Computationalism

La inteligencia artificial (IA) es la capacidad de una máquina o sistema informático para simular y realizar tareas que normalmente requerirían inteligencia humana, como el razonamiento lógico, el aprendizaje y la resolución de problemas. La inteligencia artificial se basa en el uso de algoritmos y tecnologías de aprendizaje automático para dar a las máquinas la capacidad de aplicar ciertas habilidades cognitivas y realizar tareas por sí mismas de manera autónoma o semiautónoma. La inteligencia artificial se distingue por su grado de (...) capacidad cognitiva o por su grado de autonomía. Por capacidad puede ser débil o limitada, general o superlativa. Por su autonomía, puede ser reactiva, deliberativa, cognitiva o totalmente autónoma. A medida que la inteligencia artificial mejora, muchos procesos son cada vez más eficientes y, tareas que hoy parecen complicadas se estarán realizando con mayor rapidez y precisión. (shrink)

This is a review of Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, and Artificial Intelligence, edited by John Haugeland and published by The MIT Press in 1997.

This essay examines the possibility that phenomenological laws might be implemented by a computational mechanism by carefully analyzing key passages from the Prolegomena to Pure Logic. Part I examines the famous Denkmaschine passage as evidence for the view that intuitions of evidence are causally produced by computational means. Part II connects the less famous criticism of Avenarius & Mach on thought-economy with Husserl's 1891 essay 'On the Logic of Signs (Semiotic).' Husserl is shown to reaffirm his earlier opposition to associationist (...) (Humean) and adaptationist (Darwinian) explanations of our thought-machine on the ground that they cannot reconstruct the notion of truth and its syntactic mental preservation in symbolic thought-trains. Part III reveals Husserl's interesting commitment to the idea that descriptive sciences necessarily transform into explanatory sciences on pain of contradicting the essence of science as a rational ideal. Since explanation in relation to phenomenology means causal explanation, and causal explanation in the form of the Denkmaschine accounts for phenomenological intuition, it is inferred that the rationally compelling ideal of explanatory science requires a computationalist reading of the subsequent logical investigations. (shrink)

With its use of the powerful technology of computer, the computational theory of mind or computationalism, which regards minds as computational systems, has been widely hailed as the most promising theory that will carry out the project of explaining the workings of the mind in purely scientific terms. While it continues to serve as the primary framework for scientifically inclined theorizing and investigations about the nature of minds, especially in the area of cognitive science, it, however, continues to face strong (...) objections from its critics. And with the growing complexity and sophistication of the arguments used to promote and reject the theory, the debate has become intractable. It has become quite difficult to assess which side of the dispute is gaining the upper hand. Such difficulty may be due to a variety of reasons. In this essay, I critically examine two of such reasons. The first concerns the ambiguity of the theory’s intended scope of application: whether it is limited to the mind’s cognitive features only or it also includes the mind’s phenomenal features. The second concerns the vagueness of how the so-called computer modelling of human cognitive processes is able to duplicate such processes. Accordingly, if insufficiently addressed, they remain as two roadblocks to the entire project of computationalism. (shrink)

Even if political theorists rarely read him, Italian political thinker, Marsilius of Padua, presents one of the most radical theories of the multitude prior to Machiavelli and Spinoza. This article...

Arguments for extended cognition and the extended mind are typically directed at human-centred forms of cognitive extension—forms of cognitive extension in which the cognitive/mental states/processes of a given human individual are subject to a form of extended or wide realization. The same is true of debates and discussions pertaining to the possibility of Web-extended minds and Internet-based forms of cognitive extension. In this case, the focus of attention concerns the extent to which the informational and technological elements of the online (...) environment form part of the machinery of the (individual) human mind. In this paper, we direct attention to a somewhat different form of cognitive extension. In particular, we suggest that the Web allows human individuals to be incorporated into the computational/cognitive routines of online systems. These forms of computational/cognitive extension highlight the potential of the Web and Internet to support bidirectional forms of computational/cognitive incorporation. The analysis of such bidirectional forms of incorporation broadens the scope of philosophical debates in this area, with potentially important implications for our understanding of the foundational notions of extended cognition and the extended mind. (shrink)

Recently, information retrieval is shown to be a science by mapping information retrieval scientific study to scientific study abstracted from physics. The exercise was rather tedious and lengthy. Instead of dealing with the nitty gritty, this paper looks at the insights into how computer science can be made into a science by using that methodology. That is by mapping computer science scientific study to the scientific study abstracted from physics. To show the mapping between computer science and physics, we need (...) to define what is engineering science which computer science belongs to. Some principles and assumptions of engineering science theory are presented. To show computer science is a science, we presented two approaches. Approach 1 considers computer science as simulation of human behaviour similar to the goal of artificial intelligence. Approach 2 is closely related to the actual activities in computer science, and this approach considers computer science based on the theory of computation. Finally, we answer some of the common outstanding issues about computer science to convince our reader that computer science is a science. (shrink)

According to a tradition that we hold variously today, the relational person lives most personally in affective and cognitive empathy, whereby we enter subjective communion with another person. Near future social AIs, including social robots, will give us this experience without possessing any subjectivity of their own. They will also be consumer products, designed to be subservient instruments of their users’ satisfaction. This would seem inevitable. Yet we cannot live as personal when caught between instrumentalizing apparent persons (slaveholding) or numbly (...) dismissing the apparent personalities of our instruments (mild sociopathy). This paper analyzes and proposes a step toward ameliorating this dilemma by way of the thought of a 5th century North African philosopher and theologian, Augustine of Hippo, who is among those essential in giving us our understanding of relational persons. Augustine’s semiotics, deeply intertwined with our affective life, suggest that, if we are to own persuasive social robots humanely, we must join our instinctive experience of empathy for them to an empathic acknowledgment of the real unknown relational persons whose emails, text messages, books, and bodily movements will have provided the training data for the behavior of near-future social AIs. So doing, we may see simulation as simulation (albeit persuasive), while expanding our empathy to include those whose refracted behavioral moments are the seedbed of this simulation. If we naïvely stop at the social robot as the ultimate object of our cognitive and affective empathy, we will suborn the sign to ourselves, undermining rather than sustaining a culture that prizes empathy and abhors the instrumentalization of persons. (shrink)

The segregation of image parts into foreground and background is an important aspect of the neural computation of 3D scene perception. To achieve such segregation, the brain needs information about border ownership; that is, the belongingness of a contour to a specific surface represented in the image. This article presents psychophysical data derived from 3D percepts of figure and ground that were generated by presenting 2D images composed of spatially disjoint shapes that pointed inward or outward relative to the continuous (...) boundaries that they induced along their collinear edges. The shapes in some images had the same contrast (black or white) with respect to the background gray. Other images included opposite contrasts along each induced continuous boundary. Psychophysical results demonstrate conditions under which figure-ground judgment probabilities in response to these ambiguous displays are determined by the orientation of contrasts only, not by their relative contrasts, despite the fact that many border ownership cells in cortical area V2 respond to a preferred relative contrast. Studies are also reviewed in which both polarity-specific and polarity-invariant properties obtain perceptual figure-ground grouping results. The FACADE and 3D LAMINART models are used to explain these data. Keywords: figure-ground separation, border ownership, perceptual grouping, surface filling-in, V2, V4, FACADE Theory. (shrink)

Искусственный интеллект – последняя, хотя и иллюзорная надежда продажных и провалившихся режимов как на Западе, так и на Востоке остаться на плаву: ведь тонущий хватается и за соломинку. Но всё течёт и всё изменяется, и никаким деспотиям и деспотам не удастся остановить ход истории, как бы они этого не желали и тому не противились. Хотя у истории нет конца, но их история и история совершённых ими предательств уже закончилась. Plaudite, cives, plaudite, amici, finita est comoedia: „Рукоплещите, граждане, друзья, комедия окончена.“.

Research in artificial intelligence (AI) has led to revise the challenges of the AI initial programme as well as to keep us alert to peculiarities and limitations of human cognition. Both are linked, as a careful further reading of the Turing’s test makes it clear from Searle’s Chinese room apologue and from Dreyfus’ suggestions, and in both cases, ideal had to be turned into operating mode. In order to rise these more pragmatic challenges AI does not hesitate to link together (...) operations of various levels and functionalities, more specific or more general. The challenges are not met by an operating formal system which should have from the outset all the learning skills, but -for instance in simulation- by the dynamics of a succession of solutions open to adjustments as well as to reflexive repeats. (shrink)

This is an introduction to the 80 articles on philosophy in MITECS.

Androides são "autômatos com forma humana" . Enquanto robôs são "aparelhos automáticos capazes de manipular objetos ou executar operações segundo um programa". Assim podemos dizer que um androide pode ser considerado um robô, mas nem todo robô é um androide. Devido à diversidade de gêneros, foi criado o termo ginóide, separando-se assim os androides de aparência masculina (andros) da feminina (ginos). A propagação destes se deu à ficção cientifica, em livros de Isaac Asimov, em seriados para televisão como Jornada nas (...) Estrelas, em filmes para o cinema, como Guerra nas Estrelas e A.I.: Inteligência Artificial, e diversos outros meios de cultura e entretenimento, teatro inclusive. As obras citadas possuem androides que sentem; que percebem o mundo, mesmo à sua maneira, e com isso eles interagem com o ambiente, e, logicamente, com os objetos à sua volta. Para este ensaio, o principal "androide de estudo" será Data, de Jornada nas Estrelas, A Nova Geração 3 4 , e também alguns filmes posteriores. Assim, este pequeno ensaio tem como objetivo verificar se, a percepção, a extensão sensorial e porque não, a relação entre Corpo e Espírito de Bergson, podem ser aplicados a robôs e androides da Ficção, e talvez os da não ficção. Para tanto, precisaremos percorre por todos os sentidos, pela memória, e talvez até pelos sonhos, pois como já perguntava Phillip K Dick em seu livro que inspirou Blade Runner: "Androides Sonham com Ovelhas Elétricas?". (shrink)

Computational approaches dominate contemporary cognitive science, promising a unified, scientific explanation of how the mind works. However, computational approaches raise major philosophical and scientific questions. In what sense is the mind computational? How do computational approaches explain perception, learning, and decision making? What kinds of challenges should computational approaches overcome to advance our understanding of mind, brain, and behaviour? The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind is an outstanding overview and exploration of these issues and the first philosophical collection of (...) its kind. Comprising thirty-five chapters by an international team of contributors from different disciplines, the Handbook is organised into four parts: History and future prospects of computational approaches Types of computational approach Foundations and challenges of computational approaches Applications to specific parts of psychology. Essential reading for students and researchers in philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of science, The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind will also be of interest to those studying computational models in related subjects such as psychology, neuroscience, and computer science. (shrink)

This is review of the book "Physical Computation and Cognitive Science" by Nir Fresco: http://www.springer.com/la/book/9783642413742.

We consider processes of emergence within the conceptual framework of the Information Loss principle and the concepts of systems conserving information; systems compressing information; and systems amplifying information. We deal with the supposed incompatibility between emergence and computability tout-court. We distinguish between computational emergence, when computation acquires properties, and emergent computation, when computation emerges as a property. The focus is on emergence processes occurring within computational processes. Violations of Turing-computability such as non-explicitness and incompleteness are intended to represent partially the (...) properties of phenomenological emergence, such as logical openness, given by the observer’s cognitive role; structural dynamics where change regards rules rather than only values; and multi-modelling where multiple non-equivalent models are required to model such structural dynamics. In this way, we validate, from an epistemological viewpoint, models and simulations of phenomenological emergence where the sequence of events constitutes the natural, analogical non-Turing computation which a cognitive complex system can reproduce through learning. Reproducibility through learning is different from Turing-like computational iteration. This paper aims to open a new, non-reductionist understanding of the conceptual relationship between emergence and computability. (shrink)

‘The art of living with ICTs ’ today not only means finding new ways to cope, interact and create new lifestyles on the basis of the new digital technologies individually, as ‘consumer-citizens’. It also means inventing new modes of living, producing and, not in the least place, struggling collectively, as workers and producers. As the so-called digital revolution unfolds in the context of a neoliberal cognitive and consumerist capitalism, its ‘innovations’ are predominantly employed to modulate and control both production processes (...) and consumer behavior in view of the overall goal of extracting surplus value. Today, the digital networks overwhelmingly destroy social autonomy, instead engendering increasing social heteronomy and proletarianization. Yet it is these very networks themselves, as technical pharmaka in the sense of French ‘technophilosopher’ Bernard Stiegler, that can be employed as no other to struggle against this tendency. This paper briefly explores this possibility by reflecting upon current diagnoses of our ‘technological situation’ by some exemplary post-operaist Marxists from a Stieglerian, pharmacological perspective. (shrink)

A version of the Church-Turing Thesis states that every effectively realizable physical system can be simulated by Turing Machines (‘Thesis P’). In this formulation the Thesis appears to be an empirical hypothesis, subject to physical falsification. We review the main approaches to computation beyond Turing definability (‘hypercomputation’): supertask, non-well-founded, analog, quantum, and retrocausal computation. The conclusions are that these models reduce to supertasks, i.e. infinite computation, and that even supertasks are no solution for recursive incomputability. This yields that the realization (...) of hypercomputing devices is implausible, and that Thesis P is not essentially different from the standard Church-Turing Thesis. (shrink)

The idea that human thought requires the execution of mental algorithms provides a foundation for research programs in cognitive science, which are largely based upon the computational conception of language and mentality. Consideration is given to recent work by Penrose, Searle, and Cleland, who supply various grounds for disputing computationalism. These grounds in turn qualify as reasons for preferring a non-computational, semiotic approach, which can account for them as predictable manifestations of a more adquate conception. Thinking does not ordinarily require (...) the execution of mental algorithms, which appears to be at best no more than one rather special kind of thinking. (shrink)

According to Church’s thesis, we can identify the intuitive concept of effective computability with such well-defined mathematical concepts as Turing computability and partial recursiveness. The almost universal acceptance of Church’s thesis among logicians and computer scientists is puzzling from some epistemological perspectives, since no formal proof is possible of a thesis that involves an informal concept such as effectiveness. Elliott Mendelson has recently argued, however, that equivalencies between intuitive notions and precise notions need not always be considered unprovable theses, and (...) that Church’s thesis should be accepted as true.I want to discuss a thesis that is nearly as important in current research in computer science as Church’s thesis. I call the newer thesis the tractability thesis, since it identifies the intuitive class of computationally tractable problems with a precise class of problems whose solutions can be computed in polynomial time. After briefly reviewing the theory of intractability, I compare the grounds for accepting the tractability thesis with the grounds for accepting Church's thesis. Intimately connected with the tractability thesis is the mathematical conjecture, whose meaning I shall shortly explain, that P≠NP. Unlike Church's thesis, this conjecture is precise enough to be capable of mathematical proof, but most computer scientists believe it even though no proof has been found. As we shall see below, understanding the grounds for acceptance of the conjecture that P≠NP has implications for general questions in the philosophy of mathematics and science, especially concerning the epistemological importance of explanatory and conceptual coherence. (shrink)

The term 'consciousness' has not been consistently used in the history of philosophy and psychology. It has been taken to stand for the mental activity in which all of us are engaged during our waking lives, whether absorbed in the solving of a task or in calm moments of contemplation. It has also been allied with the term 'introspection' to stand for a self-monitoring activity, one in which we are not simply engaged, but in which we aware of the succession (...) of mental items that constitute our experiences. In Consciousness and the Computational Mind, Ray Jackendoff opts for this second sense and exploits it to criticize the "central processing" theory of consciousness. The background assumption for all such theories is that the human mind is to be conceived on the model of a computer whose central processor controls in accordance with programmed instructions the reception of inputs, delegation of tasks to secondary processors carrying out sub-routines, storage and retrieval of information, and finally the production of outputs. The central processing theory identifies consciousness with the activities of those areas of the brain which function as central processor as defined by this model. Jackendoff's alternative theory correlates consciousness with intermediate-level informational structures operated on by secondary processors. Of the higher-level structures and the processes operating on them, the level we refer to with such terms as 'conceptualization' and 'understanding,' we are, he contends, unconscious. (shrink)

When computing is defined as the causal implementation of algorithms and algorithms are defined as effective decision procedures, human thought is mental computation only if it is governed by mental algorithms. An examination of ordinary thinking, however, suggests that most human thought processes are non-algorithmic. Digital machines, moreover, are mark-manipulating or string-processing systems whose marks or strings do not stand for anything for those systems, while minds are semiotic systems for which signs stand for other things for those systems. Computing, (...) at best, turns out to be no more than a special kind of thinking. (shrink)

The present paper discusses a topic often neglected by contemporary philosophy of biology: The relation between metaphorical notions of living organisms as information processing systems, the attempts to model such systems by computational means, and the idea that life itself is a computational phenomenon. This question has ramifications in theoretical biology and thedefinition of Iife, in theoretical computer science and the concept of computation, and in semiotics, and the concept of the interpreter. It is argued, that the theory of autopoietic (...) systems known from theoretical biology should be integrated with a biosemiotic reflection on the natural history of signs. (shrink)

This article examines Plotinus’ conception of metaxý – the human as interval between animals and gods – and its resonances in the work of Jacques Lacan, who implicitly retains and reconfigures the notion of the human being as a mediator. Lacan replicates this ancient narrative, but does so within the context of a cyberneticism that replaces gods and angels with symbolic computation. Humanity, according to such a conception, is tacitly regarded not only as a mediator, but as that which is (...) mediated, the subject caught within a significative network modelled on the basis of then-new systems of digital computation. (shrink)

Computers have invaded our offices, our homes, cars and coffee-pots; they have become ubiquitous. However, the advance of computing technologies is associated with an increasing lack of “visibility” of the underlying software and hardware technologies. While we use and accept the computer, we neither know its history nor functionality. In this paper, we argue that this is not a healthy situation. Also, recruitment onto UK Computing degree courses is steadily falling; these courses are appearing less attractive to school-leavers. This may (...) be associated with the increasing ubiquity. In this paper we reflect on an MSc. module of instruction, Concepts and Philosophy of Computing, and a BSc. module Computer Games Development developed at the University of Worcester which address these issues. We propose that the elements of these modules form a necessary part of the education of all citizens, and we suggest how this may be realized. We also suggest how to re-enthuse our youth about computing as a discipline and halt the drop in recruitment. (shrink)

Robust, concrete and abstract, mathematical computation and inference on the scale now becoming possible should change the discourse about many matters mathematical. These include: what mathematics is, how we know something, how we persuade each other, what suffices as a proof, the infinite, mathematical discovery or invention, and other such issues.

The Church-Turing Thesis is widely regarded as true, because of evidence that there is only one genuine notion of computation. By contrast, there are nowadays many different formal logics, and different corresponding foundational frameworks. Which ones can deliver a theory of computability? This question sets up a difficult challenge: the meanings of basic mathematical terms are not stable across frameworks. While it is easy to compare what different frameworks say, it is not so easy to compare what they mean. We (...) argue for some minimal conditions that must be met if two frameworks are to be compared; if frameworks are radical enough, comparison becomes hopeless. Our aim is to clarify the dialectical situation in this bourgeoning area of research, shedding light on the nature of non-classical logic and the notion of computation alike. (shrink)

Fodor's thinking on modularity has been influential throughout a range of the areas studying cognition, chiefly as a prod for positive work on modularity and domain-specificity. In _The Mind Doesn't Work That Way_, Fodor has developed the dark message of _The Modularity of Mind_ regarding the limits to modularity and computational analyses. This paper offers a critical assessment of Fodor's scepticism with an eye to highlighting some broader issues in play, including the nature of computation and the role of recent (...) empirical developments in the cognitive sciences in assessing Fodor's position. (shrink)