic development of phenomenology, through the investigation of the temporal structure of experiences, leads to an empirical form of naturalism, which conceives of nature as the objective pole in a process of co-constitution of the subject and the object of experience. -/- Winner of the Philosophy Essay Prize “Vittorio Sainati” XIIth Edition. (shrink)

In the pursuit of a naturalized philosophy of mind, consciousness receives concentrated attention, in part because the phenomena of consciousness seem recalcitrant, difficult to explain in the terms of the natural sciences. But this is not a new phenomenon—efforts to provide a naturalized theory of consciousness originate in Ancient Greek philosophy. This chapter defines the project of naturalism in a way that allows for a common project to be traced through the history of Western Philosophy.

This paper explores substantive accounts of emotional phenomenology so as to see whether it sheds light on key features of emotions. To this end, we focus on four features that can be introduced by way of an example. Say Sam is angry at Maria’s nasty remark. The first feature relates to the fact that anger is a negative emotion, by contrast with positive emotions such as joy and admiration (valence). The second feature is how anger differs from other emotions such (...) as sadness, fear and joy (individuation). The third concerns the objects of anger and the sense in which anger discloses the significance of Maria’s remark to Sam (intentionality). Finally, there is anger’s relation to behaviour (motivation). Does focussing on emotional phenomenology encourage specific accounts of these features? We shall see that there are reasons to think it does. Still, are these reasons of sufficient import to dispel the scepticism of those who think that nothing of consequence plays out at the personal level of emotional experience? Given the role of emotional experience in our evaluative practices, we shall conclude that they are. Our discussion is structured as follows: section 1 focuses on feeling approaches to phenomenology, section 2 on componential approaches, section 3 on perceptual approaches and section 4 on attitudinal approaches. Section 5 concludes with some observations regarding the significance of emotional phenomenology. (shrink)

Perceptual and other consciousness is left out of or is not adequately characterized in naturalist accounts, including eliminative materialism and neural functionalism. We need a radically new start. Phenomenologically, if you are perceptually conscious, then a world—a changing totality of things—must somehow exist. Partly because with consciousness nothing is hidden and all can be reported without inference, perceptual consciousness itself is literally to be understood as things existing spatio-temporally. This account of consciousness as existence does not reduce it to mental (...) worlds and satisfies our conviction of the reality of consciousness—mainly we do not think of it as ethereal or gossamer. The account also explains fundamental subjectivity, as the naturalist accounts cannot, and passes a test having to do with the mind-body problem. It is a near-naturalism. The account can be defended against objections about brains in vats, chairs in minds, and leaving out consciousness. (shrink)

In the field of machine consciousness, it has been argued that in order to build human-like conscious machines, we must first have a computational model of qualia. To this end, some have proposed a framework that supports qualia in machines by implementing a model with three computational areas (i.e., the subconceptual, conceptual, and linguistic areas). These abstract mechanisms purportedly enable the assessment of artificial qualia. However, several critics of the machine consciousness project dispute this possibility. For instance, Searle, in his (...) Chinese room objection, argues that however sophisticated a computational system is, it can never exhibit intentionality; thus, would also fail to exhibit consciousness or any of its varieties. This paper argues that the proposed architecture mentioned above answers the problem posed by Searle, at least in part. Specifically, it argues that we could reformulate Searle’s worries in the Chinese room in terms of the three-stage artificial qualia model. And by doing so, we could see that the person doing all the translations in the room could realize the three areas in the proposed framework. Consequently, this demonstrates the actualization of self-consciousness in machines. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: I join Gasparyan’s discussion on a possibility of having a theory of consciousness without ignoring the intrinsic self-referentiality of such an endeavour. My questions are: If we acknowledge the primacy of consciousness, is a theory of consciousness even possible? If so, what purpose would it serve? Explaining consciousness “from the inside” leads to some epistemological and methodological dilemmas, one of which is the encounter of phenomenal (...) modalities that might not be accessible to explication. Gasparyan suggests that one such modality is the experience of differentiation. I try to clarify the terminology and suggest further research in this direction. (shrink)

Consciousness is arguably the most important interdisciplinary area in contemporary philosophy of mind, with an explosion of research over the past thirty years from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists. It is also perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world despite the fact that it is familiar to each of us. Consciousness also seems resistant to any straightforward physical explanation. This book introduces readers to the contemporary problem of consciousness, providing a clear introduction to the overall landscape and a fair-minded critical (...) survey of various theories of consciousness. Beginning with essential historical background to the problem of consciousness, Rocco Gennaro explores the following key topics and debates: the metaphysical problem of consciousness, including varieties of dualism and materialism; consciousness and neuroscience, particularly the question of whether consciousness can be reduced to brain activity or attentional mechanisms; representational and cognitive theories of consciousness; consciousness and psychopathology; animals, machines, and consciousness. Extensive use is made of interesting phenomena throughout the book, ranging from blindsight, synaesthesia, and change blindness to phantom limb syndrome, split-brain cases, and dissociative identity disorder. The inclusion of chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary make this book essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative overview of the problem of consciousness, not only in philosophy but related fields such as psychology and cognitive science. (shrink)

Attention has been addressed either as a distinction of a figure from background or as a searchlight scanning of a surface. In both ways, attention is limited to a single object. The aim of this article is to suggest a platform for an interpretation of multi-attention, that is, attention based on multiplicity of objects and spaces. The article describes how attention can be given to more than one object, based on the experiences of pilots, parents and car drivers.

The paper argues that empirical work on Buddhist meditation has an impact on Buddhist epistemology, in particular their account of unity of consciousness. I explain the Buddhist account of unity of consciousness and show how it relates to contemporary philosophical accounts of unity of consciousness. The contemporary accounts of unity of consciousness are closely integrated with the discussion of neural correlates of consciousness. The conclusion of the paper suggests a new direction in the search for neural correlates of state consciousness (...) or creature consciousness. (shrink)

This work makes the case for a variant of panpsychism with an idealist metaphysic. It does not deny the concrete existence of any entities discoverable from commonplace experience or by science (such as cats, rocks, molecules and quarks), but argues that all true entities (the entire furniture of the universe) are in essence nothing over and above centres of experience that can perceive one another and act on their percepts. All physical properties and laws reduce without remainder to mental dittos. (...) The system gives a lucid account of mental causation. The book critiques physicalism as obscure, perhaps even incoherent, and defends libertarian free will. (shrink)

Deleuze's philosophy of difference, characterized by a style of thinking without image, offers both a powerful critique and an important contribution to philosophical conceptions of consciousness. At stake in such a philosophy is the very life of thought---its force---that philosophy must encounter as always underway. The thoughtful movement of consciousness is always already coming to expression, and this constitutes the first challenge to a thinking of consciousness. Traditionally, philosophy takes up the problem of consciousness by proposing a logical recollection of (...) the grounds of thinking. Plato's epistemology is marked by this tendency, as is Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit that begins with the recollection of consciousness. This recollection is characteristic of a philosophical style that organizes thought according to the principle of identity; the ground of thought must be recollected in order for thinking to henceforth develop into truth. ;Deleuze develops his own investigation of consciousness through a fictional recollection of the philosophical tradition. Rather than recollect other theories of consciousness, Deleuze repeats them, bringing them to bear upon the problem of a philosophy of difference and allowing them thereby to become expressive of possibilities of thinking no longer organized by identity. In particular, Deleuze's repetition of Hume, Kant and Nietzsche repeats a movement whereby empirical knowledge develops first into transcendental knowledge and then into immanent knowledge. In repeating the historical narrative of these three thinkers, Deleuze makes this narrative into a fable whose fictional character is nonetheless indicative of the force of thinking itself. ;Deleuze's Difference and Repetition takes up the force of thinking as its central theme. Displaying a strong indebtedness to Bergson, Difference and Repetition attempts to develop concepts capable of thinking the movement of thought without reducing this movement to a succession of momentary states. Difference is the concept adequate to a thinking of the diversity of the thought of consciousness, while repetition is the concept adequate to a thinking of the difference of consciousness from itself. The intersection of these concepts is the differential moment of thinking, a moment that opens difference onto the alterity of the new that always develops it. (shrink)

My aim is to clarify a certain concept of consciousness, to describe its relation to intentionality, and to explain its importance. ;I begin by arguing that one has a knowledge of one's own mind distinct in kind from that one has of another's, and propose that we rely on this distinctively first-person knowledge in thinking about consciousness. Adopting this first-person approach, I discuss certain kinds of illustrative instances, both actual and possible, of consciousness and its absence. The actual cases are (...) such as can be found in ordinary experience, and the possibilities are suggested by research on what has been called 'blindsight'. ;By reference to such examples, I draw attention to certain distinctions, the neglect of which reveals a neglect of consciousness. I argue that consciousness should not be identified with a capacity to respond discriminatively to stimuli, or with some form of self-representation or inner perception. And consciousness should be distinguished from the accessibility of information to certain cognitive capacities, and from certain kinds of functional role. ;I explain the relation between intentionality and consciousness via an account of phenomenal character. To say that experiences differ in phenomenal character is to say that they differ in ways that only what is conscious could, and to have experience with phenomenal character is to have phenomenal features. I argue that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience, imagery, and non-imagistic thought is inseparable from our intentional features, for the phenomenal features we thus have are intentional ones. ;On this view, phenomenal features are heavily and pervasively involved in manifestations of human intelligence in perception and verbal thought. Thus theories of mind cannot afford to ignore consciousness or treat it as a peripheral topic. Finally, I contend that consciousness is important to us not just for what it contingently enables us to do; having phenomenal features is an essential part of what many of us want. And, I argue, the value we thus attach to consciousness is not trivial, but underlies basic ethical attitudes we have towards ourselves and one another. (shrink)

The Minangkabau of West Sumatra have long been prominent in the political, economic, & intellectual life of Indonesia, & they have been studied for their strong Islamic faith & their matrilineality. No one, until now,has examined the fact that they are also avid explainers & interpreters of their own customs & etiquette. This engrossing book explores a culture where explanation is an art; in so doing, it addresses the question of how meaning is created & expressed within a particular social (...) context. Meaning is, for them, conveyed through signs rather than through symbols. (shrink)

Current theories of phenomenal consciousness---theories, that is, of the felt or qualitative aspect of mental states---are often accused of leaving out the essential features of this phenomenon. Moreover, the opponents of these theories typically hold that their failure is not accidental. They argue either that the problem of phenomenal consciousness is unsolvable, or that we still lack even the conceptual resources needed for its solution. My dissertation challenges both the adequacy of current theories and the skeptical stance of their rivals. (...) I think that current approaches are indeed in principle incapable of capturing phenomenal consciousness, but that an account that does capture this phenomenon is within our reach. The reason for the failure of these theories, I argue, is the underlying assumption that phenomenality consists in various strictly cognitive and representational features of mental systems. ;The main purpose of my dissertation is to lay the foundations for an alternative account of phenomenal consciousness, according to which "the missing element of consciousness"---the one needed for capturing the allegedly intractable features of this phenomenon---is the conative-evaluative aspect of our minds. Conative-evaluative attitudes like desires, interests and preferences play an essential role in constituting phenomenality. I argue that phenomenality arises from an interplay between our cognitive nature, and, in particular, the representational aspect of our minds, and our conative-evaluative nature. There can be no phenomenality---nothing "it is like" to be sensitive to various conditions---if all there is is neutral-unevaluated information. Rather, what gives rise to phenomenality is the subject's being non-indifferent towards information---her adopting conative-evaluative attitudes towards, and thereby conferring significance upon, items represented by her states. In the phenomenal mode information is "evaluatively loaded"---it is "colored" by the subject's evaluative outlook; and what creates the evaluative outlook is conative attitudes of various sorts. The "subjective point of view", which is widely taken to be the mark of the phenomenal, is actually an evaluative point of view. (shrink)