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  1. On Farkas' Lemma and Related Propositions in BISH.Josef Berger & Gregor Svindland - 2022 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 173 (2):103059.
    In this paper we analyse in the framework of constructive mathematics (BISH) the validity of Farkas' lemma and related propositions, namely the Fredholm alternative for solvability of systems of linear equations, optimality criteria in linear programming, Stiemke's lemma and the Superhedging Duality from mathematical finance, and von Neumann's minimax theorem with application to constructive game theory.
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  2. From Semantic Games to Provability: The Case of Gödel Logic.Alexandra Pavlova, Robert Freiman & Timo Lang - forthcoming - Studia Logica:1-28.
    We present a semantic game for Gödel logic and its extensions, where the players’ interaction stepwise reduces arbitrary claims about the relative order of truth degrees of complex formulas to atomic ones. The paper builds on a previously developed game for Gödel logic with projection operator in Fermüller et al., Information processing and management of uncertainty in knowledge-based systems, Springer, Cham, 2020, pp. 257–270). This game is extended to cover Gödel logic with involutive negations and constants, and then lifted to (...)
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  3. An impossibility result on methodological individualism.Hein Duijf, Allard Tamminga & Frederik Van De Putte - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4165-4185.
    Methodological individualists often claim that any social phenomenon can ultimately be explained in terms of the actions and interactions of individuals. Any Nagelian version of methodological individualism requires that there be bridge laws that translate social statements into individualistic ones. We show that Nagelian individualism can be put to logical scrutiny by making the relevant social and individualistic languages fully explicit and mathematically precise. In particular, we prove that the social statement that a group of agents performs a deontically admissible (...)
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  4. Games and Bisimulations for Intuitionistic First-Order Kripke Models.Małgorzata Kruszelnicka - 2021 - Studia Logica 109 (5):903-916.
    The aim of this paper is to introduce the notion of a game for intuitionistic first-order Kripke models. We also establish links between notions presented here and the notions of logical equivalence and bounded bisimulation for intuitionistic first-order Kripke models, and the Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé game for classical first-order structures.
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  5. Heidegger’s Being And Time.Irfan Ajvazi - manuscript
    Heidegger’s Being and Time - Irfan Ajvazi.
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  6. Can One Both Contribute to and Benefit From Herd Immunity?Lucie White - 2021 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 14 (2).
    In a recent article, Ethan Bradley and Mark Navin (2021) argue that vaccine refusal is not akin to free riding. Here, I defend one connection between vaccine refusal and free riding and suggest that, when viewed in conjunction with their other arguments, this might constitute a reason to mandate Covid-19 vaccination.
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  7. Games with Finitely Generated Structures.Adam Krawczyk & Wiesław Kubiś - 2021 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 172 (10):103016.
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  8. Cooperation, Fairness and Team Reasoning.Hein Duijf - forthcoming - Economics and Philosophy.
    This paper examines two strands of literature regarding economic models of cooperation. First, payoff transformation theories assume that people may not be exclusively motivated by self-interest, but also care about equality and fairness. Second, team reasoning theorists assume that people might reason from the perspective of the team, rather than an individualistic perspective. Can these two theories be unified? In contrast to the consensus among team reasoning theorists, I argue that team reasoning can be viewed as a particular type of (...)
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  9. Games and Reflection In.J. P. Aguilera - 2020 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 85 (3):1102-1123.
    We characterize the determinacy of $F_\sigma $ games of length $\omega ^2$ in terms of determinacy assertions for short games. Specifically, we show that $F_\sigma $ games of length $\omega ^2$ are determined if, and only if, there is a transitive model of ${\mathsf {KP}}+{\mathsf {AD}}$ containing $\mathbb {R}$ and reflecting $\Pi _1$ facts about the next admissible set.As a consequence, one obtains that, over the base theory ${\mathsf {KP}} + {\mathsf {DC}} + ``\mathbb {R}$ exists,” determinacy for $F_\sigma $ (...)
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  10. Co-Production and Economics: Insights From the Constructive Use of Experimental Games in Adaptive Resource Management.Michiru Nagatsu - 2021 - Journal of Economic Methodology 28 (1):134-142.
    I envision new directions in the methodology of experimental games in the field of developmental, environmental and resource economics. Although there have been extensive discussions on experimenta...
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  11. Salience Reasoning in Coordination Games.Julius Schönherr - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6601-6620.
    Salience reasoning, many have argued, can help solve coordination problems, but only if such reasoning is supplemented by higher-order predictions, e.g. beliefs about what others believe yet others will choose. In this paper, I will argue that this line of reasoning is self-undermining. Higher-order behavioral predictions defeat salience-based behavioral predictions. To anchor my argument in the philosophical literature, I will develop it in response and opposition to the popular Lewisian model of salience reasoning in coordination games. This model imports the (...)
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  12. Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games.M. Kojima, A. Okada & S. Shindoh - 1985 - Mathematics of Operations Research 10:650-663.
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  13. Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games.Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet - 1984 - International Journal of Game Theory 13:129-144.
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  14. Essential Equilibrium Points of N-Person Non-Cooperative Games.Wu Wen-Tsün & Jiang Jia-He - 1962 - Scientia Sinica 11:1307-1322.
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  15. Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit.Reinhard Selten - 1965 - Zeitschrift Für Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121:301-324, 667-689.
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  16. On Stability of Perfect Equilibrium Points.Akira Okada - 1981 - International Journal of Game Theory 10:67-73.
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  17. Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept.Roger B. Myerson - 1978 - International Journal of Game Theory 7:73-80.
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  18. Sequential Equilibria.David Kreps - 1982 - Econometrica 50:863-894.
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  19. Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria.Eric Van Damme - 1987 - Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
    This book discusses the main shortcomings of the classical solution concept from noncooperative game theory and provides a comprehensive study of the more refined concepts that have been introduced to overcome these drawbacks. The plausibility of the assumptions underlying each such concept are discussed, desirable properties as well as deficiencies are illustrated, characterizations are derived and the relationships between the various concepts are studied. The first six chapters provide an informal discussion with many examples as well as a comprehensive overview (...)
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  20. Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points: A New Proof.John Harsanyi - 1973 - International Journal of Game Theory 2:235-250.
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  21. Game Theory: A Survey.Ken Binmore & Partha Dasgupta - 1986 - In Ken Binmore & Partha Dasgupta (eds.), Economic Organizations as Games. Oxford:
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  22. Game Theory: Concepts and Applications.Frank C. Zagare - 1984 - Sage.
    Professor Zagare provides methods for analysing the structure of the game; considers zero and nonzero-sum games and the fundamental 'minimax theorem'; and investigates games with more than two players, including the possibility of coalitions between players.
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  23. Twice Two Game the 2 X 2 Game.Anatol Rapoport, Melvin J. Guyer & David G. Gordon - 1976 - University of Michigan Press.
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  24. Games as Models of Social Phenomena.Henry Hamburger - 1979 - New York: W. H. Freeman.
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  25. Rational Choice.Jon Elster (ed.) - 1986 - New York University Press.
  26. Why `Might'?Giorgio Sbardolini - manuscript
    Why do we use epistemic modals like 'might'? According to Factualism, the function of 'might' is to exchange information about state-of-affairs in the modal universe. As an alternative to Factualism, this paper offers a game-theoretic rationale for epistemic possibility operators in a Bayesian setting. The background picture is one whereby communication facilitates coordination, but coordination could fail if there's too much uncertainty, since the players' ability to share a belief is undermined. However, 'might' and related expressions can be used to (...)
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  27. Universalizing and the We: Endogenous Game Theoretic Deontology.Paul Studtmann & Shyam Gouri Suresh - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (2):244-259.
    The Nash counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were I to change my behaviour assuming no one else does. By contrast, the Kantian counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were everyone to deviate from some behaviour. We present a model that endogenizes the decision to engage in this type of Kantian reasoning. Autonomous agents using this moral framework receive psychic payoffs equivalent to the cooperate-cooperate payoff in Prisoner’s Dilemma regardless of the other player’s action. Moreover, if both interacting (...)
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  28. Beyond Team-Directed Reasoning: Participatory Intentions Contribute to a Theory of Collective Agency.Duijf Hein - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse.
    Philosophical accounts of collective intentionality typically rely on members to form a personal intention of sorts, viewed as a mental state. This tendency is opposed by recent economic literature on team-directed reasoning, which focuses on the reasoning process leading up to the formation of the members’ intentions. Our formal analysis bridges these paradigms and criticizes the team- directed reasoning account on two counts: first, team-directed reasoning is supposed to transcend traditional game and decision theory by adopting a certain collectivistic reasoning (...)
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  29. Minimal Cooperation and Group Roles.Katherine Ritchie - 2020 - In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency.
    Cooperation has been analyzed primarily in the context of theories of collective intentionality. These discussions have primarily focused on interactions between pairs or small groups of agents who know one another personally. Cooperative game theory has also been used to argue for a form of cooperation in large unorganized groups. Here I consider a form of minimal cooperation that can arise among members of potentially large organized groups (e.g., corporate teams, committees, governmental bodies). I argue that members of organized groups (...)
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  30. Games of Strategy in Culture and Economics Research.Maxwell Mkondiwa - 2019 - Journal of Economic Methodology 27 (2):146-163.
    Games are meant to be fun, yet economists have successfully developed games that are less fun and less understood by participants especially in developing countries. This paper surveys failures in...
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  31. Toward a Formal Analysis of Deceptive Signaling.Don Fallis & Peter J. Lewis - 2019 - Synthese (6):2279-2303.
    Deception has long been an important topic in philosophy. However, the traditional analysis of the concept, which requires that a deceiver intentionally cause her victim to have a false belief, rules out the possibility of much deception in the animal kingdom. Cognitively unsophisticated species, such as fireflies and butterflies, have simply evolved to mislead potential predators and/or prey. To capture such cases of “functional deception,” several researchers Machiavellian intelligence II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 112–143, 1997; Searcy and Nowicki, The (...)
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  32. Jens Erik Fenstad. The Axiom of Determinateness. Proceedings of the Second Scandinavian Logic Symposium, Edited by J. E. Fenstad, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, Vol. 63, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and London 1971, Pp. 41–61. [REVIEW]A. S. Kechris - 1974 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (2):331-332.
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  33. Moral Hazard, the Savage Framework, and State-Dependent Utility.Jean Baccelli - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (2):367-387.
    In this paper, I investigate the betting behavior of a decision-maker who can influence the likelihood of the events upon which she is betting. In decision theory, this is best known as a situation of moral hazard. Focusing on a particularly simple case, I sketch the first systematic analysis of moral hazard in the canonical Savage framework. From the results of this analysis, I draw two philosophical conclusions. First, from an observational and a descriptive point of view, there need to (...)
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  34. Temptation and Preference-Based Instrumental Rationality.Johanna Thoma - 2018 - In José Bermudez (ed.), Self-control, decision theory and rationality. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.
    In the dynamic choice literature, temptations are usually understood as temporary shifts in an agent’s preferences. What has been puzzling about these cases is that, on the one hand, an agent seems to do better by her own lights if she does not give into the temptation, and does so without engaging in costly commitment strategies. This seems to indicate that it is instrumentally irrational for her to give into temptation. On the other hand, resisting temptation also requires her to (...)
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  35. Texas Hold'em Poker Odds for Your Strategy, with Probability-Based Hand Analyses.Catalin Barboianu - 2011 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
    A complete probability guide of Hold'em Poker, this guide covers all possible gaming situations. The author focuses on the practical side of the presentation and use of the probabilities involved in Hold'em, while taking into account the subjective side of the probability-based criteria of each player's strategy.
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  36. Understanding and Calculating the Odds: Probability Theory Basics and Calculus Guide for Beginners, with Applications in Games of Chance and Everyday Life.Catalin Barboianu - 2006 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
    This book presents not only the mathematical concept of probability, but also its philosophical aspects, the relativity of probability and its applications and even the psychology of probability. All explanations are made in a comprehensible manner and are supported with suggestive examples from nature and daily life, and even with challenging math paradoxes.
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  37. Probability Guide to Gambling: The Mathematics of Dice, Slots, Roulette, Baccarat, Blackjack, Poker, Lottery and Sport Bets.Catalin Barboianu - 2006 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
    Over the past two decades, gamblers have begun taking mathematics into account more seriously than ever before. While probability theory is the only rigorous theory modeling the uncertainty, even though in idealized conditions, numerical probabilities are viewed not only as mere mathematical information, but also as a decision-making criterion, especially in gambling. This book presents the mathematics underlying the major games of chance and provides a precise account of the odds associated with all gaming events. It begins by explaining in (...)
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  38. Roulette Odds and Profits: The Mathematics of Complex Bets.Catalin Barboianu - 2008 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
    Continuing his series of books on the mathematics of gambling, the author shows how a simple-rule game such as roulette is suited to a complex mathematical model whose applications generate improved betting systems that take into account a player's personal playing criteria. The book is both practical and theoretical, but is mainly devoted to the application of theory. About two-thirds of the content is lists of categories and sub-categories of improved betting systems, along with all the parameters that might stand (...)
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  39. The Mathematics of Lottery: Odds, Combinations, Systems.Catalin Barboianu - 2009 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
    This work is a complete mathematical guide to lottery games, covering all of the problems related to probability, combinatorics, and all parameters describing the lottery matrices, as well as the various playing systems. The mathematics sections describe the mathematical model of the lottery, which is in fact the essence of the lotto game. The applications of this model provide players with all the mathematical data regarding the parameters attached to the gaming events and personal playing systems. By applying these data, (...)
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  40. Dancing at Gunpoint. A Review of Herbert Gintis's The Bounds of Reason: Game Theory and the Unification of the Behavioral Sciences. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, 304 Pp. [REVIEW]Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2010 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 3 (2):111.
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  41. Analytic Narratives: What They Are and How They Contribute to Historical Explanation.Philippe Mongin - 2019 - In Claude Diebolt & Michael Haupert (eds.), Handbook of Cliometrics. Berlin: Springer.
    The expression "analytic narratives" is used to refer to a range of quite recent studies that lie on the boundaries between history, political science, and economics. These studies purport to explain specific historical events by combining the usual narrative approach of historians with the analytic tools that economists and political scientists draw from formal rational choice theories. Game theory, especially of the extensive form version, is currently prominent among these tools, but there is nothing inevitable about such a technical choice. (...)
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  42. Prisoner.Marilyn Buck - 2004 - Feminist Studies 30 (2):269.
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  43. Paul Erickson. The World the Game Theorists Made. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015. Pp. 384. $35.00.Philip Mirowski - 2017 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 7 (1):160-163.
  44. How to Be Fairer.Conrad Heilmann & Stefan Wintein - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3475-3499.
    We confront the philosophical literature on fair division problems with axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics. Firstly, we show that the proportionality method advocated in Curtis is not implied by a general principle of fairness, and that the proportional rule cannot be explicated axiomatically from that very principle. Secondly, we suggest that Broome’s notion of claims is too restrictive and that game-theoretic approaches can rectify this shortcoming. More generally, we argue that axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics is an indispensable (...)
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  45. Game Theory Modeling for the Cold War on Both Sides of the Iron Curtain.Harald Hagemann, Vadim Kufenko & Danila Raskov - 2016 - History of the Human Sciences 29 (4-5):99-124.
    The bi-polar confrontation between the Soviet Union and the USA involved many leading game theorists from both sides of the Iron Curtain: Oskar Morgenstern, John von Neumann, Michael Intriligator, John Nash, Thomas Schelling and Steven Brams from the United States and Nikolay Vorob’ev, Leon A. Petrosyan, Elena B. Yanovskaya and Olga N. Bondareva from the Soviet Union. The formalization of game theory took place prior to the Cold War but the geopolitical confrontation hastened and shaped its evolution. In our article (...)
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  46. On the Foundations of Nash Equilibrium: Hans Jørgen Jacobsen.Hans J.ørgen Jacobsen - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (1):67-88.
    The most important analytical tool in non-cooperative game theory is the concept of a Nash equilibrium, which is a collection of possibly mixed strategies, one for each player, with the property that each player's strategy is a best reply to the strategies of the other players. If we do not go into normative game theory, which concerns itself with the recommendation of strategies, and focus instead entirely on the positive theory of prediction, two alternative interpretations of the Nash equilibrium concept (...)
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  47. Rejoinder: The “Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment”: Nabil I. Al-Najjar and Jonathan Weinstein.Nabil I. Al-Najjar - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):357-369.
    The pioneering contributions of Bewley, Gilboa and Schmeidler highlighted important weaknesses in the foundations of economics and game theory. The Bayesian methodology on which these fields are based does not answer such basic questions as what makes beliefs reasonable, or how agents should form beliefs and expectations. Providing the initial impetus for debating these issues is a contribution that will have the lasting value it deserves.
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  48. Grappling With the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for BI-Terminating Games: Wlodek Rabinowicz.Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1998 - Economics and Philosophy 14 (1):95-126.
    According to the standard objection to backward induction in games, its application depends on highly questionable assumptions about the players' expectations as regards future counterfactual game developments. It seems that, in order to make predictions needed for backward reasoning, the players must expect each player to act rationally at each node that in principle could be reached in the game, and also to expect that this confidence in the future rationality of the players would be kept by each player come (...)
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  49. Harsanyi Before Economics: An Introduction*: Philippe Fontaine.Philippe Fontaine - 2007 - Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):343-348.
    Upon learning that John C. Harsanyi was awarded the Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, in 1994, for his pioneering work in game theory, few economists probably questioned the appropriateness of that choice. The Budapest-born social scientist had already been recognized as a first-rank contributor to non-cooperative game theory for some time. However, as many readers of this journal will be aware, Harsanyi first contributed to welfare economics, not game theory. More importantly, he was (...)
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  50. Game Theory: A Practitioner's Approach: Thomas C. Schelling.Thomas C. Schelling - 2010 - Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):27-46.
    To a practitioner in the social sciences, game theory primarily helps to identify situations in which interdependent decisions are somehow problematic; solutions often require venturing into the social sciences. Game theory is usually about anticipating each other's choices; it can also cope with influencing other's choices. To a social scientist the great contribution of game theory is probably the payoff matrix, an accounting device comparable to the equals sign in algebra.
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