The Hermeneutics of the Subject is the third volume in the collection of Michel Foucault's lectures at the College de France, one of the world's most prestigious institutions. Faculty at the college give public lectures, in which they can present works-in-progress on any subject of their choosing. Foucault's were more speculative and free-ranging than the arguments of such groundbreaking works as The History of Sexuality or Madness and Civilization . In the lectures comprising this volume, Foucault focuses (...) upon the ways the "self" and consequently "self-study" have been conceived since the days of antiquity, starting with Socrates. Definitions and conceptions of "self-study" in Greek and Roman literature, Foucault argues, remain in force today, and underlie modern interpretations of the self. Engaging, engrossing, and provocative, The Hermeneutics of the Subject reveals Foucault at the height of his powers. (shrink)

L’articolo discute intorno alle lezioni di Michel Foucault tenute al Collége de France nel 1981-1982, pubblicate in Francia recentemente e tradotte in italiano nel 2003 col titolo L’ermeneutica del soggetto. Foucault analizza la filosofia antica greca e romana in particolare quella stoica. Egli vuole mostrare come tale filosofia, al contrario della filosofia cristiana, non si preoccupa tanto della conoscenza di sé quanto di prendersi cura del sé. Infatti la filosofia cristiana pensava di cercare la verità all’interno del soggetto proponendo di (...) trovarla con tecniche quali l’inchiesta, lo svelamento, la fede. Invece la filosofia greca e romana dava più importanza alla creatività del soggetto nello sforzo di migliorarsi e di rafforzare il proprio sé e il proprio corpo.This article is focused on Michel Foucault’s lectures held at the Collège de France in 1981-1982, entitled, The Hermeneutic of the Subject. Foucault analyses the Greek and Roman philosophy, especially the stoicism. In opposition to the Christianity, the Stoics, instead of trying to achieve the knowledge of the self, took care of the self. According to Foucault, Christians believed to be able to find the absolute truth into the subject: their purpose was to make inquiries, discoveries in order to find the truth. On the contrary, the Greek and Roman philosophy gives more importance to the creativity, the improvement, the reinforcement of the self and the body. (shrink)

RésuméLa connaissance herméneutique est généralement définie comme un savoir engagé, par opposition au savoir détaché que produit la méthode scientifique. La tension entre ces deux modèles dans la théorie psychanalytique de Freud est ici mise en évidence avec l'aide de Ricœur: cette théorie interprète des intentions conscientes, mais explique en même temps la vie psychique d'une façon mécaniste en termes depulsions somatiques. On montre ensuite comment le développement lacanien de la psychanalyse rend l'être habituellement caché de la subjectivité—l'inconscient—accessible comme langage. (...) Structuré comme un langage, l'inconscient est articulé et interprétable; et son interprétation est accès au langage du «réel», par-delà les limites de l'objectivité scientifique. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se discuten las nociones de filosofía y espiritualidad, tratadas por M. Foucault en La hermenéutica del sujeto, que relacionan el sujeto con la verdad. Si la filosofía del conócete a ti mismo trata la relación cognoscitiva del sujeto con la verdad a la que tiene derecho, entonces la espiritualidad del cuidado de sí trata de la transformación experiencial que requiere la verdad para que el sujeto acceda a ella. Este es el contexto en el que M. Foucault se refiere (...) a M. Heidegger y J. Lacan como los autores que pensaron la relación entre el sujeto y la verdad. Se discute en ambos casos la distinción entre la filosofía y la espiritualidad: en Lacan, porque la experiencia psicoanalítica aparece como vivencia espiritual del cuidado de sí; en Heidegger, porque el Dasein y la verdad como desocultamiento muestran la filosofía como actividad espiritual por excelencia. ABSTRACT The article discusses the notions of philosophy and spirituality relating the subject to truth, as dealt with by M. Foucault in The Hermeneutics of the Subject. While the philosophy of “know thyself” deals with the cognitive relation of subjects to the truth they have a right to, the spirituality of the care of the self has to do with the experiential transformation necessary for subjects to have access to truth. It is in this context that M. Foucault refers to M. Heidegger and J. Lacan as authors who thought the relation between subject and truth. In both cases, the distinction between philosophy and spirituality is discussed: in the case of Lacan, because the psychoanalytical experience appears as a spiritual experience of the care of the self, and in that of Heidegger, because Dasein and truth as unveiling reveal philosophy to be a spiritual experience par excellence. (shrink)

Certain critics, e.g. Manfred Frank and Hans-Herbert Kögler, claim that Hans-Georg Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics reduces the individual subject to a mere instrument of history and tradition, the latter reproducing themselves through the subject. However, Gadamer also emphasizes the active role of the subject in shaping and creating history and tradition. In this article I argue that the critics mistakenly emphasize a one-sided conception of history. By incorporating both active and passive aspects of the subject, Gadamer's (...) philosophical hermeneutics provides the means by which the individual may be conceived more aptly in an interdependent, dialectical relation to their corresponding historical, cultural, and social context. (shrink)

In this article, the author deals with the status of the self and personal identity in the digital milieu. In the first section, he presents his general approach to digital media and technologies, which he has called “digital hermeneutics”. He distinguishes between three perspectives in digital hermeneutics, namely the deconstructive, epistemological, and ontological approaches. In the second part, he focuses on digital hermeneutics as hermeneutics of the self. He compares Paul Ricoeur’s narrative identity to Pierre Bourdieu’s (...) habitus. His first thesis is that the habitus can be seen as a concept of subjectivation that neglects an important part of the subject. Narrative identity offers, in this sense, a remedy to such negligence. His second thesis is that today’s digital media and technologies are closer to the Bourdieusian habitus than to the Ricoeurian narrative identity. In other words, digital machines and technologies are “habitus machines” both in their structure and in their effects. In the conclusion, the author accounts for three potential responses to the habituation of our selves online. He also introduces the concepts of “digital agency” and “digital citizenship”. (shrink)

The article primarily addresses different philosophical views of otherness and tries to question them from a hermeneutic perspective. Above all, the conceptual radicalism of the asymmetrical relationships is criticized through the hermeneutic approach, understood not as mere strategy of appropriating the other or the stranger, but as an open process of understanding, in which the heterogeneity of those involved is subject to constant change, but is nevertheless always maintained. On this basis, the cultural-philosophical, but also social and political relevance (...) of the opposition between cultural pessimism and cultural optimism is called into question. (shrink)

This essay makes two claims. The first, exegetical, point shows that there are Husserlian elements in Gadamer’s hermeneutics that are usually overlooked. The second, systematic, claim takes issue with the fact that Gadamer saw himself in alliance with the project of the later Heidegger. It would have been more fruitful had Gadamer aligned himself with Husserl and the enlightenment tradition. following Heidegger in his concept of “effective history,” Gadamer risks betraying the main tenets of the enlightenment by shifting the (...) weight from subjectivity to effective history as the “agent” in history. This is not a wholesale dismissal of Gadamer’s project, however. The problem in Gadamer’s effective history can be remedied by insisting, with Husserl, on the subjective character of effective history. Gadamer was right to criticize Husserl’s idea of a transcendental genesis, but went too far in giving up the idea of human subjectivity as the agent in history. (shrink)

In this article, I ask whether Korsgaard’s ethics can be reconciled with a hermeneutic understanding of the human subject. Hermeneutics, inspired by Nietzsche, has traditionally been skeptical about the notion that moral principles have authority over us. But Korsgaard’s account of normativity as grounded in self-consciousness and its reflective distance from beliefs and desires is strikingly similar to Gadamer’s description of human beings as distant and ‘free’ from their environment. The question hermeneutics poses to deontology is how (...) a finite subject can be bound unconditionally by principles, when our understanding of them is always historically mediated and partial. I argue that Gadamer’s notion of the subject matter of understanding (the Sache) allows us to see that we understand our principles as interpretations of fully determined principles. What binds us is the principle that we are always revising our way toward, but whose content we never completely determine. (shrink)

In 1980, Michel Foucault began a vast project of research on the relationship between subjectivity and truth, an examination of conscience, confession, and truth-telling that would become a crucial feature of his life-long work on the relationship between knowledge, power, and the self. The lectures published here offer one of the clearest pathways into this project, contrasting Greco-Roman techniques of the self with those of early Christian monastic culture in order to uncover, in the latter, the historical origin of many (...) of the features that still characterize the modern subject. They are accompanied by a public discussion and debate as well as by an interview with Michael Bess, all of which took place at the University of California, Berkeley, where Foucault delivered an earlier and slightly different version of these lectures. Foucault analyzes the practices of self-examination and confession in Greco-Roman antiquity and in the first centuries of Christianity in order to highlight a radical transformation from the ancient Delphic principle of “know thyself” to the monastic precept of “confess all of your thoughts to your spiritual guide.” His aim in doing so is to retrace the genealogy of the modern subject, which is inextricably tied to the emergence of the “hermeneutics of the self”—the necessity to explore one’s own thoughts and feelings and to confess them to a spiritual director—in early Christianity. According to Foucault, since some features of this Christian hermeneutics of the subject still determine our contemporary “gnoseologic” self, then the genealogy of the modern subject is both an ethical and a political enterprise, aiming to show that the “self” is nothing but the historical correlate of a series of technologies built into our history. Thus, from Foucault’s perspective, our main problem today is not to discover what “the self” is, but to try to analyze and change these technologies in order to change its form. (shrink)

Even though there is an ineluctable abyss between Analytic and Continental Philosophy, it is not hard to argue that in his later works Ludwig Wittgenstein draws a closer philosophical attitude to the latter in terms of that the notions developed by him, such as language-games, family resemblances, meaning-in-use or rule-following, apart from his earlier nomological approach to language, leave room for various understandings and uncertainty in language. In the present work, my primary task is to concentrate on the close relationship (...) between the Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances and Gadamer’s idea of the fusion of horizons. But both philosophers, coincide in criticizing the authority of the Cartesian subject and private language and in allowing different understandings and uncertainty in language. Starting from this point of view, the linguistic turn, I will turn my remarks on the question how we learn color concepts since the structure of these concepts radically differs from the words that are able to subject to ostensive definitions. This last section will also offer a hermeneutical reading of Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblances. (shrink)

Ricoeur, Culture, and Recognition: A Hermeneutic of Cultural Subjectivity presents Ricoeur’s work from the beginning to its end in form of a cultural theory and proposes a cultural hermeneutic that clarifies the cultural facilitation in a person’s process of attaining a sense of being a human. This exploration of human being as profoundly formed and influenced by the cultural condition also enables a new understanding of intercultural questions by revealing the common human condition that the various cultures manifest.

L’examen de certains manuscrits inédits du Fonds Foucault déposé par Daniel Defert à la BnF, en 2013, montre que le Descartes de Foucault est une variante simplifiée de celui de Heidegger. Foucault reprend en effet à la lecture heideggérienne de Descartes la liaison que le philosophe allemand met en place entre la mathesis universalis et le cogito, qui ne se trouve assurément pas chez Descartes. C’est de cette manière que ces deux auteurs critiquent ce qu’ils mettent eux-mêmes au jour chez (...) Descartes – le sujet de la certitude – et qu’ils font de l’inquiétude l’affect historique propre à la pensée. La présente étude reconstruit le lien entre la mathesis et le cogito et la critique de la vérité comme certitude, tel qu’il est élaboré dans les cours de Heidegger sur Descartes, Augustin et Aristote, au début des années 20. La manière dont Heidegger établit ce lien suit l’évolution de la pensée de Heidegger, mais nous prenons le parti de mettre l’accent sur le cours sur Descartes de 1922-1923 (Introduction à la recherche phénoménologique), car dans les années 20, Heidegger fait de l’inquiétude la figure de l’ipséité. Nous reconstruisons en parallèle la manière dont Foucault intègre la lecture heideggérienne de Descartes à la sienne et comment il en déplace la signification, en évoquant certains textes connus de l’Histoire de la folie, mais aussi en analysant des manuscrits inédits de Foucault. Car le rapprochement que nous proposons entre les deux auteurs, tout comme la mise en relief de ce qui les distingue, se fait à la faveur de l’occasion historique que constitue la mise à disposition de textes qui étaient auparavant inédits. Et, en effet, les cours de Heidegger que nous analysons ont été publiés dans la Gesamtausgabe après la mort de Foucault, et leur traduction en français est toute récente. En procédant ainsi, nous voulons montrer comment la redéfinition contemporaine de la subjectivité s’est élaborée, au XXe siècle, à partir de la notion d’inquiétude, et plus spécifiquement de l’inquiétude historique. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a Foucauldian reflection on our datafied present. Following others, I characterize this present as a condition of “digital capitalism” and proceed to explore whether and how digital conditions present an important change of episteme and, accordingly, an importantly different mode of subjectivity. I answer both of these concerns affirmatively. In the process, I engage with Colin Koopman’s recent work on infopower and argue that, despite changes in episteme and modes of subjectivity, the digital capitalist present (...) is continuous with biopolitics as Foucault understood it, though it does raise serious worries about the possibility of transgressive resistance. (shrink)

This paper explores the concept of “livity,” the ground of Rastafari subjectivity. In its multifaceted nuances, “livity” represents the Rastafari invention of a religious tradition and discourse, whose ethos was fundamentally sacred, signified the immanence of the Absolute in dialectic with the Rastafari worldview and life world. Innovatively, the Rastafari coined the term “livity” to a discourse to combat despair, damnation, social death, and the existential chaos-monde they referred to as Babylon. In the process, the Rastafari reclaimed their power to (...) name their world. The Rastafari neologism “livity” articulated a mysticism, alternative spatial visions, and a positive technology of the self that revalorized blackness, explored, and interrogated profound dimensions of the human condition, from within the Jamaican context, that inevitably brought them into conflict with the local colonial authorities and implicitly shifted the model of social relations between the master and slave. (shrink)

An original reading of Nietzsche and Heidegger that paved the way for Vattimo’s conception of weak thought. In Beyond the Subject Gianni Vattimo offers a reading of Nietzsche and Heidegger that shows how the premises to overcome the metaphysical Subject were already embedded in their thought. Vattimo makes a case for a Nietzsche who is not concerned with the structure and glorification of the Overman, but rather with its opposite, by showing how it is the single individual who (...) must see and accept his/her potential and then excel and develop an inner strength and ethic. He reads Heidegger as concerned with the inevitable distortion present in every interpretation, which, when confronted and accepted, humbles us to deal with a less overarching telos or Grund, and makes us more attuned to contingency and interpersonal communication—what Vattimo calls a “weakened” notion of being. These original readings of Nietzsche and Heidegger pave the way for Vattimo’s concept of weak thought and open up to a future social ethic that is less agonistic and more community oriented. This edition includes two supplementary essays from 1986 and 1988 that expand on the same themes, providing a deeper look at an important decade in the development of Vattimo’s thought. (shrink)

This work examines Michel Foucault’s critique of the present, through his analysis of our hidden but still active historical legacies. His works from the Eighties are the beginning of what he called a “genealogy of the desiring subject,” in which he shows that practices such as confession—in its juridical, psychological, and religious forms—have largely dictated how we think about our ethical selves. This constrains our notions of ethics to legalistic forbidden/required dichotomies, and requires that we engage in a (...) class='Hi'>hermeneutics of the self which consistently fails to discover its imagined authentic self, or to find the happiness and freedom promised by contemporary ethics. In order to think the modern self in different terms, Foucault’s later works analyzed Classical and Hellenistic ethical sources, emphasizing their distance from today. He hoped doing so would allow us to rethink our current assumptions about ethical matters, the truth of oneself, and the relation to others. While Foucault’s genealogical descriptions critically diagnosed contemporary ills such as these, he did not prescribe a cure, preferring to let his readers experiment with new practices of their own design. This work attempts such an experiment, supplying concrete solutions to our ethical ills, in order to help us improve, as well as understand, our ethical selves. To that end, this work demonstrates that a form of subjectivity based on Benedict Spinoza’s ethical and political works avoids the pitfalls of modern ethics as diagnosed by Foucault. Additionally, the practices of the self found in Spinoza can be used to directly counter and displace each central element of “desiring subjectivity,” and thus supplies the kind of effective positive move which should follow after genealogical critique. (shrink)

This article is a reading of Emmanuel Falque’s Hors phénomène. Essai aux confins de la phénoménalité, published by Herman in 2021. In its first section the article presents the main theses of the book and comments on its style. In the second section it discusses the question of the subject by means of the movement that goes from de-subjectivation to the hypothesis of a re-subjectivation, through the hyper-subjectivation of suffering. Finally, in its third section, the text pinpoints three perplexities, (...) questioning the ontology of the subject at work in this philosophy, the conditions of possibility of a return from the depths of Hors phénomène, and the question of intersubjectivity for a “connected solitude”. (shrink)

The paper attempts to situate Sennett philosophically by placing him in the tradition of ontological hermeneutics. This way of reading Sennett is justified not only by the core principles that govern Sennett's social anthropology, but is also useful for tracing the trajectory of Sennett's philosophically informed diagnoses of the times. These diagnoses focus on the role of work in shaping subjectivity. After reconstructing the basic conceptual shape of Sennett's diagnoses of the work-related maladies of the "old" and the "new" (...) capitalism, the paper presents some broader reflections on the philosophical presuppositions of social criticism that takes its departure from the centrality of work. (shrink)

In this contribution to Text Matters, I would like to introduce gender into my feminist response to Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology of the capable subject. The aim is to make, phenomenologically speaking, “visible” the gendering of this subject in a hermeneutic problematic: that of a subject’s loss of confidence in her own ability to understand herself. Ricoeurian hermeneutics enables us to elucidate the generally hidden dimensions in a phenomenology of lost self-confidence; Ricoeur describes capability as “originally (...) given” to each lived body; but then, something has happened, gone wrong or been concealed in one’s loss of confidence. Ricoeur himself does not ask how the gender or sex of one’s own body affects this loss. So I draw on contemporary feminist debates about the phenomenology of the body, as well as Julia Kristeva’s hermeneutics of the Antigone figure, in order to demonstrate how women might reconfigure the epistemic limits of human capability, revealing themselves as “a horizon” of the political order, for better or worse. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:God’s Wounds: Hermeneutic of the Christian Symbol of Divine Suffering. Vol. 1 of Divine Vulnerability and Creation (Princeton Theological Monograph Series, 100)Raymond Kemp AndersonGod’s Wounds: Hermeneutic of the Christian Symbol of Divine Suffering. Vol. 1 of Divine Vulnerability and Creation (Princeton Theological Monograph Series, 100) Jeff B. Pool Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2009. 358 pp. $38.00One should not be put off by a negative-sounding title. Jeff Pool’s (...) exhaustive study could as well be titled more positively as “God’s Passion” for the “passio” root-meaning linked to our concept of suffering describes in large part what [End Page 224] he is about. But we must reluctantly concede that Pool’s treatment barely glimmers where we might expect to find light-hearted joy in the passion-resurrection and eschatological promise that he does acknowledge is at the heart of the Christian gospel.In his effort to follow methodological strictures consonant with his Chicago schooling with Langdon Gilkey and others, Pool is at pains to keep his academic back to the wall. So the first part of this two-part volume simply rehearses the enormous plurality of “Christian attestations” to the theme of divine suffering (and patripassianism). Attestations of every stripe rub shoulders here and seem to acquire almost equal footing. Yet by calling his topic a “symbol,” Pool does not mean to question the believed ontological actuality of “divine suffering.” In his view, this suffering is not just a symbol but describes for Christian faith an actuality that corners into the meaning and purpose of our very existence. So, as it turns out, he offers us much more than a history-of-religions compilation of diverse “attestations”; he is intent on reworking a tenable systematic theology and theological ethic as these intersect with his theme.Pool’s criteria for ranking some “attestations” over others remain obscure, and we might think him to be arguing rationalistically from personal preferences, until finally (217 pages into his text) he slips in what he calls “an additional epistemological interlude” that divulges what apparently has been an underlying hermeneutic basis all along: his own Messianic secret, as it were, a Christological-revelational criterion and final norm based on the apostolic tradition.Pool’s proclivity for rational analysis may become self-deceptive. At points he does include disclaimers, explaining that his “analyses” of living realities are only mental abstractions describing aspects of personal wholes that in fact cannot be split apart. Yet he forgets himself here, I think, and attempts to subject both divine and human personhood to scholastic “analysis.” For example, his descriptive categories of different “human capacities to love” (along the lines of Nygren’s three loves) become so reified in his “analysis” that he begins to refer to them as if they were schizoid entities that modify, block, and limit each other in our psyche and even in God’s (as if we could strap down the mystery of holistic love and dissect it). Nevertheless, theologians may find Pool’s analytic endeavors quite challenging.This book is definitely not for your introductory ethics course. Pool’s language is labored and presupposes a wide command of the field. His treatment is original, in some respects idiosyncratic, and intentionally revisionist. Written in a neoscholastic vein, this study will give you far more about God’s suffering than you thought anyone ever wanted or needed to know. Yet it promises you a substantial theological workout, offering something provocative and worth considering on nearly every page. Its greatest strength is its perceptive bibliographical annotations, both in the text and in the wealth of footnotes that compose between a third and half of the book. The bibliography [End Page 225] itself, however, which masses together more than a thousand titles, may be too exhaustive to provide much selective guidance.Raymond Kemp AndersonWilson CollegeCopyright © 2012 The Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

O si como reflexivo designa todos os pronomes pessoais e impessoais pelo seu caráter de omnipessoal, já evidenciado pela gramática das línguas naturais o que viabiliza uma proposta de Hermenêutica do Si, apresentada por Ricoeur em Soi-meme comme un autre, e articulada com princípios da Filosofia da Linguagem em seu aspecto semântico para a designação de uma coisa pela sua referência; e pragmático no que diz respeito às condições da interlocução que implicam a expressão: “falar é dirigir a”, evidenciado a (...) transitoriedade na relação do sujeito com o seu outro que se revela na intenção ética, na norma moral e na sabedoria prática.: The self as reflexive means all personal pronouns and impersonal for its character omnipessoal, as evidenced by the grammar of natural languages​​, thus justifying a proposed Hermeneutics of the Self, by Ricoeur on Soi-meme comme un Autre, and articulated within the Philosophy of Language in semantic aspect to the appointment of a thing by its reference; and pragmatic with regard to the conditions of dialogue involving the expression: "Talking is refers to", evidencing the transience on the subject's relation to his other which reveals on the intention ethics, moral norm and practical wisdom. Keywords: Hermeneutic of self, semantic, pragmatic, ethic, moral, politics. (shrink)

Taking as our starting point Plato'smetaphor of the doctor as philosopher we reflect on some aspects of the epistemological status of medicine. The framework to this paper is the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer which shows the paradoxical nature of Western medicine in choosing the body-object as its investigative starting point, while in actual fact dealing with subjects. Gadamer proposes a model of medicine as the art of understanding and dialogue, which is capable of bringing together its various constituent parts, (...) i.e. knowledge, knowing how to do and knowing how to be, in medical practice and in the physician'straining. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the dyadic figure of the physician as Platonic “master of the living totality” and wounded healer, capable of activating the patient'sself-healing capacity. (shrink)

Taking as our starting point Plato'smetaphor of the doctor as philosopher we reflect on some aspects of the epistemological status of medicine. The framework to this paper is the hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer which shows the paradoxical nature of Western medicine in choosing the body-object as its investigative starting point, while in actual fact dealing with subjects. Gadamer proposes a model of medicine as the art of understanding and dialogue, which is capable of bringing together its various constituent parts, (...) i.e. knowledge, knowing how to do and knowing how to be, in medical practice and in the physician'straining. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the dyadic figure of the physician as Platonic master of the living totality and wounded healer, capable of activating the patient'sself-healing capacity. (shrink)

O si como reflexivo designa todos os pronomes pessoais e impessoais pelo seu caráter de omnipessoal, já evidenciado pela gramática das línguas naturais o que viabiliza uma proposta de Hermenêutica do Si, apresentada por Ricoeur em Soi-meme comme un autre, e articulada com princípios da Filosofia da Linguagem em seu aspecto semântico para a designação de uma coisa pela sua referência; e pragmático no que diz respeito às condições da interlocução que implicam a expressão: “falar é dirigir a”, evidenciado a (...) transitoriedade na relação do sujeito com o seu outro que se revela na intenção ética, na norma moral e na sabedoria prática.The self as reflexive means all personal pronouns and impersonal for its character omnipessoal, as evidenced by the grammar of natural languages​​, thus justifying a proposed Hermeneutics of the Self, by Ricoeur on Soi-meme comme un Autre, and articulated within the Philosophy of Language in semantic aspect to the appointment of a thing by its reference; and pragmatic with regard to the conditions of dialogue involving the expression: "Talking is refers to", evidencing the transience on the subject's relation to his other which reveals on the intention ethics, moral norm and practical wisdom. (shrink)

Anglo-American and Continental accounts of interpretive practice, as developed by David Henderson and Hans-Georg Gadamer agree on interpretation's holistic character and on the necessity of a charitable initial stage of interpretation which provides a background for later disagreements or attributions of irrationality. The divergence of these accounts regarding the weighting of charitable expectations and whether interpretation aims for explicability or agreement raises questions concerning the interpreter's relation to theoretical generalizations applied in the charity stage and how interpretive practice is to (...) be understood in cases where the subject's view entails revision of the view of the interpreter. (shrink)

In this paper, I show how the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions and method converge on their treatment of the historical subject. Thinkers from both traditions claim that subjectivity is shaped by a historical worldview. Each tradition provides an account of how these worldviews are shaped, and thus how essentially historical subjective experience is molded. I argue that both traditions, although offering helpful ways of understanding the way history shapes subjectivity, go too far in their epistemic claims for the superiority (...) of subjective over positivist or academic history I propose that although the phenomenological/ hermeneutic approach to historical subjectivity is valuable for understanding both history and human nature, it cannot and ought not replace academic or what I will call ‘critical’ history. By showing the importance of historicity, and the force of historical consciousness on our actions, philosophers of history in these traditions expose the epistemic and perhaps even ethical requirement to engage in a rigorous critical history, one that recognizes the importance of historical consciousness. Such critical history is necessary to move beyond the subjective horizon of history as experienced to understand how events shaped this historical horizon. (shrink)

My first objective is to show that biblical hermeneutics inspires the contemporary art of textual interpretation, especially in the way we understand the interaction between the 'world of the text' and the 'world of the reader'. In this sense, the art of interpretation is not only the science of 'explanation' of the meaning of the text but also the 'understanding' of the impact of the text in our lives. With reference to the works of Paul Ricœur and Paul Beauchamp, (...) I will show how interpretation addresses the configuration of the plot of our lives and how it contributes to form our moral identity and our self-understanding in history and memory.Secondly, I will indicate how biblical hermeneutics and philosophical hermeneutics of the subject are deeply intertwined. There is the influence of the Christian traditions on hermeneutics, but also a complex relationship of mutual inclusion between them. (shrink)

We defend in this essay Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutics of suspicion against Toril Moi’s debunking of it as a misguided interpretation of the practice of critical inquiry, and we relate the practice of a rigorous and critical empathy to the hermeneutics of suspicion. For Ricœur, empathy would not be a mere psychological mechanism by which one subject transiently identifies with another, but the ontological presence of the self with the Other as a way of being —listening as a (...) human action that is a fundamental way of being with the Other in which “hermeneutics can stand on the authority of the resources of past ontologies.” In a rational reconstruction of what a Ricœur-friendly approach to empathy would entail, a logical space can be made for empathy to avoid the epistemological paradoxes of Husserl and the ethical enthusiasms of Levinas. How this reconstruction of empathy would apply to empathic understanding, empathic responsiveness, empathic interpretation, and empathic receptivity is elaborated from a Ricœurian perspective. (shrink)

I argue that clinical medicine can best be understood not as a purified science but as a hermeneutical enterprise: that is, as involved with the interpretation of texts. The literary critic reading a novel, the judge asked to apply a law, must arrive at a coherent reading of their respective texts. Similarly, the physician interprets the text of the ill person: clinical signs and symptoms are read to ferret out their meaning, the underlying disease. However, I suggest that the (...) class='Hi'>hermeneutics of medicine is rendered uniquely complex by its wide variety of textual forms. I discuss four in turn: the experiential text of illness as lived out by the patient; the narrative text constituted during history-taking; the physical text of the patient's body as objectively examined; the instrumental text constructed by diagnostic technologies. I further suggest that certain flaws in modern medicine arise from its refusal of a hermeneutic self-understanding. In seeking to escape all interpretive subjectivity, medicine has threatened to expunge its primary subject — the living, experiencing patient. (shrink)

The work of the German philosopher Manfred Frank has profoundly affected the direction of the contemporary debate in many areas of philosophy and literary theory. This present collection, first published in 1998, brings together some of his most important essays, on subjects as diverse as Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, the status of the literary text, and the response to the work of Derrida and Lacan. Frank shows how the discussions of subjectivity in recent literary theory fail to take account of important (...) developments in German Idealist and Romantic philosophy. The prominence accorded language in literary theory and analytic philosophy, he claims, ignores key arguments inherited from Romantic hermeneutics, those which demonstrate that interpretation is an individual activity never finally governed by rules. Andrew Bowie's introduction situates Frank's work in the context of contemporary debates in philosophy and literary theory. (shrink)

Hans-Georg Gadamer joins Martin Heidegger in thinking we need to jettison “subject” and related terms from our philosophical vocabulary. Gadamer thinks the term is problematic for different reasons than Heidegger, though, and thus has a different solution than Heidegger: a recovery of the term “Person.” Here I look at Gadamer’s reasons for rejecting the term “subject,” how Gadamer understands the historical development of the term “person” from the Ancient Greek prosopon through Pope Benedict XVI’s understanding of the Third (...) Person of the Trinity as communio, and finally how Gadamer’s understanding of personhood as being-in-dialogue avoids the problems with the term “subject.”. (shrink)

S. Geniusas: Although Gadamer’s hermeneutics has suffered attacks from a number of philosophical perspectives, the profusion of criticisms seldom constitutes new challenges and for the most part is a reiteration of two seemingly opposite claims. On the one hand, we often hear that Gadamer’s hermeneutics is merely a disguised brand of the “philosophy of the subject” which under the pretext of openness reduces the Other to the self. On the other hand, it is just as often claimed (...) that Gadamer’s writings fall into the category of the “hermeneutics of the fundamental questions” and therefore they cannot account for the selfhood of the self. Taking as its focus the theme of the oneness of the hermeneutical horizon(s), this paper argues that this theme carries no hegemonic or essentialist connotations. Rather, a careful analysis, which accentuates the negative and the dialectical elements of the oneness of horizons and the fact that this theme is for Gadamer both a presupposition and an achievement, reveals the shortcomings of both critiques. In the final analysis, the oneness of the horizon(s) is the dialogue that we ourselves are. Special attention is granted to Richard Kearney’s critique of Gadamer, to Gadamer’s critique of the incommensurabilist stance, and to the relevance of Gadamer’s hermeneutics in the context of today’s socio-political concerns. G. B. Madison: This essay is a companion piece to S. Geniusas’ “On the Oneness of the Hermeneutical Horizon(s)” and seeks to correct some of the serious misunderstandings of the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer that one often encounters in the literature. It seeks above all to show how Gadamer’s commitment to philosophical universalism is ideally suited to enabling philosophy to confront the ethical challenges posed by the phenomenon of globalization. (shrink)

The thesis that all learning has the character of enquiry is advanced and its implications are explored. R. G. Collingwood's account of ‘the logical priority of the question’ is explained and Hans-Georg Gadamer's hermeneutical justification and development, particularly the rejection of the re-enactment thesis, is discussed. Educators are encouraged to consider the following implications of the character of the question implied in all learning: (i) that it is a question that is constituted in the event rather than prepared or given (...) in advance, and that this leads to a necessary tension between learning and the curriculum or scheme, (ii) that it is a question that concerns some subject matter or issue that is at stake for both the student and the object of study, which draws our attention to the ‘intentionality’ of learning, and (iii) that it is a question that operates on the level of being—students are ‘called into question’, and thus transformed, by the object of study. (shrink)

This study is considered as a proposal to identify some metaphysical support of the self-care for a patient suffering from a chronic disease, as an extension of the bio-psycho-social paradigm. The methodology is dominated by a phenomenological perspective, supported by a hermeneutic conceptual analysis of the care of the self in Michel Foucault, focused on the Socratico-Platonic period and pervaded by the intention of having a translation and application to self-care. Foucault pleads for an aesthetics of the self, called subjectivity, (...) in which the subject is self-constituted through the so-called technologies of the self. The care of the self comes from the resignification of the philosophy as a way of life in which the subject is objectified. The translation and the applicability of the care of the self at the idea level to self-care are identified precisely in the acquisition of some important principles of the philosophy of care of the self from the Greek Antiquity: the role of awakener of consciousness of the one who is concerned about oneself as the first moment of the metaphor of awakening from the sleep, the ēthos as a way of being, a way of behaving and a life model. The pair self-knowledge – care of oneself justifies informing the former by the latter, in which being concerned about oneself means knowing oneself. Nevertheless, knowledge means care of the self where the self is synonymous with the soul and moreover, with the divine element in man. (shrink)

Kant's well-known statement from the “Critique of Practical Reason” (§ 7) that the consciousness of the basic law of pure practical reason (or the customary/moral law) can be called a fact of reason (V, 31.24) has not yet become the subject of adequate attention of domestic researchers. In the “Critique of Practical Reason”, Kant justify his famous categorical imperative by appealing to the “fact of reason” (§ 7). A closer reading of this passage reveals that it refers to a (...) “fundamental law of pure practical reason” and its “consciousness” is called “a fact of reason”. It is likely to think that Kant makes a “naturalistic fallacy” when he tries to justify “ought” (law) from “is” (fact). An analysis of the broader context of the use of the term “fact”, which occurs in the Critique in general 11 times, proves that its denotation is a moral law, which is explained in the corresponding train of thought. A special problem of interpretation is the explanation of the genitive in the expression “a fact of reason” [ein Factum der Vernunft]. It is common to read it as genitivus subjectivus (the fact is a product (act) of the reason, the fact arises thanks to the reason) and as genitivus objectivus (the reason itself is a fact, something factual). But from the standpoint of modern studies of Kant its reading as genitivus auctoris (Willaschek, Wolff, Noller) is promising. Kant’s specific use of the Latin form “ein Factum” in other works, which has the meaning not of “fact”, but of “imputable act” also, testifies in favor of this. Starting with Dieter Heinrich’s article “The Concept of Moral Insight and Kant’s Doctrine of the Fact of Reason” (1960), many researchers interpret the thesis of the “fact of reason” as Kant’s rejection of the attempt at the deduction of moral insight in the “Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Moral” (1785). However, as modern studies (Riedel, Wolff) show, this interpretation is not convincing enough. There are sufficient reasons to believe that it is Kant’s moral and legal doctrine of imputatio facti can explicate an enigmatic passage of the II Critique. (shrink)

The text provides a phenomenological analysis of The Autobiography of Malcolm X taken from the subjective perspective offered by Malik Shabazz (Malcolm X). Central to this process is the ever evolving and shifting relationality between Malcolm’s specific point of view and the social world he must take-up.

Recent scholarship has inquired into the socio-historical, discursive genesis of trauma. Trauma and the Ontology of the Modern Subject, however, seeks what has not been actualized in trauma studies - that is, how the necessity and unassailable intensity of trauma is fastened to its historical emergence. We must ask not only what trauma means for the individual person's biography, but also what it means to be the historical subject of trauma. In other words, how does being human in (...) this current period of history implicate one's lived possibilities that are threatened, and perhaps framed, through trauma? Foucauldian sensibilities inform a critical and structural analysis that is hermeneutically grounded. Drawing on the history of ideas and on Lacan's work in particular, John L. Roberts argues that what we mean by trauma has developed over time, and that it is intimately tied with an ontology of the subject; that is to say, what it is to be, and means to be human. He argues that modern subjectivity - as articulated by Heidegger, Levinas, and Lacan - is structurally traumatic, founded in its finitude as self-withdrawal in time, its temporal self-absence becoming the very conditions for agency, truth and knowledge. The book also argues that this fractured temporal horizon - as an effect of an interrupting Otherness or alterity - is obscured through the discourses and technologies of the psy-disciplines (psychiatry, psychology, and psychotherapy). Consideration is given to social, political, and economic consequences of this concealment. Trauma and the Ontology of the Modern Subject will be of enduring interest to psychoanalysts and psychotherapists as well as scholars of philosophy and cultural studies. (shrink)