While human beings generally act prosocially towards one another — contra a Hobbesian “war of all against all” — this basic social courtesy tends not to be extended to our relations with the more-than-human world. Educational philosophy is largely grounded in a worldview that privileges human-centered conceptions of the self, valuing its own opinions with little regard for the ecological realities undergirding it. This hyper-separation from the ‘society of all beings’ is a foundational cause of our current ecological crises. (...) In this paper, we develop an ecosocial philosophy of education based on the idea of an ecological self. We aspire to consolidate voices from deep ecology and ecofeminism for conceptualizing education in terms of being responsible to and for, a complex web of interdependent relations among human and more-than-human beings. By analyzing the notion of opinions in light of Gilles Deleuze’s critique of the ‘dogmatic image of thought,’ we formulate three aspects of ESPE capable of supporting an ecological as opposed to an egoistic conception of the self: rather than dealing with fixed concepts, ESPE supports adaptable and flexible boundaries between the self and the world; rather than fixating on correct answers, ESPE focuses on real-life problems shifting our concern from the self to the world; and rather than supporting arrogance, EPSE cultivates an epistemic humility grounded in our ecological embeddedness in the world. These approaches seek to enable an education that cultivates a sense of self that is less caught up with arbitrary, egoistic opinions of the self and more attuned to the ecological realities constituting our collective life-worlds. (shrink)

Writing for non-specialists and students as well as for fellow philosophers, this book explores some basic issues surrounding sex and love in today's world, among them consent, objectification, nonmonogamy, racial stereotyping, and the need to reconcile contemporary expectations about gender equality with our beliefs about how love works. Author Patricia Marino argues that we cannot fully understand these issues by focusing only on individual desires and choices. Instead, we need to examine the social contexts within which choices are made and (...) acquire their meanings. That perspective, she argues, is especially needed today, when the values of individualism, self-expression, and self-interest permeate our lives. Marino asks how we can fit these values, which govern so many areas of contemporary life, with the generosity, caring, and selflessness we expect in love and sex. Key Features ofPhilosophy of Sex and Love: An opinionated introduction Offers a contemporary, problems-based approach to the subject, helping readers better understand and address current issues and controversial questions Includes coverage of sex and love as they intersect with topics like disability, race, medicine, and economics Considers not only the ethical, but also the broadly social and political dimensions of sex and love Includes a helpful introduction and conclusion in each chapter and is written throughout in a clear and straightforward style, with examples and sign-posts to help guide the student and general reader A comprehensive and up-to-date bibliography provides a valuable tool for anyone's further research P> Offers a contemporary, problems-based approach to the subject, helping readers better understand and address current issues and controversial questions Includes coverage of sex and love as they intersect with topics like disability, race, medicine, and economics Considers not only the ethical, but also the broadly social and political dimensions of sex and love Includes a helpful introduction and conclusion in each chapter and is written throughout in a clear and straightforward style, with examples and sign-posts to help guide the student and general reader A comprehensive and up-to-date bibliography provides a valuable tool for anyone's further research. (shrink)

"The picture of Hume clinging timidly to a raft of custom and artifice, because, poor skeptic, he has no alternative, is wrong," writes John Stewart. "Hume was confident that by experience and reflection philosophers can achieve true principles." In this revisionary work Stewart surveys all of David Hume's major writings to reveal him as a liberal moral and political philosopher. Against the background of seventeenth-and eighteenth-century history and thought, Hume emerges as a proponent not of conservatism but of reform. Stewart (...) first presents the dilemma over morals in the modern natural-law school, then examines the new approach to moral and political philosophy adopted by Hume's precursors Shaftesbury, Mandeville, Hutcheson, and Butler. Illuminating Hume's explanation of the standards and rules that should govern private and public life, the author challenges interpretations of Hume's philosophy as conservative by demonstrating that he did not dismiss reason as a key factor determining right and wrong in moral and political contexts. Stewart goes on to show that Hume viewed private property, the market, contracts, and the rule of law as essential to genuine civilized society, and explores Hume's criticism of contemporary British beliefs concerning government, religion, commerce, international relations, and social structure. Originally published in 1992. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

At the heart of Mizrahi’s project lies a sociological narrative concerning the recent history of philosophers’ negative attitudes towards scientism. Critics (e.g. de Ridder (2019), Wilson (2019) and Bryant (2020)), have detected various empirical inadequacies in Mizrahi’s methodology for discussing these attitudes. Bryant (2020) points out one of the main pertinent methodological deficiencies here, namely that the mere appearance of the word ‘scientism’ in a text does not suffice in determining whether the author feels threatened by it. Not all philosophers (...) use the term in ‘inherently negative’ (29) or pejorative ways. In this paper, I not only corroborate Bryant’s critical claim, but argue that Mizrahi’s response to this part of Bryant’s objection is inadequate. (shrink)

There are several intertwined debates in the area of contemporary philos- ophy of time. One field of inquiry is the nature of time itself. Presentists think that only the present moment exists whereas eternalists believe that all of (space-)time exists on a par. The second main field of inquiry is the question of how objects persist through time. The endurantist claims that objects are three-dimensional wholes, which persist by being wholly1 present, whereas the perdurantist thinks that objects are four- dimensional (...) and that their temporal parts are the bearers of properties. The third debate in the field of contemporary philosophy of time is about tense- versus tenseless theory. Tensers are at odds with detensers about the status of the linguistic reference to the present moment. These are only very crude characterizations and it is even disputed by some ad- vocates of the corresponding positions that they are accurate. However this very sketchy picture already reveals a fundamental difference: The eternalism/presentism and endurance/perdurance discussions belong to the field of metaphysics, whereas tense is in the first instance a linguistic phenomenon. (shrink)

This paper considers the relation between philosophical discussions of, and social-scientific research into popular beliefs about, distributive justice. The first part sets out the differences and tensions between the two perspectives, identifying considerations which tend to lead adherents of each discipline to regard the other as irrelevant to its concerns. The second discusses four reasons why social scientists might benefit from philosophy: problems in identifying inconsistency, the fact that non-justice considerations might underlie distributive judgments, the way in which different (...) principles of justice can yield the same concrete distributive judgments, and the ambiguity of key terms. The third part distinguishes and evaluates three versions of the claim that normative theorising about justice can profit from empirical research into public opinion: that its findings are food for thought, that they amount to feasibility constraints, and that they are constitutive of normatively justified principles of justice. The view that popular opinion about justice has a strongly constitutive role to play in justifying principles of distributive justice stricto sensu is rejected, but it is argued that what the people think (and what they can reasonably be expected to come to think) on distributive matters can be an important factor for the political theorist to take into account, for reasons of legitimacy, or feasibility, or both. (shrink)

Upon delving into Chinese philosophy I have come to realize that Chinese philosophy is indeed rich and comprehensive, even though Chinese philosophy and the history of Chinese philosophy are different from the history of Western philosophy. Although Western society and Chinese society follow common laws, each has its own distinctive characteristics. Similarly, while Western philosophy and Chinese philosophy likewise follow common laws, each has its own distinctive characteristics. The scope of the history of (...) Chinese philosophy cannot be determined by that of Western philosophy, nor can the scope of Western philosophy be determined by that of Chinese philosophy. The most outstanding periods of Western philosophy have been the ancient and modern periods. The most outstanding period of Chinese philosophy was that of the Spring and Autumn era through the early Qing period. This was due to the differences between the two societies. In the West, both the slave system and the bourgeois revolution were much more highly developed than they were in China. China had a brilliant feudal culture and subsequently China's brilliant feudal philosophy simply had a different style from that of Western philosophy. I remember that Comrade Hou Wailu came to the following conclusion: that the style of the Western philosopher was that of a wise man [zheren], while the style of the Chinese philosopher was that of a worthy man [xianren], My impressions are similar. Western philosophers usually discussed the problems of cognition and knowledge, while Chinese philosophers usually talked and wrote about questions of politics and ethics. What they have had in common is the fact that both have discussed only the general or universal laws of nature, society, and human thought. This Marxist definition of philosophy has held true both in the East and in the West. It is said that Ridannov defined the history of philosophy as being the history of the beginnings and development of materialism. Not having his works at hand, I cannot substantiate this. But I feel that such a definition is rather narrow. The history of philosophy should discuss the history of the development of man's knowledge of nature, society, and human thought, including both the history of the rise and development of materialism and the history of the rise and development of idealism. Only by interweaving the two can we arrive at a full history of philosophy. I do not know whether or not such an understanding on my part is correct. In any case, I have to write in accordance with my own understanding; otherwise I could not write at all. (shrink)

Stewart's purpose is to show that Hume is not a political conservative, but is better understood as a liberal. The author is reacting against several recent works on Hume: David Miller's Philosophy and Ideology in Hume's Political Thought, Donald W. Livingston's Hume's Philosophy of Common Life, and Frederick G. Whelan's Order and Artifice in Hume's Political Philosophy. These "all share, with variations, the nineteenth-century view that Hume's epistemology led him to conservatism". Stewart acknowledges that the term "conservative" (...) is used in different ways by these authors, but not so differently that they cannot be collectively refuted by showing Hume to be a liberal, that is, one "who thought that major reforms were highly desirable in the United Kingdom in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries". Stewart is referring here to substantial "economic and political reforms," but not to "socialist, Marxist, or neoliberal reforms.". (shrink)

The different versions of bioethics are founded on very specific underlying philosophical and ethical elements. Every philosophical doctrine or current of thought is the source of a particular set of ethics and every set of ethics supports a distinct version of bioethics that is dependent on the wisdom or shortsightedness of both the philosophy and the ethics on which it is based. This paper is an attempt to explain how the relationship between philosophy, ethics and bioethics comes about (...) and to identify the main consequences of the “kinship” determined by that affinity. A hypothetical situation is used to show the various solutions that are possible with five different triads that can be established, at present, as part of that relationship. The bioethical consequences of the “kinship” between philosophy, ethics and bioethics are illustrated on the basis of the foregoing explanation. The limited scope of opinions and their contrast with rational discourse founded on reality leads to several conclusions: solving bioethical problems implies that we start with thinking that is properly supported by a philosophical anthropology that offers the best guarantee of accuracy, rationality, internal consistency and possibility for practice, which subsequently provides the basis for objective ethical thinking that is capable of unmasking any relativism, reductionism or ideologizing. In this way, it will be possible to provide answers to the problems associated with life in general and human life in particular. (shrink)

Examines the history of speculative thought by focusing on such dominant personalities as Plato, Bacon, Spinoza, Kant, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche.

Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This article reviews several proposed solutions to this problem. We focus on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometric averaging of probabilities), and multiplicative pooling (where probabilities are multiplied rather than averaged). We present axiomatic characterisations of each class of (...) pooling functions (most of them classic, but one new) and argue that linear pooling can be justified procedurally, but not epistemically, while the other two pooling methods can be justified epistemically. The choice between them, in turn, depends on whether the individuals' probability assignments are based on shared information or on private information. We conclude by mentioning a number of other pooling methods. (shrink)

Many of our most urgent contemporary issues-demagoguery, disinformation, white ethno-nationalism-compel us to take opinions seriously. And social media has taught us that everyone is entitled to their own opinion. But what constitutes an opinion, and how do those definitions change? In "Entitled Opinions: Doxa After Digitality," Caddie Alford has fashioned an expansive and affirmative theory of opinions for the age of social media. To address these issues, "Entitled Opinions" recuperates the ancient Greek term for opinion: doxa. While (...) doxa is often translated as "opinion" or "belief," the term originally harbored many other connotations, such as fame, reputation, and expectations. These shadings complicate simplistic notions of what opinions are and what they can do. Just as digitality has transformed what constitutes "truth," so too has social media transformed the very notion of opinions. In the context of social media, opinions are now seen as ill-informed preferences that divide people from one another. "Doxa" and its interpretive contexts help shed some of the baggage associated with opinions while signaling more useful lines of inquiry. Repurposing "doxa" recovers the nuance and rhetorical utility of opinions while attempting to make sense of how opinions are trafficked in social media. Commonplace imperatives such as "he tells it like it is" or newer, digital imperatives such as #BlackLivesMatter may seem straightforward on the surface, but haptics, emoji, and "like" buttons betray and lay bare collective assumptions about how opinions in the digital realm function. "Entitled Opinions" argues that because doxa are the virtual tickets to participation in online culture and politics more broadly, social media and opinion have become synonymous. Thus, it is all the more crucial that we scrutinize the interfaces, platforms, coding, syntax, and network architecture that determine how persuasion operates, how reputations sway, and what moments are deemed Instaworthy or worth remembering. In a world that says, "don't read the comments," this book reads the comments, so to speak, taking content that could be thrown away for any number of reasons and alchemizing judgments into implications. Each chapter in the book draws together key rhetorical concepts, current scholarship on opinions, and digital media entanglements. The first chapter lays out one of the book's more critical takeaways: while "opinion" gets reflexively figured in an opinion/fact binary, social media has shown that it is imperative to think and operate in terms of a spectrum of opinions, from reputable to less reputable. These gradations are multifaceted and susceptible to interventions-in the past, those interventions were experts; today, those interventions are algorithms. Each subsequent chapter illuminates opinions in terms of humanistic inquiries that speak to a diverse range of audiences: sociality; infrastructure; bodies; time; and, finally, invention. These chapters put opinions into conversation with algorithms, infrastructure, the rise of digital illiteracy, virality, and digital activism to highlight the digital constraints placed on opinions as well as the creative and evasive ways opinions exceed those constraints. Social media tricks us into thinking opinions are straightforward, isolating, and universal. "Entitled Opinions," however, suggests ways for social media users recuperate and reclaim the place of opinions in the digital sphere. (shrink)

We can have credences in an infinite number of propositions—that is, our opinion set can be infinite. Accuracy-first epistemologists have devoted themselves to evaluating credal states with the help of the concept of ‘accuracy’. Unfortunately, under several innocuous assumptions, infinite opinion sets yield several undesirable results, some of which are even fatal, to accuracy-first epistemology. Moreover, accuracy-first epistemologists cannot circumvent these difficulties in any standard way. In this regard, we will suggest a non-standard approach, called a relativistic approach, (...) to accuracy-first epistemology and show that such an approach can successfully circumvent undesirable results while having some advantages over the standard approach. (shrink)

According to What Is Philosophy?, all disciplines combat opinion, but art fights most effectively because art and opinion both pertain to sensibility. Yet, this common provenance also makes the line dividing art and opinion porous. The stakes of this porosity are perhaps most visible in the relation of art to life. Although art must avoid two forms of death, ‘chaos’ and ‘opinion’, Deleuze and Guattari don't treat chaos and opinion equally. The fundamental distinction between (...) good death and bad death, between death by chaos and death by opinion, has a number of problematic consequences. Perhaps the most consequential: opinion is deadlier than death itself. (shrink)

Auguste Comte accorde à l’opinion publique une place centrale dans sa sociologie et, par voie de conséquence, dans la politique qu’il en déduit. Cet intérêt le distingue dans son temps comme dans la tradition sociologique. La singularité d’Auguste Comte s’affirme surtout dans l’analyse qu’il fait de l’opinion publique, lui attribuant le statut de force sociale par excellence, jouant d’abord un rôle majeur, au cours de la phase intermédiaire, dans la résistance de la société aux forces de dispersion, puis, (...) à l’âge positif, un rôle de gouvernement des affections bienveillantes et du lien social. C’est l’opinion publique organique. La tâche de défendre la société assignée par Auguste Comte à la philosophie positive, place ainsi la sociologie dans une relation symbiotique avec l’opinion publique.Auguste Comte puts public opinion at the heart of sociology and, as a consequence, the politics that flows from it. This sets Comte apart from his contemporaries and from mainstream sociology. Auguste Comte’s singularity can be seen above all in his analysis of public opinion. Comte sees public opinion as a social force par excellence, playing a major role first of all in the intermediate phase, as society resists dispersion forces, then, in the positive age, a governing role over benevolent affection and social networks. It is organic public opinion. The job of defending society assigned by Comte to positive philosophy means that there is a symbiotic relationship between sociology and public opinion. (shrink)

way on the information available in the contexts in which they are used, it’s not surprising that there is a minor but growing industry of work in semantics and the philosophy of language concerned with the precise nature of the context-dependency of epistemically modalized sentences. Take, for instance, an epistemic might-claim like..

It is a consequence of the theory of imprecise credences that there exist situations in which rational agents inevitably become less opinionated toward some propositions as they gather more evidence. The fact that an agent's imprecise credal state can dilate in this way is often treated as a strike against the imprecise approach to inductive inference. Here, we show that dilation is not a mere artifact of this approach by demonstrating that opinion loss is countenanced as rational by a (...) substantially broader class of normative theories than has been previously recognised. Specifically, we show that dilation-like phenomena arise even when one abandons the basic assumption that agents have (precise or imprecise) credences of any kind, and follows directly from bedrock norms for rational comparative confidence judgements of the form `I am at least as confident in p as I am in q'. We then use the comparative confidence framework to develop a novel understanding of what exactly gives rise to dilation-like phenomena. By considering opinion loss in this more general setting, we are able to provide a novel assessment of the prospects for an account of inductive inference that is not saddled with the inevitability of rational opinion loss. (shrink)

We present a short introduction to, and the first English language translation of, Theodor W. Adorno's 1964 article, "Meinungsforschung und Öffentlichkeit." In this article, Adorno situates the misunderstanding of public opinion within a dialectic of elements of publicness itself: empirical publicness' dependence on a normative ideology of publicness, and modern publicness' tendency to undermine its own principles. He also locates it in the dual role of mass media as both fora for the expression of opinion and, as he (...) calls them, "organs of public opinion." The introduction provides a discussion of Adorno's reception in the American academy, arguing that contemporary sociological practice should be concerned with the problems Adorno raises. We suggest that Adorno's relegation to the fields of philosophy and aesthetics belies his relevance to empirical sociological research. (shrink)

In this short text, a distinguished philosopher turns his attention to one of the oldest and most fundamental philosophical problems of all: How it is that we are able to sort and classify different things as being of the same natural class? Professor Armstrong carefully sets out six major theories—ancient, modern, and contemporary—and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of each. Recognizing that there are no final victories or defeats in metaphysics, Armstrong nonetheless defends a traditional account of universals as the (...) most satisfactory theory we have.This study is written for advanced students, but as Armstrong goes considerably beyond his earlier work on this topic, it will interest professional scholars as well. Carefully plotted and clearly written, Universals is both a paradigm of exposition and a case study on the value of careful analysis of fundamental issues in philosophy. (shrink)

Election prediction by means of opinion polling is a rare empirical success story for social science. I examine the details of a prominent case, drawing two lessons of more general interest: Methodology over metaphysics. Traditional metaphysical criteria were not a useful guide to whether successful prediction would be possible; instead, the crucial thing was selecting an effective methodology. Which methodology? Success required sophisticated use of case-specific evidence from opinion polling. The pursuit of explanations via general theory or causal (...) mechanisms, by contrast, turned out to be precisely the wrong path—contrary to much recent philosophy of social science. (shrink)

Expert testimony figures in recent debates over how best to understand the norm of assertion and the domain-specific epistemic expectations placed on testifiers. Cases of experts asserting with only isolated second-hand knowledge (Lackey 2011, 2013) have been used to shed light on whether knowledge is sufficient for epistemically permissible assertion. I argue that relying on such cases of expert testimony introduces several problems concerning how we understand expert knowledge, and the sharing of such knowledge through testimony. Refinements are needed to (...) clarify exactly what principles are being tested by such cases; but once refined, such cases raise more questions than they answer. (shrink)

Kant famously said he 'had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith ’ . But what exactly was his conception of Glaube, and how does it fit into his epistemology? In the first Critique it is not until the concluding Method section that he explicitly addresses these issues. In the Canon of Pure Reason he lists three questions that sum up ‘all interest of my reason’: What can I know? What should I do? What may I hope? (...) . Kant here put hope on the agenda of philosophy. In his essays on history he argued that we can hope for secular progress in the development of human culture; but in his moral and religious philosophy he was also concerned with eschatological hopes that we can perfect our characters in a life after death, and that the moral governor of the universe will ensure that happiness is eventually proportionate to virtue. About immortality and the existence of God, his constant refrain is that we can have only a practical kind of faith. (shrink)

An allocation problem is a type of aggregation problem in which the values of individuals' opinions on some set of variables (canonically a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities) sum to a constant. This paper shows that for realistic allocation problems, namely ones in which the set of possible opinion values is finite, the only universal aggregation methods that satisfy two commonly invoked conditions are the dictatorial ones. The two conditions are, first, that the aggregate opinion on (...) any variable depends only on the individuals' opinions on that variable and not on their opinions on any other variable and, secondly, that the aggregate opinion minimally preserves unanimous individual opinion. Connections between this result and similar ones in the literature on judgment aggregation are explored and their significance assessed. (shrink)

The paper investigates various definitions of the concept of opinion as opposed to factual or evidence-based statements and proposes a taxonomy of opinions expressed in English as identified in selected social media. A discussion situates opinions in the realm of pragmatics and reaches to philosophy of language and cognitive science. The research methodology combines a thorough linguistic analysis of opinions, proposing their multifaceted taxonomy with the automatically generated lexical embeddings of positive and negative lexicon acquired from the analysed (...) opinionated texts. As proposed, the definition of the concept of opinion is best apprehended when looked upon in terms of an opinion event, with a number of necessary conditions on the one hand, and those that are characteristic of an explicit opinion prototype on the other. Lists of opinion discourse markers show their preferential uses either in positive or negative opinionated texts; however, no sets of necessary and/or sufficient opinion markers properties have been acquired from the analysed texts. The conclusions indicate a polysemous understanding of naturally occurring social media opinionated texts and a definitional flexibility of the boundaries around lexical positive and negative types of opinion markers. (shrink)

Auguste Comte accorde à l’opinion publique une place centrale dans sa sociologie et, par voie de conséquence, dans la politique qu’il en déduit. Cet intérêt le distingue dans son temps comme dans la tradition sociologique. La singularité d’Auguste Comte s’affirme surtout dans l’analyse qu’il fait de l’opinion publique, lui attribuant le statut de force sociale par excellence, jouant d’abord un rôle majeur, au cours de la phase intermédiaire, dans la résistance de la société aux forces de dispersion, puis, (...) à l’âge positif, un rôle de gouvernement des affections bienveillantes et du lien social. C’est l’opinion publique organique. La tâche de défendre la société assignée par Auguste Comte à la philosophie positive, place ainsi la sociologie dans une relation symbiotique avec l’opinion publique. (shrink)

From a phenomenological perspective of game-space and horizon, this paper tries to make a deconstructive reading of Hegel's "two galleries", namely, "the gallery of opinions" and "the gallery of knowledge", which are mentioned in the introduction of Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy. The reading shows that the Game-space or the ab-gruendiger Grund of the Hegelian concept of philosophical history lies in an originally differencing space that is keeping in absence, which is called by Edmund Husserl and Jacques (...) Derrida "the gallery of Dresden". (shrink)

Robots try to figure out the difference between facts and opinions.

Opinion leaders are informal leaders who have the ability to influence others' decisions about adopting new products, practices or ideas. In the healthcare setting, the importance of translating new research evidence into practice has led to interest in understanding how opinion leaders could be used to speed this process. Despite continued interest, gaps in understanding opinion leadership remain. Agent‐based models are computer models that have proven to be useful for representing dynamic and contextual phenomena such as (...) class='Hi'>opinion leadership. The purpose of this paper is to describe the work conducted in preparation for the development of an agent‐based model of nursing opinion leadership. The aim of this phase of the model development project was to clarify basic assumptions about opinions, the individual attributes of opinion leaders and characteristics of the context in which they are effective. The process used to clarify these assumptions was the construction of a preliminary nursing opinion leader model, derived from philosophical theories about belief formation. (shrink)

This book brings together two seminal works by George Santayana, one of the most significant philosophers of the twentieth century: Character and Opinion in the United States, which stands with Tocqueville's Democracy in America as one the most insightful works of American cultural criticism ever written, and The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy, a landmark text of both philosophical analysis and cultural criticism. An introduction by James Seaton situates Santayana in the intellectual and cultural context of his own (...) time. Four additional essays include John Lachs on the ways Santayana's understanding of the soul of America help explain the relative peace among nationalities and ethnic groups in the United States; Wilfred M. McClay on Santayana's life of the mind as it relates to dominant trends in American culture; Roger Kimball on Santayana's most uncommon benefice, common sense; and James Seaton on Santayana's distinction between English liberty and fierce liberty. All the essays serve to highlight the relevance of Santayana's ideas to current issues in American culture, including education, immigration, and civil rights. (shrink)

This book brings together two seminal works by George Santayana, one of the most significant philosophers of the twentieth century: _Character and Opinion in the United States,_ which stands with Tocqueville’s _Democracy in America_ as one the most insightful works of American cultural criticism ever written, and “The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy,” a landmark text of both philosophical analysis and cultural criticism. An introduction by James Seaton situates Santayana in the intellectual and cultural context of his own (...) time. Four additional essays include John Lachs on the ways Santayana’s understanding of “the soul of America” help explain the relative peace among nationalities and ethnic groups in the United States; Wilfred M. McClay on Santayana’s life of the mind as it relates to dominant trends in American culture; Roger Kimball on Santayana’s “most uncommon benefice, common sense”; and James Seaton on Santayana’s distinction between “English liberty” and “fierce liberty.” All the essays serve to highlight the relevance of Santayana’s ideas to current issues in American culture, including education, immigration, and civil rights. (shrink)

Philosophy has a schizophrenic relationship with games. On the one hand, philosophers love using games as model, arguing that phenomena as diverse as linguistic meaning, meta‐ethics, normative ethics, applied ethics, law, and aesthetics can be illuminated via an analogy with games. On the other hand, there is scant focused discussion of the concept of a game as such. This is problematic; the appeal to games as a model to clarify philosophically puzzling questions has limited utility if games themselves (and (...) the concept of a game) are poorly understood. Moreover, playing games plausibly is an important element in a good life; anyone interested in the theory of welfare, a traditional philosophical topic, should be interested in games. We play games, but if anything, play itself has been more neglected by philosophers than games. This neglect is unwarranted. Historically, philosophy has investigated foundational questions about human nature, and a disposition to play plausibly is a deep part of human nature. Moreover, play is an important concept in evolutionary biology and psychology, yet those working in those fields struggle to define the concept to their own satisfaction. E.O. Wilson went so far as to remark that “no behavioural concept has proved more ill‐defined, elusive, controversial, and even unfashionable than play.” One might have hoped philosophers could help here. In this paper, I provide an opinionated introduction to the philosophy of play and games. (shrink)

Is the history of philosophy primarily a contribution to PHILOSOPHY or primarily a contribution to HISTORY? This paper is primarily contribution to history (specifically the history of New Zealand) but although the history of philosophy has been big in New Zealand, most NZ philosophers with a historical bent are primarily interested in the history of philosophy as a contribution to philosophy. My essay focuses on two questions: 1) How did New Zealand philosophy get to (...) be so good? And why, given that is so good (a point I am at pains to establish), has it apparently had so slight a cultural impact within New Zealand itself? Did we get the wrong Anderson – the uninspiring William, who was Professor at Auckland, rather than his talented younger brother John, who had such a huge cultural influence as Professor of Philosophy at Sydney? Perhaps but that can only be part of the story since we managed to attract even bigger stars, (notably Karl Popper) as well as breeding bigger talents of our own (Prior, Baier, Bennett, Mulgan, Hursthouse, Waldron and many more). Do we export our best talent? Sometimes – but the stars that stay and the stars who arrive don’t seem to have much impact in New Zealand itself however brightly they shine in the international philosophical firmament. Is it too esoteric? Perhaps, but esoteric philosophy can still have a cultural impact, witness, Moore, Popper and the younger Anderson. Is it, like many of New Zealand’s cultural products (from romance novels to movies), primarily intended for an international audience? That’s a large part of the answer but only a part. Another part of the answer is that philosophy HAS had a cultural impact but that impact is not readily apparent. For NZ philosophers have been less keen to push their ideological barrows and more keen to produce critical thinkers, and critical thinkers don’t all think alike. The logician George Hughes was apparently a life-changing teacher not because he had a nostrum but because he taught people to think. As one of his students said ‘the only ism you believe in is the syllogism’. On the whole the history of New Zealand Philosphy is a ‘From Log Cabin to White House’ tale, ‘From colonial obscurity through struggle and adversity to philosophical excellence’. But there are shadows in the picture. Some departments have nearly come to grief through bureaucratic and political misadventures, and it is hard to resist the suspicion that there is often an element of hostility to philosophers on the part of both university bureaucrats and fellow-academics. I speculate as to why this is the case (we are too argumentative and don’t confine our argumentative tendencies to the cloister) but conclude with some upbeat reflections. on the future of New Zealand Philosophy. (shrink)