I argue that Husserl’s concept of position-taking, Stellungnahme, is adequate to understand the idea of second nature as an issue of philosophical anthropology. I claim that the methodological focus must be the living subject that acts and lives among others, and that the notion of second nature must respond to precisely this fundamental active character of subjectivity. The appropriate concept should satisfy two additional desiderata. First, it should be able to develop alongside the biological, psychological, and social individual (...) development. Second, it should be able to underlie the vast diversity of human beings within and across communities. As possible candidates, I contrast position-taking with two types of habit-like concepts: instinct and habitus, on the one hand, and customary habits, on the other. I argue that position-taking represents the active aspect of the subject while the habit-like concepts are passive. A subject’s position-takings and ensuing comportments are tied together by motivations, which evince a certain consistency, and for this reason are expression of the subject’s identity. I conclude by nuancing the relation between Stellungnahme and passivity. Passivity is deemed necessary to action but subservient to it; position-taking is thought to be prior to passivity. (shrink)

It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological (...) aspects of their objects. Instead it proposes that they are ways of taking a stand or position on the world. I refer to this as the Position-Taking View of emotion. Whilst some authors seem sympathetic to this view, this it has so far not been systematically motivated and elaborated. In this paper, I fill this gap and propose a more adequate account of our emotional engagement with the world than the predominant epistemic paradigm. I start by highlighting the specific way in which emotions are directed at something, which I contrast with the intentionality of perception and other forms of apprehension. I then go on to offer a specific account of the valence of emotion and show how this account and the directedness of emotions makes them intelligible as a way of taking a position on something. (shrink)

Müller proposes a position-taking theory to account for the manifest image of emotional feelings as “feelings towards”. He reduces the process of position-taking to goal-based construal, which is akin to the stimulus-goal comparison process central in appraisal theories. Although this reduction can account for the heat of emotional feelings and the intuition that non-linguistic organisms can also have feelings, it may fail to keep the position-taking aspect on board. Moreover, the image of emotional feelings (...) as active position-takings may itself be questioned and replaced with a passive image. I end by acknowledging that a passive image is still compatible with an active underlying mechanism as is the case in appraisal theories but even more so in the goal-directed theory. (shrink)

The theory of emotions as affective position-takings (PT) is investigated from the perspective of a computational model of the belief-desire theory of emotions (CBDTE) proposed by the author. Both theories assume that a core subset of typical emotion episodes are the products of an evaluation process in which cognized states of affairs are evaluated for their congruence with the person's desires; and that emotions are, on the conscious level, feelings of pleasure and displeasure. However, according to PT the evaluation (...) is a concern-based construal and emotional feelings are intrinsically object-directed, whereas according to CBDTE, the evaluation is performed by a hardwired mechanism that produces nonintentional feelings. Furthermore, CBDTE suggests that hedonic feelings are simultaneously reactions to the detection of value, and representations of the detected value. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 279-287, October 2022. This article clarifies and defends my view of emotional feeling in response to the commentaries by Ronnie de Sousa, Rick Furtak, Agnes Moors, Kevin Mulligan, Rainer Reisenzein and Philipp Schmidt. The issues addressed concern my critique of the axiological receptivity view, my proposed alternative, i.e. the position-taking view, as well as my methodological commitments.

1. Built upon systems of nosology that claimed to be “atheoretical,” modern psychiatry largely relies on descriptive psychopathological models based on the assumption that psychotic symptoms (such...

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 244-253, October 2022. This article is a précis of my 2019 monograph The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling: On Affect and Intentionality. The book engages with a growing trend of philosophical thinking according to which the felt dimension and the intentionality of emotion are unified. While sympathetic to the general approach, I argue for a reconceptualization of the form of intentionality that emotional feelings are widely thought to possess and, accordingly, of the kind of (...) role they play in our mental lives. More specifically, I argue that the way we feel in having an emotion is not a perception-like awareness of evaluative properties of its object, but instead constitutes the taking of a stand or position on this object in light of its evaluative properties. (shrink)

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 233-243, October 2022. This special section of Emotion Review is devoted to the discussion of a recent philosophical emotion theory, the theory of emotions as affective position-takings. The aims of the special section are to provide readers with a spotlight view of recent research in the philosophy of emotion, to advance emotion theory, and support the interdisciplinary dialogue. To increase the accessibility of the special section texts to a nonphilosophical readership, we first (...) discuss the relationship between the philosophy and the psychology of emotions and give a brief review the main types of theories of emotional experience. (shrink)

Runaway climate change and persistent inequality are ravaging the world and humanity. Who can help lead us to a better future? Business. These massive dual challenges-and other profound shifts like pandemics, resource constraints, and shrinking biodiversity-threaten our very existence on the planet. Yet division and discord risk undermining our response, just when we need to come together. Global partnership and leadership are lacking, free trade and globalization are under attack, and populism continues to breed intolerance and disruption. At this critical (...) time in history, the imperative to reimagine our economies and companies could not be more urgent. Fortunately, many in the business community-from large corporations to microenterprises-are helping to solve our most profound challenges by deploying long-term, purpose-led business models that put people and planet first. And they are profiting on this new path with new tools, AI and data-driven transparency, and radical improvements in the economics of clean technologies. The key question has flipped from "Why would you do sustainability?" to "Why wouldn't you?" In this paradigm-shifting book, former Unilever CEO Paul Polman and sustainable-business guru Andrew Winston provide a model to help leaders build companies that contribute more to the world than they use or take-that is, net positive companies. They bypass the last gasps of denial to show how purpose and profits are inextricably linked and how collective action can deliver the scale of change and transformation the world needs. Net Positive outlines the principles and practices for surviving and thriving, based on the experience of one world-leading company, Unilever, and other groundbreaking global organizations. This essential book is for leaders, executives, managers, and professionals who want to succeed, but know that winning requires caring deeply about serving the world. Building a net positive company is the key, and this book shows the way. (shrink)

This article explains how data associated with attitude change and persuasion in mainstream psychology and social psychology can be reinterpreted as evidence of the agentive ability of taking a position. A critical review is made of the elaboration likelihood model and a position model is adapted from positioning theory. The postulates of the elaboration likelihood model are then subjected to critical scrutiny by means of comparison with our position model. In this way regularities associated with attitude (...) change and persuasion are interpreted as evidence of a deliberative process, involving negotiation and the use of supporting and opposing arguments. We present this as evidence of the commonly held agentive ability to position oneself and anticipate the positions of others. (shrink)

In a well-known paper “Illusion and well-being”, Taylor and Brown maintain that positive illusions about the self play a significant role in the maintenance of mental health, as well as in the ability to maintain caring inter-personal relations and a sense of well-being. These illusions include unrealistically positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of personal control, and unrealistic optimism about one's future. Accurate self-knowledge, they maintain, is not an indispensable ingredient of mental health and well-being. Two lines of criticism are directed against (...) the creative self-deception hypothesis, one methodological and one substantive. First, it is argued that Taylor and Brown's method of eliciting experimental subjects' self-reports and comparative self-ratings under artificial experimental conditions lacks ecological validity and phenomenological realism. Second, it is argued that positive illusions diminish the range of reactive other-regarding attitudes and emotions that people can adopt. A literary case history (Ibsen's The wild duck ) which satisfies the criteria of ecological adequacy is used to illustrate the latter point. (shrink)

Relaxed naturalism and liberal naturalism both invite us to adopt a philosophy of nature that includes a range of non-scientific phenomena in its inventory while nevertheless keeping the supernatural at bay. This paper considers the question of how relaxed naturalism relates to liberal naturalism and what refinements are required if they are to succeed in their joint cause of developing a tenable alternative to scientific naturalism. Particular attention is given to what might be added to the naturalist’s toolbox when it (...) comes to identifying and dealing with supernatural excesses and clarifying how philosophers can do positive metaphysical work in support of the naturalistic project. (shrink)

The relationship between mainstream femininity and resistance to it has been theorized in a number of ways. In one approach, mainstream femininity is identified as a patriarchal set of public texts that women accept, negotiate, or resist in practice. Another view sees mainstream femininity as a dominant cultural practice to which there are resistant subcultural responses. Taking a poststructuralist view, this article offers an alternative to these models. The focus of the article is the differing ways in which a (...) set of interviewees validated their participation in a type of relationship that is socially constructed as a departure from mainstream femininity, namely, a voluntary sexual relationship between an adult man and an adolescent girl. (shrink)

This paper examines methodological issues associated with the theory of planned behaviour and explains that an alternative account of data used to support this theory can be provided by positioning theory. A case is presented that shows tests of the theory of planned behaviour fail to eliminate the possibility of alternative explanations for co-variation in its data. An agency or person-centered alternative shows how a causal interpretation can be reinterpreted as evidence of the actions of a person. Unlike the conceptualisation (...) of the individual as behaving in keeping with postulated underlying cognitive laws or rules we assume that the person has, through socialisation, acquired the skills necessary to initiate and manage their own actions. Unlike the interest in TPB data as a causal explanation of action we draw attention to the interpretation of patterns in these data as an aggregate of each person using a common mode of explanation to justify and explain their intentions. (shrink)

Trish Glazebrook and Dana Belu both think I spend too much time criticizing the Cartesianism that both empirical and transcendental philosophies of technology quite obviously oppose. They argue that I would have been better off if I had instead considered how these two philosophies “converge on the thesis of crisis” in technoscientific life and/or “made wider use of Feenberg’s work”. While I am sympathetic to both Glazebrook’s thesis and Feenberg’s work, I argue that their recommendations raise precisely the “pre-philosophical” issue (...) I discuss in my paper. The issue, addressed directly by both Nietzsche and the young Heidegger, is how such recommendations can be carried forward as productive, life-driven articulations of our current needs in technoscientific times and not just become two more in a long string of chosen “turns” in a history of philosophical “positions.”. (shrink)

The present research was designed to test whether the subjective experience of more effort related to more reward valuation as measured by a neural response. This prediction was derived from the theory of cognitive dissonance and its effort justification paradigm. Young adult participants (n = 82) engaged in multiple trails of a low or high effort task that resulted in a loss or reward on each trial. Neural responses to the reward (loss) cue were measured using EEG, so that the (...) event-related potential known as the Reward Positivity (RewP) could be assessed. Results revealed no significant differences between low and high effort conditions on the RewP. However, within the high effort condition, a more subjective experience of effort was associated with a larger RewP. This research extends past research on the effort justification paradigm of cognitive dissonance theory by suggesting that effort justification is associated with an implicit measure of reward valuation. It therefore challenges recent perspectives on dissonance processes that posit that these evaluative changes should only occur on explicit but not implicit measures. (shrink)

Socio-economic decisions are commonly explained by rational cost versus benefit considerations, whereas person variables have not much been considered. The present study aimed at investigating the degree to which dispositional power motivation and affective states predict socio-economic decisions. The power motive was assessed both indirectly and directly using a TAT-like picture test and a power motive self-report, respectively. After 9 months, 62 students completed an affect rating and performed on a money allocation task. We hypothesized and confirmed that dispositional power (...) should be associated with a tendency to maximize one’s profit but to care less about another party’s profit. Additionally, positive affect showed effects in the same direction. The results are discussed with respect to a motivational approach explaining socio-economic behaviour. (shrink)

The distinction between positive and negative eugenics is perhaps the best-known distinction that has been made between forms that eugenics takes. Roughly, positive eugenics refers to efforts aimed at increasing desirable traits, while negative eugenics refers to efforts aimed at decreasing undesirable traits. Still, it is easy to fall into confusion in drawing and deploying the distinction in particular contexts. Clarity here is important not only historically, but also for appeals to the distinction in contemporary discussions of “new eugenics” or (...) “newgenics”. (shrink)

This article sets out the basic principles of a new theory of intellectual interventions centred round the notion of positioning. Intellectual interventions are seen as ways in which intellectuals locate themselves in the socio-political and intellectual field, thereby also positioning others. The existing contributions to the study of intellectuals often take the self-concepts or dispositions of intellectuals to be fixed, and they tend to focus on the causes and motivations behind intellectual interventions. Challenging this perspective, the theory proposed substitutes a (...) vocabulary of effects for the existing vocabulary of intentions and causes: rather than speculating on the sociological determinants or purposes that underlie an intellectual intervention, this theory explores its effects for the symbolic and institutional recognition of the author(s) and for the diffusion of the ideas propagated. (shrink)

This article explores research findings regarding the possibilities offered by remote attendance at council meetings as implemented during the coronavirus pandemic, and reflects upon how...

The challenge of intercultural relations has become an important issue in many societies. In spite of the claimed value of intercultural diversity, successful outcomes as predicted by the contact hypothesis are but one possibility; on occasions intercultural contact leads to intolerance and hostility. Research has documented that one key mediator of contact is perspective taking. Differences in perspective are significant in shaping perceptions of contact and reactions to it. The ability to take the perspective of the other and to (...) understand it in its own terms is a necessary condition for successful intergroup outcomes. This paper sheds light on the processes involved in intercultural perspective taking by elaborating the notion of the point of view based on social representations theory. The point of view provides a theory of social positioning that can analyse cultural encounters between social actors, and identify the conditions for positive relations. Insights are drawn from a study of public views on the relative merits of science and religion, following a documentary by Richard Dawkins in which it was suggested that religion is a source of evil. The findings demonstrate that the point of view may be categorised according to a three-way taxonomy according to the extent to which it is open to another perspective. A point of view may be monological—closed to another's perspective entirely, dialogical—open to the possibility of another perspective while maintaining some percepts as unchallengeable, or metalogical—open to another's perspective based on the other's frame of reference. (shrink)

A natural view in distributive ethics is that everyone's interests matter, but the interests of the relatively worse off matter more than the interests of the relatively better off. I provide a new argument for this view. The argument takes as its starting point the proposal, due to Harsanyi and Rawls, that facts about distributive ethics are discerned from individual preferences in the "original position." I draw on recent work in decision theory, along with an intuitive principle about risk- (...) class='Hi'>taking, to derive the view. (shrink)

Position and Criticism of the Symbolic Functionin the First Works of Merleau-PontyIn this article, we propose to address the question of the symbolic function in Merleau-Ponty’s first works. More specifically, we shall be interested in the place thathe grants to this question in The Structure of Behavior, and to the way he critically takes it up in the Phenomenology of Perception. Although Merleau-Ponty hardly clarifies this himself, Merleau-Ponty’s commentators also have rarely made this problematic an object of debate. In (...) his first work, by appropriating the semantics of the symbolic emerging from neuropsychology, Merleau-Ponty characterizes the level of organization of human corporality by means of its capacity to overcome the immediate character of lived situations. In this work, the categorical attitude appears as a new signification of organic structuration that, among the different forms of behavior, characterizes human activity. Moreover, in the chapters of the Phenomenology of Perception where Merleau-Ponty evokes the spatiality, the motility, and the expressivity of one’s own body, he abandons causal explanations of pathological phenomena which are used as if they are arguments, just as he gives up explanations copied off the symbolic function which are then associated with intellectualist analyses. These analyses delimit the notion of intentionality that Merleau-Ponty aims at developing. The notion is established on the foundation of the synergetic unity of one’s own body. Whence the importance that another theoretico-anthropological device acquires throughout the Phenomenology of Perception: the notion of the “corporeal schema”.Posizione e critica della funzione simbolicanei primi lavori di Merleau-PontyIn questo articolo ci proponiamo di affrontare la questione della funzione simbolica nei primi lavori di Merleau-Ponty. Ci interesseremo più specificamente al posto che è accordato a tale questione ne La struttura del comportamento e alla sua ripresa critica nella Fenomenologia della percezione. Poco esplicitata dal filosofo, questa problematica è altresì poco dibattuta presso i commentatori. Nel suo primo lavoro, Merleau-Ponty, appropriandosi della semantica del simbolo sorta dalla neuropsichiatria, caratterizza il livello d’organizzazione della corporeità umana mediante la sua capacità di superare il carattere immediato delle situazioni vissute. In quest’opera, l’attitudine categoriale appare come un nuovo signifi cato della ristrutturazione organica che, fra le differenti forme di comportamento, caratterizza l’attività umana. D’altronde, nei capitoli della Fenomenologia della percezione in cui Merleau-Ponty evoca la spazialità, la motricitàe l’espressività del corpo proprio, l’autore rinuncia alle spiegazioni causali dei fenomeni patologici utilizzati alla stregua di argomentazioni, così come rinuncia alla spiegazioni ricavate dalla funzione simbolica, ormai ricondotte a delle analisi di ordine intellettualistico. Tali analisi delimitano la nozione d’intenzionalità che il filosofo mira a sviluppare, e che si stabilisce in base al fondamento dell’unità simbolica del corpo proprio. Da qui l’importanza che acquista un altro dispositivo teorico-antropologico lungo tutta la Fenomenologia della percezione: la nozione di “schema corporeo”. (shrink)

Department of Geography and Planning, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands There is a growing sense of dissatisfaction among political philosophers with the practical sterility and empirical inadequacy of the discipline. Post-Rawlsian philosophy is wrestling with the need to construct a ‘contextualized morality’ that is sensitive to the particularities and complexities of actual moral reasoning but does not succumb to the temptations of relativism. We argue that this predicament is due to its inability to take the pluralism of our moral universe, (...) the multi-layeredness of our social reality, the indeterminacy of our normative principles and the complexity of our practical reasoning seriously. To incorporate these properties of the ‘human condition’ we have constructed a complex evaluative framework, balancing moral, ethico-political, prudential and realist criteria. We argue that political philosophy new style is well advised to adopt such a framework and to position itself, as a true ‘art’, between political philosophy old style and the social sciences. Thus political philosophy is better equipped to deal with the big tradeoffs of today, rekindle our utopian hopes and regain political bite. Key Words: comparative institutionalism • evaluation studies • political philosophy • political theory. (shrink)

This article, prompted by an extended essay published in the Journal of Medical Ethics by Charles Foster, and the current controversy surrounding the case of Vincent Lambert, analyses the legal and ethical arguments in relation to the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from patients with prolonged disorders of consciousness. The article analyses the legal framework through the prism of domestic law, case-law of the European Court of Human Rights and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, and examines the (...) challenge to the ethical consensus made by Foster. It concludes that the right approach remains a version of the approach that has prevailed for the last 25 years since the decision in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland[1993] AC 789, refined to reflect that that there is now, and rightly, a much more limited place for judgments made about the ‘burden’ of treatment or the quality of life enjoyed by the person made on the basis of assumptions about that person as a category as opposed to investigation of that person as an individual human being. (shrink)

In the debate over clinicians’ conscience, there is a greater ethical, legal, and scholarly focus on negative, rather than positive, claims of conscience. This asymmetry produces a seemingly unjustified double standard with respect to clinicians’ conscience under the law. For example, a Roman Catholic physician working at a secular institution may refuse to provide physician-aid-in-dying on the basis of conscience, but a secular physician working at a Roman Catholic institution may not insist on providing physician-aid-in-dying on the basis of conscience. (...) This article outlines arguments against this asymmetry and critiques them for failing to distinguish between positive claims of conscience as positive or negative rights. I suggest the asymmetry debate should be focused on whether positive claims of conscience as positive rights ought to enjoy the same protections as negative claims of conscience. Clarifying the debate in this way helps elucidate some of the best reasons for the asymmetry, which these arguments have not addressed. This article does not take a definitive position on whether the asymmetry is justified, but attempts to bring some focus to the debate by directing arguments against the asymmetry to address the significant differences between positive claims of conscience as positive rights and negative claims of conscience. (shrink)

Workplaces are often described as places in which individuals are motivated by their self-interests and in which negative events like time pressure, anxiety, conflict with co-workers, miscomprehensions, difficulties in solving problems, not-transmitted or not-exchanged information that lead to mistakes, and in some cases to injuries, stress or control, are part of everyday life. Such situations are often the result of the limited comprehension of needs, skills, or information available to colleagues, supervisors, subordinates, clients or providers. However, workplaces are also places (...) in which employees take care of clients, support colleagues and subordinates, are enthusiastic about their job, are motivated by leaders that encourage employees to transcend their own self-interests for the good of the group or the organization and provide them with the confidence to perform beyond expectations. Thus positive relationships at work are becoming a new interdisciplinary domain of inquiry. Within this positive relationships framework, in this paper we focus on a positive component of workplaces, and particularly on an individual cognitive and emotional process that has an important role in the workplace because it facilitates interpersonal relations and communications: it is the perspective taking process. In order to describe perspective taking, we will refer to some empirical studies and particularly to the review published by Parker, Atkins and Axtell in 2008 on the International Review of Industrial and Organizational Psychology. Perspective taking is a well established psychological construct, investigated both in the field of human development, as an important component of reasoning and moral development, and also in social and clinical psychology, where it is considered a component of social behaviors and of the therapeutic process. It has also been conceptualized in different ways. Duan and Hill describe three approaches to explain reasons for perspective taking behavior: a dispositional approach, that considers empathy as a relatively stable trait or a general ability; a cognitive-affective experience influenced by situational conditions; and finally as a multiphased experiential process. However, although in modern organizations working cooperatively and taking into account customers’ needs and experiences are becoming even more important, very few studies have considered perspective taking process within organizations. This is interesting because taking into account the perspective of others may contribute to more collaborative workplaces, where it is pleasant to work, as also enlighted in the title of the Parker, Atkins and Axtell’s paper: “Building better workplaces” is one of the possible outcomes of perspective taking. This paper aims to make available to a large audience such studies and, in relation to the topic of the conference organized by “Psychology and Communion”, consider connections between this concept and ideas and writings by Chiara Lubich. (shrink)

Medical errors are all too common. Ever since a report issued by the Institute of Medicine raised awareness of this unfortunate reality, an emerging theme has gained prominence in the literature on medical error. Fears of blame and punishment, it is often claimed, allow errors to remain undisclosed. Accordingly, modern healthcare must shift away from blame towards a culture of safety in order to effectively reduce the occurrence of error. Against this shift, I argue that it would serve the medical (...) community well to retain notions of individual responsibility and blame in healthcare settings. In particular, expressions of moral emotions—such as guilt, regret and remorse—appear to play an important role in the process of disclosing harmful errors to patients and families. While such self-blaming responses can have negative psychological effects on the individual practitioner, those who take the blame are in the best position to offer apologies and show that mistakes are being taken seriously, thereby allowing harmed patients and families to move forward in the wake of medical error. (shrink)

Positive thinking is one of the most valuable tools that postmodern man possesses for personal development and transforming community life. Positive thinking is based on the harmonious relation of the individual with himself, with the others, and with the surrounding reality. It comes at the end of a process of conscious change which the individual goes through in gradual steps, and becomes nuanced as thinking and personal practices develop. Our starting point is the role of thinking as laid out by (...) Descartes. Descartes’ conception of philosophy as a thought system points to the acquisition of virtue through knowledge of truth, by cultivating measure, and thus highlighting man as a thinking being. The entire effort of achieving knowledge, of acquiring wisdom, has a moral finality. Its fundament is the presence of God as the infinite instance that deems possible the free manifestation of the human person. As a thinking being, the human subject brings himself into existence. He certifies the reality of the world. Everything takes place on the horizon of the infinite self-existence represented by the philosophical idea of God. As a spiritual being, man can use thinking to shape his desires, to master his willpower, but most of all, to integrate himself in the process of conscious personal development. (shrink)

The environmental crisis, one of the great challenges of our time, tends to disenfranchise those who come after us. Arguing that as temporary inhabitants of the earth, we cannot be indifferent to future generations, this book draws on the resources of phenomenology and poststructuralism to help us conceive of moral relations in connection with human temporality. Demonstrating that moral and political normativity emerge with generational time, the time of birth and death, this book proposes two related models of intergenerational and (...) environmental justice. The first entails a form of indirect reciprocity, in which we owe future people both because of their needs and interests and because we ourselves have been the beneficiaries of peoples past; the second posits a generational taking of turns that Matthias Fritsch applies to both our institutions and our natural environment, in other words, to the earth as a whole. Offering new readings of key philosophers, and emphasizing the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida in particular, Taking Turns with the Earth disrupts human-centered notions of terrestrial appropriation and sharing to give us a new continental philosophical account of future-oriented justice. (shrink)

For years business ethics has limited the moral duties of enterprises to negative duties. Over the last decade it has been argued that positive duties also befall commercial agents, at least when confronted with large scale public problems and when governments fail. The argument that enterprises have positive duties is often grounded in the political nature of commercial life. It is argued that agents must sometimes take over governmental responsibilities. The German republican tradition argues along these lines as does Nien-Hé (...) Hsieh. Agents in commercial life are bound by positive duties because at some point they become citizens that must take on the responsibilities of the state. In this paper we leave undisputed the claim that corporations must acknowledge positive duties. However, we demonstrate that the political grounding fails, at least in the sense that this theory insufficiently acknowledges a long standing liberal tradition that vindicates apolitical markets and clear borderlines between politics and economics. We carve out an alternative route to the grounding of one specific positive duty—the duty to further justice. Our argument is based on the moral nature of commercial agents and tries to demonstrate that the duty to further justice ensues from liberalism. Taking a Kantian perspective, it conceptualizes the duty to further justice as a moral duty, orientated toward the political domain. It is grounded in the obligation to attain moral autonomy in the civil condition. (shrink)

This chapter examines what it means to take time seriously. It begins with an examination of the arguments of Kant and Bradley for the view that time is not an ultimate primitive of reality. Then Bergson’s attempt to take time seriously is criticised. Bergson’s duration fails to capture the content of our concept of time. Space is just as important and it plays a unique role in explaining facts about our concept of time. Thus, in order to take time seriously (...) we need to posit space-time of which space and time are mere aspects. Consequences about the nature of time with respect to theories of motion, temporal progression in the universe, universals and God are also discussed. (shrink)

abstract In this paper I take seriously von Hirsch's view that sanctions imposed on offenders need to be compatible with their dignity, and argue that some versions of restorative justice — notably that defended by Braithwaite — can put offenders in the humiliating position of having to make apologies that they do not believe in in order to avoid further bad consequences. Drawing on recent work by Duff I argue that this problem can be avoided by conceiving of restorative (...) justice as an apologetic ritual. This view gives some ground to von Hirsch but presents a view of criminal justice that is distinctively restorative. I conclude by drawing out the differences between my account and that of Duff. (shrink)

"When it comes to morality as it is practiced in medicine, Brody makes clear that the ethical issues are never as simple as black and white - that there are myriad factors and fine nuances that can and should challenge decision making as it is commonly practiced in difficult medical cases. In this collection, delving thoughtfully and systematically into methodology, research ethics, clinical ethics, and Jewish medical ethics, he tackles thorny life-and-death questions head-on and fearlessly. He casts a light into (...) all the corners of end-of-life decisions - a field in which he has exemplary credentials - while illuminating a new understanding of morality and ethics." "The introduction outlines much of Brody's approach, defines the terminology used, and contrasts his ethical positions with much of the competing literature, Taking Issue will be invaluable to students and scholars in medical ethics, bioethics, and the philosophy of medicine." "Baruch A. Brody is the Leon Jaworski Professor Biomedical Ethics and director of the Center for Medical Ethics and Health Policy at Baylor College of Medicine. He is also a professor of philosophy at Rice University and director of the Ethics program at the Methodist Hospital."--BOOK JACKET. (shrink)

This paper targets an orphan topic in research ethics, namely the so called principle of the primacy of the human being, which states that the interests of the human subject should always take precedence over the interests of science and society. Although the principle occupies the central position in the majority of international ethical and legal standards for biomedical research, it has been commented in the literature mainly in passing. With a few notable exceptions, there is little in-depth discussion (...) about the meaning and role of the principle. Several authors note that the principle is vogue, ambiguous and apparently conflicting with the accepted practice of conducting non-beneficial research on individuals unable to give consent. There are opinions that it is just “a vacuous figure of speech” and should be abandoned. This paper argues that the primacy principle is far from being “a vacuous figure of speech”, rather it should be seen as a threefold concept: a fundamental interpretative rule, a procedural rule, and a substantive rule aimed at protecting research subjects from instrumental treatment and unacceptable risks. This interpretation tracks back to the principle regulatory and normative origins in the Declaration of Helsinki of 1975, but also acknowledges changes in research ethics and practice, which took place at the turn on the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Thus, the proposed reading of the principle is not only original, but also historically grounded and normatively fruitful. It provides a fresh and ethically rich perspective on extensively debated, but still controversial problem of an upper limit of permissible risks in non-beneficial studies. (shrink)

I examine the relationship between taking Pascal’s wager, faith, and hope. First, I argue that many who take Pascal’s wager have genuine faith that God exists. The person of faith and the wagerer have several things in common, including a commitment to God and positive cognitive and conative attitudes toward God’s existence. If one’s credences in theism are too low to have faith, I argue that the wagerer can still hope that God exists, another commitment-justifying theological virtue. I conclude (...) with two upshots of the argument, including how it provides responses to common objections to Pascal’s wager. (shrink)

Comments on the views on free will offered by B. D. Slife , M. Gergen , R. N. Williams , M. S. Richardson , and G. S. Howard in light of the classical definition of FW as being capable of doing otherwise. It is argued that FW interpretations differ markedly depending on whether they are viewed as due to a process or to contents within some process. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

Position and Criticism of the Symbolic Functionin the First Works of Merleau-PontyIn this article, we propose to address the question of the symbolic function in Merleau-Ponty’s first works. More specifically, we shall be interested in the place thathe grants to this question in The Structure of Behavior, and to the way he critically takes it up in the Phenomenology of Perception. Although Merleau-Ponty hardly clarifies this himself, Merleau-Ponty’s commentators also have rarely made this problematic an object of debate. In (...) his first work, by appropriating the semantics of the symbolic emerging from neuropsychology, Merleau-Ponty characterizes the level of organization of human corporality by means of its capacity to overcome the immediate character of lived situations. In this work, the categorical attitude appears as a new signification of organic structuration that, among the different forms of behavior, characterizes human activity. Moreover, in the chapters of the Phenomenology of Perception where Merleau-Ponty evokes the spatiality, the motility, and the expressivity of one’s own body, he abandons causal explanations of pathological phenomena which are used as if they are arguments, just as he gives up explanations copied off the symbolic function which are then associated with intellectualist analyses. These analyses delimit the notion of intentionality that Merleau-Ponty aims at developing. The notion is established on the foundation of the synergetic unity of one’s own body. Whence the importance that another theoretico-anthropological device acquires throughout the Phenomenology of Perception: the notion of the “corporeal schema”.Posizione e critica della funzione simbolicanei primi lavori di Merleau-PontyIn questo articolo ci proponiamo di affrontare la questione della funzione simbolica nei primi lavori di Merleau-Ponty. Ci interesseremo più specificamente al posto che è accordato a tale questione ne La struttura del comportamento e alla sua ripresa critica nella Fenomenologia della percezione. Poco esplicitata dal filosofo, questa problematica è altresì poco dibattuta presso i commentatori. Nel suo primo lavoro, Merleau-Ponty, appropriandosi della semantica del simbolo sorta dalla neuropsichiatria, caratterizza il livello d’organizzazione della corporeità umana mediante la sua capacità di superare il carattere immediato delle situazioni vissute. In quest’opera, l’attitudine categoriale appare come un nuovo signifi cato della ristrutturazione organica che, fra le differenti forme di comportamento, caratterizza l’attività umana. D’altronde, nei capitoli della Fenomenologia della percezione in cui Merleau-Ponty evoca la spazialità, la motricitàe l’espressività del corpo proprio, l’autore rinuncia alle spiegazioni causali dei fenomeni patologici utilizzati alla stregua di argomentazioni, così come rinuncia alla spiegazioni ricavate dalla funzione simbolica, ormai ricondotte a delle analisi di ordine intellettualistico. Tali analisi delimitano la nozione d’intenzionalità che il filosofo mira a sviluppare, e che si stabilisce in base al fondamento dell’unità simbolica del corpo proprio. Da qui l’importanza che acquista un altro dispositivo teorico-antropologico lungo tutta la Fenomenologia della percezione: la nozione di “schema corporeo”. (shrink)

David Enoch develops, argues for, and defends a strongly realist and objectivist view of ethics and normativity more broadly. This view--according to which there are perfectly objective, universal, moral and other normative truths that are not in any way reducible to other, natural truths--is familiar, but this book is the first in-detail development of the positive motivations for the view into reasonably precise arguments. And when the book turns to defend Robust Realism against traditional objections, it mobilizes the original positive (...) arguments for the view to help with fending off the objections. (shrink)

Positions is a collection of three interviews with Jacques Derrida that illuminate and make more accessible the complex concepts and terms treated extensively in such works as _Writing and Difference_ and _Dissemination_. Derrida takes positions on his detractors, his supporters, and the two major preoccupations of French intellectual life, Marxism and psychoanalysis. The interviews included in this volume offer a multifaceted view of Derrida. "Implications: Interview with Henri Ronse" contains a succinct statement of principles. "Seminology and Grammatology: Interview with Julia (...) Kristeva" provides important clarifications of the role played by linguistics in Derrida's work. "Positions: Interview with Jean-Louis Houdebine and Guy Scarpetta" is a wide-ranging discussion that touches on many of the polemics that Derrida's work has provoked. Alan Bass, whose translation of _Writing and Difference_ was highly praised for its clarity, accuracy, and readability, has provided extremely useful critical notes, full of vital information, including historical background. (shrink)

In this paper, I set out to answer two foundational questions concerning our psychological engagements with fictions. The first is the question of fictional transformation: How we can see fictional media while also ‘seeing’ those objects as fictional ones? The second is the question of fictional response: How and why we take the objects of fiction to be the types of things that we can respond to and judge? Standard responses to these questions rely on distinct cognitive attitudes like pretense, (...) imagination, and make-believe. I call this position the distinct attitude view. I argue against the DAV, arguing instead that a psychological framework of fiction can answer the two questions without appealing to distinct mental attitudes. Hence, I call my position the standard attitude view. The challenge for the SAV is to explain the two questions in terms of everyday mental states and the intentional content of those states. I do so by appealing to the concept of taking the fictional stance.... (shrink)