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Ilho Park
Jeonbuk National University
  1.  60
    Rescuing Reflection.Ilho Park - 2012 - Philosophy of Science 79 (4):473-489.
    In this article, I suggest an argument that seems to show a conflict between the reflection principle and conditionalization. In particular, I show that when the reflection principle is formulated in a standard way, the principle conflicts with Jeffrey conditionalization. And it is argued that the source of the conflict resides in an ambiguity of the standard formulation. Furthermore, I attempt to rescue the principle using Bayes factors. That is, I suggest a new formulation of the principle so as to (...)
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  2.  60
    Confirmation Measures and Collaborative Belief Updating.Ilho Park - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3955-3975.
    There are some candidates that have been thought to measure the degree to which evidence incrementally confirms a hypothesis. This paper provides an argument for one candidate—the log-likelihood ratio measure. For this purpose, I will suggest a plausible requirement that I call the Requirement of Collaboration. And then, it will be shown that, of various candidates, only the log-likelihood ratio measure \(l\) satisfies this requirement. Using this result, Jeffrey conditionalization will be reformulated so as to disclose explicitly what determines new (...)
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  3.  46
    Correcting Credences with Chances.Ilho Park - 2018 - Synthese 198 (1):509-536.
    Lewis’s Principal Principle is widely recognized as a rationality constraint that our credences should satisfy throughout our epistemic life. In practice, however, our credences often fail to satisfy this principle because of our various epistemic limitations. Facing such violations, we should correct our credences in accordance with this principle. In this paper, I will formulate a way of correcting our credences, which will be called the Adams Correcting Rules and then show that such a rule yields non-commutativity between conditionalizing and (...)
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  4.  64
    Simultaneous Belief Updates Via Successive Jeffrey Conditionalization.Ilho Park - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3511-3533.
    This paper discusses simultaneous belief updates. I argue here that modeling such belief updates using the Principle of Minimum Information can be regarded as applying Jeffrey conditionalization successively, and so that, contrary to what many probabilists have thought, the simultaneous belief updates can be successfully modeled by means of Jeffrey conditionalization.
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