A conflict arises from two basic insights concerning what recognition is. I call them the mutuality–insight and the adequate regard–insight. The former is the idea that recognition involves inbuilt mutuality: ego has to recognize the alter as a recognizer in order that the alter’s views may count as recognizing the ego. There always needs to be two–way recognition for even one–way recognition to take place. The adequate regard –insight in turn is that we do not merely (...) desire to be classified as recognizers, but to be treated adequately, in the light of any and all of our normatively relevant features. Both of these insights build on a third central idea, that recognition from others matters because it is relevant to one’s practical relations–to–self: say, respect from others is relevant for self–respect. But crucially for this paper, the two insights pull in different directions – they are in tension when it comes to deciding the scope of “recognition”. This paper is an attempt to negotiate the tension by comparing and assessing more and less restricted views on “recognition”. I discuss four issues on which definitions of recognition may be more or less restricted. The first question concerns the scope of possible recipients of recognition, and the second question possible recipient-dependent conceptual restrictions on whether recognition has taken place at all. On these questions I try to be true to both of the two conflicting insights. The mutuality–insight leads naturally to a strict conception of recognition (only recognizers can be recognized; recognition takes place only when two–way recognition takes place). By contrast, the adequate regard –insight leads to an unrestricted view (also other beings than recognizers can be treated adequately, and one–way adequate regard is conceptually possible). I argue that the tension between these is best negotiated by a two–part story, which will distinguish terminologically recognizing (and being recognized) from successfully giving and getting recognition. It is slightly unfortunate to have to draw such technical terminological distinctions, but drawing this distinction helps to make substantive points that upon reflection need to be made, given the mutuality–insight and adequate regard–insight. Or so I argue. The other two questions are: what sort of responses to what sort of features amount to recognition. Again, the adequate regard –insight would lead to an unrestricted normativist view: any kinds of responses that are normatively called for by any normatively relevant features may be cases of recognition. The mutuality – insight might motivate a narrower suggestion developing the idea that only other recognizers (or persons) can be recipients of recognition : only the kind of features that can only be had by other recognizers (or persons) can serve as the basis of recognition, and only the kind of responses, which are forms of taking the other as a recognizer (or a person) count as recognizing . I will argue that while such responses to such features are an important subclass of recognition, the unrestricted normativist view captures the full scope of recognition better. We should not in advance define recognition in a restricted way which rules some cases out (even though the mutuality–insight might seem to motivate some restrictions). We can fully preserve the force of the mutuality–insight with the two–part story, without restricting the scope of features and responses that amount to recognition. (shrink)

In the debate concerning the education of nurses that is currently taking place in Denmark, two widely differing views are apparent regarding the best way of training nurses such that the ethical aspect of their work is adequately considered. The first of these is based on the premise that practical care is fundamental to and justified by theories on nursing, care and ethics, which is why the theoretical part of nurse education deserves a higher priority. The second view is based (...) on the premise that social care cannot be taught by means of theories, but can be learnt only through practice. The master-apprentice principle of ancient Greece is stressed in connection with this as being a viable alternative to the theoretical model of education. These two very different views can be traced back to Plato’s and Aristotle’s ideas on ethics and teaching respectively; indeed, those engaged in the debate make specific reference to these philosophers. In Denmark, a third fundamental viewpoint exists, known as ‘ontological ethics’. Phenomenologist KE Løgstrup is one of the best-known representatives of this view. Basing the line of argument on Løgstrup’s ethics and the view of education associated with this, this article questions the relevance of ancient Greek thought to today’s world by illustrating a number of problems that are connected with the theoretical model of nurse education and with the master-apprentice principle. Løgstrup associates ethics with the aesthetic principle that ‘the useless is the most useful’ in human life and with the view we also see in Kierkegaard’s and NFS Grundtvig’s writings that ethics can be imparted only by indirect means. Løgstrup bases his understanding of ethics on the Judaeo-Christian concept of Genesis and the view that human beings were created with an ethical potential that is best nourished by aesthetic impressions. (shrink)

This article identifies problems with regard to providing criteria that regulate the matching of logical formulae and natural language. We then take on to solve these problems by defining a necessary and sufficient criterion of adequate formalization. On the basis of this criterion we argue that logic should not be seen as an ars iudicandi capable of evaluating the validity or invalidity of informal arguments, but as an ars explicandi that renders transparent the formal structure of informal reasoning.

BackgroundBreaking bad news to mothers whose children has disability is an important role of physicians. There has been considerable speculation about the inevitability of parental dissatisfaction with how they are informed of their child’s disability. Egyptian mothers’ preferences for how to be told the bad news about their child’s disability has not been investigated adequately. The objective of this study was to elicit Egyptian mothers’ preferences for how to be told the bad news about their child’s disability.MethodsMothers of 100 infants (...) recently diagnosed with Down syndrome were interviewed regarding their preferences for how to be told bad news. Mothers were recruited through outpatient clinics of the Pediatric Genetics Department at Fayoum University Hospital (located 90 km southwest of Cairo, Egypt) from January to June 2011.Results and discussionQuestionnaire analyses revealed nine themes of parental preferences for how to be told information difficult to hear. Mothers affirmed previously reported recommendations for conveying bad medical news to parents, including being told early, being told of others with a similar condition, and being informed of the prognosis.ConclusionsMothers affirmed communication themes previously discussed in the literature, such as being told early, and being informed of the prognosis. Although more research is needed in this important area, we hope that our findings will stimulate future search and help health care providers in different societies establish guidelines for effectively communicating bad news. (shrink)

BackgroundBreaking bad news to mothers whose children has disability is an important role of physicians. There has been considerable speculation about the inevitability of parental dissatisfaction with how they are informed of their child’s disability. Egyptian mothers’ preferences for how to be told the bad news about their child’s disability has not been investigated adequately. The objective of this study was to elicit Egyptian mothers’ preferences for how to be told the bad news about their child’s disability.MethodsMothers of 100 infants (...) recently diagnosed with Down syndrome were interviewed regarding their preferences for how to be told bad news. Mothers were recruited through outpatient clinics of the Pediatric Genetics Department at Fayoum University Hospital (located 90 km southwest of Cairo, Egypt) from January to June 2011.Results and discussionQuestionnaire analyses revealed nine themes of parental preferences for how to be told information difficult to hear. Mothers affirmed previously reported recommendations for conveying bad medical news to parents, including being told early, being told of others with a similar condition, and being informed of the prognosis.ConclusionsMothers affirmed communication themes previously discussed in the literature, such as being told early, and being informed of the prognosis. Although more research is needed in this important area, we hope that our findings will stimulate future search and help health care providers in different societies establish guidelines for effectively communicating bad news. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger devotes extensive discussion to medieval philosophers, particularly to their treatment of Truth and Being. On both these topics, Heidegger accuses them of forgetting the question of Being and of being responsible for subjugating truth to the modern crusade for certainty: ‘truth is denied its own mode of being’ and is subordinated ‘to an intellect that judges correctly’. Though there are some studies that discuss Heidegger’s debt to and criticism of medieval thought, particularly that of Thomas Aquinas, there is (...) no constructive reply to his assertions. As a result, Heidegger’s critique had an unprecedented effect on the credibility of medieval philosophy, whereby great portions of the philosophical community dismiss it altogether as an illegitimate Onto‐Theology. It is the aim of this study to offer a constructive reply that will fundamentally grapple with these allegations. By constructive reply we mean not only a reply that avoids the problems Heidegger raises regarding existence, essence and truth, but more importantly, one that uses Heidegger’s criticism in order to present a more insightful account of these notions. The present study is composed of two parts where the second serves as a sort of addendum. The first part, the core of this study, is an attempt to develop an understanding of the distinction between essence and existence that, on the one hand, accords with Heidegger’s criticism while on the other hand advances our understanding of how we think and understand reality. After presenting Heidegger’s depiction of Aquinas’s distinction between essence and existence (esse) as a real distinction, the study will present several views propounded by scholars of Aquinas regarding the status of this distinction. It will be argued that it is not clear whether the distinction is real, formal or conceptual, and that different types of distinction are applied in different places, particularly in regard to the phantasm that Aquinas considers essential to the human act of thinking. The second part diverges from the first part and focuses on Heidegger’s criticism of Aquinas’s conception of truth as adequation, i.e., what it is that grounds the possibility of truth as adequation. This divergence is necessary in order to present a full metaphysical response to Heidegger’s criticism. Since the aim of the present study is to argue that Aquinas’s philosophical system can contend with Heidegger’s criticism, a partial reply would greatly diminish its effectiveness. (shrink)

The article starts from the questions: what is it to be an inhabitant or citizen of a globalised world, and how are we to think of education in relation to such inhabitants? We examine more specifically the so–called ‘European area of higher education’ that is on the way to being established and that can be regarded as a concrete example of a process of globalisation. In the first part of the paper we try to show that the discursive horizon, and (...) the concrete techniques and strategies that accompany the establishment of this space of higher education, invite the inhabitants of that space to see themselves as entrepreneurial and autonomous entities. In the second part we show how this specific kind of subjectivation (this production of subjects), related as it is to this globalised space, involves what we call an immunisation that also affects our thinking and our ideas in and about education. To refer to this as a kind of immunisation implies that globalisation could in fact be considered a closing or enclosing rather than an opening up. We argue, therefore, that this immunisation needs to be refused in favour of the invention of other kinds of subjectivity, other ways of speaking and writing about the world and about education, such that we relate to ourselves in a different way. (shrink)

The article starts from the questions: what is it to be an inhabitant or citizen of a globalised world, and how are we to think of education in relation to such inhabitants? We examine more specifically the so–called ‘European area of higher education’ that is on the way to being established and that can be regarded as a concrete example of a process of globalisation. In the first part of the paper we try to show that the discursive horizon, and (...) the concrete techniques and strategies that accompany the establishment of this space of higher education, invite the inhabitants of that space to see themselves as entrepreneurial and autonomous entities. In the second part we show how this specific kind of subjectivation (this production of subjects), related as it is to this globalised space, involves what we call an immunisation that also affects our thinking and our ideas in and about education. To refer to this as a kind of immunisation implies that globalisation could in fact be considered a closing or enclosing rather than an opening up. We argue, therefore, that this immunisation needs to be refused in favour of the invention of other kinds of subjectivity, other ways of speaking and writing about the world and about education, such that we relate to ourselves in a different way. (shrink)

The analysis presented here lays out the ethical warrants for requiring community oversight of health research conducted in international settings. It reviews the inadequacies with the current standards of individual informed consent and research ethics committee review, and then, shows how a broader population-based public health perspective raises new demands on justice involving due consideration of the rights, harms and benefits to the community as a whole. As developed here, an ethical standard that requires community oversight of health research is (...) justified on three principled grounds: respect for community autonomy and their right to self-determination; due consideration of the consequences of the research for the community as a whole; and, a more complete understanding of human autonomy. The paper concludes with practical recommendations regarding the composition of Community Advisory Boards to ensure that they have legitimate decision-making authority in diverse socio-cultural contexts. (shrink)

Medical Research Council, Capetown, South Africa Nasheen Naidoo Medical Research Council, Capetown, South Africa Shamagonam James Medical Research Council, Durban, South Africa Priscilla Reddy Medical Research Council, Capetown, South Africa * Corresponding author: 306 Arnold House, School of Public Health & Health Sciences, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA 01003, USA. Tel.: (413) 545 1005; Email: Buchanan{at}schoolph.umass.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> . Abstract The analysis presented here lays out the ethical warrants for requiring community oversight (...) of health research conducted in international settings. It reviews the inadequacies with the current standards of individual informed consent and research ethics committee review, and then, shows how a broader population-based public health perspective raises new demands on justice involving due consideration of the rights, harms and benefits to the community as a whole. As developed here, an ethical standard that requires community oversight of health research is justified on three principled grounds: respect for community autonomy and their right to self-determination; due consideration of the consequences of the research for the community as a whole; and, a more complete understanding of human autonomy. The paper concludes with practical recommendations regarding the composition of Community Advisory Boards to ensure that they have legitimate decision-making authority in diverse socio-cultural contexts. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Numerous researchers have investigated accounting students’ levels of moral reasoning, ethical choice and judgment employing the Defining Issues Test and using its P score as an indicator of moral reasoning. Not surprisingly, a number of DIT studies report conflicting results. Moreover, despite widespread use of the DIT, there is concern that it may not adequately measure all facets of ethical judgment :1–26, 2010). Thus, we endeavor to provide insight not only into the contradictory results but also about the applicability of (...) the DIT for studying accounting students. To do so, we collect published and unpublished DIT studies employing accounting students as subjects and use meta-analysis to aggregate findings across these studies to quantify their results, examining commonly employed variables. We show significant relationships between P scores and some variables but not others. Further, our findings demonstrate that the DIT provides added insights when exploring questions of ethical choice, and ethics instruction, particularly when the instruction is embedded in an accounting course. Finally, we find that the level of DIT P scores reported in the studies relates to whether the study was published. We discuss the implications of our findings for future research. (shrink)

Many philosophers have objected to Kant’s account of duties regarding non-human nature, arguing that it does not ground adequate moral concern for non-human natural entities. However, the traditional interpretation of Kant on this issue is mistaken, because it takes him to be arguing merely that humans should abstain from animal cruelty and wanton destruction of flora solely because such actions could make one more likely to violate one’s duties to human beings. Instead, I argue, Kant’s account of duties regarding (...) nature grounds much stronger limitations on how humans may treat non-human animals and flora, since such duties are rooted in the imperfect duty to increase one’s own moral perfection. This duty proscribes actions affecting non-human nature that decrease one’s moral perfection, such as those that cause organisms unnecessary harm. Moreover, the duty to moral perfection prescribes (but does not strictly require) actions affecting non-human nature that increase one’s moral perfection, such as those that benefit organisms. Given this interpretation, I show that, contrary to a widely held view, Kant’s moral philosophy can ground a coherent and robust approach to environmental ethics. (shrink)

" A l'aube de la relation éducative, l'adulte est saisi par le souci de son engagement et s'interroge sur la nature de son geste éducatif, sur ce qu'il serait mieux de faire, sur ce qu'il ne faudrait surtout pas faire, sur ce que l'on aimerait qu'il découvre, apprenne, comprenne, devienne... Et assez vite l'adulte prend conscience des tensions entre excès et insuffisance, mobilisé entre ses convictions et les tendances sociales. Il est pris dans une lutte entre le " trop " (...) et le " pas assez " dont nous pouvons comprendre l'intensité du sens dans le geste de tendresse qu'est la caresse à un nouveau-né, que chacun a pu éprouver une fois ou l'autre: cette tension particulière entre retenue du geste par crainte de blesser et pression du geste par attirance, entre respecte et désir. Si, souvent, l'adulte sait trouver l'attitude adéquate, un juste milieu, dans d'autres cas, son mouvement témoigne d'une inaptitude à éduquer et peut entraîner bien des souffrances pour l'enfant. C'est sur cette dimension particulièrement délicate du rapport éducatif que porte ici ma réflexion. Délicate parce qu'elle touche à l'intimité de l'éducateur et parce qu'elle révèle l'arbitraire de la relation entre adulte et enfant. Ce livre va donc traiter du risque d'emprise de l'éducateur sur l'enfant : de l'abus éducatif. " Roger Cevey. (shrink)

According to Richard Swinburne, the principle of simplicity is of great importance to theory choice scenarios and theoretical changes in the sciences. In particular, he holds that the theory choice criterion of fit with background evidence can be reduced to the criteria of simplicity and of yielding the data. We will, however, rebut this reduction thesis and show that three central aspects of theoretical change (confirming power of empirical data, reliability of experimental methods, and truth of new theoretical proposals) cannot (...) be adequately reconstructed if simplicity is regarded as a key criterion of theory choice. (shrink)

This essay critically examines some classic philosophical and legal theories of privacy, organized into four categories: the nonintrusion, seclusion, limitation, and control theories of privacy. Although each theory includes one or more important insights regarding the concept of privacy, I argue that each falls short of providing an adequate account of privacy. I then examine and defend a theory of privacy that incorporates elements of the classic theories into one unified theory: the Restricted Access/Limited Control (RALC) theory of privacy. (...) Using an example involving data-mining technology on the Internet, I show how RALC can help us to frame an online privacy policy that is sufficiently comprehensive in scope to address a wide range of privacy concerns that arise in connection with computers and information technology. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Psychopathy, Other-Regarding Moral Beliefs, and Responsibility”R. A. Duff (bio)AbstractI make four criticisms of Fields’s account of one type of psychopathy as a responsibility-negating personality disorder which involves an incapacity to form other-regarding moral beliefs. First, his account of what it is to hold moral beliefs (in terms of accepting universal practical principles) actually specifies neither a necessary, nor a sufficient, condition for holding a moral belief. Second, (...) he is too quick to dismiss the suggestion that what psychopaths suffer from is an inability to understand moral concepts and values. Third, he does not show why we should ascribe an incapacity to accept moral beliefs to the psychopath, rather than a culpable failure to do so. Fourth, he suggests too weak a criterion of criminal liability, as requiring only the capacity to act for prudential reasons.KeywordsMoral beliefs, moral understanding, incapacity, criminal liabilityFields argues that we can properly count at least one type of psychopathy as a personality disorder which negates moral responsibility. This is not because, as others have argued, such psychopaths cannot understand moral concepts and moral values, but because they suffer an incapacity to form other-regarding moral beliefs, i. e., to accept practical moral principles; we cannot hold them morally responsible for failing to accept or obey moral principles which they lack the capacity to accept. Nor, he also argues, should we hold them criminally liable, since they lack that capacity to act for prudential reasons to which a deterrent system of law appeals.His paper rightly emphasizes the interdependence of psychiatry and philosophy, in this as in other contexts. A psychiatric account of psychopathy as a disorder involving some kind of moral incapacity must depend for its precise sense on an adequate account of the concepts of moral capacity and incapacity: an account which should draw on the resources of moral philosophy. Philosophers who aim to understand those concepts will do well to attend, as Fields does attend, to psychiatric discussions and case histories: not only because this is necessary if their comments on mental disorder or on psychopathy are to be adequately informed, but also because careful attention to the problematic phenomena of mental disorder can also illuminate our understanding of the rational powers and capacities which are lacking or distorted in the disordered, and which philosophers hope to analyze. Fields is also clearly right to emphasize that the criteria of moral responsibility might not be the same as the appropriate [End Page 283] criteria of criminal liability: that the question of whether psychopaths should be criminally liable cannot necessarily be answered simply by determining whether they are morally responsible.However, I do not think that he has provided an adequate account of psychopathy as a personality disorder which negates moral responsibility and criminal liability. I will comment on four aspects of his discussion.First, as Fields recognizes, one who wants to argue that psychopaths lack the capacity to form moral beliefs owes us an account of what it is to form, or hold, a moral belief. Fields’s account is familiar, but arguable. To hold a moral belief is to accept, and to be motivated by, a universal practical principle: a principle which one regards as providing very strong reasons for action, and breaches of which arouse such responses as (third-person) disapproval or (first-person) guilt. It could be plausibly objected, however, that accepting some universal practical principle is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for holding a moral belief.It is not a sufficient condition, partly because not any universal practical principle which an agent treats as being important can intelligibly count as a moral principle. The principle “One should never split an infinitive” cannot, by itself, count as a moral principle; and if someone treated it as if it were a moral principle, we would judge his moral understanding, and his rational capacities, to be seriously impaired. This suggests that a purely formal account of the “moral,” like Fields’s (an account that pays no attention to the content of what could count as a moral principle) cannot be adequate (see Foot 1978). A further, related reason for the... (shrink)

Healey (2019a) makes four comments on my (Park, 2019a) objections to van Fraassen’s positions. The four comments concern the issues of whether ‘disbelief’ is appropriate or inappropriate to characterize van Fraassen’s position, what the relationship between a theory and models is for van Fraassen, whether he believes or not that a theory is empirically adequate, and whether destructive empiricism is tenable or not. I reply to those comments in this paper.

While there has been general agreement among modern philosophers of science that a purely a priori method is inappropriate to the task of establishing a theory of science, there has, unfortunately, been little comparable agreement regarding the method that is appropriate. I try to lay the foundations for such agreement. I first set out reasons for a purely empirical method for establishing a theory of science, and defend such a method against charges raised by Giere. I then develop some very (...) basic criteria for the evaluation of alternative empirical methods for establishing a theory of science, and use these criteria to evaluate the two such methods that have dominated philosophic discussion in recent years--those of Lakatos and Laudan. I end by defending a revised version of Lakatos' proposal. (shrink)

In this article I consider four concerns regarding the possibility of an environmental virtue ethic functioning as an alternative – rather than a supplement – to more conventional approaches to environmental ethics. The concerns are: (1) it is not possible to provide an objective specification of environmental virtue, (2) an environmental virtue ethic will lack the resources to provide critique of obtaining cultural practices and policies, (3) an environmental virtue ethic will not provide sufficient action-guidance, (4) an environmental virtue ethic (...) cannot ground constraints on human activities regarding the natural environment. Each of these concerns makes a claim about the poverty of normative resources at the disposal of environmental virtue ethics. I defend a conception of environmental virtue – as a character virtue with the same normative standing as the conventional personal and interpersonal virtues – that enables an environmental virtue ethic with the wherewithal to address each of the concerns. (shrink)

Everybody knows the phenomena summarized with the term attention: concentration, focalization, limitation, selection, and intensification. The explanation of these phenomena is, however, a different matter. Problems easily arise with regard towhathas to be explained and with regard to thestyleof explanation. A problem of the first kind is the “methodology of ‘bad focus’”: the explanation starts with and is fixated on an intuitively striking but nonessential behavioral feature or cognitive achievement. A problem of the second kind is a “virtus (...) dormitiva” explanation: the explanation starts with emphasizing one aspect of the observed phenomena, the emphasized aspect receives an interesting and suggestive name, and that name with its connotations is used as a concept in the explanation. At the start of contemporary, behavior-based, information processing psychology, avirtus dormitivaexplanation infiltrated the functional accounts of the phenomena of attention; the empirical observation that people show performance limitations was translated into the theoretical concept of a communication channel with a limited capacity. That limited capacity notion became the core concept in what can be called the standard theory of attention. This standard theory of attention faced severe difficulties in explaining the guidance of attention by the information processor's goals and intentions. Subsequent modifications, concerned with removing these difficulties, revealed that selection, guided by goals and intentions, is the essential behavioral feature and that the observed performance limitations are a result of this selection. So, the limited capacity theorizing was not only plagued by avirtus dormitivaexplanation, it also suffered from the methodology of bad focus. (shrink)

Everybody knows the phenomena summarized with the term attention: concentration, focalization, limitation, selection, and intensification . The explanation of these phenomena is, however, a different matter. Problems easily arise with regard towhathas to be explained and with regard to thestyleof explanation. A problem of the first kind is the “methodology of ‘bad focus’”: the explanation starts with and is fixated on an intuitively striking but nonessential behavioral feature or cognitive achievement. A problem of the second kind is a (...) “virtus dormitiva” explanation: the explanation starts with emphasizing one aspect of the observed phenomena, the emphasized aspect receives an interesting and suggestive name, and that name with its connotations is used as a concept in the explanation. At the start of contemporary, behavior-based, information processing psychology, avirtus dormitivaexplanation infiltrated the functional accounts of the phenomena of attention; the empirical observation that people show performance limitations was translated into the theoretical concept of a communication channel with a limited capacity. That limited capacity notion became the core concept in what can be called the standard theory of attention. This standard theory of attention faced severe difficulties in explaining the guidance of attention by the information processor's goals and intentions. Subsequent modifications, concerned with removing these difficulties, revealed that selection, guided by goals and intentions, is the essential behavioral feature and that the observed performance limitations are a result of this selection. So, the limited capacity theorizing was not only plagued by avirtus dormitivaexplanation, it also suffered from the methodology of bad focus. (shrink)

Nearly everyone recognizes the fact of deep pluralism: it is hard to deny that contemporary America is characterized by widespread diversity of beliefs, practices, and values. We disagree, not on this reality, but on the way we should respond to the pluralism around us. In this paper, Emily G. Wenneborg discusses one of the most common responses to pluralism in contemporary philosophy of education: autonomy-based liberalism. She praises liberalism for its attempt to navigate certain tensions that accompany its approach to (...) pluralism. At the same time, she raises several critiques of liberalism as a response to pluralism, particularly with regard to religious communities and belief systems. She suggests that trust provides a better framework than autonomy for educating in and for deep pluralism. (shrink)

Detailed arguments are provided, chiefly with regard to recent Darwinian accounts of genetic selectionism (Dawkins, Dennett) and the Chomskyan view of natural language, but touching also on reductionism in general and computational accounts of the mind, that demonstrate that we are very far from supporting the adequacy of reductive materialism in science.

Using the Universal Declaration of Ethical Principles for Psychologists as an ethical framework, some of the major successes, challenges and needs that psychology has regarding its responsibilities to society in the area of end-of-life decision making and active euthanasia are outlined in this paper. Four particular responsibilities are highlighted: (a) increase professional and scientific knowledge; (b) use psychological knowledge for beneficial purposes; (c) adequately train its members: and (d) encourage beneficial social structures and policies. For each responsibility, some of the (...) major societal-level ethical issues and current needs discussed in the literature are identified, as well as ways that psychology has contributed to dealing with those issues and needs. In conclusion, several recommendations are offered regarding ways in which psychologists and psychology could increase its contribution. (shrink)

The ethical concerns of Japanese nurses are compared with those of previously described nurses from the USA. Patient comfort was a primary concern of nurses from both countries. Participants described an ethical imperative to provide adequate pain medication for patients and prevent unnecessary and uncomfortable invasive tests and procedures, especially at the end of life as the focus changed from ‘cure’ to ‘care’. The notion of regard for personhood varied, based on the communication styles and definition of the (...) self inherent in the different cultures of the nurses. A common meaning centred around knowing patients as persons, listening to their needs and preferences, supporting their everyday choices through advocacy, and maintaining their dignity. Despite background cultural differences, there are common ethical concerns between nurses in Japan and the USA. This article invites readers to reflect on everyday nursing practices that exemplify ethical expertise, and the significance of this expertise in uncovering and articulating nursing ethics across cultures. (shrink)

The emerging concept of food sovereignty refers to the right of communities, peoples, and states to independently determine their own food and agricultural policies. It raises the question of which type of food production, agriculture and rural development should be pursued to guarantee food security for the world population. Social movements and non-governmental organizations have readily integrated the concept into their terminology. The concept is also beginning to find its way into the debates and policies of UN organizations and national (...) governments in both developing and industrialized countries. Beyond its relation to civil society movements little academic attention has been paid to the concept of food sovereignty and its appropriateness for international development policies aimed at reducing hunger and poverty, especially in comparison to the human right to adequate food (RtAF). We analyze, on the basis of an extensive literature review, the concept of food sovereignty with regard to its ability to contribute to hunger and poverty reduction worldwide as well as the challenges attached to this concept. Then, we compare the concept of food sovereignty with the RtAF and discuss the appropriateness of both concepts for national public sector policy makers and international development policies. We conclude that the impact on global food security is likely to be much greater if the RtAF approach predominated public policies. While the concept of food sovereignty may be appropriate for civil society movements, we recommend that the RtAF should obtain highest priority in national and international agricultural, trade and development policies. (shrink)

This paper critiques the All-Subjected Principle. The All-Subjected Principle is one of the most prominent answers to the Boundary Problem, which consists in determining who should be entitled to participate in which democratic decision. The All-Subjected Principle comes in many versions, but the general idea is that all people who are subjected in a relevant sense with regard to a democratic decision should be entitled to participate in that decision. One respect in which versions of the All-Subjected Principle differ (...) concerns how to best understand ‘subjectedness’. One view spells out ‘subjectedness’ in terms of legal bindingness. Another view understands ‘subjectedness’ in terms of coercion. I argue that the All-Subjected Principle is extensionally inadequate on both views in that it yields verdicts that are at odds with our considered judgements about certain cases. These cases involve legal norms of referral or international administrative assistance. (shrink)

BackgroundGenetic testing presents unique ethical challenges for research and clinical practice, particularly in low-resource settings. To address such challenges, context-specific understanding of ethical, legal and social issues is essential. Return of genetics and genomics research (GGR) results remains an unresolved yet topical issue particularly in African settings that lack appropriate regulation and guidelines. Despite the need to understand what is contextually acceptable, there is a paucity of empirical research and literature on what constitutes appropriate practice with respect to GGR.The study (...) assessed patients’ awareness, experiences and perceptions regarding genetic testing and the return of GGR results in a hypothetical context.MethodsThis cross-sectional study employed a qualitative exploratory approach. Respondents were patients attending the medical outpatient unit of Mulago National Hospital. Three deliberative focus group discussions involving 18 respondents were conducted. Data were analysed through thematic analysis.ResultsThree main themes and several subthemes were identified. Most respondents were aware of genetic testing, supportive of GGR and receiving results. However, only a few had undergone genetic testing due to cost constraints. They articulated the need for adequate information and genetic counselling to inform decision-making. Privacy of results was important to respondents while others were willing to share results.ConclusionThere was general awareness and support for GGR and the return of results. Stigmatisation emerged as a barrier to disclosure of results for some. Global health inequity impacts access and affordability of genetic testing and counselling in Africa and should be addressed as a matter of social justice. (shrink)

Informed consent for anesthesia is an ethical and legal requirement. A patient must have adequate decision-making capacity (DMC) as a prerequisite to informed consent. In determining whether a patient has sufficient DMC, anesthesiologists must draw on their knowledge of DMC. Knowledge gaps regarding DMC may result in incorrect assessments of patients’ capacity. This could translate to an informed consent process that is ethically and legally unsound. This study examined the DMC-related knowledge of anesthesiologists in a group of four university-affiliated (...) hospitals. The findings suggest that anesthesiologists have several areas of knowledge deficiency regarding DMC and DMC assessment. These findings could inform the development of undergraduate and postgraduate curricula. (shrink)

In response to Putnam’s computational hypothesis on the question of the nature of the mind, Searle and Churchland argue that the nature of mental states essentially consists of neurophysiological processes in an organic brain. However, this seems to imply that mental states are products of the brain and thus, contra Putnam, that an adequate account of mental states which excludes an implementing organic structure is impossible. To this extent, an attempt is made in the paper to structure a biological-organic (...) program. By this structure, it is identified that mental state is a process of the whole organism which necessarily produces phenomenal experience. However, if phenomenal experience is a product of mental states, which consists in neural firings in the brain, then it appears the problem is reducible to a question of how; i.e. how does the brain do it? In turn, this may direct our attention to neuroscientists. However, the paper argues that even per- ceptual internalism, which is the theoretical basis of contemporary neuroscience, may not really be of help in this case. It is argued that the experimentation and observation which foreground scientific enquiry may not be able to sufficiently account for the how question without leaving some other questions unanswered. As a result, a seemingly implied otherworldly reality or principle is explored. It is submitted that our natural tendency and apparatus do not appear to lead us forward. Again, withdrawing back to our natural system, our deficient human nature requires us to tread with caution but hopefully, perhaps, we may eventually make progress in this regard. (shrink)

The way people at the receiving end of humanitarian assistance perceive this intervention may provide invaluable bottom-up feedback to improve the quality of the intervention. We analyzed and mapped Haitians’ views regarding international humanitarian aid in cases of natural disaster. Two hundred fifty participants–137 women and 113 men aged 18-67–who had suffered from the consequences of the earthquake in 2010 were presented with a series of vignettes depicting a humanitarian team's action and were asked to what extent these actions corresponded (...) to what ought to be expected from an international aid mission. Four factors were considered in the vignettes whether the team worked in close association with local institutions, whether it was composed of competent people who were prepared for their mission, whether they treated people as a function of immediate needs, and whether they behaved in a respectful way. Through cluster analysis, five qualitatively different positions were found: Complete hostility to any kind of humanitarian aid ; Strong hostility to humanitarian aid in the case of disrespectful attitudes or behaviors ; Technical competence is the only factor that matters ; Both manifestation of respect for the population and technical competence matter and Undetermined. Most Haitians expect humanitarian teams to be technically competent, but even very competent aid is not considered adequate if provided in an arrogant and disrespectful manner. (shrink)

The prevalent interpretation of Gödel’s Second Theorem states that a sufficiently adequate and consistent theory does not prove its consistency. It is however not entirely clear how to justify this informal reading, as the formulation of the underlying mathematical theorem depends on several arbitrary formalisation choices. In this paper I examine the theorem’s dependency regarding Gödel numberings. I introducedeviantnumberings, yielding provability predicates satisfying Löb’s conditions, which result in provable consistency sentences. According to the main result of this paper however, (...) these “counterexamples” do not refute the theorem’s prevalent interpretation, since once a natural class ofadmissiblenumberings is singled out, invariance is maintained. (shrink)

Randomized controlled trial trial designs exist on an explanatory-pragmatic spectrum, depending on the degree to which a study aims to address a question of efficacy or effectiveness. As conceptualized by Schwartz and Lellouch in 1967, an explanatory approach to trial design emphasizes hypothesis testing about the mechanisms of action of treatments under ideal conditions, whereas a pragmatic approach emphasizes testing effectiveness of two or more available treatments in real-world conditions. Interest in, and the number of, pragmatic trials has grown substantially (...) in recent years, with increased recognition by funders and stakeholders worldwide of the need for credible evidence to inform clinical decision-making. This increase has been accompanied by the onset of learning healthcare systems, as well as an increasing focus on patient-oriented research. However, pragmatic trials have ethical challenges that have not yet been identified or adequately characterized. The present study aims to explore the views of key stakeholders with respect to ethical issues raised by the design and conduct of pragmatic trials. It is embedded within a large, four-year project that seeks to develop guidance for the ethical design and conduct of pragmatic trials. As a first step, this study will address important gaps in the current empirical literature with respect to identifying a comprehensive range of ethical issues arising from the design and conduct of pragmatic trials. By opening up a broad range of topics for consideration within our parallel ethical analysis, we will extend the current debate, which has largely emphasized issues of consent, to the range of ethical considerations that may flow from specific design choices. Semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, across multiple jurisdictions, identified based on their known experience and/or expertise with pragmatic trials. We expect that the study outputs will be of interest to a wide range of knowledge users including trialists, ethicists, research ethics committees, journal editors, regulators, healthcare policymakers, research funders and patient groups. All publications will adhere to the Tri-Agency Open Access Policy on Publications. (shrink)

Anyone who is not a deontological absolutist regarding truthfulness will readily agree with Christopher Meyers’s thesis that there are cases in which...

Most models of generational succession in sexually reproducing populations necessarily move back and forth between genic and genotypic spaces. We show that transitions between and within these spaces are usually hidden by unstated assumptions about processes in these spaces. We also examine a widely endorsed claim regarding the mathematical equivalence of kin-, group-, individual-, and allelic-selection models made by Lee Dugatkin and Kern Reeve. We show that the claimed mathematical equivalence of the models does not hold. *Received January 2007; revised (...) April 2008. †To contact the authors, please write to: Elisabeth Lloyd, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, 130 Goodbody Hall, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN 47405; e-mail: [email protected]; Richard Lewontin, Department of Organismic and Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, 26 Oxford Street, Cambridge, MA 02138; Marcus Feldman, Department of Biological Sciences, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Most models of generational succession in sexually reproducing populations necessarily move back and forth between genic and genotypic spaces. We show that transitions between and within these spaces are usually hidden by unstated assumptions about processes in these spaces. We also examine a widely endorsed claim regarding the mathematical equivalence of kin-, group-, individual-, and allelic-selection models made by Lee Dugatkin and Kern Reeve. We show that the claimed mathematical equivalence of the models does not hold.

This paper critically assesses John Danaher’s ‘ethical behaviourism’, a theory on how the moral status of robots should be determined. The basic idea of this theory is that a robot’s moral status is determined decisively on the basis of its observable behaviour. If it behaves sufficiently similar to some entity that has moral status, such as a human or an animal, then we should ascribe the same moral status to the robot as we do to this human or animal. The (...) paper argues against ethical behaviourism by making four main points. First, it is argued that the strongest version of ethical behaviourism understands the theory as relying on inferences to the best explanation when inferring moral status. Second, as a consequence, ethical behaviourism cannot stick with merely looking at the robot’s behaviour, while remaining neutral with regard to the difficult question of which property grounds moral status. Third, not only behavioural evidence ought to play a role in inferring a robot’s moral status, but knowledge of the design process of the robot and of its designer’s intention ought to be taken into account as well. Fourth, knowledge of a robot’s ontology and how that relates to human biology often is epistemically relevant for inferring moral status as well. The paper closes with some concluding observations. (shrink)

Socrates recognizes a distinction between formal and material definitional conditions. In this dissertation, I concentrate on the material conditions rather than the formal ones for two reasons: Socrates allows a great deal of syntactic flexibility, and many answers he regards as formally adequate resist classification by contemporary standards. I argue that Socrates is committed to four material adequacy conditions in answers to "what is F-ness?" He is committed to the extensional equivalence condition, that the definiens picks out all and (...) only instances of the definiendum, the property sameness condition, that the definiens is a property identical to the definiendum, the explanation condition, that the definiens explains instances of the definiendum, and the semantic completeness condition, that statements about F-nesses involving evaluative predicates do not change their truth-value, regardless of context. (shrink)

ABSTRACT:Programs aimed at increasing women’s entrepreneurship are a rapidly proliferating class of CSR initiatives across the globe with participation by many of the world’s largest corporations. The gendered nature of this phenomenon suggests that feminist approaches to CSR may offer a particularly salient mode of their analysis. In this article, I argue that insights from feminist economics regarding the historically prevalent—but narrow and gendered—definition of work, which artificially separates production from reproduction, provide fruitful tools for theory building when conceptualizing gender (...) through the lens of CSR. I demonstrate that the gendered separation of production and reproduction is typicallytaken as givenin entrepreneurship, and that mainstream CSR research has not sufficiently challenged this perspective. I present a conceptual framework of what is to be gained by examining the CSR, entrepreneurship, and feminist economics literatures in combination, and demonstrate how researchers might use this framework for future research. (shrink)

Medical tourists, persons that travel across international borders with the intention to access non-emergency medical care, may not be adequately informed of safety and ethical concerns related to the practice of medical tourism. Researchers indicate that the sources of information frequently used by medical tourists during their decision-making process may be biased and/or lack comprehensive information regarding individual safety and treatment outcomes, as well as potential impacts of the medical tourism industry on third parties. This paper explores the feedback from (...) former Canadian medical tourists regarding the use of an information sheet to address this knowledge gap and raise awareness of the safety and ethical concerns related to medical tourism. (shrink)

IntroductionEthical intuitionists have never known quite what to make of the emotions. Generally speaking, these philosophers fall into two camps: rational intuitionists and moral sense theorists. And by my lights, neither camp has been able to tell a convincing story about the exact role and significance of emotion in moral judgment. Rational intuitionists are for the most part too dismissive of the emotions, either regarding emotions as little more than distractions to moral judgment,Samuel Clarke, for instance, after naming our “faculties (...) of reason and will, whereby [we] are enabled to distinguish good from evil,” laments that these faculties are sometimes “imposed upon and deceived in matters of good and evil, right and wrong… by absurd passions and corrupt or partial affections” (A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation (Glasgow: Richard Griffin and Co., 1823), pp. 166-167). (shrink)

Even if game theory is broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, it cannot adequately model all aspects of interactive decision making. Payoff dominance is an example of a phenomenon that can be adequately modeled only by departing radically from standard assumptions of decision theory and game theory – either the unit of agency or the nature of rationality. (Published Online April 27 2007).

BackgroundEgg donor agencies are increasingly being used as part of IVF in the US, but are essentially unregulated, posing critical ethical and policy questions concerning how providers view and use them, and what the implications might be.MethodsThirty-seven in-depth interviews of approximately 1 h were conducted – with 27 IVF providers and 10 patients.ResultsClinicians vary in their views and interactions concerning egg donor agencies, ranging widely in whether and how often they use agencies. Agencies may offer egg recipients increased choices, but (...) raise ethical and other concerns regarding respect for donors as individuals, potential harms, justice, and donors constituting a vulnerable group. The quality of agencies appears to vary considerably, from acceptable to problematic. Agencies’ medical and psychological screenings of donors can range, and be minimal. Not all agencies adequately track donors’ prior numbers of donations, or share the relevant records with clinics. Clinics may find that potential donors have genetic mutations and medical problems about which they were unaware. Yet agencies and clinics do not provide care for such donors, generating stress. Dissemination of donors’ personal data can potentially threaten confidentiality. Questions emerge of whether increased monitoring/oversight of agencies may be beneficial.ConclusionsThese data, the first to examine providers’ views and interactions regarding egg donor agencies, suggest wide variations in quality and use of agencies, and have critical implications for practice, policy, education and research. Given the potential limitations of the current model of self-regulation of agencies, the present data suggest needs to consider stronger professional guidelines or possible governmental regulations to establish, require and enforce higher standards for agencies to follow, regarding advertising to potential donors and recipients, arranging for appropriate informed consent concerning risks and benefits involved, and for quality control. Appropriate informed consent should be obtained from potential egg donors, including the fact that they may learn about mutations or medical problems about which they were unaware, but for which they will not receive treatment as part of this process. Enhancing understanding among the public-at-large about what egg donation entails may also be helpful. (shrink)

This article compares research in neuroscience regarding the right and left hemispheres of the brain, particularly in the work of Iain McGilchrist and Robert Ornstein, with Whitehead’s perception in the mode of causal efficacy and in the mode of presentational immediacy, respectively.

BackgroundIn the 1970s, the Federal Trade Commission declared that allowing medical providers to advertise directly to consumers would be “providing the public with truthful information about the price, quality or other aspects of their service.” However, our understanding of the advertising content is highly limited.ObjectiveTo assess whether direct-to-consumer medical service advertisements provide relevant information on access, quality and cost of care, a content analysis was conducted.MethodTelevision and online advertisements for medical services directly targeting consumers were collected in two major urban (...) centres in Nevada, USA, identifying 313 television advertisements and 200 non-duplicate online advertisements.ResultsBoth television and online advertisements reliably conveyed information about the services provided and how to make an appointment. At the same time, less than half of the advertisements featured insurance information and hours of operation and less than a quarter of them contained information regarding the quality and price of care. The claims of quality were substantiated in even fewer advertisements. The scarcity of quality and cost information was more severe in television advertisements.ConclusionThere is little evidence that medical service advertising, in its current form, would contribute to lower prices or improved quality of care by providing valuable information to consumers. (shrink)

A slow but steady trend to decline routine immunization has evolved over the past few decades, despite its pivotal role in staving off life-threatening communicable diseases. Religious beliefs are among the reasons given for exemptions. In the context of an overview of various religious approaches to this issue, this article addresses the Jewish religious obligation to immunize. The latter is nested in the more general obligation to take responsibility for one’s health as it is essential to living a morally productive (...) life. Furthermore, the individual’s responsibility extends to supporting communal health by contributing to herd immunity. Judaism embraces evidence-based information regarding immunization safety and efficacy and holds the resulting professional guidelines to be religiously binding. From a Jewish perspective, government bodies need to weigh respect for individual autonomy to refrain from immunization against preserving public safety, such that waiving autonomy should be reserved for immediately life-threatening situations. Nurses’ knowledge and understanding of the Jewish legal approach as explicated in this article and those of other religions in which similar principles apply (such as Islam and Christianity) can enrich their awareness of how revering God can go hand in hand with an obligation to prevent illness for the self and the community by immunizing. (shrink)

More than a quarter of the global population of two billion children live in Islamic countries; therefore, their protection is vital while a handful of them are suffering from lack of hygiene, education, and poverty. The current armed conflict in different ways also has an effect and seriously impacts children as victims and associates in armed groups. Organization of Islamic Conference as a collective voice of its 57 members, initiated a series of efforts in this regard. Islamic texts and (...) traditions show significant importance for child protection, but what has been done until today by OIC as a main intergovernmental Organization guided by Islamic principles, values and norms, is not sufficient. Covenant on the Rights of the Child in Islam is the first human rights binding document adopted by OIC as part of consecutive efforts of OIC to promote protection of children. Although it is regarded as an important step, its adequacy for protection of children affected by armed conflicts is under question. Furthermore, in comparison to International Humanitarian Law and Convention on the Rights of the Child, it does not reflect proportionately and further provisions for children affected, with regard to the extent and the dimensions of conflicts in Islamic countries. (shrink)

Background: Achieving a “good death” is a major goal of palliative care. Nurses play a key role in the end-of-life care of older patients. Understanding the perceptions of both older patients and nurses in this area could help improve care during this period. Objectives: To examine and compare the preferences and perceptions of older patients and nurses with regard to what they feel constitutes a “good death.” Research design: A cross-sectional study. Participants and research context: This study employed a (...) self-report questionnaire that asked about various options for end-of-life care. It was distributed to older patients who attended the outpatient clinic of internal medicine and nurses who worked at two medical schools in Thailand from September 2017 to February 2018. Patients were asked to respond to the questions as if they were terminally ill, and nurses were asked to imagine how older patients would answer the questions. Ethical consideration: Approval from Institutional Review Board was obtained. Findings: A total of 608 patients and 665 nurses responded to the survey. Nurses agreed with concepts of palliative care, but they rated themselves as having poor knowledge. The patient respondents felt that it was most important that they receive the full truth about their illnesses. The nurses thought the most important issue was relief of uncomfortable symptoms. On seven out of the 13 questions, nurses overestimated the importance of the relevant issue to patients and underestimated the importance on one question. Discussion: Both nurses and older patients signified concepts of palliative care, but nurses felt that they lacked adequate knowledge. Nurses estimated that patients would have positive attitudes toward autonomy and the closure of life affairs to a significantly greater degree than the patient respondents. Conclusions: We recommend that palliative care education be improved and that steps be taken to allow for more effective nurse–patient communication with regard to the patients’ end-of-life wishes. (shrink)

BackgroundGeneral practitioners often act as gatekeeper, authorizing patients’ access to hospital care. This gatekeeping role became even more important during the current COVID-19 crisis as uncertainties regarding COVID-19 made estimating the desirability of hospital referrals (for outpatient or inpatient hospitalization) complex, both for COVID and non-COVID suspected patients. This study explored Dutch general practitioners’ experiences and ethical dilemmas faced in decision making about hospital referrals in times of the COVID-19 pandemic.MethodsSemi-structured interviews with Dutch general practitioners working in the Netherlands were (...) conducted. Participants were recruited via purposive sampling. Thematic analysis was conducted using content coding.ResultsFifteen interviews were conducted, identifying four themes: one overarching regarding (1) COVID-19 uncertainties, and three themes about experienced ethical dilemmas: (2) the patients’ self-determination vs. the general practitioners’ paternalism, (3) the general practitioners’ duty of care vs. the general practitioners’ autonomy rights, (4) the general practitioners’ duty of care vs. adequate care provision.ConclusionsLack of knowledge about COVID-19, risks to infect loved ones, scarcity of hospital beds and loneliness of patients during hospital admission were central in dilemmas experienced. When developing guidelines for future crises, this should be taken into account. (shrink)