ObjectivesIn 2015, the Province of Quebec, Canada passed a law that allowed voluntary active euthanasia. Palliative care stakeholders in Canada have been largely opposed to euthanasia, yet there is little research about their views. The research question guiding this study was the following: How do palliative care physicians in Quebec position themselves regarding the practice of VAE in the context of the new provincial legislation?MethodsWe used interpretive description, an inductive methodology to answer research questions about clinical practice. A total of (...) 18 palliative care physicians participated in semistructured interviews at two university-affiliated hospitals in Quebec.ResultsParticipants positioned themselves in opposition to euthanasia. Their justifications were framed within their professional commitment to not hasten death, which sat in tension with the value of patients’ autonomy to choose how to die. Participants described VAE as unacceptable if it impeded opportunities to evaluate and alleviate suffering. Further, they contested government rhetoric that positioned VAE as a way to improve end-of-life care. Participants felt that VAE would diminish the potential of palliative care to relieve suffering. Dilemmas were apparent in their narratives, about reconciling respect for patient autonomy with broader palliative care values, and the value of accompanying and not abandoning patients who make requests for VAE while being committed to neither prolonging nor hastening death.ConclusionsThis study provides insight into nuanced positions of experienced palliative care physicians in Quebec and confirms expected tensions between an important stakeholder and the practice of VAE as guided by the new legislation. (shrink)

Anne Pasquier,Marie Chantal,Steeve Bélanger.

The authors of this article are previous or current members of the Clinical Ethics Consultation Affairs (CECA) Committee, a standing committee of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH). The committee is composed of seasoned healthcare ethics consultants (HCECs), and it is charged with developing and disseminating education materials for HCECs and ethics committees. The purpose of this article is to describe the educational research and development processes behind our teaching materials, which culminated in a case studies book called (...) A Case-Based Study Guide for Addressing Patient-Centered Ethical Issues in Health Care (hereafter, the Study Guide). In this article, we also enumerate how the Study Guide could be used in teaching and learning, and we identify areas that are ripe for future work. (shrink)

I examine the views of the renowned Catholic environmentalist, Thomas Berry, C.P., by comparing them with those of Thomas Aquinas, an author Berry frequently references. I intend to show that while the two share a number of views in common, ultimately the two diverge on many foundational issues, resulting in differing conclusions as to how we should regard and treat the environment. Aquinas upholds divine transcendence, whereas Berry regards the notion of divine transcendence to lead to the exploitation of creation (...) and locates the divine in the universe itself. Berry accordingly thinks that we should revere all natural things, whereas Aquinas thinks we should revere God and creatures in God’s image. Aquinas maintains that the human soul is created by God and is in God’s image. He sees our rational soul as placing us above other natural things, and from it follows our responsibility to care for nature. Berry, to the contrary, sees this affirmation of discontinuity between humans and the rest of nature to be the root of our environmental woes, as providing a justification for human exploitation of nature. For Berry, humans have no special status, but are one member alongside others in the earth community. Rather than being created by God, “humans have nothing but what they receive from the universe.” By highlighting both the similarities and differences between these authors, I hope to contribute to the project of formulating a sound environmental ethics. (shrink)

If Aquinas lived today, he would accept that Darwin was correct, at leastas to the broad lines of his theory, namely, that the unfit are differentially eliminatedand chance is involved in the origin of new species. Aquinas in fact offered a similarexplanation for what he believed were spontaneously generated organisms. I intendto show that extending this sort of explanation to all species in no way affects thekey steps in the Fifth Way (e.g., “those things which lack cognition do not tendto (...) an end unless directed by someone knowing and intelligent”). Thomas himselfprovides us with the crucial points for bringing evolution by natural selectioninto accord with the Fifth Way, including the distinction between a maker anda designer (builder vs. architect), an explanation for organisms’ imperfections interms of material necessity and secondary causality, and an account of the role ofchance in the world. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AQUINAS ON REINCARNATION MARIE I. GEORGE St. John's University Jamaica, New York I. INTRODUCTION AQUINAS EXPLICITLY addresses the question of whether reincarnation is possible on numerous occasions.1 Not surprisingly, his most extensive and subtle treatment of the subject is found in a work addressed to nonChristians, the Summa Contra Gentiles. Aquinas took it to be his duty as Christian philosopher to address errors which were apt to have (...) a detrimental effect on the faith of Christian believers.2 In this spirit I have undertaken the task of presenting Aquinas's philosophical arguments against reincarnation. For nowadays belief in reincarnation is becoming increasingly widespread, even among Christians, in spite of the fact that it is incompatible with belief in the resurrection of the body. My treatment of the matter will necessarily be summary, both because of the large number of arguments which Aquinas proffers, and because a full understanding of Aquinas's arguments presupposes an understanding of his teachings on natural philosophy, and especially on the soul. 1 A partial listing of the works in which Aquinas discusses reincarnation is as follows: In Super Evangelium S. Matthaei, ed. P. Raphaelis Cai, O.P. (Turin: Marietti, 1951), n. 925, Aquinas refers to transmigrationem animae. Reference is made to the Pythagorean fables on the subject in In Aristotelis Librum De Anima Commentarium (Turin: Marietti, 1959), n. 131 (hereafter cited as De Anima). Extended discussions of reincarnation are found in Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter cited as ScG), II, c. 83, ed. C. Pera, O.P., et al. (Turin: Marietti, 1961), and in Scriptum super Sententiis (hereafter cited as Sent.), IV, d. 44, q. l, a. 1 (Paris: Lethielleux, 1956). The Index Thomisticus indicates that the word "metempsychoseos" is used twice in the Catena Aurea (Matt.), but does not appear in any of Aquinas's own writings. 2 Cf. De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas. 33 34 MARIE I. GEORGE What is reincarnation? The problem in attempting to understand and to form a proper judgment about the idea of reincarnation stems from the fact that this word designates a cluster of disparate beliefs and doctrines, some popular, some philosophical, others religious. If reincarnation has always figured prominently in the religious and cultural fabric of Eastern thought, it has been less present in the West. In spite of some precedents in the past, it is only really quite recently that this idea has been gaining ground here, although in forms quite different from those of the East. The question, then, is a vast one. For this reason, among others, we intend to limit our consideration to those versions for which Western philosophers have offered a defense. Their claim is that upon death the spirits of at least certain people enter into other human bodies (generally those of newly conceived infants), or even into the bodies of lower life forms. Moreover, it is usually maintained that the kind of being one's spirit will enter after death depends upon how one has lived one's previous life. One might thus return as a queen, or as a poor and miserable person, or even as a slug, in correspondence to the goodness or evilness of one's former life. Aquinas's arguments against reincarnation are of two sorts. Sometimes he argues against what he calls the roots of a given version of the theory:' What he means by roots are positions the acceptance of which render reincarnation necessary or plausible. In showing that the roots are unsound, Aquinas refutes a given account of reincarnation, but does not refute the basic doctrine as such, for there may be some other account that would justify the belief. The other sort of argument which Aquinas gives positively establishes that reincarnation is impossible. We intend to consider here both sorts of argument.4 'Cf. IV Sent., d. 44, q. I, a. 1, sol. 1. 4 Note that Aquinas does not address the religious versions of the theory with the exception of Plato's theory which can be considered religious to the extent that it is derived from the Pythagorean mysteries. Aquinas interests himself in those theories known to him that both offer a rational account and have some plausibility. AQUINAS ON... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:MIND FORMING AND MANUDUCTIO IN AQUINAS* MARIE I. GEORGE St. John's University Jamaica, New York QUINAS'S CONCERN for pedagogy is plain from his explicit discussions of the subject, the most noteworthy of which is found in the preface to the Summa Theologiae. His qualities as a teacher of beginning students have been brought out by numerous modern authors, among whom are Josef Pieper,1 who underlines both Thomas's ability (...) to arouse wonder and his use of ordinary language intelligible to all, and James Weisheipl,2 who points out that Aquinas's commentaries on Aristotle reveal a concern for the neophyte who is trying to comprehend the relation between faith and reason. One important aspect of Aquinas's teaching on pedagogy generally does not get the attention it merits, however, and this is the need for ' manuductio.' 3 ' Manuductio ', or ' xeipaywv£a ' (literally, 'leading by the hand') is an expression which Aquinas *This paper was read at the Sixteenth International Conference on Patristic, Mediaeval, and Renaissance Studies, Villanova University, Pennsylvania, September 1991. 1 Cf. Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas (New York: Pantheon Books, 1962)' c. 8. 2 Cf. James Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas d'Aquino (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1974), 281. 3 This article drew much of its inspiration from the works of Msgr. Maurice Dionne, a thinker who both elaborated upon and consciously implemented Aquinas's teachings on this subject. Cf. especially: Initation a la logique, ed. Yvan Pelletier (Ste-Foy, Quebec: L'Institut Apostolique Renaissance inc., 1976), and La N ecessite de la logique en regard de chacune des vertus intellectuelles, ed. Louis Brunet, vol. 1 (Quebec: Societe d'Etudes Aristoteliciennes 1980), hereafter cited as La N ec. 201 202 MARIE I. GEORGE adopts from Dionysius.4 It is a word that has different but related meanings in the moral, intellectual, and spiritual orders. Our intention is to elucidate the thomistic doctrine of ' leadingby -the-hand ' in the context of intellectual education, or ' mind forming,' discussing its nature, its necessity, and its place in the global picture of human knowing as outlined by Aquinas. We will begin by delineating in general what manuductio is by comparing two key passages, the first of which is to be found in the Summa Theologiae: The teacher leads the students from what is already known to knowledge of things unknown in two ways. First, by putting before him certain aids or instruments which his intellect uses in order to acquire science ; for example, when he presents him with some less universal proposition which nevertheless the student is able to judge from things already known; or when he proposes to him some sensible examples, or similitudes, or opposites, or some other things of this sort, from which the intellect of the learner is ' led by the hand ' (manuducitur) to the knowledge of a truth previously unknown to him. The other way [the teacher leads the student] is when he strengthens the intellect of the learner... inasmuch as he proposes the order of principles to conclusions to the student, who perhaps by himself would not have so much ability to put things together (virtutem collativam) that from the principles he could deduce the conclusions. And therefore it is said in Posterior Analytics. Bk. I, that 'demonstration is a syllogism making one know '. And through this mode the one who demonstrates makes the listener know.5 4 Cf. In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Ezpositio (Turin: Marietti, 1950), where St. Thomas comments on the following phrase from Dionysius (p. 14) : "E1r ailT7]11 a11a"Yoµe110J11 a11aTaTtX7/ xe1pa"YOJ1lla" ("ad ipsam sursum actorum suscitative manuductio "). The commentary reads (p. 17, # 48) : "Further, it is necessary that man progress to better things; and as to this, he says fifthly ' suscitative manuductio sursum actorum ' i.e., those things which go up, that is, make progre"ss, 'ad Ipsam ', namely to the Divinity. [The expression] 'suscitative' manuductio, however, is used because not only can one give a helping hand to those wanting to make progress, but one can even stimulate or urge [people] to progress." All translations are my own. Cf. also Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 27, art... (shrink)

The retirement village sector1 is one part of the increasingly marketized `aged-care' services in New Zealand and in many other parts of the industrialized world. While critical researchers have examined organizational and residents' representations of aging, retirement, and retirement communities in the context of `the market', there is no research that examines communication related to residents' enactment of participation within these settings with respect to these processes of marketization. We aim to refine, complicate, and extend what we might call `the (...) marketization thesis' through this study that examines resident participation within retirement communities. This essay is based on a comparative examination of two major New Zealand retirement community organizations. The rhetorical and critical discourse analysis reveals the complexity of what `participation' means for the residents within the context of an institution that is in transition from a medicalized to a marketized model of service delivery. Through a close examination of these meanings, we offer new insights into issues of individual action and freedom within the frame of a market-driven and avowedly `customer-centred' organization and consequently suggest a reconsideration of participation in organizations in which clients are also `insiders'. (shrink)

This volume examines some of the most contentious social justice issues present in the corpus of Augustine's writings. Whether one is concerned with human trafficking and the contemporary slave trade, the global economy, or endless wars, these essays further the conversation on social justice as informed by the writings of Augustine of Hippo.

The systems perspective, as applied to biology, involves regarding organisms as systems consisting of biological molecules in motion; its goal is to determine which interacting molecules make up the organism and how their interactions change over time. I argue here that Nicanor Austriaco’s attempt at reformulating Aristotelian-Thomistic hylomorphism in terms of the systems perspective fails because it looks to systems biology to answer questions that only natural philosophy can answer. These questions include whether an organism is collection of parts having (...) accidental unity or is a substance, what constitutes an emergent property, and what role the final cause plays in understanding organisms. In addition, insufficient attention is paid to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tenet that the soul can only be united to a suitably disposed body, namely, one with organs. Nothing is offered to show that this tenet can be accorded with a perspective that views organisms as networks of interacting molecules. (shrink)

If Aquinas lived today, he would accept that Darwin was correct, at leastas to the broad lines of his theory, namely, that the unfit are differentially eliminatedand chance is involved in the origin of new species. Aquinas in fact offered a similarexplanation for what he believed were spontaneously generated organisms. I intendto show that extending this sort of explanation to all species in no way affects thekey steps in the Fifth Way (e.g., “those things which lack cognition do not tendto (...) an end unless directed by someone knowing and intelligent”). Thomas himselfprovides us with the crucial points for bringing evolution by natural selectioninto accord with the Fifth Way, including the distinction between a maker anda designer (builder vs. architect), an explanation for organisms’ imperfections interms of material necessity and secondary causality, and an account of the role ofchance in the world. (shrink)

Probably most of us have suffered at the hands of a friend who continually turned to us for help, as well having been grieved by a friend who failed to do so on a given occasion. And we have probably been chagrinned by friends who divulge to us only the most limited knowledge about their past problems, as well as by friends who provide unnecessary information about their woeful past. The purpose of this paper is to set out Aquinas’s recommendations (...) for the moral guidelines to be followed in deciding which problems we disclose to our friends; these guidelines include: (1) not placing burdens on friends unnecessarily; (2) affording one’s friends the opportunity to do one good; (3) living in accord with one’s social nature; (4) being genuine; (5) encouraging friends struggling with moral problems; (6) bearing faith witness on occasion; (7) avoiding scandal; and (8) avoiding vices involving speech. (shrink)