- Humean Laws: Stability, Undermining, and Context.Antony Eagle - manuscriptdetails
- Credence and Chance in Quantum Theory.John Earman - manuscriptdetails
- Local and Global Deference.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscriptdetails
- Expert Deference De Se.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscriptdetails
- Rationalizing the Principal Principle for Non-Humean Chance.J. Khawaja - manuscriptdetails
- Quantum probability and decision theory, revisited [2002 online-only paper].David Wallace - 2002details
- That Does Not Compute: David Lewis on Credence and Chance.Gordon Belot - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.details
- Does non-measurability favour imprecision?Cian Dorr - forthcoming - Mind.details
- Two-Dimensional De Se Chance Deference.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
- Indifference to Anti-Humean Chances.J. Dmitri Gallow - forthcoming - Canadian Journal of Philosophy.details
- The Meta-Reversibility Objection.Christopher J. G. Meacham - forthcoming - In Barry Loewer, Brad Weslake & Eric Winsberg (eds.), Time's Arrow and the Probability Structure of the World.details
- No Double-Halfer Embarrassment: A Reply to Titelbaum.Joel Pust - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
- Counterfactual Probability.Ginger Schultheis - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
- The Typical Principle.Isaac Wilhelm - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
- Direct inference and probabilistic accounts of induction.Jon Williamson - forthcoming - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-22.details
- Infinite frequency principles of direct inference.Lennart B. Ackermans - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2).details
- Dilating and contracting arbitrarily.David Builes, Sophie Horowitz & Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):3-20.details
- What chance-credence norms should be.Mariangela Zoe Cocchiaro, Zalán Gyenis & Leszek Wroński - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-22.details
- Comparative Opinion Loss.Benjamin Eva & Reuben Stern - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
- The content of indexical belief.Tamar Lando - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (1):107-127.details
- Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):128-151.details
- One world is (probably) just as good as many.Jer Steeger - 2022 - Synthese 200 (97):1-32.details
- Peirce, Pedigree, Probability.Rush T. Stewart & Tom F. Sterkenburg - 2022 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 58 (2):138-166.details
- Chance Debugged.Daniel Dohrn - 2021 - Lato Sensu: Revue de la Société de Philosophie des Sciences 2 (8):6-14.details
- Solving a Paradox of Evidential Equivalence.Cian Dorr, John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2021 - Mind 130 (520):1159–82.details
- Justifying Lewis’s Kinematics of Chance.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):439-463.details
- On the principal principle and imprecise subjective Bayesianism: A reply to Christian Wallmann and Jon Williamson.Marc Fischer - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-10.details
- A subjectivist’s guide to deterministic chance.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4339-4372.details
- The Principal Principle, admissibility, and normal informal standards of what is reasonable.Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (2):1-15.details
- Centering the Principal Principle.Isaac Wilhelm - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1897-1915.details
- Accuracy and Credal Imprecision.Dominik Berger & Nilanjan Das - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):666-703.details
- A Paradox of Evidential Equivalence.David Builes - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):113-127.details
- The Relationship between Humean Chance and Principal Principle: A Reply to Hall’s Critique against Lewis’ Best System Approach to Chance.Sungmin Kim - 2020 - Journal of the Society of Philosophical Studies 61:271-306.details
- Inductive Logic from the Viewpoint of Quantum Information.Vasil Penchev - 2020 - Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 12 (13):1-2.details
- The Dutch Book Arguments.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.details
- The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):605-619.details
- No Crystal Balls.Jack Spencer - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):105-125.details
- Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference.Jan Sprenger - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):319-335.details
- The Principal Principle Does Not Imply the Principle of Indifference, Because Conditioning on Biconditionals Is Counterintuitive.Michael G. Titelbaum & Casey Hart - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (2):621-632.details
- Admissibility Troubles for Bayesian Direct Inference Principles.Christian Wallmann & James Hawthorne - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):957-993.details
- The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
- The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism.Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-14.details
- Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
- Everettian theory as pure wave mechanics plus a no-collapse probability postulate.Paul Tappenden - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6375-6402.details
- Exploring a New Argument for Synchronic Chance.Katrina Elliott - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.details
- Taking a chance on KK.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):183-196.details
- On the Inadmissibility of Some Historical Information.Ittay Nissan-Rozen - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (2):479-493.details
- Correcting credences with chances.Ilho Park - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):509-536.details
- Chance, Credence and Circles.Fabrizio Cariani - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):49-58.details
- Is it the Principal Principle that implies the Principle of Indifference?Balazs Gyenis & Leszek Wronski - 2017 - In Gábor Hofer-Szabó & Leszek Wroński (eds.), Making it Formally Explicit: Probability, Causality and Indeterminism. Springer International Publishing.details
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