Game Theory

This paper argues that extant signalling-based analyses cannot explain a range of cases of biological (and psychological) deception, such as those in which the deceiver does not send a signal at all, but that Artiga and Paternotte’s (Philos Stud 175:579–600, 2018) functional and my (Krstić in The analysis of self-deception: rehabilitating the traditionalist account. PhD Dissertation, University of Auckland, 2018: §3; Krstić and Saville in Australas J Philos 97:830–835, 2019) manipulativist analyses can. Therefore, the latter views should be given preference. (...) And because we still do not have a satisfactory definition of manipulation, the functional analysis, according to which a state is deceptive iff its function is to mislead and it misleads, is currently our best theory of deception. This is not to argue that the signalling-based analyses have no value but only that they should not be used in general analyses of biological deception. We need to move on to some other interesting issues. (shrink)

Hadfield-Menell et al. (2017) propose the Off-Switch Game, a model of Human-AI cooperation in which AI agents always defer to humans because they are uncertain about our preferences. I explain two reasons why AI agents might not defer. First, AI agents might not value learning. Second, even if AI agents value learning, they might not be certain to learn our actual preferences.

The critical intention of this article does not focus on a comprehensive socio-cultural evaluation of gambling. Rather, its perspective is guided towards ways of picturing gambling and the subject of the gambler in different theoretical contexts. It is argued that one might expand philosophical conceptions of practical self-determination by taking an interdisciplinary look at gambling. However, such an attempt runs into the danger of painting an overly simplistic picture of self-control as self-continence, which can be found in theoretical approaches pathologizing (...) the gambler. In order to avoid such an outcome, an interdisciplinary analogy combining psychoanalytical and philosophical thought is presented. This analogy brings together the perspectives of the analysand and the gambler. By confronting these scenarios of human agency, it is shown that practical self-determination depends on instances of daring that can be related to certain gambling practices, too. The interdisciplinary view on gambling highlights its potentials for self-exploration, without neglecting the fact that an appropriate realization of such a self-exploration requires experiential and interpersonal conditions that often collide with the harsh reality of gambling practices. (shrink)

While the importance of social norms for shaping and transforming communities is uncontested, their nature and normativity are controversial. Most recent theorists take social norms to arise if members hold certain attitudes, such as expectations on others, perhaps along with certain behaviours. Yet attitudes do not create norms, let alone social norms or social normativity. Social norms are instead ‘made’: through a social process. Social norming processes are special communication processes, often non-verbal and informal. We present different versions of a (...) process-based account of social norms and social normativity. The process-based view brings social norms closer to legal norms, as processes represent social ‘acts’, just as laws and contracts arise through acts rather than mere attitudes, for instances acts of voting or signing. (shrink)

De Cruz and Levy, in their commentaries on Religion as make‐believe, present distinct questions that can be addressed by clarifying one core idea. De Cruz asks whether one can rationally assess the mental state of religious credence that I theorize. Levy asks why we should not explain the data on religious “belief” merely by positing factual beliefs with religious contents, which happen to be rationally acquired through testimony. To both, I say that having religious credences is p‐irrational: a purposeful departure (...) from rational thought and behavior, where the purpose in question is maintaining a group identity. (shrink)

The excessive population growth leading to urbanization and, subsequent to it, urban sprawl, increases the size and number of urban settlements. Consequently, to fulfill the land needed for this expansion, humans encroach the public open areas, including highly crucial urban green spaces. Generally, any kind of greenness within the city, known as urban green spaces, benefits the ecosystem and the inhabitants. Hence, the green infrastructure, universally, should be preserved. Urban parks, specifically urban forest parks, serving as recreational green public spaces, (...) are beneficial for environmental issues and human’s mental and physical health, in other words, well-being, by enabling them to interact with nature. To appropriately preserve the urban forest parks, being aware of the motivational factors for the visitors have a key role. While the willingness factors vary amongst people, it is important to know whether different people can experience the same park diversely, which is almost attractive in terms of general park features. Hence, the study refers to the concept of sense of place, capable of turning spaces into the desired places, framing the users’ behavior and transmitting cultural meaning. Augmentation occurs using Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in urban environments. It can be as simple as telecommunication technologies or very complicated ones. With their everyday use in peoples’ lifestyles, they have penetrated humans’ real lives, fading away the border detaching the real world from the world of computer-mediated services. Nowadays, a holistic technological perspective dominates the urban areas rather than individual ICT projects, which can reshape people’s interaction with their surroundings. Hence, the ICT-enriched spaces result in augmented spaces that convey a sense of place, supporting meaning-making and behavior framing. With its recent definition, gamification, which is the process of making activities more game-like, is a sample of augmentation. While triggering motivation in the users, it can support inducing new behaviors or reshaping the existing ones. Currently, gamification is spread out to various domains, both in academia and amongst practitioners. However, while gamification may involve any type of content, it is called a serious game in the case of transmitting serious educational content besides being entertaining. They are able to engage the player with the education of a certain topic or enhancement of a specific skill. The recent covid-19 outbreak and consequent confinement periods affected people's everyday lifestyles. While suddenly, people lost the freedom of being outdoor, experiencing new places, and interacting with each other, the technology rescued them from such a phenomenon. Virtual environment served them as a mediator to be in the same place, interact, and experience their daily activities in a novel form. Additionally, gamification changed even the sense of their virtual places. This thesis aims to enrich the park visitors’ experience via entertainingly introducing the Atatürk urban forest park to them, accompanied with educational content, by means of a locative serious game. The game benefits from the public awareness reinforcement to serve urban green space preservation. It generates a sense of placeness in its in situ mobile version and desktop version, played remotely, to frame the players’ behavior for the sake of its aim. The thesis is divided into six chapters to achieve its intended aim: The first chapter, the introduction, describes the excessive population growth leading to urbanization and its subsequent, urban sprawl, which increases the size and number of urban settlements and decreases the area of highly crucial urban green spaces. Discussing the green infrastructure benefits, this part emphasizes the importance of its preservation. After a brief debate around the possible ways of this conservation, this chapter continues with the thesis's purpose, method, and content. The literature review part, located in the second and the third chapter, introduces the types, definitions, and the benefits of the urban green spaces, instanced as parks and urban forest parks. This chapter continues with a description of the park experience, followed by the concept of the sense of place. Augmentation and the use of ICTs for behavior framing are described, followed by the idea of gamification, serious games, related case studies, and software. Next, in the fourth chapter, the thesis continues with the research part. Firstly, it introduces the selected area, Atatürk Urban Forest Park, with its detailed fauna and flora information. Then, it proceeds with the game development part, introducing the operated 360° panoramic field photography with a smartphone and using 3dvista Virtual Tour PRO software as the game development tool to provide a locative serious game. For the evaluation of the developed game’s success, in the fifth chapter, the thesis conducts an online survey, including a Google form questionnaire, requested to be filled after the gameplay, focused on the remote version, inspired by the pandemic situation. Finally, in the last chapter, the thesis results are concluded, and the discussions around the future possibilities of the provided method and its capabilities are made to enlighten the field for further studies. (shrink)

This paper is an original attempt to understand the foundations of economic reasoning. It endeavors to rigorously define the relationship between subjective interpretations and objective valuations of such interpretations in the context of theoretical economics. This analysis is substantially expanded through a dynamic approach, where the truth of a valuation results in an updated interpretation or changes in the agent's subjective belief regarding the effectiveness of the selected action as well as the objective reality of the effectiveness of all other (...) possible actions (i.e. consequence realization). Complications arise when the economic agent is presented with a set of actions that render ambiguous preference, or when the effectiveness of an action cannot be perceived upon its selection, thereby necessitating a different theory of choice and consequence realization. (shrink)

In this paper we explore the absentminded driver problem using two different scenarios. In the first scenario we assume that the driver is capable of reasoning about his degree of absentmindedness before he hits the highway. This leads to a Savage-style model where the states are mutually exclusive and the act-state independence is in place. In the second we employ centred possibilities, by modelling the states (i.e. the events about which the driver is uncertain) as the possible final destinations indexed (...) by a time period. The optimal probability we find for continuing at an exit is different from almost all papers in the literature. In this scenario, act-state independence is still violated, but states are mutually exclusive and the driver arrives at his optimal choice probability via Bayesian updating. We show that our solution is the only one guaranteeing immunity from sure loss via a Dutch strategy, and that – despite initial appearances – it is time consistent. This raises important implications for the rationality of commitment in such scenarios. (shrink)

This note identifies and comments on selected crucial traits of Robert Aumann’s philosophy of game theory. In doing so, it aims at carving out and expressing some notions tacitly held by many working game theorists and ideally even at triggering subsequent reflection on the philosophy of game theory in general. According to my reconstruction of Aumann’s position, sophisticated, relatively precise rules of language—an ultra-refined grammar for interactions—constitute the heart of game theory. Consequently, the heart of game theory is devoid, or (...) almost devoid, of empirical content. The final section proposes a nomenclature for lucidly discussing the relationships between theories, different types of models, and “the real world” and employs it to explicate and slightly amend Aumann’s remarks on the role of truth and fruitfulness in game theory. (shrink)

Recent work on the evolution of social contracts and conventions has often used models of bargaining games, with reinforcement learning. A recent innovation is the requirement that every strategy must be invented either through through learning or reinforcement. However, agents frequently get stuck in highly-reinforced “traps” that prevent them from arriving at outcomes that are efficient or fair to the both players. Agents face a trade-off between exploration and exploitation, i.e. between continuing to invent new strategies and reinforcing strategies that (...) have already become highly reinforced by yielding high rewards. In this paper I systematically study the relationship between rates of invention and the efficiency and fairness of outcomes in two-player, repeated bargaining games. I use a basic reinforcement learning model with invention, and five variations of this model, designed introduce various forms of forgetting, to prioritize more recent reinforcement, or to maintain a higher rate of invention. I use computer simulations to investigate the outcomes of each model. Each models shows qualitative similarities in the relationship between the efficiency and fairness of outcomes, and the relative amount of exploration or exploitation that takes place. Surprisingly, there are often trade-offs between the efficiency and the fairness of the outcomes. (shrink)

This paper argues that extant signalling-based analyses cannot explain a range of cases of biological (and psychological) deception, such as those in which the deceiver does not send a signal at all, but that Artiga and Paternotte’s (Philos Stud 175:579–600, 2018) functional and my (Krstić in The analysis of self-deception: rehabilitating the traditionalist account. PhD Dissertation, University of Auckland, 2018: §3; Krstić and Saville in Australas J Philos 97:830–835, 2019) manipulativist analyses can. Therefore, the latter views should be given preference. (...) And because we still do not have a satisfactory definition of manipulation, the functional analysis, according to which a state is deceptive iff its function is to mislead and it misleads, is currently our best theory of deception. This is not to argue that the signalling-based analyses have no value but only that they should not be used in general analyses of biological deception. We need to move on to some other interesting issues. (shrink)

In this paper, I outline and defend the view that variations in compliance levels with one and the same norm represent differentnorms about following norms. In support of this claim, I first argue that classic game-theoretic accounts, which define norms as Nash equilibria of noncooperative games, typically consider variations in compliance levels as separate norms. After that, I suggest a more fine-grained, game-theoretic distinction that accounts for degrees of compliance with the same norm and I show how to incorporate such (...) an account into a psychological framework. Finally, the paper examines what given degrees of compliance can reveal about the dynamics underlying the process of norm change. I will argue that they are indicators of different reactions to the introduction of new norms. (shrink)

The cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman argues that we don't perceive reality: spacetime, objects, colors, sounds, tastes, and so forth, are all merely an interface that we evolved to track evolutionary fitness rather than to perceive truths about external reality. In this paper, I expound on his argument, then I extend it, primarily, by looking at key ideas in physics that are quite germane to it. Among the topics in physics that I discuss are black holes, the holographic principle, string theory, (...) duality, quantum gravity, and special relativity. I discuss these ideas from physics with an eye to their relevance for Hoffman's view. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that categories play significant roles in the appreciation of artworks. This paper argues that the correct categories of artworks are institutionally established through social processes. Section 1 examines the candidates for determining correct categories and proposes that this question should shift the focus from category membership to appreciative behaviour associated with categories. Section 2 draws on Francesco Guala’s theory of institutions to show that categories of artworks are established as rules-in-equilibrium. Section 3 reviews the explanatory benefits (...) of this institutional theory of the correct category. [Winner of the 2022 Debates in Aesthetics Essay Prize]. (shrink)

This paper examines two strands of literature regarding economic models of cooperation. First, payoff transformation theories assume that people may not be exclusively motivated by self-interest, but also care about equality and fairness. Second, team reasoning theorists assume that people might reason from the perspective of the team, rather than an individualistic perspective. Can these two theories be unified? In contrast to the consensus among team reasoning theorists, I argue that team reasoning can be viewed as a particular type of (...) payoff transformation. However, I also demonstrate that many payoff transformations yield actions that team reasoning rules out. (shrink)

Begründet und entfaltet wird ein Begriff des Spiels, der sich um Lockungen und Drohungen des Unerwarteten dreht. Das Autorenduo ordnet seine Theorie der ludischen Aktion in klassische Konzepte des Spiels ein sowie in den aktuellen Diskurs der Game Studies. Die phänomenale Mannigfaltigkeit des Spiels wird in historischer Perspektive skizziert und in systematischer Weise gegliedert. Die Autoren erläutern medientechnische und kommunikative Voraussetzungen des Booms der Computerspiele und reflektieren die Diskussion über Eskalationen ludischer Gewalt. Kritisch ausgeleuchtet werden Instrumentalisierungen des Spiels, die sich (...) unter dem Stichwort Gamification wachsender Beliebtheit erfreuen. Die auffällige Inflation der Spielmetapher wird in Zusammenhang gebracht mit ludischen Anmutungen in den sozialen Strukturen der modernen und digitalen Gesellschaft. Fabian Arlt, M. A., hat Medienmanagement studiert und promoviert im Studiengang Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftskommunikation der Universität der Künste (UdK) in Berlin. Prof. Dr. Hans-Jürgen Arlt ist Sozialwissenschaftler und Publizist, er lehrt am Institut für Theorie und Praxis der Kommunikation der Universität der Künste (UdK) in Berlin. (shrink)

This book synthesizes the game-theoretic modeling of decision-making processes and an ancient moral requirement, called the Golden Rule of ethics (GR). This rule states, "Behave to others as you would like them to behave to you." The GR is one of the oldest, most widespread and specific moral requirements that appear in Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The book constructs and justifies mathematical models of dynamic socio-economic processes and phenomena that reveal the mechanism of the GR and are based (...) on the concept of Berge equilibrium. The GR can be naturally used for resolving or balancing conflicts, and its "altruistic character" obviously excludes wars, blood-letting, and armed clashes. The previous book of the authors, The Berge Equilibrium: A Game-Theoretic Framework for the Golden Rule of Ethics, covers the static case of the GR. In this book, the dynamic case of the GR is investigated using the altruistic concept of Berge equilibrium and three factors as follows: a) a modification of N.N. Krasovskii's mathematical formalization of differential positional games (DPGs), in view of the counterexamples given by A.I. Subbotin and A.F. Kononenko; b) the method of guiding control, proposed by N.N. Krasovskii; c) the Germeier convolution of the payoff functions of different players. Additionally, the book features exercises, problems, and solution tips collected together in Appendix 1, as well as new approaches to conflict resolution as presented in Appendices 2-4. The book will be of use to undergraduate and graduate students and experts in the field of decision-making in complex control and management systems, as well as anyone interested in game theory and applications. (shrink)

A pair of interpreters of a speaker's sentences can disagree by assigning different truth-values to sentences in the speaker's language that the speaker neither accepts nor rejects. Alternately, they can assign different truth-values to some sentence that the speaker accepts as true. Neither source of disagreement is open to the speaker: on pain of inconsistency in the latter case, and ex hypothesis, the speaker neither accepts nor rejects the contested sentence in the former case. Arguably, interpreters possibilities of disagreement do (...) not undercut first-person semantic authority. (shrink)

We present a semantic game for Gödel logic and its extensions, where the players’ interaction stepwise reduces arbitrary claims about the relative order of truth degrees of complex formulas to atomic ones. The paper builds on a previously developed game for Gödel logic with projection operator in Fermüller et al., Information processing and management of uncertainty in knowledge-based systems, Springer, Cham, 2020, pp. 257–270). This game is extended to cover Gödel logic with involutive negations and constants, and then lifted to (...) a provability game using the concept of disjunctive strategies. Winning strategies in the provability game, with and without constants and involutive negations, turn out to correspond to analytic proofs in a version of \ :1941–1958, 2010) and in a sequent-of-relations calculus, Automated reasoning with analytic tableaux and related methods, Springer, Berlin, 1999, pp. 36–51) respectively. (shrink)

Translation into Portuguese of SEP entries on Philosophy of Economics.

In this lively history of game theory, a gifted math educator and science writer explains for lay readers the uses and value of this innovative yet easy-to-understand approach to mathematical modeling. Essentially, game theory interprets life as a game with mathematical rules. By following the rules, decisions can be calculated that result in the greatest benefit for all participants. The author takes the reader from the 17th century through the Cold War to today's age of turbo capitalism. Along the way (...) he introduces such leading contributors as Blaise Pascal in the 17th century, who invented the theory of probability; Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 20th century, who conceived of the world as a play of words; John Nash in the 1950s, who laid the foundation of modern game theory; and today's practitioners who apply the theory to global finance and military strategy. As the author shows, game theory is more than a type of cost-benefit analysis; ultimately, it is a quest for meaning. (shrink)

In this paper we analyse in the framework of constructive mathematics (BISH) the validity of Farkas' lemma and related propositions, namely the Fredholm alternative for solvability of systems of linear equations, optimality criteria in linear programming, Stiemke's lemma and the Superhedging Duality from mathematical finance, and von Neumann's minimax theorem with application to constructive game theory.

Methodological individualists often claim that any social phenomenon can ultimately be explained in terms of the actions and interactions of individuals. Any Nagelian version of methodological individualism requires that there be bridge laws that translate social statements into individualistic ones. We show that Nagelian individualism can be put to logical scrutiny by making the relevant social and individualistic languages fully explicit and mathematically precise. In particular, we prove that the social statement that a group of (at least two) agents performs (...) a deontically admissible group action cannot be expressed in a well-established deontic logic of agency that models every combination of actions, omissions, abilities, and obligations of finitely many individual agents. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to introduce the notion of a game for intuitionistic first-order Kripke models. We also establish links between notions presented here and the notions of logical equivalence and bounded bisimulation for intuitionistic first-order Kripke models, and the Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé game for classical first-order structures.

Heidegger’s Being and Time - Irfan Ajvazi.

In a recent article, Ethan Bradley and Mark Navin (2021) argue that vaccine refusal is not akin to free riding. Here, I defend one connection between vaccine refusal and free riding and suggest that, when viewed in conjunction with their other arguments, this might constitute a reason to mandate Covid-19 vaccination.

We characterize the determinacy of $F_\sigma $ games of length $\omega ^2$ in terms of determinacy assertions for short games. Specifically, we show that $F_\sigma $ games of length $\omega ^2$ are determined if, and only if, there is a transitive model of ${\mathsf {KP}}+{\mathsf {AD}}$ containing $\mathbb {R}$ and reflecting $\Pi _1$ facts about the next admissible set.As a consequence, one obtains that, over the base theory ${\mathsf {KP}} + {\mathsf {DC}} + ``\mathbb {R}$ exists,” determinacy for $F_\sigma $ (...) games of length $\omega ^2$ is stronger than ${\mathsf {AD}}$, but weaker than ${\mathsf {AD}} + \Sigma _1$ -separation. (shrink)

I envision new directions in the methodology of experimental games in the field of developmental, environmental and resource economics. Although there have been extensive discussions on experimenta...

Salience reasoning, many have argued, can help solve coordination problems, but only if such reasoning is supplemented by higher-order predictions, e.g. beliefs about what others believe yet others will choose. In this paper, I will argue that this line of reasoning is self-undermining. Higher-order behavioral predictions defeat salience-based behavioral predictions. To anchor my argument in the philosophical literature, I will develop it in response and opposition to the popular Lewisian model of salience reasoning in coordination games. This model imports the (...) problematic higher-order beliefs by way of a ‘symmetric reasoning’ constraint. In the second part of this paper, I will argue that a player may employ salience reasoning only if she suspends judgment about what others believe yet others will do. (shrink)

This book discusses the main shortcomings of the classical solution concept from noncooperative game theory and provides a comprehensive study of the more refined concepts that have been introduced to overcome these drawbacks. The plausibility of the assumptions underlying each such concept are discussed, desirable properties as well as deficiencies are illustrated, characterizations are derived and the relationships between the various concepts are studied. The first six chapters provide an informal discussion with many examples as well as a comprehensive overview (...) for normal form games. The remaining chapters are devoted to specific applications, illustrating the strength of the various concepts. (shrink)

Professor Zagare provides methods for analysing the structure of the game; considers zero and nonzero-sum games and the fundamental 'minimax theorem'; and investigates games with more than two players, including the possibility of coalitions between players.

Why do we use epistemic modals like 'might'? According to Factualism, the function of 'might' is to exchange information about state-of-affairs in the modal universe. As an alternative to Factualism, this paper offers a game-theoretic rationale for epistemic possibility operators in a Bayesian setting. The background picture is one whereby communication facilitates coordination, but coordination could fail if there's too much uncertainty, since the players' ability to share a belief is undermined. However, 'might' and related expressions can be used to (...) reveal one's uncertainty, and exploit this to coordinate despite the lack of a common epistemic ground. The final result is a way to articulate a non-Factualist view of epistemic possibility modals that builds on their standard semantics. (shrink)

The Nash counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were I to change my behaviour assuming no one else does. By contrast, the Kantian counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were everyone to deviate from some behaviour. We present a model that endogenizes the decision to engage in this type of Kantian reasoning. Autonomous agents using this moral framework receive psychic payoffs equivalent to the cooperate-cooperate payoff in Prisoner’s Dilemma regardless of the other player’s action. Moreover, if both interacting (...) agents play Prisoner’s Dilemma using this moral framework, their material outcomes are a Pareto improvement over the Nash equilibrium. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of collective intentionality typically rely on members to form a personal intention of sorts, viewed as a mental state. This tendency is opposed by recent economic literature on team-directed reasoning, which focuses on the reasoning process leading up to the formation of the members’ intentions. Our formal analysis bridges these paradigms and criticizes the team- directed reasoning account on two counts: first, team-directed reasoning is supposed to transcend traditional game and decision theory by adopting a certain collectivistic reasoning (...) method. However, we show that team-directed reasoning yields the same action recommendations as a certain I-mode we-intention type. Accordingly, an important part of we-mode reasoning can be reduced to I-mode reasoning with certain preferences. Second, contrary to the claims of team-directed-reasoning theorists, we refute that team-directed reasoning surpasses pro-group intentions in selecting cooperatively rational solutions. That is, in some scenarios team-directed reasoning fails to guarantee successful cooperation whereas pro-group intentions succeed in doing so. We therefore propose to revise team-directed reasoning and introduce a third we-intention type, called participatory intentions. We prove that participatory intentions guarantee that a best group action is performed whenever either team-directed reasoning or pro-group intentions do. (shrink)