Love is not enough: Other-regarding preferences cannot explain payoff dominance in game theory

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):22-23 (2007)
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Abstract

Even if game theory is broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, it cannot adequately model all aspects of interactive decision making. Payoff dominance is an example of a phenomenon that can be adequately modeled only by departing radically from standard assumptions of decision theory and game theory – either the unit of agency or the nature of rationality. (Published Online April 27 2007).

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References found in this work

Trust Within Reason.Martin Hollis - 1998 - Cambridge University Press.
Trust within Reason (SJ Brams).M. Hollis - 1999 - Philosophical Books 40 (2):129-130.
Theories of team agency.Robert Sugden & Natalie Gold - 2007 - In Fabienne Peter & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), Rationality and Commitment. Oxford University Press.
Rationalizing Focal Points.Maarten C. W. Janssen - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (2):119-148.

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