Predicate Logic

I define categories in first-order logic, enumerate unique categories of *n* arrows, and then enumerate possible properties of a category as statements in the first-order theory of categories, by assigning each one a Gödel numbering. I then show which of the enumerated categories fulfills which of the enumerated properties, and calculate a complexity bound to estimate what realistic number of categories could be studied in this way. I conclude with speculations about development in new directions: higher order properties, or higher (...) order enumeration algorithms. (shrink)

This text is a short introduction to logic that was primarily used for accompanying an introductory course in Logic for Linguists held at the New University of Lisbon (UNL) in fall 2010. The main idea of this course was to give students the formal background and skills in order to later assess literature in logic, semantics, and related fields and perhaps even use logic on their own for the purpose of doing truth-conditional semantics. This course in logic does not replace (...) a proper introduction to semantics and is not intended as such, although parts of Chapter 1 and 4 could be used to supplement an introductory course in semantics. In contrast to other introductions it has a certain focus on ‘writing things down correctly.’ Proofs of metatheorems are omitted, though. -/- This is work in progress. Please send suggestions and corrigenda to [email protected]. Have fun! (shrink)

Noun phrases with overt determiners, such as <i>some apples</i> or <i>a quantity of milk</i>, differ from bare noun phrases like <i>apples</i> or <i>milk</i> in their contribution to aspectual composition. While this has been attributed to syntactic or algebraic properties of these noun phrases, such accounts have explanatory shortcomings. We suggest instead that the relevant property that distinguishes between the two classes of noun phrases derives from two modes of existential quantification, one of which holds the values of a variable fixed (...) throughout a quantificational context while the other allows them to vary. Inspired by Dynamic Plural Logic and Dependence Logic, we propose Plural Predicate Logic as an extension of Predicate Logic to formalize this difference. We suggest that temporal <i>for</i>-adverbials are sensitive to aspect because of the way they manipulate quantificational contexts, and that analogous manipulations occur with spatial <i>for</i>-adverbials, habituals, and the quantifier <i>all</i>. (shrink)

A notion of strictly primitive recursive realizability is introduced by Damnjanovic in 1994. It is a kind of constructive semantics of the arithmetical sentences using primitive recursive functions. It is of interest to study the corresponding predicate logic. It was argued by Park in 2003 that the predicate logic of strictly primitive recursive realizability is not arithmetical. Park’s argument is essentially based on a claim of Damnjanovic that intuitionistic logic is sound with respect to strictly primitive recursive realizability, but that (...) claim was disproved by the author of this article in 2006. The aim of this paper is to present a correct proof of the result of Park. (shrink)

Logic has pride of place in mathematics and its 20th century offshoot, computer science. Modern symbolic logic was developed, in part, as a way to provide a formal framework for mathematics: Frege, Peano, Whitehead and Russell, as well as Hilbert developed systems of logic to formalize mathematics. These systems were meant to serve either as themselves foundational, or at least as formal analogs of mathematical reasoning amenable to mathematical study, e.g., in Hilbert’s consistency program. Similar efforts continue, but have been (...) expanded by the development of sophisticated methods to study the properties of such systems using proof and model theory. In parallel with this evolution of logical formalisms as tools for articulating mathematical theories (broadly speaking), much progress has been made in the quest for a mechanization of logical inference and the investigation of its theoretical limits, culminating recently in the development of new foundational frameworks for mathematics with sophisticated computer-assisted proof systems. In addition, logical formalisms developed by logicians in mathematical and philosophical contexts have proved immensely useful in describing theories and systems of interest to computer scientists, and to some degree, vice versa. Three examples of the influence of logic in computer science are automated reasoning, computer verification, and type systems for programming languages. (shrink)

In this multi-disciplinary investigation we show how an evidence-based perspective of quantification---in terms of algorithmic verifiability and algorithmic computability---admits evidence-based definitions of well-definedness and effective computability, which yield two unarguably constructive interpretations of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA---over the structure N of the natural numbers---that are complementary, not contradictory. The first yields the weak, standard, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically verifiable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. (...) The second yields a strong, finitary, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically computable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. We situate our investigation within a broad analysis of quantification vis a vis: * Hilbert's epsilon-calculus * Goedel's omega-consistency * The Law of the Excluded Middle * Hilbert's omega-Rule * An Algorithmic omega-Rule * Gentzen's Rule of Infinite Induction * Rosser's Rule C * Markov's Principle * The Church-Turing Thesis * Aristotle's particularisation * Wittgenstein's perspective of constructive mathematics * An evidence-based perspective of quantification. By showing how these are formally inter-related, we highlight the fragility of both the persisting, theistic, classical/Platonic interpretation of quantification grounded in Hilbert's epsilon-calculus; and the persisting, atheistic, constructive/Intuitionistic interpretation of quantification rooted in Brouwer's belief that the Law of the Excluded Middle is non-finitary. We then consider some consequences for mathematics, mathematics education, philosophy, and the natural sciences, of an agnostic, evidence-based, finitary interpretation of quantification that challenges classical paradigms in all these disciplines. (shrink)

LK is much more difficult than NK, and to make matters worse, Gentzen's intention is still unclear when it comes to that system (LK). -/- The second and third volumes of the series titled What is LK? conduct the detailed survey of each inference-figure in a toe-to-toe way, as it were, which most mathematicians looked through. -/- The present volume, Vol.2, looks deeper into structural inference-figures, which is never an easy task.

LK is much more difficult than NK, and to make matters worse, Gentzen's intention is still unclear when it comes to that system (LK). -/- The second and third volumes of the series titled What is LK? conduct the detailed survey of each inference-figure in a toe-to-toe way, as it were, which most mathematicians looked through. -/- The present volume, Vol.3, looks deeper into those operational inference-figures which concerns propositional logic.

We give a new and elementary construction of primitive positive decomposition of higher arity relations into binary relations on finite domains. Such decompositions come up in applications to constraint satisfaction problems, clone theory and relational databases. The construction exploits functional completeness of 2-input functions in many-valued logic by interpreting relations as graphs of partially defined multivalued ‘functions’. The ‘functions’ are then composed from ordinary functions in the usual sense. The construction is computationally effective and relies on well-developed methods of functional (...) decomposition, but reduces relations only to ternary relations. An additional construction then decomposes ternary into binary relations, also effectively, by converting certain disjunctions into existential quantifications. The result gives a uniform proof of Peirce’s reduction thesis on finite domains, and shows that the graph of any Sheffer function composes all relations there. (shrink)

Jigsaw lessons, initially developed in the 1970s by Elliot Aronson for elementary schools in the wake of desegregation, are perfect for active learning in philosophy classrooms, fostering collaboration and interdependence. This essay describes how to use jigsaw lessons in philosophy classrooms and presents, as an example, instructions and materials for a jigsaw lesson for translation using identity in first-order logic.

Most analytic philosophers believe that the existential quantifier, ∃, has ontological import. Mario Bunge was one of the first thinkers to challenge this view. He traces a distinction between the quantifier ∃ and a first-order existence predicate. Furthermore, he acknowledges two kinds of existence: real and conceptual. One of the reasons for accepting Bunge’s proposal is that it can do justice to statements about fictional entities, which is something that rival proposals do not seem to be capable of doing. Additionally, (...) I will also discuss the issue of the ontological argument, and the problem of material constitution. (shrink)

The original interest of this article lies in existential import. It provides a broader view on the problem by reference to modern, symbolic logic (ch.1). Gradually, however, our interest will change into the amalgamated expressions often used in logic; that is, why are such expressions as “x is a round triangle” applied in logic? We critically discuss this question from an extensional viewpoint, namely model theoretic semantics (ch.2). We also touch on Church’s λ-calculus in the appendix (app.2).

LK is much more difficult than NK, and to make matters worse, Gentzen's intention is still unclear when it comes to that system (LK). -/- This book, Vol.1 of the series titled What is LK?, tackles this issue, focusing on the sequent, the most enigmatic notion we find in LK. The dependence-relation we find in NK shall play a crucial role in that investigation. -/- The style is typically textbook-like, so readers can learn the system of LK, using this series (...) as a guidance, too. (shrink)

As a result of trying to distinguish between what we do not know as humans and what we do know, concepts such as dialectic were formed. On this basis, logic was developed to monitor arguments' validity and provide methods for creating valid complex arguments. This work provides a brief overview of such topics and studies the development of formal logic and its semantics. In doing so, we enter the territory of propositional logic and predicate logic. In the next edition, we (...) will discuss modal logic when we confront the future contingent problem. (shrink)

In his paper on the incompleteness theorems, Gödel seemed to say that a direct way of constructing a formula that says of itself that it is unprovable might involve a faulty circularity. In this note, it is proved that ‘direct’ self-reference can actually be used to prove his result.

Any intermediate propositional logic can be extended to a calculus with epsilon- and tau-operators and critical formulas. For classical logic, this results in Hilbert’s $\varepsilon $ -calculus. The first and second $\varepsilon $ -theorems for classical logic establish conservativity of the $\varepsilon $ -calculus over its classical base logic. It is well known that the second $\varepsilon $ -theorem fails for the intuitionistic $\varepsilon $ -calculus, as prenexation is impossible. The paper investigates the effect of adding critical $\varepsilon $ - (...) and $\tau $ -formulas and using the translation of quantifiers into $\varepsilon $ - and $\tau $ -terms to intermediate logics. It is shown that conservativity over the propositional base logic also holds for such intermediate ${\varepsilon \tau }$ -calculi. The “extended” first $\varepsilon $ -theorem holds if the base logic is finite-valued Gödel–Dummett logic, and fails otherwise, but holds for certain provable formulas in infinite-valued Gödel logic. The second $\varepsilon $ -theorem also holds for finite-valued first-order Gödel logics. The methods used to prove the extended first $\varepsilon $ -theorem for infinite-valued Gödel logic suggest applications to theories of arithmetic. (shrink)

In recent decades, plural logic has established itself as a well-respected member of the extensions of first-order classical logic. In the present paper, I draw attention to the fact that among the examples that are commonly given in order to motivate the need for this new logical system, there are some in which the elements of the plurality in question are internally singularized (e.g. ‘Whitehead and Russell wrote Principia Mathematica’), while in others they are not (e.g. ‘Some philosophers wrote Principia (...) Mathematica’). Then, building on previous work, I point to a subsystem of plural logic in which inferences concerning examples of the first type can be adequately dealt with. I notice that such a subsystem (here called ‘discrete plural logic’) is in reality a mere variant of first-order logic as standardly formulated, and highlight the fact that it is axiomatizable while full plural logic is not. Finally, I urge that greater attention be paid to discrete plural logic and that discrete plurals are not used in order to motivate the introduction of full-fledged plural logic—or, at least, not without remarking that they can also be adequately dealt with in a considerably simpler system. (shrink)

Two objections are raised against Oliver and Smiley’s analysis of the collective–distributive opposition in their 2016 book: They take it as a basic premise that the collective reading of ‘baked a cake’ corresponds to a predicate different from its distributive reading, and the same applies to all predicate expressions that admit both a collective and a distributive interpretation. At the same time, however, they argue that inflectional forms of the same lexeme reveal a univocity that should be preserved in a (...) formal representation of English. These two assumptions sit uneasily. In developing their analysis, Oliver and Smiley come to the conclusion that even a singular predication such as ‘Tom baked a cake’ must be regarded as ambiguous between a collective and a distributive reading. This is so artificial that it hardly makes sense, and yet there seems to be no way out of the difficulty unless we are prepared to give up the basic premise just mentioned. (shrink)

In traditional semantics for classical logic and its extensions, such as modal logic, propositions are interpreted as subsets of a set, as in discrete duality, or as clopen sets of a Stone space, as in topological duality. A point in such a set can be viewed as a "possible world," with the key property of a world being primeness—a world makes a disjunction true only if it makes one of the disjuncts true—which classically implies totality—for each proposition, a world either (...) makes the proposition true or makes its negation true. This chapter surveys a more general approach to logical semantics, known as possibility semantics, which replaces possible worlds with possibly partial "possibilities." In classical possibility semantics, propositions are interpreted as regular open sets of a poset, as in set-theoretic forcing, or as compact regular open sets of an upper Vietoris space, as in the recent theory of "choice-free Stone duality." The elements of these sets, viewed as possibilities, may be partial in the sense of making a disjunction true without settling which disjunct is true. We explain how possibilities may be used in semantics for classical logic and modal logics and generalized to semantics for intuitionistic logics. The goals are to overcome or deepen incompleteness results for traditional semantics, to avoid the nonconstructivity of traditional semantics, and to provide richer structures for the interpretation of new languages. (shrink)

This textbook is a logic manual which includes an elementary course and an advanced course. It covers more than most introductory logic textbooks, while maintaining a comfortable pace that students can follow. The technical exposition is clear, precise and follows a paced increase in complexity, allowing the reader to get comfortable with previous definitions and procedures before facing more difficult material. The book also presents an interesting overall balance between formal and philosophical discussion, making it suitable for both philosophy and (...) more formal/science oriented students. This textbook is of great use to undergraduate philosophy students, graduate philosophy students, logic teachers, undergraduates and graduates in mathematics, computer science or related fields in which logic is required. (shrink)

This paper presents rules in sequent calculus for a binary quantifier I to formalise definite descriptions: Ix[F, G] means ‘The F is G’. The rules are suitable to be added to a system of positive free logic. The paper extends the proof of a cut elimination theorem for this system by Indrzejczak by proving the cases for the rules of I. There are also brief comparisons of the present approach to the more common one that formalises definite descriptions with a (...) term forming operator. In the final section rules for I for negative free and classical logic are also mentioned. (shrink)

This paper considers a formalisation of classical logic using general introduction rules and general elimination rules. It proposes a definition of ‘maximal formula’, ‘segment’ and ‘maximal segment’ suitable to the system, and gives reduction procedures for them. It is then shown that deductions in the system convert into normal form, i.e. deductions that contain neither maximal formulas nor maximal segments, and that deductions in normal form satisfy the subformula property. Tarski’s Rule is treated as a general introduction rule for implication. (...) The general introduction rule for negation has a similar form. Maximal formulas with implication or negation as main operator require reduction procedures of a more intricate kind not present in normalisation for intuitionist logic. (shrink)

The Modal Predicate Calculus gives rise to issues surrounding the Barcan formulas, their converses, and necessary existence. I examine these issues by means of the Quantified Argument Calculus, a recently developed, powerful formal logic system. Quarc is closer in syntax and logical properties to Natural Language than is the Predicate Calculus, a fact that lends additional interest to this examination, as Quarc might offer a better representation of our modal concepts. The validity of the Barcan formulas and their converses is (...) shown by Quarc to be a result of the specific incorporation of quantification in the Predicate Calculus, and not as reflecting a feature of the interaction of quantification and modality more generally. Necessary existence is shown to follow from the identification, in the Predicate Calculus on its canonical interpretation, of particular quantification, ascription of existence and the ‘there is’ construction, three constructions which are distinguished in both Quarc and Natural Language. The issues surrounding the Barcan formulas, their converses and necessary existence are thus shown to be an artefact of a specific logic system, not an essential feature of our relevant modal concepts or of formal logic. (shrink)

We argue that the extant evidence for Stoic logic provides all the elements required for a variable-free theory of multiple generality, including a number of remarkably modern features that straddle logic and semantics, such as the understanding of one- and two-place predicates as functions, the canonical formulation of universals as quantified conditionals, a straightforward relation between elements of propositional and first-order logic, and the roles of anaphora and rigid order in the regimented sentences that express multiply general propositions. We consider (...) and reinterpret some ancient texts that have been neglected in the context of Stoic universal and existential propositions and offer new explanations of some puzzling features in Stoic logic. Our results confirm that Stoic logic surpasses Aristotle’s with regard to multiple generality, and are a reminder that focusing on multiple generality through the lens of Frege-inspired variable-binding quantifier theory may hamper our understanding and appreciation of pre-Fregean theories of multiple generality. (shrink)

Edward Nieznański developed two logical systems in order to deal with a version of the problem of evil associated with two formulations of religious determinism. The aim of this research was to revisit these systems, providing them with a more appropriate formalization. The new resulting systems, namely, N1 and N2, were reformulated in first-order modal logic; they retain much of their original basic structures, but some additional results were obtained. Furthermore, our research found that an underlying minimal set of axioms (...) is enough to settle the questions proposed. Thus, we developed a minimal system, called N3, that solves the same issues tackled by N1 and N2, but with less assumptions than these systems. All of the systems developed here are proposed as solutions to the logical problem of evil through the refutation of two versions of religious determinism, showing that the attributes of God in Classical Theism, namely, those of omniscience, omnipotence, infallibility, and omnibenevolence, when formalized, are consistent with the existence of evil, providing one more response to this traditional issue. (shrink)

In order to decide whether a discursive product of human reason corresponds or not to the logical order, one must analyze it in terms of syntactic correctness, consistency, and validity. The first step in logical analysis is formalization, that is, the process by which logical forms of thoughts are represented in different formal languages or logical systems. Although each thought can be properly formalized in different ways, the formalization variants are not equally adequate. The adequacy of formalization seems to depend (...) on several essential features: parsimony, accuracy, transparency, fertility and reliability. Because there is a partial antinomy between these traits, it is impossible to find a perfectly adequate variant of formalization. However, it is possible and preferable to reach a reasonable compromise by choosing the variant of formalization which satisfies all of these fundamental characteristics. (shrink)

We aim to compile some means for a rational reconstruction of a named part of the start-over of Baruch (Benedictus) de Spinoza's metaphysics in 'de deo' (which is 'pars prima' of the 'ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata' ) in terms of 1st order model theory. In so far, as our approach will be judged successful, it may, besides providing some help in understanding Spinoza, also contribute to the discussion of some or other philosophical evergreen, e.g. 'ontological commitment'. For this text we (...) assume the reader familiar with 'de deo' as well as with some basic concepts and results of 1st order model theory. Before we start reconstruction, we will first revisit shortly the concept of 'attributum' (definitio IV) in it's setting in 'de deo' , next scan for formalizable aspects of 'in suo genere finita' ('de deo', definitio II), subsequently list the model theoretic constructs we will make use of. Then we begin reconstruction by stating "coordinative definitions" for the notions of 'attribute (of a substance)', 'modus (as conceived via an attribute)' and 'substance (as conceived via an attribute)', reasoning shortly for each of them. The "coordinative definitions", we will arrive at, must not be understood as literal translations of Spinoza's concepts - of course, there can't be such a thing as a literal translation - they are meant as formal analoga of these concepts, mapping some logical structure. But even with this caveat they may seem strange to the reader at this stage of discussion. Additional justification for them then should be found in our endeavour, to map some argumentation of Spinoza's proofs of some of his propositions from this starting point. -/- [ Version 1 of this paper originated from 2020-03-14. This is version 2 from 2021-09-12 with some readability amendments. ]. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to communicate - as a proposal - a general method of assigning a 'truthmaker' to any 1st order sentence in each of its models. The respective construct is derived from the standard model theoretic (recursive) satisfaction definition for 1st order languages and is a conservative extension thereof. The heuristics of the proposal (which has been somewhat idiosyncratic from the current point of view) and some more technical detail of the construction may be found in (...) my article on part I of Spinoza's 'ethica, ordine geometrico demonstrata', which is the context within which I elaborated the assignment. But this context need not be repeated here, the presentation of the truthmaker assignment will be comprehensible to anybody with solid basic knowledge in 1st order model theory, anything used is standard and no advanced techniques are required. (shrink)

Work on the nature and scope of formal logic has focused unduly on the distinction between logical and extra-logical vocabulary; which argument forms a logical theory countenances depends not only on its stock of logical terms, but also on its range of grammatical categories and modes of composition. Furthermore, there is a sense in which logical terms are unnecessary. Alexandra Zinke has recently pointed out that propositional logic can be done without logical terms. By defining a logical-term-free language with the (...) full expressive power of first-order logic with identity, I show that this is true of logic more generally. Furthermore, having, in a logical theory, non-trivial valid forms that do not involve logical terms is not merely a technical possibility. As the case of adverbs shows, issues about the range of argument forms logic should countenance can quite naturally arise in such a way that they do not turn on whether we countenance certain terms as logical. (shrink)

Extensions of traditional syllogistics have been increasingly researched in philosophy, linguistics, and areas such as artificial intelligence and computer science in recent decades. This is mainly due to the fact that syllogistics is seen as a logic that comes very close to natural language abilities. Various forms of extended syllogistics have become established. This paper deals with the question to what extent a syllogistic representation in CL diagrams can be seen as a form of extended syllogistics. It will be shown (...) that the ontology of CL enables numerically exact assertions and inferences. (shrink)

Derek Turner, Professor of Philosophy, has written an introductory logic textbook that students at Connecticut College, or anywhere, can access for free. The book differs from other standard logic textbooks in its reliance on fun, low-stakes examples involving dinosaurs, a dog and his friends, etc. This work is published in 2020 under a Creative Commons AttributionNonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License. You may share this text in any format or medium. You may not use it for commercial purposes. If you share it, (...) you must give appropriate credit. If you remix, transform, add to, or modify the text in any way, you may not then redistribute the modified text. (shrink)

This paper will present two contributions to teaching introductory logic. The first contribution is an alternative tree proof method that differs from the traditional one-sided tree method. The second contribution combines this tree system with an index system to produce a user-friendly tree method for sentential modal logic.

In §93 of The Principles of Mathematics, Bertrand Russell observes that “the variable is a very complicated logical entity, by no means easy to analyze correctly”. This assessment is borne out by the fact that even now we have no fully satisfactory understanding of the role of variables in a compositional semantics for first-order logic. In standard Tarskian semantics, variables are treated as meaning-bearing entities; moreover, they serve as the basic building blocks of all meanings, which are constructed out of (...) variable assignments. But this has disquieting consequences, including Fine’s antinomy of the variable and an undue dependence of meanings on language. Here I develop an alternative, Fregean version of predicate logic that uses the traditional quantifier–variable apparatus for the expression of generality, possesses a fully compositional, non-representational semantics, and is not subject to the antinomy of the variable. The advantages of Fregean over Tarskian predicate logic are due to the former’s treating variables not as meaningful lexical items, but as mere marks of punctuation, similar to parentheses. I submit that this is indeed how the variables of predicate logic should be construed. (shrink)

One well known problem regarding quantifiers, in particular the 1storder quantifiers, is connected with their syntactic categories and denotations. The unsatisfactory efforts to establish the syntactic and ontological categories of quantifiers in formalized first-order languages can be solved by means of the so called principle of categorial compatibility formulated by Roman Suszko, referring to some innovative ideas of Gottlob Frege and visible in syntactic and semantic compatibility of language expressions. In the paper the principle is introduced for categorial languages generated (...) by the Ajdukiewicz’s classical categorial grammar. The 1st-order quantifiers are typically ambiguous. Every 1st-order quantifier of the type k > 0 is treated as a two-argument functorfunction defined on the variable standing at this quantifier and its scope (the sentential function with exactly k free variables, including the variable bound by this quantifier); a binary function defined on denotations of its two arguments is its denotation. Denotations of sentential functions, and hence also quantifiers, are defined separately in Fregean and in situational semantics. They belong to the ontological categories that correspond to the syntactic categories of these sentential functions and the considered quantifiers. The main result of the paper is a solution of the problem of categories of the 1st-order quantifiers based on the principle of categorial compatibility. (shrink)

In the study of modal and nonclassical logics, translations have frequently been employed as a way of measuring the inferential capabilities of a logic. It is sometimes claimed that two logics are “notational variants” if they are translationally equivalent. However, we will show that this cannot be quite right, since first-order logic and propositional logic are translationally equivalent. Others have claimed that for two logics to be notational variants, they must at least be compositionally intertranslatable. The definition of compositionality these (...) accounts use, however, is too strong, as the standard translation from modal logic to first-order logic is not compositional in this sense. In light of this, we will explore a weaker version of this notion that we will call schematicity and show that there is no schematic translation either from first-order logic to propositional logic or from intuitionistic logic to classical logic. (shrink)

One of the main logical functions of the truth predicate is to enable us to express so-called ‘infinite conjunctions’. Several authors claim that the truth predicate can serve this function only if it is fully disquotational, which leads to triviality in classical logic. As a consequence, many have concluded that classical logic should be rejected. The purpose of this paper is threefold. First, we consider two accounts available in the literature of what it means to express infinite conjunctions with a (...) truth predicate and argue that they fail to support the necessity of transparency for that purpose. Second, we show that, with the aid of some regimentation, many expressive functions of the truth predicate can actually be performed using truth principles that are consistent in classical logic. Finally, we suggest a reconceptualisation of deflationism, according to which the principles that govern the use of the truth predicate in natural language are largely irrelevant for the question of what formal theory of truth we should adopt. Many philosophers think that the paradoxes pose a special problem for deflationists; we will argue, on the contrary, that deflationists are in a much better position to deal with the paradoxes than their opponents. (shrink)

The epsilon operator is a term-forming operator which replaces quantifiers in ordinary predicate logic. The application of this undervalued formalism has been hampered by the absence of well-behaved proof systems on the one hand, and accessible presentations of its theory on the other. One significant early result for the original axiomatic proof system for the epsilon-calculus is the first epsilon theorem, for which a proof is sketched. The system itself is discussed, also relative to possible semantic interpretations. The problems facing (...) the development of proof-theoretically well-behaved systems are outlined. (shrink)

We consider the argument that Tarski's classic definitions permit an intelligence---whether human or mechanistic---to admit finitary evidence-based definitions of the satisfaction and truth of the atomic formulas of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA over the domain N of the natural numbers in two, hitherto unsuspected and essentially different, ways: (1) in terms of classical algorithmic verifiabilty; and (2) in terms of finitary algorithmic computability. We then show that the two definitions correspond to two distinctly different assignments of satisfaction and truth (...) to the compound formulas of PA over N---I_PA(N; SV ) and I_PA(N; SC). We further show that the PA axioms are true over N, and that the PA rules of inference preserve truth over N, under both I_PA(N; SV ) and I_PA(N; SC). We then show: (a) that if we assume the satisfaction and truth of the compound formulas of PA are always non-finitarily decidable under I_PA(N; SV ), then this assignment corresponds to the classical non-finitary putative standard interpretation I_PA(N; S) of PA over the domain N; and (b) that the satisfaction and truth of the compound formulas of PA are always finitarily decidable under the assignment I_PA(N; SC), from which we may finitarily conclude that PA is consistent. We further conclude that the appropriate inference to be drawn from Goedel's 1931 paper on undecidable arithmetical propositions is that we can define PA formulas which---under interpretation---are algorithmically verifiable as always true over N, but not algorithmically computable as always true over N. We conclude from this that Lucas' Goedelian argument is validated if the assignment I_PA(N; SV ) can be treated as circumscribing the ambit of human reasoning about `true' arithmetical propositions, and the assignment I_PA(N; SC) as circumscribing the ambit of mechanistic reasoning about `true' arithmetical propositions. (shrink)

“Slingshot Arguments” are a family of arguments underlying the Fregean view that if sentences have reference at all, their references are their truth-values. Usually seen as a kind of collapsing argument, the slingshot consists in proving that, once you suppose that there are some items that are references of sentences (as facts or situations, for example), these items collapse into just two items: The True and The False. This dissertation treats of the slingshot dubbed “Gödel’s slingshot”. Gödel argued that there (...) is a deep connection between these arguments and definite descriptions. More precisely, according to Gödel, if one adopts Russell’s interpretation of definite descriptions (which clashes with Frege’s view that definite descriptions are singular terms), it is possible to evade the slingshot. We challenge Gödel’s view in two manners, first by presenting a slingshot even with a Russellian interpretation of definite descriptions and second by presenting a slingshot even when we change from singular terms to plural terms in the light of new developments of the so-called Plural Logic. The text is divided in three chapters, in the first, we present the discussion between Russell and Frege regarding definite descriptions, in the second, we present Gödel’s position and reconstructions of Gödel’s argument and in the third we prove our slingshot argument for Plural Logic. In light of these results we conclude that we can maintain the validity of slingshot arguments even within a Russellian interpretation of definite descriptions or in the context of Plural Logic. (shrink)

This essay expands on Barry Smith’s paper “Against Fantology” of 2005, which defends the view that analytic philosophy has throughout its history been marked by a tendency to conceive the syntax of first-order predicate logic as a key to ontology. I present fantology (or "F(a)ntology") in the light of a more general and in itself ontologically neutral operation that I call a default ontologization of a language. I then discuss Quine’s views, since he is the most outspoken fantologist in the (...) second half of the twentieth century. As Smith points out, “fantology sometimes takes the form of a thesis according to which the language of standard predicate logic can serve the formulation of the truths of natural science in a uniquely illuminating way”. Hence Quine’s doctrine according to which the ontological commitments of a theory become evident only when the theory has been regimented in fantological clothing. (shrink)

The book contains an introduction to basic logical concepts and methods. It covers traditional logic of categorical judgment and syllogism, modern propositional logic, and introductory elements of predicate logic with corresponding methods (truth tables, natural deduction, truth trees).

An arithmetic theory of oppositions is devised by comparing expressions, Boolean bitstrings, and integers. This leads to a set of correspondences between three domains of investigation, namely: logic, geometry, and arithmetic. The structural properties of each area are investigated in turn, before justifying the procedure as a whole. Io finish, I show how this helps to improve the logical calculus of oppositions, through the consideration of corresponding operations between integers.

Contrary to common misconceptions, today's logic is not devoid of existential import: the universalized conditional ∀ x [S→ P] implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction ∃ x [S & P], not in all cases, but in some. We characterize the proexamples by proving the Existential-Import Equivalence: The antecedent S of the universalized conditional alone determines whether the universalized conditional has existential import, i.e. whether it implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction.A predicate is an open formula having only x free. An existential-import predicate (...) Q is one whose existentialization, ∃ x Q, is logically true; otherwise, Q is existential-import-free or simply import-free.How abundant or widespread is existential import? How abundant or widespread are existential-import predicates in themselves or in comparison to import-free predicates? We show that existential-import predicates are quite abundant, and no less so than import-free predicates. Existential.. (shrink)

The epsilon calculus is a logical formalism developed by David Hilbert in the service of his program in the foundations of mathematics. The epsilon operator is a term-forming operator which replaces quantifiers in ordinary predicate logic. Specifically, in the calculus, a term εx A denotes some x satisfying A(x), if there is one. In Hilbert's Program, the epsilon terms play the role of ideal elements; the aim of Hilbert's finitistic consistency proofs is to give a procedure which removes such terms (...) from a formal proof. The procedures by which this is to be carried out are based on Hilbert's epsilon substitution method. The epsilon calculus, however, has applications in other contexts as well. The first general application of the epsilon calculus was in Hilbert's epsilon theorems, which in turn provide the basis for the first correct proof of Herbrand's theorem. More recently, variants of the epsilon operator have been applied in linguistics and linguistic philosophy to deal with anaphoric pronouns. (shrink)

In 1986, Mikenberg et al. introduced the semantic notion of quasi-truth defined by means of partial structures. In such structures, the predicates are seen as triples of pairwise disjoint sets: the set of tuples which satisfies, does not satisfy and can satisfy or not the predicate, respectively. The syntactical counterpart of the logic of partial truth is a rather complicated first-order modal logic. In the present article, the notion of predicates as triples is recursively extended, in a natural way, to (...) any complex formula of the first-order object language. From this, a new definition of quasi-truth is obtained. The proof-theoretic counterpart of the new semantics is a first-order paraconsistent logic whose propositional base is a 3-valued logic belonging to hierarchy of paraconsistent logics known as Logics of Formal Inconsistency, which was proposed by Carnielli and Marcos in 2002. (shrink)

A truth-preservation fallacy is using the concept of truth-preservation where some other concept is needed. For example, in certain contexts saying that consequences can be deduced from premises using truth-preserving deduction rules is a fallacy if it suggests that all truth-preserving rules are consequence-preserving. The arithmetic additive-associativity rule that yields 6 = (3 + (2 + 1)) from 6 = ((3 + 2) + 1) is truth-preserving but not consequence-preserving. As noted in James Gasser’s dissertation, Leibniz has been criticized for (...) using that rule in attempting to show that arithmetic equations are consequences of definitions. -/- A system of deductions is truth-preserving if each of its deductions having true premises has a true conclusion—and consequence-preserving if, for any given set of sentences, each deduction having premises that are consequences of that set has a conclusion that is a consequence of that set. Consequence-preserving amounts to: in each of its deductions the conclusion is a consequence of the premises. The same definitions apply to deduction rules considered as systems of deductions. Every consequence-preserving system is truth-preserving. It is not as well-known that the converse fails: not every truth-preserving system is consequence-preserving. Likewise for rules: not every truth-preserving rule is consequence-preserving. There are many famous examples. In ordinary first-order Peano-Arithmetic, the induction rule yields the conclusion ‘every number x is such that: x is zero or x is a successor’—which is not a consequence of the null set—from two tautological premises, which are consequences of the null set, of course. The arithmetic induction rule is truth-preserving but not consequence-preserving. Truth-preserving rules that are not consequence-preserving are non-logical or extra-logical rules. Such rules are unacceptable to persons espousing traditional truth-and-consequence conceptions of demonstration: a demonstration shows its conclusion is true by showing that its conclusion is a consequence of premises already known to be true. The 1965 Preface in Benson Mates (1972, vii) contains the first occurrence of truth-preservation fallacies in the book. (shrink)

We extend first-order logic to include variadic function symbols, and prove a substitution lemma. Two applications are given: one to bounded quantifier elimination and one to the definability of certain Borel sets.

We re-examine the problem of existential import by using classical predicate logic. Our problem is: How to distribute the existential import among the quantified propositions in order for all the relations of the logical square to be valid? After defining existential import and scrutinizing the available solutions, we distinguish between three possible cases: explicit import, implicit non-import, explicit negative import and formalize the propositions accordingly. Then, we examine the 16 combinations between the 8 propositions having the first two kinds of (...) import, the third one being trivial and rule out the squares where at least one relation does not hold. This leads to the following results: (1) three squares are valid when the domain is non-empty; (2) one of them is valid even in the empty domain: the square can thus be saved in arbitrary domains and (3) the aforementioned eight propositions give rise to a cube, which contains two more (non-classical) valid squares and several hexagons. A classical solution to the problem of existential import is thus possible, without resorting to deviant systems and merely relying upon the symbolism of First-order Logic (FOL). Aristotle’s system appears then as a fragment of a broader system which can be developed by using FOL. (shrink)