Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.

This essay argues that the ethics of humanitarian intervention cannot be readily subsumed by the ethics of just war without due attention to matters of political and moral motivation. In the modern era, a just war draws directly from self-benefitting motives in wars of self-defense, or indirectly in wars that enforce international law or promote the global common good. Humanitarian interventions, in contrast, are intuitively admirable insofar as they are other-regarding. That difference poses a challenge to the casuistry of (...) humanitarian intervention because it makes it difficult to reason by analogy from the case of war to the case of humanitarian intervention. The author develops this point in dialogue with Michael Walzer, the U.S. Catholic bishops, and President Clinton. He concludes by showing how a casuistry of intervention is possible, developing a motivational rationale that draws on the Golden Rule. (shrink)

Carers often interfere with the choices of people living with dementia. On neorepublican and (most) relational egalitarian views, interference can be justified if it tracks a person's interests: if it does not lead to a relationship of domination. However, the kind of environment-shaping interventions carers often pursue would be considered infantilising or objectionably paternalistic in other cases. In this paper, I defend this indirect approach and argue that it offers the best prospects of dementia care without domination.

The Supreme Court’s decision in the Dobb’s case has given rise to confusion in the medical community, mostly concerning the specific definition of an abortion and what procedures are acceptable. Catholic bioethics has a long history of examining the ethical issues surrounding procedures used in vital conflict situations and other instances where direct or indirect abortion may be the preferred treatment. This article lays out the important points and ethical dimensions surrounding some of the most common pregnancy related interventions (...) and provides guidance to physicians seeking to treat both patients in a manner that acknowledges their value as human beings. (shrink)

Background and ObjectivesUp to 10% of fathers experience perinatal depression, often accompanied by anxiety, with a detrimental impact on the emotional and behavioural development of infants. Yet, few evidence-based interventions specifically for paternal perinatal depression or anxiety exist, and few depressed or anxious fathers engage with support. This mini-review aims to build on the evidence base set by other recent systematic reviews by synthesising more recently available studies on interventions for paternal perinatal depression and anxiety. Secondarily, we also aimed to (...) identify useful information on key implementation strategies, if any, that increase the engagement of men.MethodsWe drew upon three major previous systematic reviews and performed an updated search of PubMed/Medline; Psycinfo; Cochrane Database; Embase and Cinahl. The search was limited to trials, feasibility studies or pilot studies of interventions published between 2015 and 2020 that reported on fathers' perinatal mental health. We included psychological, educational, psychosocial, paternal, couple-focused, or group therapies, delivered face-to-face, via telephone and/or online that reported on either paternal depression, anxiety or both.ResultsEleven studies satisfied search criteria. The majority were randomised controlled trials. Most interventions incorporated counselling, therapy or psychoeducation and took an indirect approach to perinatal mental health through antenatal or postnatal education and were couple-focused. No studies reported a presence of diagnosed depression or anxiety at baseline, although five studies reported a positive effect on sub-threshold symptoms.DiscussionThere was some evidence that these approaches may be useful in the initial engagement of fathers with perinatal supports and improve depression and anxiety scores. No studies targeted the explicit treatment of clinically depressed or anxious men, and this remains the most substantial gap in the peer-reviewed evidence base. Our results highlight the need to deliver perinatal interventions specifically designed for men and evaluate them in populations with clinical levels of depressive and anxious symptomatology. (shrink)

Background. In some organisations, traumatic events via direct or indirect exposure are routine experiences. A NICE review (2005; updated in December 2018) of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) management in primary and secondary care did not address early interventions for trauma in emergency response organisations. Aims. This scoping review was designed to identify previous research which evaluated the use of early interventions following exposure to primary or secondary trauma, to report on the effectiveness of early interventions models. Method. A scoping (...) review was conducted to examine early interventions for trauma with staff in roles potentially exposed to trauma including: emergency response, military and humanitarian aid. Relevant data was extracted from included studies and outcomes were assessed using meta-ethnography. Results. Fifty studies of mixed quality met the inclusion criteria for this review. Synthesis of study outcomes found that early interventions help emergency responders to manage post-incident trauma when they: are delivered in a manner that respects distinct organisational culture; are supported by organisations and senior management, and; harness existing social cohesion and peer support systems within teams. Conclusions. This review demonstrates that early interventions support emergency responders following exposure to trauma when: tailored to the needs of the population, are supported by the host organisation, and harness existing social cohesion and peer support processes within a team or unit. We identify a number of recommendations for the delivery and evaluation of early interventions for psychological trauma in emergency response organisations. (shrink)

Feminist science studies scholars have documented the historical and cultural contingency of scientific knowledge production. It follows that political and social activism has impacted the practice of science today; however, little has been done to examine the current cultures of science in light of feminist critiques and activism. In this article, I argue that, although critiques have changed the cultures of science both directly and indirectly, fundamental epistemological questions have largely been ignored and neutralized through these policy reforms. I provide (...) an auto-ethnography of my doctoral work in a neuroscience program to a) demonstrate how the culture of science has incorporated critiques into its practices and b) identify how we might use these changes in scientific practices to advance feminist science agendas. I critically analyze three areas in current scientific practice in which I see obstacles and opportunities: 1) research ethics, 2) diversity of research subjects and scientists, and 3) identification of a project's significance for funding. I argue that an understanding of the complicated and changing cultures of science is necessary for future feminist interventions into the sciences that directly challenge science's claim to epistemic authority. (shrink)

Relative to the abundance of literature devoted to the legal significance of UN authorisation, little has been written about whether the UN’s failure to sanction an intervention can ever make it immoral. This is the question that I take up here. I argue that UN authorisation (or lack thereof) can have some indirect bearing on the moral status of a humanitarian intervention. That is, it can affect whether an intervention satisfies other widely accepted justifying conditions, such (...) as proportionality, “internal” legitimacy, and likelihood of success. The more interesting question, however, is whether the UN’s failure to provide a mandate can make a humanitarian operation unjust independently of these other familiar considerations. Is a proportional, internally legitimate humanitarian intervention, with a just cause and strong prospect of success, still morally unacceptable if it is not approved by the United Nations Security Council? This is the question that I turn to in the second half of the paper. (shrink)

Understanding the pathways whereby an intervention has an effect on an outcome is a common scientific goal. A rich body of literature provides various decompositions of the total intervention effect into pathway-specific effects. Interventional direct and indirect effects provide one such decomposition. Existing estimators of these effects are based on parametric models with confidence interval estimation facilitated via the nonparametric bootstrap. We provide theory that allows for more flexible, possibly machine learning-based, estimation techniques to be considered. In (...) particular, we establish weak convergence results that facilitate the construction of closed-form confidence intervals and hypothesis tests and prove multiple robustness properties of the proposed estimators. Simulations show that inference based on large-sample theory has adequate small-sample performance. Our work thus provides a means of leveraging modern statistical learning techniques in estimation of interventional mediation effects. (shrink)

BackgroundMediation analysis is important to test the theoretical framework underpinning an intervention. We therefore aimed to investigate if the healthy body image intervention’s effect on eating disorder symptomatology and use of muscle building supplements was mediated by the change in risk and protective factors for ED development and muscle building supplement use.MethodsThis study used data from the HBI intervention: a cluster randomized controlled universal intervention aiming to promote positive body image and embodiment and reduce the risk (...) for ED development including 30 schools in Norway. A total of 1,713 participants were included in the analyses. Conditional latent growth curve analyses were performed to test for indirect effects on ED symptomatology and weekly frequency of protein and creatine supplement use measured at the 12-month follow-up via change in the proposed mediators.ResultsIn girls, the reduction in ED symptomatology was mediated by positive changes in protective factors and reductions in risk factor scores. Comparable changes in protective and risk factors among boys played no mediating role.ConclusionInterventions aiming to reduce the risk of ED development in girls may benefit from aiming to enhance self-esteem and body image flexibility and reduce perceived media pressure and thin appearance internalization. Future studies should investigate the casual relationship between muscle building supplement use and risk and protective factors for ED development in both girls and boys. (shrink)

A wide range of non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) have been introduced to stop or slow down the COVID-19 pandemic. Examples include school closures, environmental cleaning and disinfection, mask mandates, restrictions on freedom of assembly and lockdowns. These NPIs depend on coercion for their effectiveness, either directly or indirectly. A widely held view is that coercive policies need to be publicly justified—justified to each citizen—to be legitimate. Standardly, this is thought to entail that there is a scientific consensus on the factual propositions (...) that are used to support the policies. In this paper, we argue that such a consensus has been lacking on the factual propositions justifying most NPIs. Consequently, they would on the standard view be illegitimate. This is regrettable since there are good reasons for granting the state the legitimate authority to enact NPIs under conditions of uncertainty. The upshot of our argument is that it is impossible to have both the standard interpretation of the permissibility of empirical claims in public justification and an effective pandemic response. We provide an alternative view that allows the state sufficient room for action while precluding the possibility of it acting without empirical support. (shrink)

Spillover occurs when one environmentally sustainable behaviour leads to another, often initiated by a behaviour change intervention. A number of studies have investigated positive and negative spillover effects, but empirical evidence is mixed, showing evidence for both positive and negative spillover effects, and lack of spillover altogether. Environmental identity has been identified as an influential factor for spillover effects. Building on identity process theory the current framework proposes that positive, negative, and a lack of spillover are determined by perceived (...) threat of initial behaviour and identity process mechanisms evaluating the behaviour. It is proposed, that an environmental behaviour change intervention may threaten one’s existing identities, leading to either (a) integration, (b) compartmentalisation, or (c) conflict between one’s environmental identity and non-environmental identities. Initial evidence for the proposed framework is based on a field intervention which included a meat reduction programme in a canteen of a medium size private sector company. Semi-structured interviews and an explorative visualisation method that aimed at assessing identity change were implemented with thirteen employees (i.e. intervention participants) before and after the intervention. The qualitative data was analysed by using thematic analysis via NVivo12. Results of the visualisation task and interview method provided initial evidence of direct and indirect positive contextual spillover effects, with comparatively less evidence a lack of spillover and a relative absence of reported negative spillover. This paper provides a novel theoretical approach, centred on identity process theory to enhance understanding of positive spillover, negative spillover, and the lack of spillover. (shrink)

Friedrich Nietzsche is often depicted in popular and scholarly discourse as a lonely philosopher dealing with abstract concerns unconnected to the intellectual debates of his time and place. Robert C. Holub counters this narrative, arguing that Nietzsche was very well attuned to the events and issues of his era and responded to them frequently in his writings. Organized around nine important questions circulating in Europe at the time in the realms of politics, society, and science, Nietzsche in the Nineteenth Century (...) presents a thorough investigation of Nietzsche's familiarity with contemporary life, his contact with and comments on these various questions, and the sources from which he gathered his knowledge. Holub begins his analysis with Nietzsche's views on education, nationhood, and the working-class movement, turns to questions of women and women's emancipation, colonialism, and Jews and Judaism, and looks at Nietzsche's dealings with evolutionary biology, cosmological theories, and the new "science" of eugenics. He shows how Nietzsche, although infrequently read during his lifetime, formulated his thought in an ongoing dialogue with the concerns of his contemporaries, and how his philosophy can be conceived as a contribution to the debates taking place in the nineteenth century. Throughout his examination, Holub finds that, against conventional wisdom, Nietzsche was only indirectly in conversation with the modern philosophical tradition from Descartes through German idealism, and that the books and individuals central to his development were more obscure writers, most of whom have long since been forgotten. This book thus sheds light on Nietzsche's thought as enmeshed in a web of nineteenth-century discourses and offers new insights into his interactive method of engaging with the philosophical universe of his time. (shrink)

The chapter focuses on cases of assisted suicide and voluntary euthanasia in relation to the rarely discussed notion of indirect paternalism. Indirect paternalism involves not just a paternalistic intervener and a person whose welfare is supposed to be protected, but also another party, whom I call “assistant.” Indirect paternalism interferes with an assistant in order to prevent harm to another person. I will introduce a strategy that paternalists can pursue to justify indirect paternalism. It specifically targets (...) an element of assistance cases, namely the fact that people do not necessarily have a justified claim or entitlement to demand such assistance. To prevent people from providing assistance seems normatively different from preventing a person to do something to herself by her own means. I critically discuss arguments from the goals of medicine and from the conscientious objection. These aspects are not deemed decisive when considering the case of indirect paternalistic intervention. Finally, I argue against the rationale of indirect paternalism by showing that there are at least two situations where it does not succeed. One such situation that undermines the justification of indirect paternalism is present when the offered service is itself harmless, another pertinent situation consists of a person necessarily requiring assistance to be really free. At least in some cases, these very conditions are given when contemplating assistance to die. (shrink)

Most current criticisms against the intervention in Iraq have tackled the two justifications articulated by the members of the coalition: that the United States had to neutralize the threats that Iraq generated for their own security and to the political stability in the Middle Eastand that the war in Iraq can be justified as a necessary stage in the war against international terrorism. The principal objection against justification is that it was, and remains, unfounded. Against justification, many have replied (...) that the intervention in Iraq had no connection,or at best had merely an indirect connection, with the fight against terrorism. In a recent text,Fernando Tesón claims that the American intervention in Iraq can nevertheless be morally justified as a case of humanitarian intervention. By “humanitarian intervention”, one must understand a coercive action taken by a state or a group of states inside the sphere of jurisdiction of an independent political community, without the permission of the latter, in order to preventor to end a massive violation of individual rights perpetrated against innocent persons which are not co-nationals inside this political community. I argue in this article that the American intervention in Iraq does not satisfy the conditions of a legitimate humanitarian intervention, as opposed to what Fernando Tesón claims. (shrink)

We investigated the week-to-week effects of a mindfulness intervention on emotional exhaustion, work engagement, and job satisfaction in a field study involving 218 participants who participated and reported their weekly outcomes during the 8-week program. To examine how mindfulness impacted work outcomes, we used intraindividual modeling of the 8-week data. Mindfulness increased over time, and time also had indirect effects on emotional exhaustion, work engagement, and job satisfaction, through mindfulness. Supplementary growth curve analyses on the improvement of mindfulness (...) over time showed a slight decrease in the positive effect of time on mindfulness. (shrink)

With the increasing urbanization in China, the mental health problems of migrant children have attracted widespread attention. From the perspective of social cognition, psychological capital, self-esteem, and other factors are closely related to the social and cultural adaptation of the group. In order to explore the relationship among the psychological capital, self-esteem and socio-cultural adaptations of migrant children, a total of 245 Chinese migrant children were investigated with the psychological capital scale, self-esteem scale, and socio-cultural adaptation scale. At the same (...) time, 24 months group longitudinal intervention exercises was designed scientifically, the participants were provided with it continuously to enhance their psychological capital. According to the results, there were significant differences in t-test in experiment group and control group of migrant children. At the same time, there was a significant linear correlation between predictive variables’ psychological capital and self-esteem and outcome variable’s socio-cultural adaptation. In the next step of mediating effect analysis, psychological capital and self-esteem were adopted for predicting socio-cultural adaptation. The psychological capital could not only directly affect the social and cultural adaptation of migrant children, but also indirectly affect the degree of social and cultural adaptation of migrant children through changing self-esteem. The results showed that the self-esteem mediation model fitted well with the data. Furthermore, the mediation effect accounted for 17.3% in the direct effect. Longitudinal group intervention could improve the psychological capital and social and cultural adaptation of migrant children. In a word, the research was helpful to explore the influence mechanism of migrant children’s psychological capital on social and cultural adaptation, and had certain practical value in preventing and reducing the crisis caused by the social and cultural adaptation of migrant children. (shrink)

Although Foucault’s 1979 lectures on The Birth of Biopolitics promised to treat the theme of biopolitics, the course deals at length with neoliberalism while mentioning biopolitics hardly at all. Some scholars account for this elision by claiming that Foucault sympathized with neoliberalism; I argue on the contrary that Foucault develops a penetrating critique of the neoliberal claim to preserve individual liberty. Following Foucault, I show that the Chicago economist Gary Becker exemplifies what Foucault describes elsewhere as biopolitics: a form of (...) power applied to the behavior of a population through the normalizing use of statistics. Although Becker’s preference for indirect intervention might seem to preserve the independence of individuals, under biopolitics individual liberty is itself the means by which populations are governed indirectly. In my view, by describing the history and ambivalence of neoliberal biopolitics, Foucault fosters a critical vigilance that is the precondition for creative political resistance. (shrink)

This article describes a theory about the ambition of most Inspectorates to realise 'school improvement through inspection'. Literature about a number of direct and indirect interventions, such as reciprocity, communication and feedback is used to build a theoretical model stating the relations between working methods of school inspectors, reactions of schools and resulting effects and side effects. Finally two types of inspections strategies are described that can be used in different types of schools. We expect schools with a low (...) innovation capacity and few external impulses to be helped best by a directive approach in which an inspector clearly points to the strong and weak points of the school, the probable causes of their level of functioning, and potential ways for improvement. The inspector should pressure the school to change by making written agreements on how to change and by asking the school to work out these agreements in an improvement plan. A school with a high innovation capacity and strong external impulses is expected to do better with a more reserved inspection approach. Inspectors only need to provide this school with some insight into their strong and weak points. (shrink)

When scientists consider the interaction of science and value judgments, debates often occur. When public policy grows out of science, disagreements between scientists can become even more spirited. This paper examines the case of nutrition policy in the United States, which has been both at the interface between agriculture and medicine and the object of serious discord concerned with the strength and validity of the scientific evidence and the responsibility for action. The development of indirect intervention policies, designed (...) to educate and inform the public on diet and health, is traced as a practical demonstration of the effects of involvements of nutritional scientists of different disciplines and philosophic bents. Controversies centered mainly on the issues of diet and coronary heart disease and of diet and cancer in nutritional guidelines for Americans and the recommended dietary allowances. But the arguments turned on a complex web of values and interests as well as scientific questions. A remarkable turnaround by animal agriculture and its scientific support occurred, changing from a defensive, rightist stance to one that appears to recognize a moral responsibility to the public health. The convincing point was likely the changing market. Nutritional scientists, however, remained divided on the issue of whether a public health strategy keyed to public education should replace a strategy to identify persons of high risk and modify the risk by treatment. Our analysis suggests that the tension between libertarian and utilitarian social values of scientists is at least as important as disagreements relative to validity and strengths of the scientific evidence. (shrink)

Several states, including the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, have recently engaged in the high-profile supporting of foreign rebel fighters, providing them with training, weapons, and financial resources. Justifications for providing this assistance usually invoke, at least in part, our obligations to prevent harm to the citizens of oppressive and violent regimes. Providing such assistance is often presented as a morally safe ‘middle ground’ between doing nothing and putting one’s own troops at risk. Yet this assistance typically enables (...) rebels to cause unjust harms, since armed uprisings almost invariably cause harm to innocent people. I argue that enabling these unjust harms can render the provision of assistance unjustified. When a state could prevent at least as much harm by using its resources in other ways, such as preventing disease, without thereby causing comparable unjust harm and without incurring a (significantly greater) supererogatory cost, the state acts unjustifiably if it nonetheless funds the rebellion. When assistors unjustifiably enable unjust harms, they are morally liable to bear costs for the sake of people who suffer those harms. This is true even if the rebels act justifiably in directly inflicting those harms. (shrink)

It is uncontroversial to claim that the extent to which health care interventions benefit patients is a relevant consideration for health care priority setting. However, when effects accrue to the individual patient, effects of a more indirect kind may accrue to other individuals as well, such as the patient's children, friends, or partner. If, and if so how, such relational effects should be considered relevant in priority setting is contentious. In this paper, we illustrate this question by using disease‐modifying (...) drugs for Alzheimer's disease as a case in point. The ethical analysis begins by sketching the so‐called prima facie case for ascribing moral weight to relational effects and then moves on to consider a number of objections to it. We argue that, whereas one set of objections may be dismissed, there is another set of arguments that poses more serious challenges for including relational effects in priority setting. (shrink)

Global climate change threatens the health, economic prospects, and basic food and water sources of people. A wide range of changes in household energy behaviour is needed to realise a sustainable energy transition. We propose a general framework to understand and encourage sustainable energy behaviours, comprising four key issues. First, we need to identify which behaviours need to be changed. A sustainable energy transition involves changes in a wide range of energy behaviours, including the adoption of sustainable energy sources and (...) energy-efficient technology, investments in energy efficiency measures in buildings, and changes in direct and indirect energy use behaviour. Second, we need to understand which factors underlie these different types of sustainable energy behaviours. We discuss three main factors that influence sustainable energy behaviours: knowledge, motivations, and contextual factors. Third, we need to test the effects of interventions aimed to promote sustainable energy behaviours. Interventions can be aimed at changing the actual costs and benefits of behaviour, or at changing people’s perceptions and evaluations of different costs and benefits of behavioural options. Fourth, it is important to understand which factors affect the acceptability of energy policies and energy systems changes. We discuss important findings from psychological studies on these four topics, and propose a research agenda to further explore these topics. We emphasise the need of an integrated approach in studying the human dimensions of a sustainable energy transition that increases our understanding of which general factors affect a wide range of energy behaviours as well as the acceptability of different energy policies and energy system changes. (shrink)

Despite the frequency of stillbirths, the subsequent implications are overlooked and underappreciated. We present findings from comprehensive, systematic literature reviews, and new analyses of published and unpublished data, to establish the effect of stillbirth on parents, families, health-care providers, and societies worldwide. Data for direct costs of this event are sparse but suggest that a stillbirth needs more resources than a livebirth, both in the perinatal period and in additional surveillance during subsequent pregnancies. Indirect and intangible costs of stillbirth (...) are extensive and are usually met by families alone. This issue is particularly onerous for those with few resources. Negative effects, particularly on parental mental health, might be moderated by empathic attitudes of care providers and tailored interventions. The value of the baby, as well as the associated costs for parents, families, care providers, communities, and society, should be considered to prevent stillbirths and reduce associated morbidity. (shrink)

This paper deals with the moral issues relevant to medical decisions to terminate the life of a human organism. The expression “termination of life” will be used to cover both (1) active intervention to bring about a state of an Organism that will cause its death, and (2) a failure to intervene in causal processes that will otherwise result in the death of an organism. I shall attempt to distinguish the different cases in which the decision to terminate life (...) is morally justified and to isolate the considerations that are morally relevant to such decisions. -/- Decisions to terminate life: some possibly relevant considerations -/- There are a number of considerations that different people think relevant to medical decisions to terminate life and that are taken into account in actual medical practice. The following questions capture, I hope, the main ones: 1. Can the Organism in question be characterized as a person? 2. If the Organism is not a person, is it at least a potential person; that is such as will develop into a person? 3. If the Organism is a person, does he or she desire his or her own death, and if so is that desire a rational one? 4. If the Organism is a potential person, will this potential person express a rational desire to die once it becomes capable of expressing such a desire? 5. What quality of life will this person enjoy 6. What quality of life will this potential person enjoy? 7. What is the cost of maintaining the life of this person? 8. What is the cost of allowing this potential person to become a person, and then of maintaining his or her life? 9. Are we dealing with an unconscious person whom it is technologically impossible to restore to consciousness? 10. Is the termination of life a matter of active intervention or only a matter of refraining from saving the life of the organism? 11. Are we dealing with the case of “direct” killing or only one of “indirect” killing? 12 Does it require “ extraordinary” or only “ordinary” means to keep the person alive? 13. Is the individual suffering from a fatal illness? There are two ways in which each of these considerations might be relevant to a decision to terminate life. First, it might bear upon the question of whether it is morally permissible to terminate life. Secondly, if termination of life is morally permissible it may be relevant to the question of whether there is any positive reason for terminating life. (shrink)

Non-therapeutic research on children raises ethical concerns. Such research is not only conducted on individuals who are incapable of providing informed consent. It also typically involves some degree of risk or discomfort, without prospects of medically benefiting the participating children. Therefore, these children seem to be instrumentalized. Some ethicists, however, have tried to sidestep this problem by arguing that the children may indirectly benefit from participating in such research, in ways not related to the medical intervention as such. It (...) has been argued, for example, that non-therapeutic pediatric research does not instrumentalize the children enrolled since it has the prospects of furthering their moral development. We argue that this argument is far too undeveloped to be taken seriously. (shrink)

This study conceptualized digital competence in line with self-determined theory and investigated how it alongside help-seeking and learning agency collectively preserved university students’ psychological well-being by assisting them to manage cognitive load and academic burnout, as well as increasing their engagement in online learning during the coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic. Moreover, students’ socioeconomic status and demographic variables were examined. Partial least square modeling and cluster analysis were performed on the survey data collected from 695 students. The findings show that mental (...) load and mental effort were positively related to academic burnout, which was significantly negatively associated with student engagement in online learning. Digital competence did not directly affect academic burnout, but indirectly via its counteracting effect on cognitive load. However, help-seeking and agency were not found to be significantly negatively related to cognitive load. Among the three SDT constructs, digital competence demonstrated the greatest positive influence on student engagement. In addition, female students from humanities and social sciences disciplines and lower-income families seemed to demonstrate the weakest digital competence, lowest learning agency, and least help-seeking behaviors. Consequently, they were more vulnerable to high cognitive load and academic burnout, leading to the lowest learning engagement. This study contributes to the ongoing arguments related to the psychological impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and informs the development of efficient interventions that preserve university students’ psychological well-being in online learning. (shrink)

The technical possibilities of biomedicine open up the opportunity to intervene in ageing itself with the aim of mitigating, reducing or eliminating it. However, before undertaking these changes or rejecting them outright, it is necessary to ask ourselves if what would be lost by doing so really has much value. This article will analyse the desirability of ageing from an individual point of view, without circumscribing this question to the desirability or undesirability of death. First, we will present the three (...) most widely used arguments to reject biomedical interventions against ageing. We will argue that only the last of these arguments provides a consistent answer to the question of the desirability of ageing. Second, we will show that the third argument falls prey to a conceptual confusion that we will call the paradox of ageing: although ageing entails negative health effects, it leads to a life stage with valuable goods. Both valuations, one positive and the other negative, refer to two different dimensions of ageing: the chronological and the biological. We will defend that, by not adequately distinguishing these two types of ageing, it does not become apparent that all the valuable goods exclusive to ageing derive only from its chronological dimension. Third, we will argue that, if we just conceive ageing biologically, it is undesirable. We will elaborate on the two kinds of undesirable effects biological ageing has: direct and indirect. Finally, we will respond to potential objections by adducing that these are insufficient to weaken our argument. (shrink)

How do cognition and affect interact to produce action? Research in intergroup psychology illuminates this question by investigating the relationship between stereotypes and prejudices about social groups. Yet it is now clear that many social attitudes are implicit. This raises the question: how does the distinction between cognition and affect apply to implicit mental states? An influential view—roughly analogous to a Humean theory of action—is that “implicit stereotypes” and “implicit prejudices” constitute two separate constructs, reflecting different mental processes and neural (...) systems. On this basis, some have also argued that interventions to reduce discrimination should combat implicit stereotypes and prejudices separately. We propose an alternative framework. We argue that all putative implicit stereotypes are affect-laden and all putative implicit prejudices are “semantic,” that is, they stand in co-activating associations with concepts and beliefs. Implicit biases, therefore, consist in “clusters” of semantic-affective associations, which differ in degree, rather than kind. This framework captures the psychological structure of implicit bias, promises to improve the power of indirect measures to predict behavior, and points toward the design of more effective interventions to combat discrimination. (shrink)

One of the reasons why moral enhancement may be controversial, is because the advantages of moral enhancement may fall upon society rather than on those who are enhanced. If directed at individuals with certain counter-moral traits it may have direct societal benefits by lowering immoral behavior and increasing public safety, but it is not directly clear if this also benefits the individual in question. In this paper, we will discuss what we consider to be moral enhancement, how different means may (...) be used to achieve it and whether the means we employ to reach moral enhancement matter morally. Are certain means to achieve moral enhancement wrong in themselves? Are certain means to achieve moral enhancement better than others, and if so, why? More specifically, we will investigate whether the difference between direct and indirect moral enhancement matters morally. Is it the case that indirect means are morally preferable to direct means of moral enhancement and can we indeed pinpoint relevant intrinsic, moral differences between both? We argue that the distinction between direct and indirect means is indeed morally relevant, but only insofar as it tracks an underlying distinction between active and passive interventions. Although passive interventions can be ethical provided specific safeguards are put in place, these interventions exhibit a greater potential to compromise autonomy and disrupt identity. (shrink)

Measuring the effectiveness of medical interventions faces three epistemological challenges: the choice of good measuring instruments, the use of appropriate analytic measures, and the use of a reliable method of extrapolating measures from an experimental context to a more general context. In practice each of these challenges contributes to overestimating the effectiveness of medical interventions. These challenges suggest the need for corrective normative principles. The instruments employed in clinical research should measure patient-relevant and disease-specific parameters, and should not be sensitive (...) to parameters that are only indirectly relevant. Effectiveness always should be measured and reported in absolute terms (using measures such as 'absolute risk reduction'), and only sometimes should effectiveness also be measured and reported in relative terms (using measures such as 'relative risk reduction')-employment of relative measures promotes an informal fallacy akin to the base-rate fallacy, which can be exploited to exaggerate claims of effectiveness. Finally, extrapolating from research settings to clinical settings should more rigorously take into account possible ways in which the intervention in question can fail to be effective in a target population. (shrink)

This research investigates the efficacy of business ethics intervention, tests a theoretical model that the love of money is directly or indirectly related to propensity to engage in unethical behavior (PUB), and treats college major (business vs. psychology) and gender (male vs. female) as moderators in multi-group analyses. Results suggested that business students who received business ethics intervention significantly changed their conceptions of unethical behavior and reduced their propensity to engage in theft; while psychology students without intervention (...) had no such changes. Therefore, ethics training had some impacts on business students' learning and education (intelligence). For our theoretical model, results of the whole sample (N = 298) revealed that Machiavellianism (measured at Time 1) was a mediator of the relationship between the love of money (measured at Time 1) and unethical behavior (measured at Time 2) (the Love of Money → Machiavellianism → Unethical Behavior). Further, this mediating effect existed for business students (n = 198) but not for psychology students (n = 100), for male students (n = 165) but not for female students (n = 133), and for male business students (n = 128) but not for female business students (n = 70). Moreover, when examined alone, the direct effect (the Love of Money → Unethical Behavior) existed for business students but not for psychology students. We concluded that a short business ethics intervention may have no impact on the issue of virtue (wisdom). (shrink)

This chapter addresses the claim that, as new types of neurointervention get developed allowing us to enhance various aspects of our mental functioning, we should work to prevent the use of such interventions from ever becoming the “new normal,” that is, a practice expected—even if not directly required—by employers. The author’s response to that claim is that, unlike compulsion or most cases of direct coercion, indirect coercion to use such neurointerventions is, per se, no more problematic than the pressure (...) people all find themselves under to use modern technological devices like computers or mobile phones. Few people seem to believe that special protections should be introduced to protect contemporary Neo-Luddites from such pressures. That being said, the author acknowledges that separate factors, when present, can indeed render indirect coercion to enhance problematic. The factors in question include lack of safety, fostering adaptation to oppressive circumstances, and having negative side effects that go beyond health. Nonetheless, the chapter stresses that these factors do not seem to be necessary correlates of neuroenhancement. (shrink)

Many philosophers invoke the "wisdom of nature" in arguing for varying degrees of caution in the development and use of genetic enhancement technologies. Because they view natural selection as akin to a master engineer that creates functionally and morally optimal design, these authors tend to regard genetic intervention with suspicion. In Part II, we examine and ultimately reject the evolutionary assumptions that underlie the master engineer analogy (MEA). By highlighting the constraints on ordinary unassisted evolution, we show how intentional (...) genetic modification can overcome many of the natural impediments to the human good. Our contention is that genetic engineering offers a solution that is more eff icient, reliable, versatile, and morally palatable than the lumbering juggernaut of Darwinian evolution. In Part III, we evaluate a recent attempt to ground precautionary enhancement heuristics in adaptive etiology. Our problem with this approach is two-fold: first, it is based on the same "strong adaptationist" interpretation of evolution that motivates the flawed MEA, and second, the etiological concept of function on which it relies provides indirect and potentially misleading information about the likely consequences of genetic intervention. We offer instead enhancement criteria based on causal relationships in ontogeny. We conclude that rather than grounding a presumption against deliberate genetic modification, the causal structure of the living world gives us good moral reason to pursue it. (shrink)

What makes paternalism wrong? I give an indirect answer to that question by challenging a recent trend in the literature that I call the exclusionary strategy. The exclusionary strategy aims to show how some feature of the paternalizee’s normative situation morally excludes acting for the paternalizee’s well-being. This moral exclusion consists either in ruling out the reasons for which a paternalizer may act or in changes to the right-making status of the reasons that (would) justify paternalistic intervention. I (...) argue that both versions of the exclusionary strategy fail to explain the wrongness of paternalism and that they struggle to accommodate the mainstream view that paternalism is only pro tanto wrong. Their failure consists either in being implausibly strong expressions of antipaternalism or in struggling to spell out the scope of exclusion in an uncomplicated way. After discouraging this exclusionary strategy, I suggest we can capture what is appealing about it—as well as avoiding its pitfalls—by sketching a philosophical model in which we compare the weights of reasons for and against paternalistically interfering. To precisify this sketch, I introduce some conceptual tools from the literature on practical reasoning—in particular, the concept of modifiers—and suggest that these tools offer a better starting point for figuring out what makes paternalism (pro tanto) wrong. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:LettersJames L. Walsh, Moira M. McQueen, Kevin O'Rourke, and Jean deBloisEarly Delivery of the Anencephalic InfantMadam:In the March 1994 issue of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, Kevin O'Rourke and Jean deBlois have replied to an article of ours (KIEJ, December 1993) on the early induction of the anencephalic fetus. They agree with our conclusion that such early delivery may be morally acceptable, but argue that our justification is (...) flawed. Exchanges on the subject probably could continue ad nauseam; here we simply state some of the elements of their article that leave us perplexed.1. The phrase "prolonging the life of" (p. 49) has one meaning in the case of artificial life supports, which may be unwarranted interventions, but it has a different meaning when it refers to not interfering with a person's enjoyment of necessary natural means of preserving his or her life. Inducing labor prior to viability, which denies the natural means of life support without a possible substitute, has more in common with smothering a dying patient than the nonemployment of or withdrawing of artificial means of life support. To refer to the death of the fetus here as an effect is rather like saying that I suffocated you and the effect of the suffocation is your death. This is quite different from induction after viability where the induction can have different effects.2. If the authors were correct that "the prohibition on inducing delivery before viability is predicated upon the assumption that the fetus in utero is a human being with the potential for further development" (p. 49) and the anencephalic has none, why is there need to employ the principle of double effect? They say that there is no moral obligation to prolong the life of the anencephalic fetus. Just as there is no need for the principle in cases of withdrawing unwarranted artificial life support, so there would be no need for it here. Because the authors seem to perceive a complete disjunction between direct and indirect killing (allowing to die being in the category of indirect killing), it seems that they are unable to let their argument rest here, but have to justify the death that occurs.3. The example concerning smothering and the nonemployment of aggressive interventions (p. 49) explains well the difference between killing and allowing to die. But allowing to die is not indirectly killing since it occurs as a result of the disease and not from the causality of the agent.4. How can we cause something and not intend it? There are instances in which we simply "permit" evil events, but where we are not the cause. For example, evil events may be attributable to the bad will of others. Legislators make just laws knowing that some people of bad will will break them for their own advantage. Here the legislators really do permit evil. Neither are we the cause of death when we allow a person to die by not imposing unwarranted means of life support; we permit his or her death. But can we so readily designate by "permit" [End Page 184] what we knowingly choose to bring about? O'Rourke and deBlois use interchangeably "indirectly intended" and "unintended" for what is caused by our actions; "indirectly intended" is a better designation than "unintended." The whole package, including all foreseen effects, is intended. Evil "happening" (p. 51) as a result of an action that I place can refer either to evil as caused by my action or to evil as arising from a cause apart from my action. Only in this latter sense do I permit evil and not intend it, either directly or indirectly.5. The fourth condition of the principle of double effect is given as follows: "There must be a proportionately grave reason for placing the act. The greater the evil, the more cogent the reason must be for performing the act" (p. 50). How the authors can abstract from balancing goods and evils here is beyond us.6. We cannot follow the authors' use of the term "morally good" with respect to the induced delivery (p. 50). The problem is concerned with the morally right... (shrink)

This research investigates 266 business students' panel data across 4 time periods and tests a theoretical model involving intrinsic religiosity, the love of money, Machiavellianism, and propensity to engage in unethical behaviors. There was a short ethics intervention between Times 3 and 4. We identified good apples and bad apples using the PUB measure collected at Time 4. From Time 3 to Time 4, good apples became more ethical, whereas bad apples became less ethical after the ethics intervention. (...) Moreover, for the whole sample, intrinsic religiosity deterred unethical intentions not only directly but also indirectly through the absence of Machiavellianism. Before the ethics intervention, intrinsic religiosity curbed unethical intention directly for good apples but indirectly for bad apples. After the intervention, only the indirect effect was significant for bad apples. Intrinsic religiosity offers us hope to open the hearts of the lost sheep and bring them home. Research results were discussed in light of this study's theoretical, empirical, and practical contributions; Judeo-Christian ethics and values; challenging roles of educators and executives in educating Gen-Yers; creating a sea change of the ethical social norm in schools, organizations, and society, or ethical community building, and promoting ethical behavior; and future directions for research. (shrink)

Most of what we know about teaching comes from research among people living in large, politically and economically stratified societies with formal education systems and highly specialized roles with a global market economy. In this paper, we review and synthesize research on teaching among contemporary hunter-gatherer societies. The hunter-gatherer lifeway is the oldest humanity has known and is more representative of the circumstances under which teaching evolved and was utilized most often throughout human history. Research among contemporary hunter-gatherers also illustrates (...) a complex pattern of teaching that is both consistent with and distinct from teaching in other small- and large-scale societies with different subsistence practices and cultural forms. In particular, we find that the cultural emphasis on individual autonomy and socio-political egalitarianism among hunter-gatherers differently shapes how teaching occurs. For example, teaching clearly exists among hunter-gatherers and appears in many forms, including institutionalized instruction in valued cultural and technical skills. However, teaching tends to be less common in hunter-gatherer societies because people live in small, intimate egalitarian, groups that support each other’s learning in a variety of ways without teaching. Furthermore, foundational cultural schemas of autonomy and egalitarianism impact the nature of teaching. For example, adults and older children limit their interventions, permitting autonomous learning, and, when they occur, teaching episodes are generally brief, subtle, indirect, and situated in a present activity. We discuss the implications of this research in terms of discussions of the evolution of human cognition and the co-evolution of teaching and culture through the process of cultural niche construction. (shrink)

BackgroundThe pandemic of Coronavirus Disease 2019 has burdened an unprecedented psychological stress on the front-line medical staff, who are at high risk of depression. While existing studies and theories suggest that factors such as gratitude, social support, and hope play a role in the risk of depression, few studies have combined these factors to explore the relationship between them.ObjectiveThis study examined the mediating roles of social support and hope in the relationship between gratitude and depression among front-line medical staff during (...) the pandemic of COVID-19.MethodsThis study used the Gratitude Questionnaire, the Perceived Social Support Scale, the State Hope Scale, and the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale to examine the gratitude, social support, hope, and depression among 344 front-line medical workers in Wuhan, which was the hardest-hit area of COVID-19 in China.ResultsThe results showed that the prevalence of mild depressive disorder was 40.12% and the prevalence of major depressive disorder was 9.59% among front-line medical staff during the pandemic of COVID-19; gratitude has a direct and negative effect on depression. Gratitude was negative predictors of depression through the mediating variables of social support and hope [βgratitude–social support–depression = −0.096, 95%CI; βgratitude–hope–depression = −0.034, 95%CI], as well as via an indirect path from social support to hope [βgratitude–social support–hope–depression = −0.089, 95%CI ].ConclusionThe study findings indicate that gratitude as a positive emotion can reduce depression in medical staff by promoting social support and hope, respectively. Gratitude also reduced depression in health care workers through a chain mediating effect of social support and hope. Overall, gratitude can directly foster social support and hope, and protect people from stress and depression, which has implications for clinical interventions among front-line medical staff during the pandemic of COVID-19. (shrink)

Health promotion efforts are commonly directed towards encouraging people to discard ‘unhealthy’ and adopt ‘healthy’ behaviours in order to tackle chronic disease. Typical targets for behaviour change interventions include diet, physical activity, smoking and alcohol consumption, sometimes described as ‘lifestyle behaviours.’ In this paper, I discuss how efforts to raise awareness of the impact of lifestyles on health, in seeking to communicate the need for people to change their behaviour, can contribute to a climate of ‘healthism’ and promote the moralisation (...) of people’s lifestyles. I begin by summarising recent trends in health promotion and introducing the notion of healthism, as described by Robert Crawford in the 1980s. One aspect of healthism is moralisation, which I outline and suggest is facilitated by efforts to promote health via information provision and educational strategies. I propose that perceived responsibility plays a role in mediating the tendency to moralise about health and behaviour. Since I argue that states ought to avoid direct and indirect moralisation of people’s health-related behaviour, this suggests states must be cautious with regard to the use of responsibility-indicating interventions to promote health. (shrink)

Group dynamics play an important role in the social interactions of both children and adults. A large amount of research has shown that merely being allocated to arbitrarily defined groups can evoke disproportionately positive attitudes toward one’s in-group and negative attitudes toward out-groups, and that these biases emerge in early childhood. This prompts important empirical questions with far-reaching theoretical and applied significance. How robust are these inter-group biases? Can biases be mitigated by behaviors known to bond individuals and groups together? (...) How can bonds be forged across existing group divides? To explore these questions, we examined the bonding effects of interpersonal synchrony on minimally constructed groups in a controlled experiment. In-group and out-group bonding were assessed using questionnaires administered before and after a task in which groups performed movements either synchronously or non-synchronously in a between-participants design. We also developed an implicit behavioral measure, the Island Game, in which physical proximity was used as an indirect measure of interpersonal closeness. Self-report and behavioral measures showed increased bonding between groups after synchronous movement. Bonding with the out-group was significantly higher in the condition in which movements were performed synchronously than when movements were performed non-synchronously between groups. The findings are discussed in terms of their importance for the developmental social psychology of group dynamics as well as their implications for applied intervention programs. (shrink)