Berkeley: New Theory of Vision

George Berkeley argues that vision is a language of God, that the immediate objects of vision are arbitrary signs for tactile objects and that there is no necessary connection between what we see and what we touch. Thomas Reid, on the other hand, aims to establish a geometrical connection between visible and tactile figures. Consequently, although Reid and Berkeley's theories of vision share important elements, Reid explicitly rejects Berkeley's idea that visible figures are merely arbitrary signs for tangible bodies. But (...) is he right in doing so? I show that many passages in Berkeley's work on vision suggest that he acknowledges a geometrical connection between visibles and tangibles. So the opposition between the arbitrariness Berkeley defends and a geometrical connection cannot be as universal as Reid thinks. This paper seeks to offer a plausible reading of Berkeley's theory of vision in this regard and an explanation of why Reid interprets Berkeley differently. (shrink)

Johannes Kepler dedicated much of his work to discover a law for the refraction of light. Unfortunately, he formulated an incorrect law. Nevertheless, it was useful for anticipating the behavior of light in some specific conditions. Some believe that Kepler did not have the elements to formulate the law that was later accepted by the scientific community, that is, the Snell–Descartes law. However, in this paper, we propose a model that agrees with Kepler’s heuristics and that is also successful in (...) anticipating the behavior of light when it passes through a surface that separates two media with different optical densities. This model adopts strategies that were recommended by Kepler in two types of analogies. The obstacles that led to the failure of the two types of analogies are presented in the article, and we argue that the model proposed here could overcome these specific obstacles. Finally, we show how the proposed model could be articulated with Kepler’s metaphysics of light. (shrink)

At the beginning of the 18th century, Berkeley believed an anomaly pointed out by Isaac Barrow could be regarded as important evidence against the optical theories that had been established and standardized thanks to the works of Kepler and Newton. In this article, we want to show that Berkeley’s treatment of the Barrovian Case does not falsify these theories. We will contend that the strategy used by Berkeley to resolve the anomaly by alluding to a change of convention is a (...) strategy that the classical theorist could use as well. In other words, the classical theorist could also appeal to a change of convention to deal with the problem. (shrink)

Berkeley and Kant are known for having developed philosophical critiques of materialism, critiques leading them to propose instead an epistemology based on the coherence of our mental representations. For all that the two had in common, however, Kant was adamant in distinguishing his own " empirical realism " from the immaterialist consequences entailed by Berkeley's attack on abstract ideas. Kant focused his most explicit criticisms on Berkeley's account of space, and commentators have for the most part decided that Kant either (...) misunderstood or was simply unfamiliar with the Bishop's actual position. Rather than demonstrate that Kant understood Berkeley perfectly well—an argument that has already been forcefully made by Colin Turbayne—I want to take a different tack altogether. For it is by paying attention to Berkeley's actual account of space, an account oriented by his rejection of spatial " geometers " like Descartes, and spatial " absolutists " like Newton, that we discover an account of embodied cognition, of spatial distance and size that can only be known by way of the body's motion and touch. Perhaps even more striking, I will want to suggest, is the manner in which Kant's approach to the problem of incongruent counterparts will equally need to rely on a proprioceptive cognition, one requiring a different geometry of position altogether. My discussion proceeds in three stages, with stage one focused on Kant's efforts to distinguish his philosophical project from Berkeley's own idealist system, and stages two and three describing the manner in which their approach to spatial orientation both challenges and extends the traditional narrative of their differences as laid out in stage one. (shrink)

Over _Principles_ 42-43, Berkeley worried that we might "in truth" see things existing at a distance from us, in which case they could not plausibly be supposed to exist independently of being perceived. He went on to say that he had developed his new theory of vision to address this worry. This paper argues that the worry is serious and that Berkeley was right to think that it would take nothing less than a theory of vision to address it. The (...) paper further argues that Berkeley's theory of vision fails to adequately address the worry. The locus of the failure is Berkeley's account of what he called "situation." The term has an ambiguity that Berkeley exploited. It can refer to how coloured points are localized on a two dimensional visual field or it can mean how the visual field is oriented with respect to the direction of gravity. Berkeley focused on the second when he needed to explain how the first is possible without granting that we originally experience objects as disposed over at least two spatial dimensions. (shrink)

Berkeley holds that vision, in isolation, presents only color and light. He also claims that typical perceivers experience distance, figure, magnitude, and situation visually. The question posed in New Theory is how we perceive by sight spatial features that are not, strictly speaking, visible. Berkeley’s answer is “that the proper objects of vision constitute an universal language of the Author of nature.” For typical humans, this language of vision comes naturally. Berkeley identifies two sorts of objects of vision: primary (light (...) and colors) and secondary (distance, figure, magnitude, and situation). Berkeley also appeals to a third class of a different sort: visible figure, magnitude, and situation, constituting the vocabulary of the language of vision. By considering two perceivers who lack this vocabulary we may better understand this third category and the difference between those who must learn the language of vision and those for whom it is a natural endowment. (shrink)

In Section 38 of the Theory of Vision Vindicated, George Berkeley claims that he had used the method of analysis throughout the Theory of Vision. What does that mean? I first show that "analysis" denoted a fairly well-defined method in the early modern period: it was regularly described as a method of discovery. Then I show that the discussion of distance perception in the Theory of Vision exemplifies the method of analysis and may be seen as a modification of a (...) non-geometrical account of distance vision in Rene Descartes' Optics. (shrink)

Bertil Belfrage has recently given a "new interpretation" of Berkeley's Theory of Vision. He opposes the view that it is a contribution to metaphysics; it is, he argues, a scientific theory comparable with physics and mechanics. I shall argue that both alternatives are mistaken: Berkeley does not present any definite theory at all in his essay on vision; it is not a contribution either to science or metaphysics but an essay towards a theory that would include both scientific and metaphysical (...) aspects. Even if the Theory of Vision is not a treatise on ontology or theology, and it is no doubt an empirical work, it is not a contribution exclusively to empirical psychology. Berkeley wanted to show the need for a new theory of vision. This explains why he seems to deal with both scientific and metaphysical themes at the same time. (shrink)

Berkeley thinks that we only see the size, shape, location, and orientation of objects in virtue of the correlation between sight and touch. Shadows have all of these spatial properties and yet are intangible. In Seeing Dark Things (2008), Roy Sorensen argues that shadows provide a counterexample to Berkeley's theory of vision and, consequently, to his idealism. This paper shows that Berkeley can accept both that shadows are intangible and that they have spatial properties.

The paper provides an account of necessary truths in Berkeley based upon his divine language model. If the thesis of the paper is correct, not all Berkeleian necessary truths can be known a priori.

The problem of whether perception is direct or if it depends on additional, cognitive contributions made by the perceiving subject, is posed with particular force in an Essay towards a New Theory of Vision. It is evident from the recurrent treatment it receives therein that Berkeley considers it to be one of the central issues concerning perception. Fittingly, the NTV devotes the most attention to it. In this essay, I deal exclusively with Berkeley's treatment of the problem of indirect distance (...) perception, as it is presented in the context of that work. (shrink)

: Berkeley's Essay Towards a New Theory of Vision presents a theory of various aspects of the spatial content of visual experience that attempts to undercut not only the optico-geometric accounts of e.g., Descartes and Malebranche, but also elements of the empiricist account of Locke. My task in this paper is to shed light on some features of Berkeley's account that have not been adequately appreciated. After rehearsing a more detailed Lockean critique of the notion that depth is a proper (...) object of vision, Berkeley directs arguments he takes to be entirely parallel against the notion that vision has two-dimensional planar contents as proper objects. I show that this argument fails due to an illicit slide unnoticed by both Berkeley and his commentators—a slide present but innocuously so in the case of depth. Berkeley's positive account, according to which the apparent spatial content of vision is a matter of associations between, on the one hand, tactile and motor contents, and on the other hand non-spatial visual contents, also fails because of an illicit slide—again, unnoticed by Berkeley and his commentators. I close by discerning the salvageable and correct core of Berkeley's theory of the spatiality of vision. (shrink)

George Berkeley's New Theory of Vision is frequently read as a simple precursor or “half-way house” to his later metaphysics. As a result, some allege the value of the New Theory has been overlooked as critics judge it by its association with immaterialism. In this piece I examine the ongoing debate over the nature of the connection between Berkeley's early work on perception and his later immaterialist tracts. I identify four principal positions on the nature of the connection that have (...) been advanced in the scholarly literature, critically engage the evidence for and against them, and finally weigh in by arguing that an excellent case can be made for thinking that the New Theory is a half-way house to immaterialism after all. (shrink)

By "transparency" with respect to Berkeley's theory of signs, I mean the notion that because of the often close association between signs and what they signify, we mistakenly think we sense what is signified by the sense that accesses the sign. I argue that although this makes sense for some examples, for a variety of reasons it's not really applicable to Berkeley's claim that we mistakenly think we immediately see distance ('outness') when we, in fact, immediately see only light and (...) colors. (shrink)

In the _New Theory of Vision, Berkeley defends the heterogeneity thesis, i.e., the view that the ideas of sight and touch are numerically and specifically distinct. In sections 121-122 of that work, he suggests that the thesis of abstract ideas is somehow closely connected to the heterogeneity thesis, though he does not there fully explain just what the connection is supposed to be. In this paper an interpretation of this connection is proposed and defended. Berkeley needs to reject abstract ideas (...) because, if there were such ideas then the heterogeneity thesis would be false and, in turn, this would lead directly to the falsity of Berkeley's theory of vision. (shrink)

Taking up John of Salisbury’s dictum that we read ancient texts to improve our eyesight, this article returns to an “old” book for “new” insight into the perennial philosophical problem of visual perception. A careful reading of Berkeley’s essay on vision improves our eyesight in at least four ways: First, it reminds us that the most interesting aspects of visual perception are not “primary” but “derivative.” Second, it reminds us that our relationship with the world is an interactive process of (...) making connections and proposes some ways in which those connections and the process of making them might be brought to consciousness and subjected to critical examination. Third, it reminds us of the extent to which making connections is a linguistic process: we live in language as surely as we live in the world, and the processes by which we take our places in the world are forms of language. Fourth, it introduces a concept of “levels” and movement between them that is particularly important to computational models that may result in nonhuman analogues of human vision. (shrink)

Berkeley and Helmholtz proposed different indirect mechanisms for size perception: Berkeley, that size was conditioned to various cues, independently of perceived distance; Helmholtz, that it was unconsciously calculated from angular size and perceived distance. The geometrical approach cannot explain size-distance paradoxes (e.g., moon illusion). The dorsal/ventral solution is dubious for close displays and untestable for far displays.

(This article was republished in lightly re-edited form in _Journal of Scottish Philosophy_ 16 (2018) 175-91.) Reid and Berkeley disagreed over whether we directly perceive objects located outside of us in a surrounding space, commonly revealed by both vision and touch. Berkeley considered a successful account of erect vision to be crucial for deciding this dispute, at one point calling it ‘the principal point in the whole optic theory.’ Reid's critique of Berkeley's position on this topic is very brief, and (...) appears to miss Berkeley's point. I argue that there is more to Reid's response to Berkeley than at first meets the eye. Reid's rival account of erect vision draws on evidence that makes a compelling case for the position that we see the same space that we touch. (shrink)

This paper examines Berkeley's attitude toward our perception of spatial relations on the two- dimensional visual field. This is a topic on which there has been some controversy. Historians of visual theory have tended to suppose that Berkeley took "all" spatial relations to be derived in the way our knowledge of depth is: from association of more primitive sensations which are themselves in no way spatial. But many philosophers commenting on Berkeley have supposed that he takes our awareness of two- (...) dimensional visual layout to be directly perceived. I argue that Berkeley's position on this issue is deeply ambivalent and that neither alternative sits well with the rest of his philosophy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:"Magic Buffalo" and Berkeley's Theory ofVision: Learning in Society David M. Levy Introduction Berkeley's Theory of Vision contains the remarkable claim that the perception ofdistance is learned by experience. This thesis is rooted in Berkeley's doctrine that the physical basic of optical perception is angular. An impression of angle? impacts upon the optic nerve. The interpretative problem confronting an individual is that of reconstructing two pieces ofinformation, distance d (...) and magnitude m, from one datum T. Let the ratio ofm/d form arctan T. How do we come to distinguish between the pair m1,d1 and the pair m2,d2 when m^d 1 = m2/d2? How do we distinguish big objects at a distance from small objects up close? The evidence Berkeley provides for this thesis is of a funny sort. He gives examples that we do, in fact, distinguish large distant objects from small near objects. Since the arctan of the pair m1, d 1 is by hypothesisthe sameas thatofthepairm2, d2thenrecognizingdistance must be alearned abihty. We cannotextractd and m from? alone. The proper interpretation ofBerkeley's philosophy ofscience is a matter of considerable debate.1 Nonetheless, as a working theorist of visual perception he is afairly simple-minded falsificationist. Here is what he says: find a person born blind who comes by surgery to see. If that person can distinguish at a glance big distant objects from small near objects, 111 amend my theory.2 The literature on Berkeley's Theory ofVision can be fairly said to bifurcate between those who "see" the argument and those who don't. Berkeley's most important eighteenth century disciple, Adam Smith, extended Berkeley's teaching to encompass the remarkable claim that we learn to perceive our economic interest (Levy 1992a, 1992b). The negative reaction to Berkeley's theory starts in 1842 with Samuel Bailey who pronounced himself mystified by the very claim that we learn to perceive distance. The debate between Bailey and John Stuart Mill, a debate which has twentieth century counterparts, has all the characteristics ofpeople talking past each other. Volume XLX Number 1 223 DAVID M. LEVY The missing social dimension The problem, as I see it, with Berkeley's proposed critical test—stipulating his own doctrine—is that a blind person would grow up in a sighted community. Perhaps, if he grew up in a blind community, and most of the community became sighted at the same time he did, all the community might be able to perceive distance. The problem with Berkeley's test is that ifhe himself is correct about the importance ofheuristics in making the visual distinctions, the fate of one individual is somewhat beside the point. One individual surely cannot create the necessary heuristics. This learning requires some evolutionary social process. Thus, while Berkeley's thesis requires some claim about some verybasicsocial epistemology(Fuller 1988), his proposed test, asking about a blind person growing up in a community silently presumed to be sighted, does not take into account the social dimension oflearning. Having said this, it is easy to think ofa better test for Berkeley's theoryofvision. Let us find an entire community where life takes place without the visual perception of great distance. Take any individual from this community and ask Berkeleian questions. Now, we know the answer becausejust such a dialogue was reported thirtyyears ago. One society which fulfils the test criterion is that ofthe BaMbuti people who lived their life in a very dense African forest. The American anthropologist Colin Turnbull took his friend from the BaMbuti, Kenge, to the top of a hill. Here is TurnbuH's famous report: Then he saw the buffalo, still grazing lazily several miles away, far downbelow. He turned to me and said, "Whatinsects are those?" At first I hardly understood; then I realized that in the forest the range of vision is so limited that there is no great need to make an automatic allowance for distance when judging size. Out here in the plains, however, Kenge was looking for the first time Over apparently unending miles of unfamiliar grasslands, with not a tree worth the name to give him any basis for comparison. The same thing happened later on... (shrink)

This book examines longstanding problems in the theory of vision. Each section begins by looking at the issues as they were raised and discussed by Berkeley. This work is unique in its blend of philosophical and historical perspectives on contemporary problems of readership.

An Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision addresses a problem which George Berkeley encountered in formulating the metaphysics of his philosophy of immaterialism in A Treatise Concerning The Principles Of Human Knowledge. In opposition to mechanical materialism, Berkeley argued that bodies do not exist without the mind, and that our everyday experience delivers clear evidence of the Divine Presence. The difficulty is that we normally conduct our lives in accordance with an independent physical world which exists in external space, (...) and we are not always mindful of the Divine Presence. This seems to be inconsistent with the basic hypothesis of immaterialism. ;Berkeley sought to resolve this difficulty by redefining our visual experience in terms of a revised science of optics while remaining true to his metaphysics and religious convictions. Hence, four major areas define the parameters of this dissertation with regard to why Berkeley thought that his theory of vision fulfills the proper requirements of scientific method and explanation, what his intention was in challenging geometric optics, how his theory of vision is consistent with his other major works, and whether the results of his revisionism have contemporary relevance. ;Part I deals with specific historical data with respect to the corpuscularian hypothesis and materialism, immaterialism and hypotheses of vision. My defence of Berkeley's corpuscularianism and my demonstration of its applicability to his theory of vision conclude Part I. ;Part II argues that a thread of consistency runs through all of Berkeley's works. Like the objects of vision with which it deals, his theory of vision projects a significant direction beyond its literal content. I address three factors of Berkeley's intention which are essential to his theory of vision and to the coherent rendering of all of his works. ;Part III consists of a close examination of Berkeley's challenges to geometric optics which are crucial to his rebuttal of mechanical materialism. ;Part IV demonstrates the contemporary applicability of Berkeley's doctrine of signification and of his analogy of vision and language. ;This dissertation supports the conclusion that An Essay Towards A New Theory Of Vision is preparatory and complementary to Berkeley's subsequent work. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. ;The aim of this thesis is to evaluate Descartes and Berkeley's theories of perception in the light of Merleau Ponty's objections to classical theories in La Phenomenologie de la Perception. According to Merleau Ponty--whose thesis is elucidated by reference to the Gestaltists and Husserl--classical theories of perception either rely on causal explanations or on logical analyses. But, Merleau Ponty argues, neither form of explanation can suitably account for the intentional character of (...) perception. Merleau Ponty claims that it is the adherence of classical theories to the concepts and assumptions of science which lies at the root of their failure to find an adequate third form of explanation. In an attempt to give Merleau Ponty's arguments some historical substance, I undertake a detailed examination of Descartes and Berkeley's theories of perception and I argue that they are indeed founded on the new physics and that they both fail to capture the intentional character of perception. (shrink)

Descartes' writing on optics were important to the victory of the new mechanistic natural philosophy over the Aristoteleans. His innovations, however, destroyed the bases of Aristotelean realism, and contained the seeds from which Berkeley's perceptual idealism developed. This essay examines the interweaving of philosophical and scientific considerations in Descartes' theory of vision against the background of Aristotle's theory of perception, and traces the way in which his theory of vision developed, through the work of Malebranche and Locke, in an increasingly (...) idealistic direction, culminating with Berkeley's New Theory of Vision. ;The first chapter presents the Aristotelean view and attempts to single out some aspects important to his perceptual realism. The second documents Descartes' break with that tradition, focussing especially on his account of perception in Rule XII. The mechanization of light and color and the significance of this are discussed in Chapter III. ;Chapter IV focusses upon the processes of perception with special attention his account of visual spatial perception and the way in which his physiological hypotheses entangled him in problems about the nature and role of the images involved in vision, and about the judgments by means of which the mind corrects for defects in these images. ;In the last chapter three strands of thought growing out of Descartes' theory of vision are traced through the work of Malebranche and Locke to their culmination in Berkeley's New Theory of Vision, and it is shown how they are woven together there to establish visual idealism. ;In conclusion it is noted that Berkeley's argument would not have been possible in the Aristotelean framework. Aristotle's metaphysical assumptions preclude the theory that ideas are the objects of perception, the distinction between proper and common sensibles does not permit the subjectivization of colors, and the function of the common sense makes impossible a sharp distinction between seeing and judging of the sort Berkeley relies on. (shrink)

Independently of any eighteenth century work on the geometry of parallels, Thomas Reid discovered the non-euclidean "geometry of visibles" in 1764. Reid's construction uses an idealized eye, incapable of making distance discriminations, to specify operationally a two dimensional visible space and a set of objects, the visibles. Reid offers sample theorems for his doubly elliptical geometry and proposes a natural model, the surface of the sphere. His construction draws on eighteenth century theory of vision for some of its technical features (...) and is motivated by Reid's desire to defend realism against Berkeley's idealist treatment of visual space. (shrink)

"Berkeley's Analysis of Perception" is an internal analysis of the development and consequences of Berkeley's interpretation of the perceptual process. It seeks to show that the implications of Berkeley's understanding of perception lead to conclusions later formulated in phenomenalistic theories of perception.

Berkeley's essay on vision was published in the spring of 1709. It was recognised at once as a book of considerable importance, and there was a second edition within the first year. The author was still only 24. His design, he wrote, was to show the ‘manner we perceive by sight the distance, magnitude and situation of objects’. Hitherto, writers on optics had ‘proceeded on wrong principles’.

A treatise concerning the principles of human knowledge -- An essay towards a new theory of vision -- Alciphron, the fourth dialogue (excerpts) -- The theory of vision.