The master-servant and self-substance dialectic in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit presents the self as reflectively negating the particularities of its natural consciousness and transcending towards the social substance in order to inscribe its culturally refined self-conception upon the universal substance. Hegel argues that the reflective and determinate negations of the subordinated self by means of participative cultural production (Bildung) lead to the overcoming of servitude and subordination. That is, the actions of the supposedly ‘inessential’ servant-selfhood lead (...) to freedom and disallows the ossification of the social substance. This Hegelian insight is employed in this article to understand dominations in contemporary liberal democracies, and the participative cultural productions of the Dalits and their politics of resistance in the Indian subcontinent. (shrink)

In this article, the master-servant figure in the Phenomenology of Spirit is analyzed against the background of Hegel’s ontology of life as an embodied process. It is therefore argued that the theme of this figure is the question of domination in general, understood as a social relationship of subjection that can take on different historical configurations. Domination is understood as a relationship of disparity of status between dominant and dominated subjects. Therefore, domination would have an intersubjective aspect, as (...) constituted by asymmetric relations of recognition, and a material one, as this disparity in recognitive status enacts the extraction of physical and symbolic resources from subordinated subjects. (shrink)

O presente artigo objetiva discutir a lógica subjacente ao movimento dialético da figura do Senhor e do Servo. Jean-Pierre Labarrière é quem afirma categoricamente a tese segundo a qual há uma Lógica por trás do movimento da Consciência. Ora, a questão fundamental que se coloca, nesse caso, é: qual a lógica que preside o movimento da consciência para a consciência de si, culminado em sua unidade no momento da Razão? A hipótese aqui perseguida, situando-se na esteira da interpretação de Labarrière, (...) é de que a lógica que se encontra "por trás da consciência", nessa figura da Fenomenologia do Espírito, é a mesma lógica que Hegel apresenta na Doutrina da Essência, na Ciência da Lógica. Para tanto, explicitar as categorias lógicas da Doutrina da Essência e acompanhar o seu desdobramento configuram o objetivo central deste trabalho. This paper aims to discuss the logic that underlies the master-servant dialectic. Jean-Pierre Labarrière categorically claims that there is a logic underlying the movement of the consciousness. The fundamental issue at stake is this: What is the logic that regulates the movement of the consciousness of the self, which culminates in its unity in the moment of reason? The hypothesis advanced here, following Labarrière's suggestions, is that the logic that lies "behind the consciousness" in this figure in Phenomenology of the Mind, is the same logic that Hegel presents in the doctrine of essence in the Science of Logic. The central goal of the present work is to make explicit the logical categories of the doctrine of essence, and to follow their unfolding. (shrink)

Psychologists and moral philosophers have much to say about self-awareness and so it is no surprise that in leadership research self-awareness also has come to play an important role. For some time now, leadership research has been dominated by psychologists and we argue that their version of the self-awareness is very thin. It is empty of morality and therefore offers only a partial understanding of humanity. That make its conclusions for leadership ineffective and unethical. Psychology-driven approaches to leadership stress effectiveness: (...) leaders make followers work towards a given goal in an effective manner. Self-awareness, to them, is a thorough understanding of one’s strengths, weaknesses, values, how others see one, all with the goal of turning people into followers. Since ethics is excluded, this view of self-awareness lacks a foundational moral concept: respect/dignity and is closer to self-assessment. Building on Immanuel Kant and other German Idealists, Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel proposed a theory of the development of self-awareness that is more holistic as it situates the individual in a social and moral context and thus transcends the purely functional view of the self-other relationship propagated in psychological approaches. We concretely argue that psychological approaches to leadership systematically drive managers into a catastrophic situation that Hegel describes in the Master-Slave Dialectic. Understanding Hegelian self-awareness prevents leaders becoming self-less masters. Truly self-aware leaders heed the warning of the Humanity Formulation of Kant’s Categorial Imperative, namely that they must always treat humanity, whether in their own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end. They understand their self, they understand its social and moral dimension, and they see their self-reflected in the other. (shrink)

Hegel continues to be credited with the discovery of a "master-slave dialectic". Critics, however, have established that there was no "master-slave dialectic" but rather a Knecht, that is, servant or footman, with the latter a member of an abstract relationship of Herrschaft-Knechtschaft, which is central to Hegel's idea of the journey from dependence to independence. This "primitive scene" sets up a cycle for the whole paradigm, which is a reformulation of the victory over animal life (...) and its appetites, and a reformulation of the birth of nations. Hegel followed Aristotle here; those who risked their own life are given recognition as masters and those who chose to preserve it at the cost of their freedom, are servants. (shrink)

In this article I put forward an interpretation of what is at stake in Frantz Fanon's claim that there is a reciprocity at the basis of G. W. F Hegel's master-servant dialectic. I do this by staging a critique of the ‘shared-humanity’ interpretation of Fanon's claim. Fanon's problem, as this interpretation understands it, is that the master-servant dialectic describes a situation in which two human beings knowingly confront one another as such. Such a situation—because (...) human-to-human confrontation is assumed—does not adequately describe a racially divided situation because of racism's dehumanizing force. Fanon's problem would thus be that Hegel assumed shared humanity. I contest this reading by claiming that Fanon's issue is not reciprocal humanity but reciprocal struggle. To get to this point requires demonstrating that the shared-humanity reading is implausible on a variety of grounds. Thanks to the work of Philippe Van Haute it can already be said that in Hegel's text no shared humanity takes place. But Van Haute nevertheless claims that the shared-humanity problem is present in Kojève. Thus, it first needs to be shown that Kojève's text disallows such a reading. With this result in hand, I move to show the textually unsupportable nature of a subset of the shared-humanity reading—the ‘ontological reading’—whose strategy of reading Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks obscures the Sartrean-Beauvoirian commitments which would in fact allow a more accurate reading of Fanon's claims about reciprocity in Hegel to be made. I then seek to show—with reference to these commitments and a broadly Kojèvean emphasis on the centrality of struggle in human subject-formation—that Fanon's comments about reciprocity take aim at the question of mutual struggle in Hegel and Kojève. ‘The French Negro’, Fanon argues, did not get to experience the cost and value of freedom, unlike Hegel's servant. (shrink)

While political philosophers have turned to Hegel’s notion of recognition in their development of a theory of identity politics, a careful reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit, and of the master-servant dialectic in particular, reveals the limits of this approach. For Hegel, recognition cannot be separated from a process of self-determination, which is as essential to the development of genuine autonomy as the affirmation of claims to recognition. This article examines the role of self-determination in the Phenomenology (...) of Spirit and considers its implications for the theorization of contemporary politics. (shrink)

While political philosophers have turned to Hegel’s notion of recognition in their development of a theory of identity politics, a careful reading of the Phenomenology of Spirit, and of the master-servant dialectic in particular, reveals the limits of this approach. For Hegel, recognition cannot be separated from a process of self-determination, which is as essential to the development of genuine autonomy as the affirmation of claims to recognition. This article examines the role of self-determination in the Phenomenology (...) of Spirit and considers its implications for the theorization of contemporary politics. (shrink)

This article aims to take under consideration the relationship between identity and political obedience. First, it explains the famous encouragement of De la Bo?tie: it is sufficient to decide to quit serving to be instantly free. Nevertheless, man often renounces his freedom in favor of obeying authority. Why does it happen? At the bottom of this surrender there is an?animal? factor: as Alexandre Koj?ve has shown, in the master-slave dialectic the first is able to dominate the animal within (...) himself, while the servant has not the same capability and doesn?t want to accept the risk of death. Finally, it is with respect to the latter that everyone decides for himself, which opens the possibility for a full and actual identity through the appropriation of his own mortality. nema. (shrink)

Hegel’s famous analyses of the ‘master-slave dialectic’, and the more general struggle for recognition which it is a part of, have been remarkably influential throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Bound up with the dominance of this idea, however, has been a corresponding treatment of sadism and masochism as complicit projects that are mutually necessary for one another in a manner that is structurally isomorphic with the way in which master and slave depend on one another. In (...) clinical diagnoses it is almost invariably asserted that sadism and masochism are causally connected, with one of these ‘pathologies’ being seen to derive from an inversion or displacement of the other. Deleuze, however, in Difference and Repetition, ‘Coldness and Cruelty’, and elsewhere, rejects the primacy of the master-slave dialectic for understanding social relations, at least insofar as it relies upon the themes of negativity, contradiction, opposition, and he also rejects the resultant treatment of sadism and masochism. Moreover, if his symptomatology of the latter (especially masochism) convinces us that the master-slave dialectic not only does not understand these ways of existing, but necessarily could not, then we are faced with an important challenge to any conception of social relations that is too closely tied to the dialectic of lordship and bondage as it is sometimes known. This paper, then, is composed of four sections: 1. an exposition of Hegel’s treatment of the master-slave dialectic; 2. a selective account of later understandings of social relations that are indebted to it; 3. a recital of Deleuze’s objections to the master-slave dialectic and its reliance upon three key components: contradiction, opposition, and negativity; and 4. an argument, extending Deleuze’s work, for the manner in which the master-slave dialectic has also been bound up with, and made possible, the belief in a ‘sado-masochistic’ unity (i.e. the way in which they are envisaged as complementary opposites, or as causally connected symptoms). (shrink)

In an appendix, Professor Masters examines the continuity of the several themes of the Platonic-Hermetic tradition as they occur in the five books of the Rabelaisian corpus.

Hegel's famous descriptions of the “master–slave dialectic,” and the more general analysis of the struggle for recognition that it is a part of, have been remarkably influential throughout the nine...

This paper considers whether Hegel's master/slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit should be considered as a refutation of solipsism. It focuses on a recent and detailed attempt to argue for this sort of reading that has been proposed by Frederick Beiser ? but it argues that this reading is unconvincing, both in the historical motivations given for it in the work of Jacobi and Fichte, and as an interpretation of the text itself. An alternative reading of the (...) dialectic is proposed, where it is argued that the central problem Hegel is concerned with is not solipsism, but the sociality of freedom. (shrink)

The central axis of the article is the argument that History and Class Consciousness adopts from the Hegelian dialectics not only the category of totality but also the master–slave dialectic, although it never refers explicitly to the latter. Hence, in this article, we aim to detect the subtle influence that the Hegelian master–slave dialectic exerts on History and Class Consciousness and, more specifically, on the constitution of the Lukacsian concepts of reification, praxis, working class-bourgeoisie interaction, working-class (...) self-consciousness, autonomous subject. Our approach to the Hegelian master–slave dialectic is mostly – but not only – based on its philosophical–anthropological interpretation by A. Kojeve. Kojeve’s interpretation, by attributing a crucial role to labour in the mastery–slavery dialectic, focuses on that aspect of the Hegelian dialectic which, in our estimation, was determining for HCC. In addition, our approach to the Hegelian master–slave dialectic is based on some occasional references Lukacs has to it in Young Hegel as well as on his interpretation latent in History and Class Consciousness. (shrink)

In this article I seek to explain Hegel’s significance to contemporary meta-ethics, in particular to Kantian constructivism. I argue that in the master–slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel shows that self-consciousness and intersubjectivity arise at the same time. This point, I argue, shows that there is no problem with taking other people’s reasons to motivate us since reflection on our aims is necessarily also reflection on the needs of those around us. I further explore Hegel’s contribution (...) to the debate about internal and external reasons. I end by arguing that we should understand reasons as historically constructed in the sense that who counts as an intrinsic bearer of value changes over time. I thus argue that the struggle for recognition is in fact the beginning of the long march toward the idea of recognition and the Kantian kingdom of ends. This march, however, is driven by the need to overcome injustice as it is instantiated at the beginning of history by the master’s absolute domination of the slave. (shrink)

In this article I seek to explain Hegel’s significance to contemporary meta-ethics, in particular to Kantian constructivism. I argue that in the master–slave dialectic in the Phenomenology of Spirit , Hegel shows that self-consciousness and intersubjectivity arise at the same time. This point, I argue, shows that there is no problem with taking other people’s reasons to motivate us since reflection on our aims is necessarily also reflection on the needs of those around us. I further explore Hegel’s (...) contribution to the debate about internal and external reasons. I end by arguing that we should understand reasons as historically constructed in the sense that who counts as an intrinsic bearer of value changes over time. I thus argue that the struggle for recognition is in fact the beginning of the long march toward the idea of recognition and the Kantian kingdom of ends. This march, however, is driven by the need to overcome injustice as it is instantiated at the beginning of history by the master’s absolute domination of the slave. (shrink)

This work contributes to recent transdisciplinary efforts to view the Haitian slave revolt (1791–1804) as the historical inspiration for Hegel’s master-slave dialectic. Reconstructions offered by contemporary postcolonial scholars argue that the Haitian revolt was chronicled in Minerva as Hegel raced to finish his Phenomenology. Benhabib recently recognized the Hegel-Haiti thesis as entailing the sort of inclusive dialogical learning process necessary to validate subaltern experiences. The thesis has also drawn its share of sceptical scrutiny as Badiou claims that it (...) risks forcing an unnecessary moral dissymmetry, neglects objectionable features of enslavement and imposes a mismatch between apolitical subject and revolutionary. In reply, we appeal to the pioneering work of Tavares to show that the asymmetrical construction of classification schemes for persons of mixed-racial statuses accords with decades of documented literary exchanges between Hegel and Gregoire. We then turn to the work of James on the role of mixed-race merchants in the testimonial accounts of late 18th century French historians to show that European literate publics were well aware of the extremely coercive forms of commodified labour found in Saint-Domingue. We then invoke the archival work of Du Bois on French, British and American parliamentary proceedings that show the provisional colonial identities ascribed to Caribbean subjects did not hinder their self-conscious exercise of political agency. Viewing Hegel in terms of the historiographic records of the racial ontologies of early modern transatlantic literary exchanges helps explain how he adapted these tropes concerning mixed-race subjects in a manner that better explains many of the anomalous features of the dialectic. However, conferring the Haitian revolution its proper world-historical warrant as inspiration for his infamous master-slave dialectic need not lead us to overlook Hegel’s complicity with many of the epistemic and ontological flaws of colonial tropes held in early modern transatlantic print. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:The section “Lordship and Bondage” in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit offers us, through the criticism of slavery, some indications regarding Hegel’s conception of human nature. In this paper some consequences of this conception for Hegel’s political philosophy are identified and presented. The analysis shows problems may emerge when we analyze some fundamental Hegelian concepts – “recognition” and shows that some “men” – if we take into consideration the way these concepts were defined in the master-slave dialectic. In light (...) of these problems it is pointed out that Hegel’s political philosophy, and also his position regarding slavery, become less cogent and more susceptible to criticism. The last part of the text analyzes some consequences of problems related to the possibility of defining the concepts “recognition” and “men” in terms of Hegel’s model of state. RESUMO:A seção “Dominação e escravidão” da Fenomenologia do espírito de Hegel nos oferece, por meio da crítica da escravidão, algumas indicações com respeito à concepção hegeliana da natureza humana. Neste artigo, serão identificadas e apresentadas algumas consequências dessa concepção para a filosofia política de Hegel. A análise aponta que alguns problemas podem emergir, quando analisamos alguns dos conceitos fundamentais de Hegel, “reconhecimento” e “homem”, se levamos em consideração o modo como estes conceitos foram definidos na dialética do senhor e do escravo. Como resultado desses problemas, é apontado que sua filosofia política, e igualmente sua posição com respeito à escravidão, se tornam menos cogentes e mais suscetíveis a críticas. A última parte do texto analisa algumas consequências dos problemas relacionados às possibilidades de definir os conceitos “reconhecimento” e “homem” para o modelo hegeliano de Estado. (shrink)

This article seeks to articulate an interpretation of Fanon’s engagement with G.W.F. Hegel that does not either assume that Fanon rejects Hegel’s normative conclusions or that Fanon’s engagement is incidental to his larger philosophical projects. I argue that Fanon’s take on the master-slave dialectic allows us to better understand the normative claims that undergird Fanon’s calls for violence and revolution in Black Skin, The Wretched of the Earth, and A Dying Colonialism.

In this paper I want to pursue some variations on Hegelian philosophy, some responses and elaborations of aspects of Hegel’s thought, which have appeared in Latin America, and which contribute to a new understanding of the philosophical experience as it has taken place in Latin America.

From Karl Marx to Alexandre Kojève to Luce Irigaray, many writers have explored the implications of the famous master-slave dialectic in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit.1 An interesting debate has developed out of the possible gender connotations of this dialectic—a debate that has centered largely on the theory that the master could represent man, with the slave consequently representing woman. A close analysis of the Phenomenology reveals that both the master and the slave are, in fact, (...) supposed to be men. But is it possible to preserve the core ideas of the Phenomenology while simultaneously recasting both the master and the slave as women? And what are the ramifications of this reconfiguration?These questions. (shrink)

In Glas, Derrida focuses his attention on a question regarding the family, on the unintelligibility of familial love for which Hegel makes Antigone representative. The account of the emergence of self-consciousness in the family differs in several crucial ways from the standard account of how Hegelian self-consciousness is constituted in the master–slave dialectic. Most notably, the achievement of self-consciousness through familial love involves no risk of life, no struggle to the death, no conflict. While Derrida refrains from interrogating (...) the relation between the master–slave dialectic and sexual difference directly, he interrogates the peaceful recognition that Hegel says occurs between Polynices as brother and Antigone as sister. I explore the silences that punctuate Derrida's discussion of Antigone, especially his silence on Hegel's twofold elision of the master–slave dialectic with the husband–wife relation, and of Antigone with the figure of the wife. By symbolically marrying her off, Hegel subordinates Antigone to a symbolic husband. (shrink)

Simone de Beauvoir incorporates a significantly altered form of the Hegelian master/slave dialectic into "The Ethics of Ambiguity." Her ethical theory explains and denounces extreme wrongdoing, such as the mass murder of millions of Jews at the hands of the Nazis. This essay demonstrates that, in the Beauvoirean dialectic, the Nazi value system (and Hitler) was the master, Adolf Eichmann was a slave, and Jews were denied human status. The analysis counters Robin May Schott's claims that (...) "Beauvoir portrays the attitudes of the oppressor as defined fundamentally in relation to the oppressed" and that her use of the dialectic is "inadequate to account for how human beings create extreme situations of evil, such as that of genocide.". (shrink)

The small section of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes called “Das geistige Tierreich und der Betrug oder die Sache selbst” is one stage of the total dialectical movement of Hegel’s “Science of the Experience of Consciousness.” It plays a role like any other stage, as a form of appearance through which consciousness must pass on its way to “absolute knowing.” Some stages of Hegel’s Phänomenologie have tended to acquire a status for its readers beyond the function they serve in the total (...) movement of consciousness. This has certainly been true of the famous “Master and Servant” relationship and to a lesser extent of the “Unhappy Consciousness,” the “Beautiful Soul,” and that part of “Force and Understanding” called the “inverted” or “topsy-turvy world,” to name a few. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Heroic Virtue, Comic Infidelity: Reassessing Marguerite de Navarre’s HeptaméronG. Mallary MastersHeroic Virtue, Comic Infidelity: Reassessing Marguerite de Navarre’s Heptaméron, by Dora E. Polachek; 170 pp. Amherst: Hestia Press, 1993, $19.00.The volume of essays edited by Professor Polachek represents one of the most attractive collections of symposium papers I have seen in recent years. Attractive to see and to read, it contains a variety of approaches dealing with a (...) timely topic, the “feminine” perspective of a sixteenth-century French collection of novellas within the framework of a “romance” written by a female author. Professor Polachek has masterfully edited the materials, grouping them by subject and giving her readers a text remarkably clean of typographical errors. Her introduction gives a review, as it were, a critical evaluation of the contents. The reader who wishes a more detailed synopsis of the studies in the volume may consult it to advantage.Building upon the historic reference implicit in the introduction, “The Heptaméron Then and Now,” the first group of essays by Robert D. Cottrell, Robert Melançon, and Judy Kem appear in the section entitled “Locus Amænus: Setting the Stage.” They provide background setting for the two groups that follow. Articles by Patricia Francis Cholakian, Carla Freccero, Jeffery C. Persels, and François Paré deal with the topic “Heroic Virtue: Signaling Crisis.” Gary Ferguson, Paula Sommers, Jerry C. Nash, and Dora E. Polachek conclude the volume’s third part with the theme “Engendering Laughters: Men Mocked.”The Amherst conference on Marguerite proved, of the three I attended, the most varied in theme, in critical approach, and in openness of discussion. It produced an outstanding volume of essays: timely, imaginative, qualitative, and even provocative. Colloquium implies dialogue, and dialogue means dialectic, open debate of divergent opinions. And yet, even as Marguerite herself would [End Page 150] wish it, the total experience is one of harmony, the sounding together in unison of the divergent themes, the seemingly discordant approaches that parallel the different voices created by one of the great sixteenth-century female authors of the French Renaissance. In her edition of the conference, Professor Polachek has succeeded very well in presenting a coincidentia oppositorum of the sometimes discordant opinions of Marguerite’s critics whose divergent points of view contribute to our better understanding of her too often underestimated text.The volume will prove very useful for students of Marguerite at all levels of inquiry, as it permits exposure to many different critical approaches to the text and provides additional bibliography such that readers may pursue their own interests and serious research on the subject by looking into the best of Marguerite criticism of the last decades and, indeed, of the last two centuries. The studies contained in it propel us back to the beginnings, so to speak, of Marguerite criticism, bring us up to date in terms of the most recent approaches, and move us forward through the setting of new directions and standards for future research.G. Mallary MastersUniversity of North Carolina, Chapel HillCopyright © 1995 The Johns Hopkins University Press... (shrink)

— In the Hegel’s philosophy the conflict has not only a social dimension, its sense cannot be reduced to the dialectic of the master and the servant. In fact the conflict works at two levels, the one of the self-consciousness and the one of the history : the tragic conflict between the gods and the mankind, and then between the man and the fate in the Greek tragedy ; the conflict for the recognition as a fight to (...) the life, to the death ; the juridical conflict, and the disappearance of all conflicts in the State which is really political. But the conflict reappears at the historical level inso far as the State remains a State and the war between the States follows from the interplay of passions and violence. In the Hegel’s philosophy the proper site of the conflict is not the political organization, but rather what is infra-political and historical. In Hegel all is conflict except the Idea of the State. (shrink)

Sophists’ apologia. -/- Sophists were the first paid teachers ever. These ancient Greek enlighteners taught wisdom. Protagoras, Antiphon, Prodicus, Hippias, Lykophron are most famous ones. Sophists views and concerns made a unified encyclopedic system aimed at teaching common wisdom, virtue, management and public speaking. Of the contemporary “enlighters”, Deil Carnegy’s educational work seems to be the most similar to sophism. Sophists were the first intellectuals – their trade was to sell knowledge. They introduced a new type of teacher-student relationship – (...) the mutually beneficial communication on equal terms. They taught pupils how to think independently and how to persuade others, which was inseparably connected with the rise of democracy in the most advanced Greek polices. Sophists were the first to proclaim that all people are naturally equal. They put forward the idea of natural rights and social contract, working out the fundamentals of the present-day law. In addition, they developed the basics of philology, psychology, logic, and gave a scientific explanation to the origins of religions. They embodied definite positive ideals of their epoch. Sophistry flourished in the second half of the Vth through he first third of the IVth centuries B. C. The period coincides with the heyday of the entire Greek history – the so called Greek Miracle epoch. Sophists expressed some present-day concepts of Ancient Greek ideology and mentality, characteristic of its Golden Age times. The Ancient Athens of the times of Periclus were similar to the Florence of Renaissance as to the type of social structure. That is why (?) the art of eloquence (public speaking) was highly respected in Florence. The two cities had a lot of features of the present-day capitalist society, which was due to their role as the main centres of industry of their “worlds-economies”. During the subsequent Hellenic period, the Old Order was restored, based on the feudal rent recipients’ rule. The degradation of society resulted in the decline of sophistry. Sophistry represents the highest point in the evolution of Greek philosophy. It is also the most prominent school as to the novelty of its ideas. That was owing to the common propensity for innovation typical of Periclus’ Golden Age, which in its turn resulted from the establishment of the individualistic and rationalistic thinking similar to present-day mentality. Among other aspects, close attention was paid to ethnic issues; some humanistic ideas such as Master and Servant ethics and Enlightment as the primary condition of man’s freedom, received scientific grounding. The genre of philosophical dialogue was developed, as well as the rationalistic scientific gnoceology, aimed at consistently opposing any religion. Dialectics, the most outstanding achievement of the Antiquity, was also worked out by the sophists. Zeno of Helleas was one of the sophists. Democrites’ ideas were, too, quite close to dialectics. Socrates’ contemporaries regarded him ironically, as shown, for example, in the Aristophanes’ comedy “Clouds”. Nevertheless, this scholar can still be referred to as a sophist, although of somewhat weird personality. Socrates’ popularity, which came later, should be attributed to the fact that he was the first philosopher ever to have been sentenced and executed by law, rather than to any valuable scientific contributions. Sophistry as such, rather than Socrates, marks the line between pre-Socratic and post- Socratic schools. Plato, with the exception of his latest works, is considered to belong to the same philosophical school. Specifically, there are valid reasons to believe that he was paid fees by his disciples. In Plato’s Dialogues, all points of view will be proven and then disproved, so that an integral philosophical system is hard to observe. Plato’s “Idealism” is but one of the many possible theories. His ideal philosophy is a high-minded argument of wise men. As late as towards the end of his life, Plato betrayed the ideals of sophistry, turning into the world’s first proponent of totalitarianism. Sophistry is Greek classical literature. Later on, philosophy, as well as the entire Greek civilization, started to fall into decline. Over 500 subsequent years, Hellenistic-Roman scholars never came up with anything novel. The entire process of antique philosophical evolution can be subdivided into the following six stages: Phoenician (IX–VIIth centuries B. C.), archaic (VIth – the first half of IVth century B. C., classic (the epoch of sophistry: the second half of the Vth through the first decades of the IIIrd centuries B. C.), late antique (middle of the IIIrd – first decades of the VI th centuries B.C.) The fact that early in the VIth century B. C. sophistry was rejected in Athens, has a lot to do with the consequences of their defeat in Peloponnesian war, a social catastrophe. Ever since, the prevalent part of the criticism of sophistry is a criticism of sophists’ immoral ways of life and personalities, rather than the essentials of their philosophy. For instance, Aristotle’s criticism primarily concerns their pragmatism and tendency to make a profit out of teaching. However, Aristotle himself taught his disciples along similar lines, showing them how to “be able to prove both opposites”. It was Aristotle who summed up sophists’ century-long elaborations. The traditional modern interpretation of sophists as shown in Plato’s dialogues appears to be groundless. The truth of the matter is that Plato regards sophists as more serious philosophers than Socrates was. It becomes especially clear in the dialogue titled “Protagoras”, which shows the latter as gaining an undoubted victory over Socrates. Generally speaking, Plato’s works never regard sophists as weak or worthless opponents. A common opinion as to the essence of sophists’, in particular, Protagoras’s philosophy, has hitherto not been worked out. Many researchers renounce the very existence of any specific philosophical position in sophistry. The term “relativism” itself now has a bad name. However, it should be borne in mind that Protagoras doctrine emerged as a result of an attempt to get out of the ontological dead-end to which the entire Greek natural philosophy had come. To this purpose, he employed Anaxagoras’s idea about everything comprising everything, whereupon he built his physical-ontological theory, and Zeno of Helleas’s concept that all objects are such and different at the same time in the same respect. According to Protagoras’s philosophy, every object does not only seem, but is different from every other object, including human beings. Therefore, every person is his or her own measure of all other entities. The objective reality is the Ego’s relations with the outer world. Every object’s essence is defined through its interaction with ourselves. Nothing remains stagnant – every existence already contains non-existence, and vice-versa. However, the relativity of being is not to be regarded as absolute. That means, that relatively stable and therefore relatively cognizable entities do exist, among them the words we say. Doubt is not considered absolute by relativists either, which differentiates them from skeptics and agnostics. They dare to believe. Uncertainty is Godly – here, Protagoras becomes very close to the concept of apathetic theology. Gorgius shared Protagoras’s views and tried to prove them applying the same method as Zeno applied when upholding Parmenidis’s philosophy. He argued that if one accepts the opposite point of view and agrees that nothing can exist and not exist at the same time, one is bound to come to an the absurd conclusion that nothing is cognizable and nothing exists. To prove that there is a universal contradiction within the Existence itself, Protagoras and his followers in their turn put forward a number of special logical arguments, called rules of contraries, or sophisms. The most well-known of them is the Euathle’s sophism, which proves that an object can be such and different at the same time in the same respect. Generally speaking, all relationships of any entity are extraneous. The idea that all entities, including concepts, exist and do not exist at the same time, was also accepted by Plato. It should be stressed, that Plato’s philosophy as a whole is relativists’ greatest achievement. In his dispute against relativism, Aristotle put forward the main concepts of his ontology: the existence falls into the existence in possibility and the existence in reality, or substance and accidence – the ever changing “sublunary” world and the stable world of divine heavenly bodies. This division made his system self-contradictory to the point of absurd. Aristotle quite realized, that the direct disproof of relativism is hardly possible, which fact makes his criticism a mere tautology. It is very indicative in this respect that materialists, idealists and even skeptical agnostics applied the same arguments do disprove relativism. That demonstrates that the inner contradiction between any forms of “absolutism” and relativism is the most fundamental philosophical problem. Relativist ideas were repeatedly renewed throughout history, provided the social conditions were favourable. In variations, the concepts were advanced by Tzuan Tsi and ancient Chinese sophists, apostle Paul, Nicolas of Cusa, Galileo, Rene Descartes, G. Berkley, D. Hume, Ch. S. Pierce, E. Mach, A. Bogdanov, F. de Saussure, N. Bore, P. Feuerabend, U. Quain and others. However, no consistent relativist ontological system was developed after Protagoras. Meanwhile, a valid relativist theory could provide a clue to a fuller and more adequate general physical concept of the world, and to a deeper understanding of quantum mechanics. -/- Relativism as an ontological system of beliefs. -/- The relativist principle of relativity of all that exists is fundamental for the entire system of philosophy. Absolutely everything exists, but, at the same time, no existence is absolute. Anything is possible, but those entities only exist for us with which we interact this way or another, i. e., reality is interaction, “I interact – hence, I exist”. However, an overly close relationship between entities leads to non-existence – in other words, there is a certain existential optimum. For all of us, information, or perceptible heterogeneities, is real. Each of us is the center of a definite system of interactions with the world. If God is an endless Possibility, then the World is but the man’s dialogue with God. However, the ties that bind us with the world are of some definite kind, which predetermines our reality. The principle of relativity constrains itself, as any relativity is relative. On the one hand, that calls forth the Evil – caused by our own weakness. On the other hand, it makes our world relatively stable and cognizable. Generally speaking, the world is what we are. Everybody has an own Universe, but since people are fairly similar, our universes can be regarded as one Universe with common laws and regulations. It is possible for us to change the degree of objects’ existence in relation to ourselves and one another. It is equally important, though, to remain ourselves (keep following our “warrior’s path”). Since everything exists and no existence is absolute, the process of cognition should involve a criticism of everything but never a complete rebuttal of anything. The criterion of verity for any theory then is in its capacity to build itself upon a bigger number of diverse statements than in any other theory. Theoretically, all philosophies should ideally be complementary. The question of what in fact happened is meaningless unless we specify the “we”, the “where” and the “when”. The past can only exist as part of the present. When we change, our past undergoes corresponding qualitative objective changes, all of which are irreversible. The contemporary physics regards all objects of the Universe as existing for one another, which results in absurd conclusions. In fact, only what we interact with, exists. The so called “speed of light in vacuum” c is the maximum speed of direct interaction and direct exchange of signals. Specifically, at the oncoming speed c with a significant blue parallax the gamma-quantum is unable to interact with the matter. When this speed is reached, the gravitational mass of objects in relation to one another becomes equal to zero (imaginary), whereas their inertial mass equals infinity. Further acceleration will bring us into an entirely different Universe. That means that the Universe is an open system, which fact destroys all present-day cosmological models. Anything is possible in this world. Our reality is magic. Every bit of space contains a potentially limitless number of bits of other, however virtual, universes, as well as an infinite number of particles, which are still virtual for us (as postulated by quantum mechanics). In other words, there exists an infinity of different realities. With all the above in mind, the different levels of entities’ existence, in particular, of Life and Reason, should be taken into consideration. For example, to which extent a live system exists in relation to the inanimate forms of being is very indefinite, as what life is has to be determined by living creatures. An even greater compass of levels of existence can be brought about through interaction – that is the core idea of Godel’s theorem. As a result, the range of forms of existence tends towards infinity – the evolution of matter through super-intelligence will bring us up to God’s heights. A more generalized mathematical model of the physical world, including a universal operator of the co-existence of objects, can be developed based on the above considerations. The bonds between objects become weaker owing to 1) a high speed, 2) acceleration, 3) rotation, 4) strong gravity, 5) strong fields of other kinds, 6) the difference of levels of existence , 7) phase shifts. Yet, there always is an existential optimum. Such mathematical model is to operate certain non-transitive algebras. Relativist ontology assumes that the notion of “temperature” is relative, thus making it possible to ignore the Second Law of Thermodynamics. In its turn, that will allow for phase shifts. A perpetual motion machine of the second type will become a reality. Rotation could presumably be used to increase inertial and decrease gravitational mass, slowing down the time. An experimental research could shed light on the mentioned effects. (shrink)

In his first examination of questions of criminal law, a series of articles on the wood theft law of the Prussian Rhine province (1842), the young Karl Marx unmistakably followed in the footsteps of Hegel. In the following years, however, Marx increasingly broke away from Hegel. While Hegel trusted the state as the custodian of the general public interest to tame the potentially destructive forces of bourgeois market society, Marx considered such a belief illusory: The modern state is not the (...) master of bourgeois society but its servant, and its exaltation by Hegel is nothing but ideology. According to Marx, the doubling of modern societies into a real world of economic conflicts of interest and the ethereal region of an unreal state generality means that such societies cannot be content with one theory of punishment, but need two theories: a doctrine of prevention based on robust protection of interests and a theory of retaliation that is at the height of idealistic semantics of reason and freedom. Marx rejected both types of theory as ideological. Instead of punishing the individual wrongdoer, he argued, it is necessary to eliminate the origins of the crime. This goal could only be realized under communism. In a communist community, the punishment would be nothing other than the judgment of the wrongdoer about himself. In the person who executed this punishment he would therefore find “the natural redeemer from the punishment that he imposed on himself”. In political practice, however, this claim inevitably turns into total control by the association over its members. Not only the Enlightenment is subject to a disastrous dialectic, but also Marx’ idea of radical emancipation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Master" versus "Servant":Contradictions in Drama and Theatre EducationShifra Schonmann (bio)Mr Jourdain: You mean to say that when I say "Nicole, fetch me my slippers" or "Give me my night-cap" that's prose?Philosopher: Certainly, sir.Mr Jourdain: Well, my goodness! Here I've been talking prose for the last forty years and never known it, and mighty grateful I am to you for telling me!—Molière, Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme1My basic claim is (...) that our young field—drama and theatre education—feels old. Are we being stifled by applied drama and theatre, so that it has put real obstacles in the way of broadening the horizons of the field? I know that by asking this question I risk setting myself up as a living target for all those who maintain that applied theatre is the "hot" and the appropriate concept in the field. For more than twenty-five years now, we have been working with our students in teacher education departments and with children in schools in the manner of applied drama and theatre, but we have named it differently. It is as if we had been speaking the language of applied drama and theatre for twenty-five years—and we did not know that this was the case. (It reminds me of Moliere's Monsieur Jourdain who suddenly discovers that he has been speaking prose for the past forty years.) I would like to make it very clear from the outset that my claim is not against applied drama and theatre; it is a claim for another proportion (balance) between the instrumental function and the artistic-aesthetic function of our drama and theatre work in education.Is this a new claim? Not at all. But in the midst of our intensive endeavors in the field, it strikes me again and again that we have been running after our own tails, doing almost the same things over the past twenty-five [End Page 31] years. I have tried to understand why we are wandering around, surrounded by the same basic circles and experiencing a feeling of déjà-vu. What, really, is our problem? As a result of asking myself these questions, I began to analyze programs of the major conferences of the last ten years in drama and theatre education: Exeter (Researching Drama and Theatre in Education), AATE (American Alliance for Theatre and Education), IDEA (International Drama/Theatre and Education Association), and IDIERI (International Drama in Education Research Institute). These are considered to be the main international professional gatherings in the field (most of which I have attended). I have been looking into the headings that express the topics that were discussed. My data show that the majority of the topics were concerned with the by-products that drama and theatre can produce but not with the artistic and/or the aesthetic dimensions of the field. Sometimes I wonder if we fail to see the wood for the trees.In the Dictionary of Developmental Drama, written by Richard Courtney, an attempt was made to clarify the terms of drama used in a variety of practical fields.2 In this dictionary, we cannot find the applied theatre entry or process drama entry, but we can find entries such as developmental drama, drama in education, drama therapy, dramatic activity, educational drama, educational theatre, forum theatre, and many others. The terminology used among drama workers, leaders, and researchers is not precise. When drama educators and researchers meet, we engage in extensive discussion, often exchanging experiences and successful strategies. Quite some time can pass before we realize that our concepts of drama education differ considerably. These concepts range from completely spontaneous activities, such as improvisational exercises, to very carefully planned work, such as staging written scripts. Courtney's dictionary is the only one that I know that tries to define the basic concepts in our field: It is necessary but not adequate or up to date.In the "Drama Way" Project, a comprehensive work by Jouni Piekkari et al., coordinated by the University of Turku in Finland, I found a good attempt to set up a "mini" dictionary.3 The "Drama Way" Project identified a number of... (shrink)

This review argues that the role of technology in business and society debates has predominantly been examined from the limited, narrow perspective of technology as instrumental, and that two additional but relatively neglected perspectives are important: technology as value-laden and technology as relationally agentic. Technology has always been part of the relationship between business and society, for better and worse. However, as technological development is frequently advanced as a solution to many pressing societal problems and grand challenges, it is imperative (...) that technology is understood and analyzed in a more nuanced, critical, and comprehensive way. The two additional perspectives invite a broader research agenda, one that includes questions, such as “Which values and whose interests has technology come to emulate?”; “How do these values and interests play out in stabilizing the status quo?”; and, importantly, “How can it be contested, disrupted, and changed?” Any research that endorses green, sustainable, environmental, or climate mitigating technologies potentially contributes to maintaining the very thing that it seeks to change if questions such as these are not being addressed. (shrink)

Should education serve external goals, or should it be non-instrumental? In this paper, I recognize a tension between these two views with respect to the question of the end and the means in education, and I suggest conceptual and practical ways to handle this tension. The paper comprises two parts: the first part discusses the problem, and the second part offers solutions. To expose the problem, I present a brief overview of the opposing views of purposiveness versus anti-instrumentalism in education, (...) based on old inspirations and new manifestations of each, and I present two examples of current theories that carry this tension as an inner contradiction. Additionally, I argue these theoretical tensions lead to professional confusions and practical dilemmas among teachers. In search of solutions, I lean on current theoretical arguments to reconcile the contradictions and offer ways to integrate the two views into one pedagogical approach. Finally, I draw a conceptual model that turns the tensions and confusions into a more reasonable complexity that educators can handle in their theoretical thinking and accommodate in their practical choices in school. My conclusions lead to a re-justified commitment to education for democracy, and to teachers’ autonomy. (shrink)

This article explores and examines research in the field of human vocalization, proposing an evolutionary sequence for human acoustic perception and productive response. This involves updating and extending Charles Darwin’s 1871 proposal that musical communi­cation predated language, while providing the anatomical and behavioral foundations for the articulacy on which it depends. In presenting evidence on which a new consensus regarding the emergence of human vocal ability may be based, we present and review contributions from a wide range of disciplines, illustrating (...) that the phenomenon of human musicality may have had more of a core function in shaping our anatomy and culture than has hitherto been recognized. Essential to the adaptive sequence on which this depends is human perceptual and productive response to the properties of the Harmonic Series. Both music and language have emerged from the auditory and performative consequences of this relationship. (shrink)

Notwithstanding the notion of progress, the social and environmental record of our age poses serious doubts for the present and the future. Technology, being the mainspring of progress, may be seen, accordingly, as the master of history more than the servant of society. In line with this view, a case can be made to strengthen the value of technology and to weaken the deterministic character of history. To do so, the paper canvasses the use of artificial markets designed (...) to improve compliance of technology with environmental or social standards. The emerging interest in following this path poses a radical departure from the traditional policy approach to technology assessment. The traditional approach may be described asex ante, relying on cost-benefit analysis to anticipate the welfare effects of technology, combining this analysis with bureaucratic management based on command and control. Cost-benefit analysis, however, is piecemeal and shortsighted and, in a dynamic and synergistic world, can be considered of limited value to ensure longer-term goals. On the other hand, artificial markets operateex post and on the basis of ambient standards. As such, they constitute an artificial device that does not require discretion and a predictive capacity that social science cannot offer. Nonetheless, and given political will, this new approach offers the potential to ensure efficient and sustainable outcomes under conditions of uncertainty. (shrink)

Throughout the history of capitalism, there have been tensions between financial institutions and the state, and between financial capital and the firms and households engaged in the production and consumption of physical goods and services. Periods of financial sector dominance have regularly ended in spectacular panics and crashes, often resulting in the liquidation of large numbers of financial institutions and the reimposition of regulatory controls previously dismissed as outmoded and unnecessary. The aim of this article is to consider measures to (...) restore financial markets to their proper role, as servants rather than masters of the market economy and the society within which it is embedded. (shrink)

The massive introduction of artificial intelligence has triggered significant societal concerns, ranging from “technological unemployment” and the dominance of algorithms in the work place and in everyday life, among others. While AI is made by humans and is, therefore, dependent on the latter for its purpose, the increasing capabilities of AI to carry out productive activities for humans can lead the latter to unwitting slavish existence. This has become evident, for example, in the area of social media use, where AI (...) programmers tie psychology and persuasion to the human social need for approval and validation in ways that few users can resist. We argue that AI should serve humans with humans as masters and not the other way around. Moreover, we propose that virtue ethics might play a role to solidify the human as master of AI and guard against the alternative of AI as the master. (shrink)

Originally published in Czechoslovakia just prior to Prague Spring in 1968, this collection of three essays on the political and philosophical thought of Montaigne, Voltaire, and Holbach examines the relationships between social life and ideological categories, and economics and the development of ideas.

Bioethics, like the sixteenth-century commedia dell’arte, is a master of revelation. At the heart of this is a propensity to highlight that what we see is as much truthful and elegant as it is made up of pretence and staging. Must we persuade ourselves that what is false is not false, that what is true is changeable and fragile? Is it possible to serve two masters? Is it possible to get by without antics and disgrace? The Odelet is at (...) once a cryptic portent of the past, present and future of bioethics and a reflection on the capacity of the field to act as a motor for social change. (shrink)