Die beiden in dieser Studienausgabe veroffentlichten Haupt­ texte wurden von Husserl vom Oktober bis Dezember 1910 ge­ schrieben. Sie wurden zum erst en Mal 1973 im Band XIII der H usserliana, Edmund H usserl, Gesammelte Werke, veroffent­ licht.! Beim ersten Text (S. 1ft) handelt es sich urn eine person­ liche Vorbereitung fur die Vorlesungen "Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie" vom Wintersemester 1910/11, beim zweiten Text (S. 15ft) urn Husserls Manuskript dieser Vorlesungen. Dieses hier abgedruckte Manuskript gibt nicht die ganzen wahrend eines (...) Semesters in zwei W ochenstunden gehaltenen Vorlesungen wie­ der, sondern nur ihren erst en Teil, wohl bis Weihnachten 1910. N ach Husserls eigenen Angaben knupften sich an dies en Teil Dis­ kussionen, in denen er ohne Manuskript frei sprach.2 Diese Vorlesungen "Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie" wa­ ren fur Husserl von entscheidender Bedeutung. In zwei von ihm selbst publizierten Schriften, in Formale und transzendentale Lo­ gik (1929) (Husserliana XVII, S. 250, Anm. 1) und im Nachwort zu meinen Ideen (1930) (Husserliana V, S. 150, Anm.), weist Husserl auf diese Vorlesungen, und auch in seinem Nachlass wird 1 Und zwar als Texte Nr. 5 und Nr. 6. Diese Nummerierung sowie auch diejenige der zugehorigen Beilagen wurde in dieser Studienausgabe beibehalten. Die urspriing­ lichen Seitenzahlen der Husserliana-Ausgabe werden in eckigen Klammern wieder­ gegeben. (shrink)

TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS A DRAFT OF A PREFACE TO THE LOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS ( 1913) Edited by EUGEN FINK Translated with Introductions by PHILIP J. BOSSERT and CURTIS H. PETERS • MARTINUS NIJHOFF THE HAGUE 1975 © I975 by Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague. Netherlands All rights reserved. including the right to translate or to reproduce this book or parts thereof in any form ISBN-I3: 978-90-247-1711-8 e-ISBN-I3: 978-94-010-1655-1 DOl: 10. 1007/978-94-010-1655-1 TO HERBERT SPIEGELBERG ESTEEMED SCHOLAR, MENTOR, FRIEND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS We would like (...) to express our thanks to H. L. Van Breda, director of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain), for his approval and encouragement of this project, and to Professor Dr. Gerhart Husserl, Professor Dr. Eugen Fink and the editors of Tijdschrift voor Philosophie for their permission to undertake it. We also owe a debt of appreciation to Dr. Karl Schuhmann of the Catholic University of Louvain and to Dr. Elmar Holenstein, Dr. Edi Marbach and Mr. Rudolf Bernet of the Husserl-Archiv (Louvain) for their help in reading the original manuscripts and for putting their excellent knowledge of the Husserl "Nachlass" preserved at the Archives at our disposal. We especially wish to thank Professor Herbert Spiegelberg whose careful and critical reading of our manuscript at an earlier stage resulted in numerous suggestions for its improvement; and, last but not least, our wives, Jane and Pam, for their help in preparing the typescripts. TABLE OF CONTENTS Translator's Introductions XI I. HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION XI II. THEMATIC INTRODUCTION XX III. (shrink)

Une philosophie atteste sa grandeur en affrontant les questions les plus difficiles. Donc, au premier chef, celle du Temps. Aussi est-ce dès 1904-1905, à Göttingen, que Husserl tenta une analyse phénoménologique du temps, en lui appliquant les concepts fondamentaux d'intentionnalité et de réduction. En 1916, Edith Stein, alors assistante de Husserl, entreprit d'éditer ces cours, et de les compléter par d'autres textes, postérieurs (1905-1910). Ce n'est pourtant qu'en 1928 que l'entreprise aboutit, quand Heidegger, qui venait de publier Etre (...) et Temps (1927), édita pour la première fois les Leçons. Il déclarait en ouverture : " Ce qui est décisif dans ce travail, c'est la mise en relief du caractère intentionnel de la conscience et, d'une façon générale, la clarté croissante que reçoit l'intentionnalité dans son principe (...). Aujourd'hui encore cette expression n'est pas un mot de passe, mais le titre d'un problème central. " Bien qu'une édition plus complète soit, grâce aux soins de R. Boehm, parue depuis dans les Husserliana (Bd. X, 1966), la traduction d'H. Dussort reste un outil de travail inappréciable, puisqu'elle donne accès à un texte qui fut, en 1928, à la fois un achèvement de la pensée de Husserl, un hommage rendu par Heidegger à son maître, et, sans doute, leur ultime croisement - à savoir une rencontre et indissolublement un éloignement. (shrink)

Patient support tools have drawn on a variety of disciplines, including psychotherapy, social psychology, and social care. One discipline that has not so far been used to support patients is philosophy. This paper proposes that a particular philosophical approach, phenomenology, could prove useful for patients, giving them tools to reflect on and expand their understanding of their illness. I present a framework for a resource that could help patients to philosophically examine their illness, its impact on their life, and its (...) meaning. I explain the need for such a resource, provide philosophical grounding for it, and outline the epistemic and existential gains philosophy offers. Illness often begins as an intrusion on one’s life but with time becomes a way of being. I argue that this transition impacts on core human features such as the experience of space and time, human abilities, and adaptability. It therefore requires philosophical analysis and response. The paper uses ideas from Husserl and Merleau-Ponty to present such a response in the form of a phenomenological toolkit for patients. The toolkit includes viewing illness as a form of phenomenological reduction, thematizing illness, and examining illness as altering the ill person’s being in the world. I suggest that this toolkit could be offered to patients as a workshop, using phenomenological concepts, texts, and film clips to reflect on illness. I conclude by arguing that examining illness as a limit case of embodied existence deepens our understanding of phenomenology. (shrink)

ABSTRACTA number of philosophers within critical race theory use phenomenology to describe the way in which their identities are always already constituted as delinquent within the consciousness of white people, and how their own identity fractures in relation to this white gaze – a fracturing that creates unspeakable ontological, and ultimately physical, violence. Though these philosophers are already doing phenomenology in their work, there is a deeper level of analysis that has yet to be given. Specifically, an account has not (...) yet been provided as regards the production of the white gaze within the consciousness of white people. That is, how is an already racialized world of experience produced prior to any active reflection? In this essay, I engage George Yancy’s famous elevator example, using Edmund Husserl’s concepts of apperception, internal time consciousness and passive synthesis to give a phenomenological description of the production of a pre-reflective racialized world. (shrink)

Husserl speaks of horizons, Heidegger of worlds. The concept behind these terms is the same; the two philosophers mentioned held generally widely divergent views. In this article I articulate the shared concept and then proceed to argue that the differences of view can be reduced to a difference in the range accorded to the concept. This strategy brings about a great simplification in the generally muddled controversy about the two philosophers. It also has the additional advantage of showing the (...) interest this discussion could have for contemporary philosophy in general. (shrink)

This paper compares clinical intuition and phenomenological intuition. I begin with a brief analysis of Husserl’s conception of intuition. Second, I review the attitude toward clinical intuition by physicians and philosophers. Third, I discuss the Aristotelian conception of intellectual intuition or nous and its relation to phronesis. Phronesis provides a philosophical ground for clinical intuition by linking medicine as both a techné and praxis. Considering medicine as a techné, Pellegrino and Thomasma exclude clinical intuitions from their philosophy of medicine. (...) However, in modeling clinical reasoning on phronesis, they link Aristotelian nous with clinical reasoning. While supporting the application of phronesis to clinical reasoning, I consider Pellegrino and Thomasma’s model deficient for eliminating intuition as an inalienable element of clinical reasoning. Rather, clinical intuitions are necessary in linking medicine as both art and practice. This becomes more obvious through the phenomenological analysis of clinical intuitions. Clinical reasoning and phenomenological intuitions are similar in joining the perceptual and intellectual aspects of human judgment. Furthermore, clinical intuitions can be extended to become phenomenological intuitions through phenomenological reflection. Clinical intuitions may be examined phenomenologically for their originary foundations. In this way, medicine acts as a phenomenological clue. Phenomenology provides a method to restore the Hippocratic synthesis of empirical observation and wholism associated with clinical intuitions. (shrink)

Die beiden in dieser Studienausgabe veroffentlichten Haupt­ texte wurden von Husserl vom Oktober bis Dezember 1910 ge­ schrieben. Sie wurden zum erst en Mal 1973 im Band XIII der H usserliana, Edmund H usserl, Gesammelte Werke, veroffent­ licht.! Beim ersten Text (S. 1ft) handelt es sich urn eine person­ liche Vorbereitung fur die Vorlesungen "Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie" vom Wintersemester 1910/11, beim zweiten Text (S. 15ft) urn Husserls Manuskript dieser Vorlesungen. Dieses hier abgedruckte Manuskript gibt nicht die ganzen wahrend eines (...) Semesters in zwei W ochenstunden gehaltenen Vorlesungen wie­ der, sondern nur ihren erst en Teil, wohl bis Weihnachten 1910. N ach Husserls eigenen Angaben knupften sich an dies en Teil Dis­ kussionen, in denen er ohne Manuskript frei sprach.2 Diese Vorlesungen "Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie" wa­ ren fur Husserl von entscheidender Bedeutung. In zwei von ihm selbst publizierten Schriften, in Formale und transzendentale Lo­ gik (1929) (Husserliana XVII, S. 250, Anm. 1) und im Nachwort zu meinen Ideen (1930) (Husserliana V, S. 150, Anm.), weist Husserl auf diese Vorlesungen, und auch in seinem Nachlass wird 1 Und zwar als Texte Nr. 5 und Nr. 6. Diese Nummerierung sowie auch diejenige der zugehorigen Beilagen wurde in dieser Studienausgabe beibehalten. Die urspriing­ lichen Seitenzahlen der Husserliana-Ausgabe werden in eckigen Klammern wieder­ gegeben. (shrink)

Erstmals lemte ich die Formale und transzendentale Logik von Edmund HusserI - damals noch in der hervorragenden englischen Ubersetzung von D. Cairns: Formal and transcendental Logic - im Herbstsemester 1977 kennen, als ich als cando phil. an der School of Philosophy der Catholic University of America in Washington, D. C., an einem Hauptseminar daruber bei Herm Prof. Dr. Robert Sokolowski teilnahm. Das an diesem Text, was mich sofort interessierte und seitdem interessiert, ist die Art und Weise, wie HusserI den "natiirIichen (...) Weg von formaler zu transzendentaler Logik zeichnet", indem er die Grundlagen der objektiven, formalen Logik des Urteils auf subjektive, transzendentale Untersuchungen tiber das Ur teilen zu sttitzen versucht. Ich wuBte zwar, daB man schon immer - ins besondere von Descartes bis Wittgenstein - davon geredet hatte, wie wichtig Evidenzfragen fUr die Logik seien, aber es schien mir, daB HusserI der erste war, der in concreto wirklich zeigen konnte, daB und inwiefem eine Theorie des Urteils einer Theorie des Urteilens, also eine Theorie der Logik einer Theorie der Erfahrung, und damit einer der Evidenz bedarf. 1m Hinblick darauf stellt das 1. Kapitel - d. h. die §§ 12-22: "Die formale Logik als apophantische Analytik" - des 1. Abschnittes der Logik den grundlegenden Text tiberhaupt dar, obwohl es nattirlich erst in enger Verbindung mit dem 4. Kapitel-d. h. mit den §§ 82-91: "RtickfUhrung der Evidenzkritik der logischen Prinzipien auf die EvideIlzkritik der Erfahrung" - des II. Abschnittes verstanden werden kann. (shrink)

As philosophers speak, they think that there are things whicht they can see and speak about as philosophers. But what are these things? And what is the general character of the philosopher's statements? How can we find out whether they are true? If, as is widely agreed, the philosopher does not rely on empirical research, in which direction ought we to look for the evidence to support philosophical statements? Husserl's transcendental-phenomenological reduction, we propose to show, can best be understood (...) as an attempt to indicate the nature and direction of the specifically philosophical concern. The reduction, as he understood it, determines the domain of philosophical research, the character of philosophical statements, and the direction in which we can look for evidence to support such statements. In this paper we shall concentrate on the Ideas, the work which Husserl published in 1913 as a general introduction to phenomenology. (shrink)

The mind-body relation or, more particularly, the mind-brain relation 1 has been a perennial puzzle for philosophers—how can things so different be intimately related? Husserl dealt with the mind-brain relation in Section 63 of Ideen II, “Psychophysischer Parallelismus and Wechselwirkung,” 2 where he gave a critique of psychophysical parallelism. For Husserl, the mind-brain relation is to be understood not as a material or metaphysical relation, but as a relation between the presented sense or significance of two varieties of (...) appearances. Husserl’s account in this section will be examined and the following points will be discussed: (1) Husserl’s argument that the significance of brain states is basic to the full sense of a mind operating in an objective world; (2) Husserl’s view that a strict parallelism between the psyche and brain is an eidetic impossibility; (3) Husserl’s treatment of these questions, in so far as he raises but does not adequately resolve the issue, whether states of consciousness precede or follow brain states; (4) Husserl’s somewhat Cartesian failure to distinguish the phenomenological priority of consciousness from the metaphysical question of the possibility of an existent mind apart from a body. (shrink)

This book presents a detailed analysis of what it means to be absorbed in playing music. Based on interviews with one of the world’s leading classical ensembles, “The Danish String Quartet”, it debunks the myth that experts cannot reflect while performing, but also shows that intense absorption is not something that can be achieved through will, intention, prediction or planning – it remains something individuals have to be receptive to. Based in the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty as (...) well as of Dan Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher, it lays out the conditions and essential structures of musical absorption. Employing the lived experience of the DSQ members, it also engages and challenges core ideas in phenomenology, philosophy of mind, enactivism, expertise studies, musical psychology, flow theory, aesthetics, dream and sleep studies, psychopathology and social ontology, and proposes a method that integrates phenomenology and cognitive science. (shrink)

Husserl's views add up to a very complex set of conceptual relationships, Which I try to articulate in twelve theses. What I here call assertion--The author himself uses various terms--Is the sort of propositional attitude hume discussed as belief and brentano as judgment, I show how he distinguishes it from such things as namings and predications, Even from predications which assign existence, Truth, Or reality. I also deal with the neutral counterpart of assertion and its relation to the characteristically (...) phenomenological attitude. (shrink)

Dilthey is a figure of real importance in European philosophy and social theory. He exerted a significant influence on Husserl, Heidegger and Weber through his work on the nature of philosophy and the methodology and epistemology of human and social studies. He was also a distinguished and original historian of ideas and, indeed, many of his philosophical interests arose from the insights and practical difficulties he encountered as a historian. He produced a monumental biography of Schleiermacher, and a series (...) of shorter, but no less striking studies of Hegel, Dickens, Shakespeare, Schiller and many others. (shrink)

Husserl - at least in his third intellectual career - was convinced that subject is placed at the heart of philosophy and philosophy is nothing but egology. This Cartesian character makes Husserl one of the greatest figures of modern thought. But in contemporary period, this central ego and, accompanied with that, the modern thought have been challenged by poststructuralists. Because of their focus on psychoanalysis and their priority to other poststructuralist writings, Lacan's argumeats are significant. In this article, (...) at first, we proceed with the Lacan's central idea against the Cartesian subject, and then by explaining Husserl's thoughts we will see what his defence is. Husserl, by phenomenological reduction of natural attitude inherent in natural sciences, places phenomenology in a different dimension and prefers it to other sciences. The process of raising empirical ego to transcendental ego supports such defence. (shrink)

The article examines philosophical conceptions of responsibility found in the contributions of Martin Buber, Hans Jonas and Emmanuel Levinas. It argues that, despite the significant differences of these contributions, they all share important goals, significant structural features, and corresponding challenges. All three thinkers try to overcome the solipsistic limitations of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology as well as the egocentrism of Heidegger’s concept of "solicitude" or "self-care." All three try to overcome the Kantian subject-object dichotomy. All three understand responsibility as a (...) bipolar relation only. In consequence, all of them face similar challenges resulting from new forms of dichotomies and the exclusion of “thirdness” that are the result of their conceptual decisions. (shrink)

This original, contemporary synthesis between phenomenology and Marx’s late work begins from Edmund Husserl’s The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology to chart a new program for Socratic phenomenology in the current confrontation between planetary technology and place-based Indigeneity.

Begrüssung und Einführung, von H. Gehrig.--Bewusstseinsanalytik und Weltproblem, von E. Fink.--Die Zeitanalyse in der Phänomenologie und in der klassischen Tradition, von L. Landgrebe.--Einige Reflexionen über den geschichtlichen Ort der Phänomenologie, von M. Müller.--Der gegenwärtige Stand der Arbeiten am Nachlass Edmund Husserls, von H. L. Van Breda.--Über das Zeitverständnis in der Phänomenologie und im Denken der Seinsfrage, von M. Heidegger.--Personalia.

Is 'n transendentale kritiek religieus bepaald? deur V. Brümmer. -- Constitution and creativity in the philosophy of Edmund Husserl, by A. L. Conradie. -- Studium Generale, deur H. J. De Vleeschauwer. -- Sociology of law and its philosophical foundtions, by H. Dooyeweerd. -- Beginvrae en antwoorde in der Wysbegeerte, deur P. G. W. Du Plesis. -- Max Scheler's concern with the highest perfection, by S. I. M. Du Plessis. -- Christelike wetenskap, highest perfection, by S. I. M. Deu Plessis. (...) -- Christelike wetenskap, deur B. Duvenage. -- Malan's critical study, by H. Hart. -- Raakpunte vir 'n dialoog met 'n Christelike Wysbegeerte, deur A. M. T. Meyer. -- Nuwe gedagtes oor die begrip Natuurwet, deur A. H. Murray. -- Die voorwaardes vir die uitbou van 'n wysgerige antropologie, deur C. K. Oberholzer. -- De structuur van feit-en-betekenis, deur K. J. Popma. -- The relation of the arts to the presentation of the truth, by C. G. Seerveld. -- Gezag en vrijheid in het licht van Gods Woord, deur J. Stellingwerff. -- Voorveronderstellings vir 'n filosogie van die opvoeding, deur J. A. L. Taljaard. -- Objektiwiteit, sekularisasie en geskiedenis, deur N. T. Van der Merwe. -- Etiek: wetenskap van relasies, deur S. P. Van der Walt. -- Wetten en feiten, deur C. A. Van Peursen. -- Enige opmerkingen over entiteiten, deur H. Van Riessen. -- Richard Kroner on Herman Dooyeweerd, by C. Van Til. -- De mens in de taalkunde, deur P. A. Verburg, -- Enkele motieven van het anti-militair pacifisme, deur S, U. Zuidema. -- Publications of prof. dr. H. G. Stoker. Publikasies van prof. dr. H. G. Stoker (p. 303-311). (shrink)

DaB fUr die Entwicklung der Phanomenologie Husserls nicht zuletzt auch,wissenschaftstheoretische' Motive ausschlaggebend waren, ist hinreichend bekannt. Umso mehr verwundert es, daB die Husserl-Rezeption sich diese Motive nur selten zueigen gemacht hat. Zwar sind in einer Reihe von Einzel­ wissenschaften, wie in der Literaturwissenschaft, der Sozialwissenschaft und besonders auch der Psychologie, phanomenologische Motive wirksam gewor­ den. Versuche einer ausdriicklichen wissenschaftskritischen Anwendung der Husserlschen Philosophie auf einzelwissenschaftliehe Theorien jedoch, wie sie z.B. Alfred Schiitz in seinem friihen Werk zur phanomenologischen Grundlegung der (...) "verstehenden Soziologie"l ansatzweise unternommen hat, sind rar. Freilich ging auch Husserl hier nieht eben mit gutem Beispiel voran. Auch er selbst hat seine wissenschaftstheoretische Programmatik nirgends einer ernsthaften Bewahrungsprobe unterzogen. Die vorliegende Untersuchung will diese Frage einer wissenschaftstheore­ tischen Anwendbarkeit der transzendentalen Phiinomenologie paradigmatisch im Hinblick auf die Problemstellungen der Geschiehtswissenschaft iiberprii­ fen. Was also kann die Phanomenologie fUr die Historik leisten? DaB sieh fiir eine solche Absieht gerade die geschichtstheoretischen Perspektiven in Hus­ serls Werk anbieten, hat vor allem zwei Griinde. (shrink)

Die Rilke-Auslegung wird in weitreichende historische Perspektiven gestellt. Seit der Renaissance lässt sich ein Autonom-werden der Kunst beobachten, das bei Hölderlin, Wagner und Nietzsche zur Erwartung eines neuen ästhetisch bestimmten Zeitalters fuhrt. Heidegger schliesst für seine Kennzeichnung der gegenwärtigen Zeit, nach dem Tode Gottes und ohne eine neue bestimmende Mitte der Kultur, als ,, dürftiger Zeit" bei Hölderlin und Nietzsche an. Rilkes Position als „Dichter in dürftiger Zeit” ist in Heideggers Texten indessen nicht eindeutig. Rilke ist schliesslich nur ein Gesprächspartner (...) in einem Gesprächskontext zwischen Philosophie und Kunst. Innerhalb dieses Kontextes werden hier zwei Gedichte und die Grabschrift Rilkes interpretiert. Adorno und Habermas werfen Husserl vor, dass er die Forderung der Phänomenologie, zu einer „Wesensschau” zu kommen, die das objektivierende Denken überwindet, nicht einlösen kann. Die These dieser Abhandlung ist, dass Rilke in einigen seiner Gedichte die „Wesensschau” auf adäquate Weise verwirklicht. Die methodische Seite, die freilich nicht von der inhaltlichen zu trennen ist, kommt in „Der Schauende”, die ganz auf das Inhaltliche gerichtete Seite in „Der Panther” mit völliger Klarheit zum Ausdruck. Was kann es bedeuten, dass Rilke das Wesen schliesslich als Un-wesen erblickt ? (shrink)

Although Dilthey is increasingly recognized as a seminal philosopher whose thought finds significant expression in the works of Heidegger, Husserl, Jaspers, Mannheim, Weber, Spranger, Simmel, Troeltsch, and Buber, his writings are available in English in only the scantiest of excerpts. Book-size English commentaries on Dilthey can be counted without exhausting the fingers of one hand. The present, slim volume would, therefore, be of interest for no other reason than that it adds a reference to an all-too skimpy library. Fortunately, (...) it is of value for much better reasons. What Tuttle has attempted is the first systematic exposition of Dilthey's life-long attempt to establish an objectively valid basis for his theory of Verstehen and Nacherlebnis.. This may belie the subtitle of the book, but it can hardly be denied that the exposition is at least equal in importance to the critical analysis which follows it. The reconstruction of Dilthey's arguments consists of a description of: his concept of the special nature of human life which permits the subject and object of historical knowledge to be the same; the original descriptive psychology which Dilthey worked out as the basis for the study of history and of all the human sciences; his somewhat equivocal abandonment of psychology because of its ahistorical and law-like character in favor of an emphasis on empirical life assertions which are internalized by the method of Verstehen; his notion of human nature and the tension between its historically changing aspect and its unchanging epistemological aspect; the role of motives in Dilthey's system as causes of historical action; and his theory of ideal types as a methodological device for generalizing without having to utilize the causal explanations of natural science. The book begins and ends on the same note; namely, that Dilthey is unable to verify that the re-experience of the historian is actually a duplicate of the experience of the historical agent. But in between the opening statement and its repetition at the end, a wealth of insight into Dilthey's thought is provided.--H. B. (shrink)

A critical analysis of Alfred Schuetz' conception of rationality based upon Edmund Husserl's phenomenology.

Extant literature suggests a correlation between the thematic core of an adolescent’s personal account of depression and the trajectory of her personality development. This possible correlation has not been explored in a way that includes detailed qualitative analyses of reported experiences of adolescent depression. By discussing a single case design, this contribution illustrates and justifies an interpretative procedure that has been implemented to assist such an exploration. The paper focuses on the suitability of this approach for the investigation of all-encompassing (...) alterations of the experiential field in psychopathological conditions. I argue that this suitability is grounded in a phenomenological understanding of the explicative task in terms of a disclosure of the intentional constitution of the life-world of adolescent depression. The discussion begins with a contextualization of the single case design within a multilayered and methodologically mixed study. Against this background, I illustrate the steps of a ‘systematic of interpretation’ aimed at exposing meaning horizons. Touching on issues concerning the empirical validity of the approach, these meaning horizons are construed as objectively plausible frames of intelligibility of a subjectively particular form of experience. Drawing on a characterization of transcendental arguments, I discuss the relationship between the illustrated procedure and the investigational attitude that, according to Husserl, defines phenomenology as a properly philosophical endeavor. In this context, I eventually characterize the illustrated procedure as a crossover approach to human experiential life aligned with the tradition of phenomenological psychopathology. (shrink)

Although recent cognitive science and traditional phenomenology has placed great importance on first-person descriptions, exactly what this entails goes undefined. I will seek to answer what's involved in phenomenological description, with reference to Husserl. I define phenomenological description according to its genus and differentia. I compare description in the natural sciences with description in phenomenology. I discuss how the basic particulars for Husserlian phenomenological description stem from the intentional relation -- particularly the distinction between noesis and noema. I discuss (...) the pivotal role of reflection in phenomenological description. I further argue that a phenomenological description is more than a statement which utilizes the 'I-[verb]' template. The final section analyses the difficulties inherent in describing intersubjectivity and argues these difficulties may have influenced Husserl's early, descriptive account of this topic. (shrink)

This brings us not only to the conclusion of my list of eight features proposed as being common to all or most value experience, but also to a reminder of its purpose. First, I hope that, in the spirit of Husserl's dictum, “to the things themselves,” this proposal will initiate a discussion of a “basic research” type of question, namely: What are the main features of value experience? Second, I hope that the fruits of such a discussion might eventually (...) contribute to the working out of a metatheory for value inquiry: a theory about criteria of adequacy for any general theory of value.In a paper of this scope it is obvious that one cannot even begin to discuss all the points and subpoints made in the manner in which they deserve. Much less can one defend all, or even any, of its claims with the kind of logical rigor and linguistic fastidiousness which have come to be the norm in most Anglo-American philosophy today. As a counterbalance to a tendency in some professional circles to making adherence to this norm the end of, rather than merely a means for, philosophic understanding, I have offered this paper after the spirit of Socrates and Plato, who certainly appreciated appropriate logical rigor and linguistic tidiness. Philosophy was nevertheless always for them first and foremost a mutual adventure of exploration into value through significant dialogue. Thus, rather than submitting one more piece of logic or language to the microscope, it has been my purpose to go exploring this time with a telescope. I cordially invite other seekers to join me and to challenge my findings. (shrink)